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Innovation ou Financiarisation ? L’Évolution du Business Model basé sur l’Intégration de 
Systèmes chez Airbus et Boeing. 
Résumé : S’appuyant sur une approche comparative et historique au niveau de la firme, cette thèse 
étudie les dynamiques de la réussite économique à long terme de la construction d'avions civils aux 
Etats-Unis et en Europe. Cette analyse est menée à partir de l’étude d’Airbus et de Boeing qui sont les 
deux plus grandes firmes du secteur aéronautique au niveau mondial. La thèse identifie les conditions 
sociales qui influencent les capacités concurrentielles des deux firmes et les pratiques qui jouent un 
rôle sur l’amélioration ou la dégradation des capacités productives de leur secteur à travers un cadre 
analytique basé sur les modèles productifs / les modèles d’affaires (productive/business models). Les 
trois éléments majeurs de l’activité productive au niveau de la firme, à savoir la stratégie d’entreprise, 
la structure organisationnelle et le degré d’engagement financier sont analysés dans ce cadre appliqué 
à l’intégration de systèmes. Les résultats de cette recherche montrent qu’il existe une forte corrélation 
entre la sous-traitance massive, la financiarisation des stratégies d’entreprise et les relations 
conflictuelles de travail. L’évolution des stratégies d’Airbus et de Boeing et leur influence sur 
l’amélioration ou la dégradation de leurs capacités productives sont fortement liées aux 
transformations dans le domaine financier et dans l’organisation productive / les relations industrielles 
qui caractérisent les économies occidentales depuis les trois dernières décennies. Les conséquences 
des actions menées par les entreprises sur la promotion de l’emploi dans leur(s) pays d’origine sont 
questionnées et des implications en termes de stratégies d’entreprise et de politiques publiques sont 
tirées de cette thèse. 
Mots-clés : innovation, capacités organisationnelles, financiarisation, intégration de systèmes, 
industrie aéronautique, Airbus, Boeing 
 
Innovation or Financialization? The Evolution of the Systems-Integration Business Model 
Airbus and Boeing 
Abstract: This dissertation analyzes the dynamics of long-term success in commercial aircraft 
manufacturing in the US and Europe performed through a historical-comparative methodology 
employed for firm level analysis. The firm-level case studies are Airbus and Boeing, the two biggest 
firms in the commercial aircraft manufacturing industry. Through an analytical framework 
concentrated on business/productive models of corporate activity, the study identifies the social 
conditions that influence the competitive capabilities of these two companies and their practices in 
upgrading, or downgrading, the productive capabilities of their respective industries. The three main 
elements of firm-level productive activity under modern capitalism, namely corporate strategy, 
organizational structure and financial commitment are analyzed through the lens of the systems-
integration business/productive model framework. The results of the research show that there is a 
strong correlation between extensive outsourcing, financialization of business strategies and 
conflicting employment relations. Distinct constructive and destructive processes of corporate 
strategies of Airbus and Boeing are strongly linked to the role of the transformations of finance and 
work organization/industrial relations in the last three decades in Western economies. The 
consequences of corporate action on the promotion of secure jobs with positive prospects for their 
respective economies are questioned and relevant implications are drawn for business and 
government policy.  
Keywords: innovation, organizational capabilities, financialization, systems integration, commercial 
aircraft industry, Airbus, Boeing 
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General Introduction 
 
In the wake of financial and economic repercussions of the global recession, a consensus has 
emerged in the developed world which claims that a renewed approach to industry and 
manufacturing is fundamental for economic recovery. Proposed as a cure to economic 
problems of the post-crisis period, the term reindustrialization is once again in wide 
circulation. After around six million manufacturing jobs were lost between 2007 and 2012 in 
the US and EU together, the US and European administrations initiated a variety of programs 
and proposed a set of financial support schemes and tools. Europeans also set a target of 
raising manufacturing share in EU GDP to 20 percent by 2020 from its current level of around 
15 percent. 
Indeed, the statistics over the decline of manufacturing jobs and output in the US and Europe 
show the slowdown of industry for almost every advanced economy of the West (see 
Appendix A for a detailed discussion over the extent of Western deindustrialization in the form 
of degrading manufacturing capabilities). There is a widening gap between public policies to 
preserve productive capabilities of national economies and the corporate strategies with their 
shifting focus on innovation and capability development activity. In effect, the accord between 
the government policy and corporate action that maintains high-end, high-productivity 
manufacturing that in turn sustain high-wage employment opportunities to keep Western 
national economies prosperous has been degrading for some time. On the other hand, only a 
combination of sound business strategy and government policy can enable the conditions to 
sustain high-productivity with high-wage employment opportunities. 
For scholarly research, this weakening accord represented by the loss of high road jobs, 
faltering employment levels and slowly eroding competitiveness of Western economies calls 
for a renewed theoretical perspective to guide government policy that seeks to restore high 
value-added industrial employment with positive multiplier effects for the rest of the society. 
It is these jobs that support relatively high standards of living and they are sustainable over a 
long period of time as they mostly belong to industries that are key drivers of innovation. 
Accordingly, only an integrated theory of innovative enterprise can address the 
interconnections between the role of business enterprise, industrial sectors and institutions 
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(Lazonick, 2010b) to determine necessary policy recommendations for national prosperity in 
a globalized economy. 
An answer to the question why do innovative enterprises matter to the economic prosperity 
of a nation should thus provide an understanding over the relevance of their productive 
activity for nations and societies. An inquiry into the value of an industry and its firms 
supporting high wages and expanding employment opportunities may eventually provide a 
basis for the explanations for the reasons of the loss of competitiveness in the West. Such an 
inquiry, in effect, should be followed with a comparative analysis elaborating different aspects 
of industrial activity within specific sectors, such as commercial aircraft manufacturing that is 
the focus of this study. The major purpose of this study is to identify the sources of 
competitiveness in commercial aircraft manufacturing, one of the few remaining 
manufacturing industries which Western economies master by far the best, in order to explore 
the dynamics of industrial strength and weakness. The reason for choosing this specific 
industry mainly rests upon the fact that thus far it has not shared the fate of many other 
productive industries’ loss of competitiveness, degraded employment opportunities and 
faltering growth prospects. 
Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to investigate the dynamics of long-term success in 
commercial aircraft manufacturing in the US and Europe analyzed through a historical-
comparative methodology employed for firm level analysis. As it is highlighted above, the 
reason why Airbus and Boeing were chosen to be studied in detail is to shed light on the 
comparative industrial performance in terms of the strengths and weaknesses of these two 
success stories on the two sides of the Atlantic. Through an analytical framework concentrated 
on business/productive models of corporate activity, the thesis tries to identify the social 
conditions that influence the competitive capabilities of these two companies and the 
practices of the companies in upgrading, or downgrading, the productive capabilities of their 
respective industries within their geographies. The consequences of corporate action over the 
promotion of secure jobs with positive prospects for their respective economies are 
investigated and relevant implications are drawn for business and government policy. 
An analysis of the multiple aspects of the widening gap between public policy and corporate 
action would not be complete without a discussion of the actions of the principal actor of 
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economic activity, business enterprise. It would be an important mistake to highlight the role 
of government in supporting manufacturing industries while ignoring the role of enterprise in 
developing and utilizing productive resources. This is a mistake continuously made by 
industrial policy proponents who highlight the role of government investments in productive 
capabilities while they ignore the necessarily complementary role of enterprises (Atkinson et 
al., 2012, Ezell and Atkinson, 2011). When the research in this fashion claims that many non-
Western and some Western governments support their industries with multiple mechanisms 
and coordinated action (Atkinson et al., 2012; Gaffard, 2013; Wade, 2012), it usually ignores 
the differences in social conditions in each country that may support or discourage corporate 
actions oriented towards pro-innovation, pro-skills development and pro-high-road 
employment that endorse the reproduction of collective and cumulative innovative 
capabilities. In other words, they lament the demise of manufacturing or productive activity 
while neglecting an analysis of the possible role of corporate resource-allocation decisions. 
The role of corporate decision-making in fostering or impairing industrial activity at home can 
only be seen through a firm-level analysis that integrates a specific theoretical framework and 
historical research. 
Units of Analysis 
Industrial strengths and weaknesses of different countries vary a great deal. Industries that 
are successful in the long term can only be created under conditions that have gradually 
evolved over time. Industrial production is the activity to transform human labor into 
economic value or wealth. Within the modern capitalist organization, the activity is primarily 
organized around business enterprises. These enterprises develop and utilize different forms 
of capabilities to enable the transformation of intellect and labor into value, and the main 
form of extending the economic and social wealth is innovation. Innovation is the historic and 
irreversible change in the way of doing things (Schumpeter, 1968). By definition it requires 
learning about how to transform technologies and access markets in ways that generate 
higher quality, lower cost products (Lazonick, 2005). There are countless ways of developing 
or activating productive capabilities which result in a myriad of forms of organizing value 
creation. Business enterprises represent an immense variety of organizational forms and 
innovative performance even though they may perform similar business activities in specific 
areas. In order to find appropriate answers to the issues of upgrading or worsening productive 
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capabilities of certain firms, industries and nations, the fundamental question that should be 
continuously asked is: How do the value creation and the value distribution work as 
transformation processes within the modern business enterprise, and how do they evolve in 
time? If innovation is defined as the engine of wealth generation and the qualitative and 
quantitative development of value creation is the result of innovation, it is the corporate 
action that enables or disables innovation. The long-term commitment of all stakeholders, and 
before all, the actors who oversight strategic control on resource allocation should target 
fostering value creation and innovation (Lazonick, 2013). As a result, it is necessary to track 
the shift in corporate resource allocation and strategic control in the last three decades in 
specific industries and pivot firms that are key actors within their industries in order to identify 
the real reasons behind the loss of certain productive capabilities in the West. To give an 
example, if outsourcing and offshoring contribute to deindustrialization in the West as an 
aspect of globalization, the corporate action that favors such practices together with its 
reasons should be deeply investigated. 
The major concern with the loss of productive capabilities is that a major part of the learning 
process takes place when companies move through commercialization after prototyping and 
demonstration, when production workforce including engineers on the shop floor collaborate 
with design engineers to find better solutions to identified problems. When the learning 
process falters, the technical expertise and skills needed to further the production process 
cannot be developed further for the new generation of products (MIT, 2013). The separation 
of innovation and production is under-studied in terms of its implications for the pool of 
capabilities and skills at firm and nation levels with resulting effects on employment. The 
impact of fundamental changes that have been spurring global manufacturing in the last two 
decades like the transformations in supply chains, intercompany collaborations and alliances, 
and the role of ‘national systems’ pursuing economic growth has to be analyzed beyond 
employment, trade or domestic policy focused analyses of industrial success and sustainable 
growth. The links between skills and capability development, access to innovation finance and 
corporate strategies promoting or undermining these processes have to be established within 
an analysis of competitive success of productive economies, sectors and organizations. 
Accordingly, this thesis proposes an analysis organized around a business/productive model 
framework focused on the comparison of strategic, organizational and financial orientations 
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of Airbus and Boeing, two pivot firms of commercial aircraft manufacturing industry of the 
world. 
In effect, the character of the subject matter strongly entails the necessity of conceptual 
frameworks to construct and use in order to pin down corporate strategy, organization and 
finance as the fundamental elements of firm-level analysis. In any case, the usage of 
frameworks based on certain theoretical perspectives is critical to understand industrial 
dynamics and corporate actions within any specific period of time or in any specific geography. 
Conceptualized with the guidance of the theory of innovative enterprise (Lazonick, 2013) and 
productive models framework of the Regulation theory (Boyer and Freyssenet, 2000a) in the 
following chapters, the thesis analyzes the systems integration business/productive model of 
commercial aircraft manufacturing embraced by Airbus and Boeing albeit with converging and 
diverging inclinations at strategic, organizational and financial levels. 
The main conclusion drawn from the research around this framework is that the history of 
organizational success of both firms is still being written by their deliberate actions and 
decisions over the extent of their productive organizations. Differing and resembling features 
of systems integration orientation of two firms are built on their highly normative 
understanding of the term through varying degrees of outsourcing, integration, disintegration 
and internationalization in various segments of commercial aircraft manufacturing in 
particular and aerospace in general. In addition, the strategic decisions they take and their 
functional results which are sometimes controversial in different times and spaces help to 
identify the strong relation between knowing and doing innovation. These actions also contain 
the endless efforts of two firms to change their technological and industrial boundaries in 
order to keep their positions as the most innovative aerospace companies of their regions, if 
not globally. 
However, these strategic orientations can only be fully understood when they are construed 
with organizational and financial processes these two companies simultaneously follow. These 
processes are also marked with important similarities and differences. 
The comparative case study research of this thesis shows that the concerns over industrial 
relations and the protection of productive capabilities are critically important factors over 
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strategic decisions of two firms in reshaping their map of productive capabilities. Part of their 
supply chain reorganizations for their latest aircraft programs, both firms extended their reach 
beyond advanced economies towards developing economies. There is an evolutionary process 
of capability development of suppliers primarily endorsed by Airbus and Boeing through their 
changing outsourcing and partnering strategies. However, in the case of partners from 
developing economies and primarily the Chinese ones, the support of their respective 
governments to support national aerospace capability development efforts largely 
complements the willingness of Airbus and Boeing to transfer more work to these emerging 
aerospace firms. For both firms, there is equally relevant evidence of integration and 
disintegration depending on the highly normative understanding of the term systems 
integration by these companies. Especially in investments related to soft businesses like 
electronics, IT or services, the definition of systems integration is highly ambiguous as both 
companies invest and divest in these domains simultaneously. Compared to Airbus’ much 
more active strategy to enlarge and contract its boundaries through higher number of 
acquisitions, divestments and investments out of its home countries, Boeing’s investment 
strategy is largely restricted to the US while its outsourcing is much more highlighted in terms 
of geographical dispersion compared to Airbus. 
In both cases employment relations are strained with mounting concerns of employees over 
job security and long-term employment opportunities on both sides of the Atlantic. Such 
concerns are also expressed in the declining interest in aerospace of the potential labor force 
especially in the US. Conflictual relations with employees, lack of sound communication 
channels between the management and labor force and flexible work schemes are received 
with mixed reactions by the labor force of both firms. However, degrading practices of work 
in the systems integration period are not equally highlighted in two companies. Certain 
aspects of the model like leveraging over stakeholders to extract gains through managing 
flexibility and conflict resolution have different forms with different types of tensions created 
among labor force. 
Nevertheless, these concerns which are expanded during the systems integration period are 
not equally highlighted in two companies and certain aspects like conflict resolution have 
considerably different forms. These differences remind the critical role of institutional 
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structures in giving certain character to the forms of industrial relations and work 
organization.  
Finally, financial motives are also as important as organizational inclinations in giving shape to 
strategic decision-making of both firms. Utilizing government support and retained earnings 
as the most important sources of financing innovation and value creation, these two 
companies have so far expressed different value extraction practices expressed in their 
different levels of shareholder value distribution. However, the orientation towards 
shareholder value maximization characterizes both firms, but is much stronger in the case of 
Boeing with massive amounts of share repurchases and dividend payments and the rapid rise 
of stock-based executive compensation in the last two decades. 
General results of this research show that there is a strong correlation between extensive 
outsourcing, financialization of business strategies and conflicting employment relations 
which is critical in determining the long-term sustainability of the commercial aircraft 
manufacturing in these two geographies. None of the firms has an ongoing aircraft 
development program other than derivatives and upgrades of existing programs. This means 
that they are going to enter a head-to-head competition with two or more other firms in the 
following decade in smaller aircraft segments with their upgraded narrow body aircraft. It is 
the segment which they generate a great bulk of their cash inflow critically necessary to fund 
future development programs. 
New aircraft development is the very center of innovation in commercial aircraft 
manufacturing. The activity defines the future shape of skill pool of the company and the 
national industry as long as leading companies extend their reach to other companies through 
partnerships. The implications for innovation of the strategic, organizational and financial 
inclinations of these two companies are strongly attached to the future course of aircraft 
manufacturing in the US and Europe. In contrast with ever-deepening government support, 
the social conditions of innovation in aerospace are hampered with excessive outsourcing, 
conflictual industrial relations and shareholder value orientation on both sides of the Atlantic. 
The recent history of these two companies analyzed throughout this study shows that Boeing 
is much less immune to the perils of financialization and shareholder value orientation with 
their exigencies at corporate level expressed in terms of conflictual relationships with 
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stakeholders, especially the labor force, with long term consequences. However, the 
differences between the two firms are not categorical. Most recent orientation of Airbus 
towards shareholder value also shows that the ideas around maximization of shareholder 
value can easily be bought even by the most resilient European firms to financial pressures. 
The decisions over the productive organization expressed in terms of new product 
development efforts will define the future course aerospace in the US and Western Europe. 
Nevertheless, commercial aircraft manufacturing still remains as the major competitive 
industry of the US and Europe with substantial high-road employment opportunities, 
extensive export revenues and prolific innovative capabilities required for the future course 
of human transport and space research. The conclusions of this study entail important 
implications both for business firms as the primary sources of productive capabilities and 
government policy as the age-old facilitator of the business action to develop these productive 
resources. The analysis has shown that the two firms are not immune to the ongoing 
organizational and financial transformations at the global level even though the persisting 
differences rest upon individual (firm-level) and national factors that support or undermine 
productive capabilities in the long run. The strong association of extensive outsourcing, ever 
increasing job insecurity and conflictual employment relations and massive shareholder value 
distribution offers important insights for renewed approaches to government policy. The 
policies have been largely focused on providing funds and other tools to foster companies’ 
innovative capabilities. However, they have ignored mounting problems at organizational and 
financial levels of corporate decision making which has been rendering the ever increasing 
government support more and more ineffectual and unsustainable. There is a growing need 
to address the contradiction between the use of public support for developing next generation 
capabilities to produce more energy efficient, environmentally friendly and competitive 
products of the future, and pursuing financialized and conflictual corporate strategies. 
Accordingly, in order to lay out the research framework necessary to provide answers to the 
problems addressed, the following section details the reasoning with the focus on innovation 
and productive capabilities as the foundations of economic growth. It is followed by the 
research design of the analytical framework, research methodology and the outline of the 
following chapters. 
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The Main Dynamic of Prosperity – Innovation 
The most notable dynamic of capitalism is change. It is the most shared aspect of every 
capitalistic relation. Production techniques, innovative technologies, organizations, industrial 
relations, exchange and market mechanisms and all their supporting institutional structures 
are in constant change since the early days of Industrial Revolution in mid-eighteenth century 
years. 
The primary effort of economic and social theory structured and ramified around different 
disciplines has long been to document and interpret this change within capitalistic systems 
and structures through myriad of perspectives. These efforts of enormous intellectual 
diversity have even generated full-fledged academic disciplines with countless approaches to 
the very same phenomena with remarkably intertwined analytical forms of inquiry. 
Change is also decisive in the analytical rigor of these numerous economic perspectives of 
understanding and interpreting the dynamisms of capitalism principally as a production 
system. While neoclassical economics, a main line of contemporary economic research, 
categorically excludes any role of change in redesigning tools and mechanisms of economic 
activity across the world, other lines of research have been struggling to keep up with the 
tremendous speed of change in order to integrate it in their analytical frameworks. 
As part of the second group’s efforts to understand economic dynamics, this thesis identifies 
innovation as the primary source of constructive change in an economy. It is the main purpose 
of economic activity to further value creating efforts of organizations and the uppermost aim 
of industries to stay competitive. Equally important, it has important implications for 
sustaining the distribution of value created, among all the stakeholders involved in the 
production process. Considering the hardship for the scholarly research community to 
overcome difficulties to go beyond the established perspectives like optimizing firm or 
markets as value creators, there is a permanent requirement to keep pushing the role of 
innovation in value creation as well as the conditions that support or undermine these 
processes. 
To sustain the value-creation process and to advance it through innovation can only be 
possible through required investments in productive capabilities. The study of innovation and 
capabilities should first maintain that these investments can only be designed through an 
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organizational process (Lazonick, 2013). Any intellectual, technological or communicational 
process has to be embedded in certain organizational structures. Accordingly, the research 
agenda can be structured around the question of how these structures help productive forces 
of organizations including business firms to generate innovation and under what conditions 
they are enabled or undermined. 
This question is very critical because much of the literature on innovation misses the point of 
systemic change which can only be elaborated with a joint analysis of strategy, organization 
and finance, the very enablers of innovation as an uncertain, cumulative and collective 
activity. Only an analysis complete enough to elaborate the sources of change at different 
levels of economic activity shaped by different interactions between actors can give a meaning 
to the constant remaking of the organization of economic activity and the relations between 
all the parties involved. Change is neither restricted to the technological breakthroughs along 
innovation, nor it is a byproduct of the most recent phenomena like globalization or 
financialization, causing abstract reconfigurations for analysis of the elements of productive 
organizations. As an example, the widening gap between financial motives and productive 
activity is not an abstract phenomenon happened in its own accord, but it is part of 
transformation of corporate strategies aiming a replacement of existing schemes of value 
distribution among different stakeholders built around compromises with value extraction 
mechanisms in profit of certain groups whether they are directly involved in the production 
process or not. While the change in general is still part of a natural process of industrial 
evolution conditioned on the emergence of new knowledge (Metcalfe and Ramlogan, 2006), 
the transformation of the organization of business enterprise and its priorities, and the impact 
of this transformation over strategies and structures charges scholarly research with the duty 
to go further in analytical abstractions and restricted analyses of the relation between 
innovation and corporate behavior. 
Research Design 
To capture the flow of such transformations within a frame broad enough to see the bigger 
picture, or in other words, to interpret these transformations within a rigorous analytical 
perspective, this thesis proposes a model framework to conduct the research comparing and 
contrasting corporate practices of Airbus and Boeing in their productive activities. The model 
considers the systems integration orientation of the two firms in the last two decades as the 
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central task of original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to maintain necessary 
communication and coordination of a predominantly multi-actor project from the preliminary 
design till customer services confronted with a tremendous level of uncertainty due to the 
magnitude, novelty and complexity. Their particular strategic, organizational and financial 
characteristics in fulfilling this task also give shape to their distinct features within this shared 
business/productive model around systems integration. The model framework utilized by this 
thesis has been developed after three years’ observation and understanding of the dynamics 
of aerospace industry in general and two firms’ activities in particular through a very large 
number of sources including company reports and publications, business press articles, 
industry reports generated by third parties, and proprietary databases providing financial, 
sectoral and intellectual property data over specific companies and industries at global level 
in order to explain what is observed within a certain logical sequence. 
Also detailed in the following chapter, the proposed model is built around a three pillar 
analysis of productive activities of Airbus and Boeing. These pillars, strategy which allocates 
resources to investments in capabilities required for the firm to compete for particular 
product markets; organization which develops and utilizes these value-creating capabilities of 
these resources to generate products; and finance which sustains this process of developing 
products and accessing markets until the financial returns are generated through the sale of 
these products (Lazonick, 2012) are utilized for the detailed analysis of these two firms’ actions 
with a focus on their last two decades in the second part of this thesis. The two-decades period 
of observation is tried to be extended as long as possible when relevant information is 
available in order to be able to document the course of developments engendered by path 
continuity, departure and change (Lippert et al., 2014). 
The interrelationship between corporate finance, business strategy and workplace 
organization is a matter of debate. It is a major handicap of many industrial and firm studies 
which try to analyze this triangular relationship through one or two dimensional perspectives 
exploring the impact of one item on others. The aim of this study is to make an elementary 
contribution to this debate through an empirical exploration of these issues in commercial 
aircraft manufacturing with a focus on each three item underlining strong links among actions 
within each pillar. The research has shown that, in order to document twenty-first century 
corporate activity in advanced economies, more empirical exploration is required of the 
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unfolding dynamics of financialization and shareholder-value orientation; business growth 
strategies and continuous transformation of supply chain organizations; and corporate 
governance change and the management of industrial relations. 
The primary reasoning behind the model proposition of this thesis is to handle economic 
theory for a more practical use of industrial research. Theories are simplified forms of reality 
to comprehend it and to make sense of historical facts (Penrose, 1989 in Lazonick, 2005), and 
models are considered in this thesis as the means of applying theory to certain cases of 
empirical analysis that has to be regularly checked along the accumulation of new historical 
facts. 
In other words, a model framework is the connecting link of theoretical perspective and 
empirical analysis of a certain topic which is under constant change (in this case changing 
industrial dynamics and corporate strategies/actions). Indeed, the study of industrial 
dynamics demands a permanent and sound connection between facts and theories (Krafft, 
2006). It is the constant industrial evolution which requires continuously updated research on 
specific sectors and pivot firms. In the case of commercial aircraft manufacturing which is the 
specific focus of this thesis, the industry has been analyzed in great detail in the 1980s and 
1990s, and after this period, with an increased focus on specific details on issues like the 
subsidy war between major companies, sources and impacts technological developments or 
changing supply chain structure. Even though such specific research is useful to capture 
emerging dynamics in detail, it has the potential threat to overlook the general picture of 
changing industrial outlook in the West and its repercussions on a wide range of topics like 
corporate finance, industrial relations, and changing geographies, seemingly unrelated, but in 
fact strongly connected issues through the constant reorganization of resource allocation 
among actors of economic activity. As a result, this thesis tries to embrace a more traditional 
approach in a Chandlerian sense to document the course of action over the last two decades 
of commercial aircraft manufacturing. 
Accordingly, the study follows the work of Chandler (1962, 1977) and Penrose (1959, 1960) 
and more recently Froud et al. (2006) and Lippert et al. (2014) in presenting detailed historical 
accounts of business firms in action primarily in the form of a comparative case study laid out 
in its second part. The practical reason of comparing only two firms is the current duopoly 
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character of commercial large-body aircraft manufacturing in the world. Methodological 
reason is that the case studies cope with many more variables of interest than data points 
(Yin, 2003) even though data points are also important for a different dimension of analysis. 
In the case of specific studies of innovative enterprises, these variables correspond to the 
social conditions of innovation that are central to the development and utilization of 
productive resources.  These are strategic, organizational and financial conditions which may 
differ across nations and they certainly change in time. Thus the study relies on multiple 
sources of evidence explored through a comparative-historical method detailed below.  
Analytical and Methodological Choices 
With a restricted focus to a specific geography (two sides of the Atlantic) and a specific 
industry (commercial aircraft manufacturing), this thesis is a small-scale effort to document 
the changing dynamics in Western productive activities with respect to their role in sustaining 
economic growth and prosperity to their respective nations. Its analytical proposition shaped 
around the business/productive models framework leans on the recent approaches of the late 
twentieth and early twenty first centuries to understand organizational (firm) and sectoral 
(industry) activity embracing change as a major impetus and a testbed for analytical rigor. Its 
aim to explore the sources and threats of organizational success is no different than those of 
previous research on firms and industries performed by scholars having comparative-
historical methodologies and it is a small contribution to the ongoing efforts to understand 
the most recent organizational and industrial dynamics in advanced economies of the world. 
The sectoral choice, as it is previously stated, reflects the importance of aerospace and 
commercial aircraft manufacturing industries for the productive capabilities of these 
economies. Economic sectors are the spaces of competition between firms utilizing similar 
technologies, demand forms, skill sets and respective organizational structures and they 
reflect the economic strength of the nations in which they are rooted. The national framework 
also conditions certain regulatory and support structures that provide coordination and 
funding mechanisms which are fundamental to the success of these national industries and 
the firms they contain. As business firms attain higher levels of innovation and resulting 
economic performance, they may also seek to change the institutional structures in order to 
make them suitable for their updated strategic, organizational, and financial needs (Lazonick, 
2012). Indeed, the differences between greater performance of some nations in certain 
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sectors than others may help explain the institutional differences between these countries 
(Malerba, 2004). 
Industries emerge and act within a certain institutional context built in certain historical 
trajectories enabling to understand how various actions fit together in a specific industry with 
implications for performance. As a result, a historically informed analysis of business firms 
may best be conducted within an industrial perspective as long as it provides an important 
institutional context for firms to operate efficiently and effectively (Sako, 2008). This is a 
critical aspect of identifying certain groups of firms in a world where technologies and markets 
are constantly reshaping industrial boundaries and it is usually difficult to draw strong 
borderlines between different economic activities to be grouped under different sectors. The 
role of certain industries in reshaping world economy and politics is also fundamental. As an 
example, the historical role of governments in promoting aerospace capabilities of their 
respective nations with substantial impact over the performance of these sectors in promoting 
national economic growth had tremendous impact over the general economic and social life 
in the twentieth century through the exploding growth of global air travel or the role of 
military aerospace in global conflicts started with the First World War. 
As a result, to have a certain industrial focus is highly important, as long as it helps to form a 
certain analytical focus favoring a rich set of descriptive contextualization which is hardly 
possible at micro or macro level analyses. To this aim, Chapter Two, provides a factual analysis 
of aerospace and commercial aircraft manufacturing highlighting its unique characteristics 
and principal particularities concerning specific elements like technological level, employment 
and organization of value creation as a collective effort of myriad of industrial actors/firms. 
Again in Chapter Two, the role of government in supporting aerospace industries and firms 
through a large collection of direct and indirect financial support mechanisms and regulatory 
frameworks that facilitated the development of the industry in the first instance are discussed 
in the context of US and European aerospace and their top companies Boeing and Airbus. 
On the other hand, for a full understanding of an industry, in its full institutional and historical 
context (Sako 2008), a detailed analysis of the firms populating that industry is also 
fundamental. Indeed, the primary unit of analysis of this thesis is the business firm and the 
main analytical focus is the innovative enterprise in action. The approach is deliberately 
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centered on the organization of innovation around business enterprise, therefore, the analysis 
differs from the perspectives of much other research on innovation where the unit of analysis 
is either the R&D management of the innovative enterprise or the collective environment like 
networks where the innovative enterprise acts in connection with other entities, either other 
firms or institutions. 
A firm-level analysis is also adopted in order to have an integrated and focused perspective. 
Integrated because the dynamics of innovation is not solely about the organization and 
management of R&D or benefiting from the innovation in competition with other actors. To 
make R&D or knowledge resources functional in order to sustain innovation and to compete 
in the markets, an innovative business enterprise has to mobilize critical amounts of labor and 
capital resources. The underlying link between different forms of resources is where the 
sources of competitive advantage are located. By integrating the dynamics of capital and labor 
into the analysis, the study tries to avoid the oversight of the underlying reasons of fostering 
or hampering innovation at the firm level. This is one of the main obstacle of the technology 
literature as well as the institutional and ‘systemic’ research of innovation literature. Second, 
the perspective is focused because it is largely reserved, to a firm-level analysis in order to 
limit the discussion within the field of enterprise and incorporate institutional and market 
dynamics as explanatory factors when necessary. The analytical choice is to start with a 
discussion of industrial characteristics and to continue with a firm-level analysis. 
The other important reason behind the adoption of this analytical perspective is to go beyond 
the idea that specific types of innovation is suitable for specific types of organizations in order 
to highlight the fact that different strategic actions of decision-makers over the allocation of 
labor and capital is predominantly important for the innovation in any form. Innovation cannot 
be restricted solely to managerial actions to coordinate technical organization. Only an 
integrated perspective endorsed with a theory of innovative enterprise can search for an 
answer to the question how does the role of commitment of different actors, who contribute 
to costly and complex innovative activities function by providing and further developing their 
resources in the course of innovation. 
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The endeavor to search for answers to such central questions should be based on a 
comparative-historical understanding of corporate activity to establish the required relevance 
of theoretical framework with empirical reality (Lazonick, 2005). 
Thus the principal methodological approach of this thesis is historical-comparative. Primarily 
focused on around the last twenty years of business activity of Airbus and Boeing, the thesis 
embraces this methodology in order to integrate the theoretical framework with empirical 
research on the actions of innovative enterprise in different times and places. 
The approach is historical because it is fundamental for the theoretical framework which 
“requires an understanding of the historical process that is sufficiently broad and deep so that 
the assumptions and relations that form the substance of the theory capture the essential 
reality to which the theory purports to be relevant” (Lazonick, 2002). Equally important, the 
historical perspective is crucial to have an understanding of historical reality in order to avoid 
inferring categorically wrong conclusions from shorter sections of a much longer trajectory 
(Froud, et al., 2006). Keeping this in mind, the thesis tries to extend its focus as far back in 
history as the relevant historical information is found to shed light on current phenomena like 
continuing product development programs, ongoing employment relations or recent financial 
activity engaged for value creation or value extraction. The historical perspective is also 
practically important for the analysis of this industry considering its long-term character of 
committing its resources to design and build end products that can be used and maintained 
for several decades. The last but not least, historical method is also crucial to find out the 
ruptures and continuities if there are, by looking at longer periods of time when change 
becomes largely visible to detect. It is especially important for a firm-level analysis which 
reveals more precisely the many facets of change and helps to explore the details hidden in 
the diversity and its underlying dynamics (Lippert et al., 2014). 
The approach is comparative for two main reasons. The more practical reason is because the 
acknowledgement of distinct firm characteristics can only be possible when the firms having 
these characteristics are compared with other firms. Rather fundamental reason is that in 
order to highlight the role of national institutional settings for the strategic orientation and 
performance of business enterprises, it is crucial to have an understanding of the dynamics of 
value-creating innovative firms of different economies. The evolution of the conditions of 
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innovative firms and their organization and performance in different times and places can only 
be identified through a comparative analysis of firms and industries across nations (Lazonick, 
2010b). Only through a comparative analysis one can identify the ways how productive 
resources in an economy are allocated differently by corporations. As an example put by 
Jacoby (2007); “one can understand what makes American companies ‘American’ only by 
comparing them to companies elsewhere in the world that operate under different rules of 
the game”. To investigate how do different national institutional settings induce differences 
in corporate strategies and structures, an explicit comparative study focused on specific 
industries and firms is essential (Sako, 2006). Empirical studies investigating differing R&D and 
growth dynamics in the US and EU address the policy differences characterized by distinct 
institutional foundations creating varying outcomes (Castello, 2010; Crescenzi, et al., 2007). 
The last but not least, the comparative analysis of actors belonging different institutional 
structures also permits to identify converging and diverging practices of corporations under 
the impact of same phenomena like globalization, increasing value chain activity or 
technological breakthroughs within the industry in question. 
Thus the continuous interaction of firm specific organizational dynamics and geography 
specific social conditions provide important insights for a comparative analysis to explore 
evolutionary trends in the commercial aircraft industry shaped by strategic decisions taken by 
major firms like Airbus and Boeing. 
Although it is beyond this thesis primarily due to the structural reason that only one firm exists 
in each geography in commercial aircraft manufacturing, another intellectual activity can be 
to identify differences among business firms belonging to the same industry in the same 
country through an in-country comparative analysis. Even though they are subject to similar 
technology and market related pressures, these companies may exhibit distinct strategies and 
varying performance outcomes owing to their different capabilities to cope with challenges of 
productive and market activity (Nelson, 1991; Sako, 2008).  
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Sources of Data 
Although there is substantial academic and non-academic literature on the historical and 
technological evolution of the aircraft industry, little has been written from the viewpoint of 
business/productive model comparisons of major aerospace companies of the world. The 
research on industry is mainly composed of separate accounts focused on specific companies 
with a much heavier weight on Boeing. Limited number of non-academic studies comparing 
business strategies of and competition between Airbus and Boeing are far from providing 
detailed accounts of strategic, organizational and financial inclinations of two companies in 
the last two decades. On this note, the empirical findings for this research are based on several 
different information sources: 
 A big range of quantitative information created through the collection of data from 
primary sources like companies’ annual reports, and industrial, intellectual property 
and financial databases. 
 Information collected from the websites of companies, industry journals and other 
media sources providing industry specific news and reports. 
 Published material from industry associations and government agencies. 
The main difference between this research and many other inquiries of commercial aircraft 
manufacturing is that this study presents an integrated account of two major aerospace 
companies through a comparative perspective. It focuses on every aspect of corporate activity 
related to the sustainability of innovative performance as well as potential threats 
undermining innovative enterprise character of the two firms. These two firms provided the 
milestones of air transport in the last decades while many other aircraft manufacturers were 
eliminated from the world market during the same period. 
Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured in two parts. The first part lays out the general theoretical perspective 
proposed for the analysis and the industrial level discussion. The second part discusses the 
last two decades of Airbus and Boeing through a comparative methodology with a focus on 
their strategic, organizational and financial orientations during their latest aircraft 
development programs which are still running with derivative options. 
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In the first chapter following this introduction, a theoretical framework is proposed for the 
analysis of the sector and the two firms around the discussion of business/productive models. 
After a brief discussion of innovation and capabilities within the innovation literature, the use 
of models is discussed as bridges between theories and empirical studies. Following, the 
productive models perspective of the Regulation school and the discussion of business models 
within the business literature are presented in order to help create the analytical methodology 
of the study. In the last part of the chapter, the orientation towards systems integration is 
introduced as the dominant model of doing business in commercial aircraft manufacturing. 
The history and the current discussion over systems integration are also presented. 
In the second chapter, the study takes an industry-level approach in order to analyze the most 
important elements of aerospace and commercial aircraft manufacturing. Such an analysis is 
fundamental to reveal the major dynamics of the industry and its future course to be 
highlighted with increased competition. Product markets, technological characteristics, 
industrial organization of aircraft manufacturing, particularities of the aerospace workforce, 
and the finance of the industry are main headlines that are elaborated throughout the 
chapter. Due to its crucial importance for the development of the industry and its ongoing 
activity, the role of governments through a wide range of financial and non-financial support 
mechanisms deserves a bigger section dedicated to a historical analysis of government 
presence at the end of this chapter. 
Following the industrial level discussion, the following three chapters are dedicated to the 
comparative analysis of Airbus and Boeing shaped around the proposed business/productive 
model methodology. Structured around the discussion of changing productive organization 
via their latest aircraft programs, each chapter elaborates one pillar of the model framework, 
initiated with a general discussion of the pillar and the business action that gave shape to its 
historical course in the last decades. The focus of Chapter Three is the changing business 
strategies of Airbus and Boeing and their dynamic boundaries marked with both capability 
enlarging (investments in innovation) and shrinking (divestment and increased outsourcing) 
actions along their latest aircraft development programs namely Boeing 787 and Airbus A350. 
The focus of Chapter Four is on the organizational aspect of these two firms’ 
business/productive models. Their work organization is compared and contrasted with a 
discussion of the marked events of industrial relations and organizational restructurings. 
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Finally, Chapter Five is focused on the finance component of the business/productive model 
framework and discusses the approaches of two firms in terms of sources and uses of finance 
during the financialization era marked with shareholder value maximization. Finance of 
innovation and finance of shareholder value maximization at Airbus and Boeing are compared 
and contrasted. In this chapter two companies’ shareholding structures are also compared 
and the functions of stock market are elaborated from the perspective of these two 
companies.  
21 
 
First Part 
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Chapter One  
 
Theoretical Discussion and Model Building: 
Innovation, Capabilities and Business/Productive 
Models 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Since its early-twentieth century definition as the source of economic development by 
Schumpeter who extended its scope beyond the narrow conceptualization of technological 
progress, innovation became a buzzword for anything about growth, prosperity, social welfare 
or economic policy. Any reform initiative to alter existing structures of social organizations or 
to launch new undertakings is today labelled as innovative activity whether it is involved in 
economic activity or not. For Schumpeter who coined the term, innovation is the historic and 
irreversible change in the way of doing things (Schumpeter, 1968). It is central to the process 
of economic development and it is the key driver of economic growth. It is the only means to 
create new sources of value in order to produce higher quality, lower cost products than those 
had previously been available (Lazonick, 2013). 
In modern capitalism the prime generator of innovation and resulting economic development 
is the business enterprise. Documented and theorized all along the twentieth century by 
prominent scholars including Marshall, Schumpeter, Penrose and Chandler, modern business 
enterprise emerged as the universal model of organization for value creation without ignoring 
the nuances formed by different geographical, political or legal origins throughout the last 
century up until this day. The evolution of the small scale value creating activity of early 
capitalism into full-scale enterprise is itself a novelty in the form of industrial innovation 
characterized as one of the major forms of innovation by Schumpeter (1968). Thus, an inquiry 
on the role of innovation in economy and society cannot be separated from a broader 
understanding of modern business enterprise. It stays as the perpetual objective of value 
creating organizations while any other business strategy or corporate action may eventually 
change over time. In effect, the social conditions affecting innovation may also change over 
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time and vary across productive activities. This change also includes the transformation of the 
business enterprise and its ambitions. For the sake of analytical rigor, any theoretical analysis 
of the innovative activity must be integrated with historical study (Lazonick, 2002). 
1.2 Innovation as organization 
There is a symbiotic relation between the process of innovation and business organization 
which provides them with the ability to have impact on each other’s evolving forms and 
structures. The twentieth century history of innovation is a chronicle of the emergence and 
diffusion of different organizational forms of productive activity and their corresponding 
management forms. However, this symbiosis has also been the source of a major disaccord 
between scholars of innovation in terms of the decisive power of the one on the other. While 
some studies set sail for technological determinism in the name of the potential influence of 
innovation over the form of organization, some others are much more cautious. Nevertheless, 
organizational issues of innovation at the firm-level is interestingly the most ignored section 
of innovation studies and especially the ones in economics. The thematic focus on 
organization or firm is basically left to business scholars (Fagerberg et al., 2012) and the direct 
links between the organizational or firm-level issues of innovation and its role in economic 
and social change in general are not established at least as a major research field within 
innovation studies. For example, while the Oxford Handbook of Innovation devoted a 
complete section to the process of innovation at organizational level (Fagerberg et al., 2005), 
in a sizeable collection of works on innovation titled Handbook of the Economics of Innovation 
(Hall and Rosenberg, 2010), there is no main section dedicated on the organization of 
innovation. One single chapter on the firm, written by D. Teece highlights the role of business 
enterprise as a distinct actor of technological innovation. 
Whether the link between a theory of the firm and a theory of innovation has not 
strengthened, for almost half a century, the general discussion over the sphere of innovation 
stayed within the business enterprise as Schumpeter defined it as a business activity. Starting 
with the 1970s, the role of institutions was also respected (Freeman, 1974, 1995; Mowery and 
Rosenberg, 1989). In effect, the idea of the interaction between technology and institutions is 
not new. As early as 19th century, K. Marx highlighted the role of technological dynamism 
which is directly associated with the historical emergence of capitalist institutions. It was the 
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capitalist classes who were the principal defenders of technological change as their interests 
are firmly connected to it (Rosenberg, 1982). 
In the following years, its main features were stylized by scholars (Hall and Rosenberg, 2010; 
Lazonick, 2005; Nelson and Winter, 1982; O’Sullivan, 2000; Rosenberg, 1976; Teece, 1996). 
For the use of business activity, the most pertinent ones are its uncertain, collective and 
cumulative natures (Lazonick, 2005; O’Sullivan, 2000). Indeed, the organizational dynamics 
usually frame the scope and the content of innovation for the same general aim of economic 
development. However, with the integration of different perspectives in business organization 
for the discussion of innovation by technology scholars; its general features are increasingly 
characterized by different actors and different types of organizations at different levels. The 
claim is that the growing diversity of organizational forms of business firms and their linkages 
formed with other organizations may have a great impact over the direction of innovation. 
1.3 Innovation beyond organization 
As a result of the diversifying agenda of innovation research, beginning with 1990s, scholars 
of industrial and technological change started to discuss the aspects of innovation by 
questioning the borders of business enterprise. Inspired by Williamson’s (1975) discussion 
over the forms of organizations, Teece (1996) claimed that the formal and informal structures 
of the firm, together with its external links drive the strength as well as the kind of innovative 
activity of the business enterprise. Different organizational forms like vertical integration or 
conglomerates or archetypes in his words address the type of innovation that they can support 
the best. For example, an autonomous innovation, where a novelty can be introduced without 
modifying other components or items of equipment, better corresponds to alliances or other 
dynamic structures like Silicon Valley type forms. A systemic innovation, on the other hand, 
requires significant readjustment to other parts of the system and an integrated 
organizational structure which keeps the entire process under control facilitates innovation 
better as long as the required capabilities exist in-house (Teece, 1996). It is the nature of the 
flow of information between the actors of innovation which designates the suitable form of 
organization for a specific type of innovation and potential coordination and intellectual 
property issues forces companies to choose between different forms (Chesbrough and Teece, 
1996).  
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Inspired with the assessment of the symbiosis or the interdependence of technological and 
organizational innovations by Chandler, Pisano (2010) also highlights the role of the design of 
appropriate organizational, managerial and institutional forms on the potential of innovation. 
As an example, science-based sectors need new models and new institutional arrangements 
incorporating both technological and organizational innovations and the potential of 
innovation can only be realized through these new appropriate forms. 
Another discussion over the structure of innovation is on the means of benefiting from 
innovation. In their focus on the sources of industrial leadership as the translation of 
technological expertise into commercial success, Mowery and Nelson (1999) emphasize the 
systems character of organization beyond firm-level dynamics to facilitate innovation and 
resulting economic performance which also help to explain the factors behind national 
differences. Leading firms of specific industries not only benefited from their first-mover 
advantages and individual organizational strengths in Chandlerian sense or they solidified 
competitive advantage through their own investments and learning efforts in the 
Schumpeterian sense. They have also benefited from their national institutional and policy 
environments. Teece (1986) in his earlier work emphasized the same issue in a restricted level 
within an appropriability regime which is about the external factors including the nature of 
technology (putting it outside of a firm structure); the efficacy of legal mechanisms of 
protection; a dominant design paradigm which determines the maturity of the technology and 
the stage of competition (from design to price); and complementary assets needed for 
successful commercialization which were seen at that time out of the center of the 
innovativeness of a business organization. Following, industry architectures have been 
proposed by business scholars as an upgraded level of appropriability analysis to explain the 
creation and appropriation of the returns from innovation (Jacobides et al., 2006). These 
architectures are sector-wide mechanisms to benefit from innovation by providing the 
framework in which business actors interact. Businesses’ ability to create architectural 
advantages also defines the level of their value appropriation from their or others’ innovative 
activities. 
Such efforts of explaining industrial success based on technical progress through the 
organization of innovation beyond internal mechanisms of business firms have also been put 
within a ‘systems’ perspective. These approaches see innovation as a collective work of rather 
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distinct actors both organizationally and institutionally. The “national innovation system” 
approach highlights the roles of different actors including financial institutions, government 
agencies, universities, and even different occupational actors within business organizations in 
fostering innovation within national boundaries (Freeman 1995). The sectoral system of 
innovation approach also embraces the idea that innovation is a collective output of a set of 
different agents interacting with each other for the creation, production and sale of sectoral 
products (Malerba, 2004). Stressing the role of knowledge and technology together with their 
dynamic nature as a building block of these systems, the emphasis is on the activation of 
virtuous cycles of innovation and change through the coevolution of different elements of 
these systems. 
Another influential line of recent research on innovation is the open innovation literature. It 
highlights the linkages between different actors or simply whether the innovation takes place 
only inside the boundaries of firms or in collaboration with other firms or non-firm actors. 
Different than systems approaches, the open innovation discussion mainly takes place within 
the sphere of the firm. It is proposed as the antithesis of the vertical integration model where 
the generation of innovation through internal research and development, the production and 
the distribution are all integral to the firm (Chesbrough, 2006). In the open innovation model 
innovation is generated within and outside of the borders of the firm and its benefits can also 
be shared by all the actors involved. The distribution of knowledge which can easily transcend 
the borders of a single firm forces business organizations to set up linkages in the form of joint 
ventures, alliances, networks, spin-offs, in-licensing and out-licensing at different stages of the 
development of technology which embodies knowledge. Teece (1996) on external linkages, 
Mowery (1988) on joint ventures, Langlois and Robertson (1995) on networks are some 
examples. Firms following the open model in comparison to so-called old vertical integration 
model benefit from the development of transactions along with technological development, 
easier access to knowledge and the development of intermediaries for knowledge exchange. 
In effect, the boundaries of the firm discussion and the impact of changing boundaries on 
innovation is not new. Together with the rise of inter-organizational business relations which 
include innovative activities like joint R&D, there has been an effort to develop a chronological 
order for the locus of innovation. Mowery (2009) highlights that many of the elements of this 
(open innovation) model are apparent in the early development of US industrial R&D when 
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larger firms monitored innovation outside of their boundaries and formed collaborations with 
other firms and universities; extending the definition of markets to the relations including the 
ones with ‘firm-like’ characteristics. From an institutional perspective, Langlois (2003) 
emphasizes that the contemporary productive organization with important implications on 
innovation is shaped by open modular systems of the current ‘vanishing hand’ period 
following the ‘visible hand’ of the vertical integration model offered by Chandler for the 
twentieth century capitalism. 
1.4 Need for an enriched return to the analysis of the ‘box’  
Another important discussion over innovation is about the sharing of the benefits of 
innovation or the balance between the risks and rewards. Previous discussion over capturing 
the benefits of innovation by different actors considered firms composed of professionals as 
a unified group with common interest (Jacobides et al., 2006; Teece, 1986). This has left the 
question over the distribution of the benefits among the actors of the same entities 
unanswered. A parallel analysis over the question who benefits within the firm, after the firm 
itself benefits from innovation remains unaccomplished (Lazonick and Mazzucato, 2013). The 
impact of business organization’s orientation over the ways in which rewards are distributed 
is strictly connected to the long-term success of the innovation and its benefits for the entire 
society. In other words, as important as the creation of value through innovation, its 
distribution of the gains from innovation is central to the long run sustainability of the 
prosperity and growth generated by innovation. Indeed, the decision over the distribution of 
the value created through productive activity and innovation depends on the positioning of 
the actors to extract more or less value than what they contribute. The imbalance between 
the actors who take the risk and the ones who reap the rewards of innovation has important 
implications over the productive capabilities of economies and their actors in the long-run 
(Lazonick and Mazzucato, 2013). 
Thus the real strong link between innovation and organization can only be established through 
research on innovative enterprise with respect to a risk and reward dichotomy. Starting with 
the basics, the initial question is how do firms construct and coordinate complex systems of 
innovation and how do they coordinate an innovative project? A preliminary answer can be 
found in the “capabilities” perspective by leaning on the insights into the operation and 
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performance of the innovating firm developed by scholars in the past three decades (Lazonick, 
2013). A discussion over the origins and the development of capabilities perspectives may also 
help to identify the principal actors who take risks by putting their efforts in developing these 
capabilities to generate value through innovation and productive activity. Provided by 
productive actors, capabilities in general and organizational capabilities in particular are the 
transformers of innovation into value within a business organization. 
1.5 Origins of capabilities discussion 
To construct his perspective on innovation and economic development, Schumpeter leaned 
on a profound understanding of economic theory. From a perspective alternative to the 
mainstream view of firm and its organizational dynamics which was also cultivated by 
Schumpeter (1968) in the first half of the twentieth century; Chandler and Penrose, the two 
most prominent scholars of business organization, rightfully saw the sources of innovation 
and development within the business enterprise and the way how it is managed and analyzed 
the running of firm with their detailed empirical analyses (Chandler, 1962, 1977, 1990; 
Penrose, 1959, 1960). Their skepticism of mainstream explanations of economic growth and 
industrial organization of the day guided them to stay away from ahistorical accounts of 
business organization and economic growth. 
Their analogous work led up to a large array of perspectives within economics and business 
research. One important concept which occupies a large space within this research and a key 
notion in structuring the theoretical understanding of this study is capabilities. They are firm-
specific enablers of innovation and the development of capabilities specific to business 
organizations is fundamental to establish the link between innovation and productive 
organization. 
In her seminal work Penrose (1959) defined firm as the collection of productive resources for 
the production and sale of goods and services for a profit. Physical, humane, cash, managerial 
or entrepreneurial, these resources are not only used for productive activity but also to create 
new productive services and to plan further expansion. Growth is a creative and dynamic 
interaction between a firm’s productive resources and its market opportunities (Pitelis, 2009) 
and it is an integral aspect of the nature of firm. It is performed through a continuous search 
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to take full advantage of opportunities for expansion and innovation as the introduction of 
new combinations of resources (Penrose, 1959). 
Chandler’s subject was also the firm. Without any restriction imposed by a theoretical focus 
(Teece, 2010a), he analyzed the emergence of the large industrial corporation and the role of 
organizational transformations in different sorts of ‘economies’ which constitute the 
development of productive resources. Nevertheless, his narrative of the firm and the focus on 
its role in resource allocation in an economy render his work fairly Schumpeterian (Lazonick, 
2010a). His analysis on innovation has a systemic character. Innovation, in his perspective, 
cannot be separated from the context in which it occurs (Chandler, 1977). Thus his analysis on 
the rise of business enterprise as the center of productive economic activity takes an 
integrated approach in which technological, organizational, managerial, institutional, 
administrative, legal, financial or even statistical/accounting innovations act in a way that they 
complement each other as missing pieces of a puzzle (Chandler, 1977). They may be faster or 
slower than each other or they may appear in a sequential order but at the end, they all 
contribute to the shaping of modern business enterprise as the primary element of value 
creation.  
The foundations laid by Penrose and Chandler provided a new perspective on organizational 
theories and strategic management. The ideas presented in their seminal works later 
extended and used by a large number of economics and business scholars. The concepts of 
strategy, structure and resources evolved in different directions. In the meantime, new 
concepts including capabilities emerged and they also evolved. 
1.6 Organizational capabilities 
There is a considerable discussion of capabilities by scholars who search for the links between 
the growth, innovativeness and profitability of firms and their organizational structures. Even 
though the terminology used by scholars differs because of their different conceptualization 
based on different combinations of theoretical perspectives they utilize, the Schumpeter-
Penrose-Chandler triangle is in general the common framework they lean on. 
A very early discussion of capabilities as the sources of competitive advantage is found in 
Learned et al. (1969). Cited in Teece et al., (1997): 
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“The capability of an organization ‘is its demonstrated and potential ability to 
accomplish against the opposition of circumstance or competition, whatever it sets 
out to do. Every organization has actual and potential strengths and weaknesses; 
it is important to try to determine what they are and to distinguish one from the 
other”. 
Apart from the industry level discussion of capabilities by Richardson (1972) highly influenced 
by Penrose’s views, the first elaborate discussion of capabilities is in Nelson and Winter (1982) 
as part of their theory building efforts of the research on economic change. Even though they 
do not explicitly define organizational capabilities, they categorize them as the abilities to 
perform and sustain routines which are of ‘habitual reactions’ connecting the members of an 
organization to one another and to the environment. There is an inductive reasoning here. As 
an organization's capabilities require the exercise of individual skills of these organizational 
members, the characteristics of organizational capabilities are structured by the individual 
skilled behavior. 
Following Nelson and Winter (1982), after a relatively dry period of 1980s considering 
influential research on industrial and organizational dynamics within the heterodox literature 
of the firm, 1990s started with a rich set of publications on organizational capabilities.  
It was again Chandler (1990) who elaborated the first the concept of organizational 
capabilities by the empirical analysis comparative development of the large industrial 
corporation in the West. In his view, the fundamental motive behind the industrial success 
interpreted in terms of ‘economies’ of scale and scope resides on knowledge, skill, experience, 
and teamwork as the ‘organized human capabilities to exploit the potential of technological 
processes’ (Chandler, 1992). It is these capabilities that provided firms with the basis for their 
competitive power. In his view, capabilities are developed via cumulative learning while 
exploiting these economies which utilize resources. The continuity of the learning process 
defines the sustainability of the competitive advantage.  
Another key point with the role of capabilities is the integration issues of business firms. In 
Chandler the decisions over integration or disintegration are explained as answers to specific 
market and technology situations while an enterprise aims on growth through utilizing its 
competitive advantages created by coordinated organizational learning and the desire to 
develop new ones. Accordingly, any cost calculation becomes arbitrary if the specific skills and 
capabilities which are either in hand or can be developed are not considered. 
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Accordingly, learned organizational capabilities of industrial enterprises of a nation mirrors 
the competitive strength of it and the differences in organizational design and governance 
give insights to industrial success or failure. (Chandler, 1993). In his historical account on the 
rise and fall of American managerial capitalism richly elaborated previously by Chandler 
(1977), Lazonick (1990a) defined organizational capabilities from the perspective of 
production process as ‘the power of planned and coordinated specialized divisions of labor to 
achieve organizational goals’. The coordination is necessary to integrate knowledge in a 
collective manner to achieve necessary economic performance represented in faster flow of 
work and lower unit costs. The utilization of cognitive, R&D and even marketing capabilities 
to activate organizational ones to work with the help of necessary managerial structures was 
the source behind the success of American capitalism in the twentieth century. Equivalently 
their erosion in the second half of the century starting with shop-floor capabilities and later 
the managerial ones put American competitive advantage in a difficult position beginning with 
1970s (Lazonick, 1990a). Indeed, the respond of the US firms to the rising international 
competition was to acquire other businesses instead of investing in their own capabilities. 
Another respond was to contract to core capabilities (Chandler, 1992). 
In the turbulence of the substantial changes in corporate management and corporate culture 
Prahalad and Hamel (1990) proposed the core competencies approach which became widely 
popular in the years ahead especially among corporate executives and business consultants 
although in a controversial manner that the ‘focus on core’ was fed into the trend of 
downsizing or outsourcing. The approach of Prahalad and Hamel is rather different from the 
capabilities approach which were being developed in parallel. Their approach directly 
addresses the corporate executives of the period who were under great tension due to the 
tough Japanese competition of the period which put many Western industries in difficulty. 
Competencies are directly expressed in terms of core products which give their producers 
necessary competitive advantage even though they are not always the end product 
manufacturers. Nevertheless, the authors share similar perspectives with the organizational 
capabilities literature in the sense that core competencies are about the collective learning in 
an organization. They provide firms with the abilities to coordinate different skills, to maintain 
involvement and commitment of people, and to organize the delivery of value to customers 
but they are not only abstract or cognitive. They are tightly attached to the core products of 
33 
 
firms that their production has to be kept in-house. Widely acknowledged by executives in the 
1990s also because of its easy to understand ‘test’ and ‘listing’ logics to identify what is core 
and what is not within a corporation but with skipping the stress on the role of commitment 
and long-term planning highlighted by the authors, major companies of the world started to 
announce lists of their core competencies which would have been reviewed in the following 
years with or without concrete reasons. Business lines which are not on the list are considered 
the ones to be discarded and core competencies became an excuse to outsource anything 
considered not ‘core’ (Londsale and Cox, 2000). 
The reason behind the differences in firm performance during the period was a compelling 
subject to inquiry. In his seminal paper, Nelson (1991) searches for answers for the sources of 
inter-firm differences. Arguing the organizational differences as the root cause of differences 
among firms, core capabilities in the form of abilities to generate and gain from innovation 
are the source of rather durable differences among firms. From his evolutionary perspective 
for the conditions of economic progress, firm diversity is fundamental. Contrary to the 
neoclassical understanding of perfect competition and trivial firm differences, it is this 
diversity which creates the conditions of economic progress which necessitates ‘changes’ in 
the Schumpeterian sense like shifts in resource allocation or the creation of new 
organizational routines based on new skills. For example, the success of certain routines and 
technology selection embedded in manufacturing methods are expressed in the differences 
between firms or even between different factories and projects which are resulted in 
divergent performances in productivity (Fujimoto, 1999; 2012). 
Descriptions of capabilities are also available in the search for organizational explanations for 
a definition of the firm. Following resource-based perspective views, Kogut and Zanders (1992) 
try to explain the productive activity as the mobilization of inert resources or capabilities. The 
decisions over the selection of capabilities to keep and to develop are structured by the 
current knowledge of the firm and the future expectations of the economic gains from 
exploring new technologies and new organizing principles. These decisions are determined by 
the ability of learning specific capabilities and again capability differences among firms have 
prevailing effects on their performance. The road to growth is achieved by mobilizing 
knowledge with relevant organizing of social relationships inside the firm. 
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In the search for the sources of competitive advantage and its sustainability, the focus on firm-
specific features led some scholars to look for an answer to the question, how these features 
in the form of competences and resources can be developed and protected in order to 
maintain and sustain competitive advantage (Teece et al., 1997; Teece, 2009). These scholars 
redefined the concept around the term ‘dynamic capabilities’ in order to highlight the focus 
on the productive activity of firms under rapidly changing technological conditions and 
competitive environment. With the emphasis on path dependencies and existing market 
positions of firms, the idea of dynamic capabilities is proposed to identify the paths, positions 
and processes of firms to explain their distinctiveness and inimitability. The unit of analysis, in 
that respect, is not the firm as a social organization but these processes and positions/patterns 
where the competitive advantage breeds. Research in areas like R&D management, product 
and process development, technology transfer, intellectual property, manufacturing, human 
resources, and organizational learning are integrated into the analysis but they are relevant 
only if they help to explain the identification of capabilities and skills for competitive 
advantage. The stress on building and retaining capabilities in-house is still critical. 
Organizations should not risk their future by focusing extensively on alliances and 
decentralization (Chesbrough and Teece, 1996). Indeed, dynamic capabilities require ‘long-
term commitments to specialized resources’ by nature (Winter, 2003) that the potential to 
manage and sustain certain productive activities including product development necessitates 
the continuity of the supply of resources either they are in the form of engineering knowledge 
or physical assets like facilities and equipment.  
Within this economics and business literature, the discussion over capabilities remains 
abstract even though it is channeled into a divergent set of prescriptions and analysis. It is not 
observed any extensive attempt to develop a new theory of the firm and a common research 
framework which may be based on this rich set of literature of resource based, evolutionary, 
behavioral and organizational views as an alternative to neoclassical perspectives on the firm. 
Even though there is a considerable deepening of the research over the sources of competitive 
advantages of firms and the general agreement that they are generally based on firms’ 
genuine competencies and capabilities whether they are usually temporary (Collis, 1994), the 
wide variety of theoretical underpinnings which provide inputs to these capabilities 
frameworks renders building an applicable theory of the firm fairly impossible. The growing 
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literature including empirical work on Teecian dynamic capabilities perspectives and Porterian 
framework of competitive advantage as two fertile grounds among these perspectives has not 
so far evolved into an effort of building an economic theory of innovative firm. Envisaging the 
strong connection to theory building, a research framework based on certain models can still 
be a valuable effort to reestablish the broken link between empirical analysis and theory 
building. 
1.7 Models as theory building efforts 
One reason for the lack of a common research agenda on business firms is that economics and 
business literatures interpret business strategy and action through a big variety of analytical 
frameworks containing rather distinct features shaped by different motives and interests. 
Similarly, the growing literature on business models contains a very large number of 
propositions structured by the emphasis on distinct parts or aims of productive activity. In 
addition, the research of economists and sociologists on productive models by the French 
Regulation School also offers important insights over the practices of industries and business 
firms which compose distinctive patterns over a certain period. A discussion over these 
‘models’ perspectives can be helpful to identify the elements of similarities and distinctions to 
propose an integrated research framework for this study. 
Before a discussion on the variety of business/productive model definitions with their distinct 
forms and functions, a clarification over the ‘model’ concept is needed. In essence models are 
abstract representations of a structure or a system. Boyer and Freyssenet (2000a) provide a 
list of ways in which a model is articulated in social sciences. It can be an ideal to be attained; 
a set of attributes to firm performance; a methodological construct to estimate the coherency 
of theoretical arguments over firm performance; and an ex post articulation of change along 
with its roots and outcomes. Similarly, a business/productive model can be approached from 
several different aspects identified by the analytical point of departure. The coherence 
between the purpose of models and their conceptualized functioning defines the boundaries 
of any model proposed. Again Boyer and Freyssenet (2000a) highlight the context of the 
identification of a model as a response to new questions of economic profitability and social 
acceptability which are inherent in previous models’ dynamics as well as in the 
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transformations of competitive, macroeconomic and societal contexts either at national or 
global levels. In this fashion; 
“An approach identifying this sort of model should be substantive (describing the 
contents of the practices), historical (identifying the problems faced so as to 
understand what the practices actually mean) and analytical (process of building 
the firm’s profitability through the creation of a modicum of external relevancy and 
internal coherency for the changes)” (Boyer and Freyssenet 2002). 
Such a methodological proposition to analyze productive activities within a model context 
resides in these scholars’ broad understanding of the functioning of capitalist economies 
developed through the Regulation School’s long efforts to shed light on underlying forces of 
capitalist development and change. 
1.8 Business Models 
Every important analytical concept or theoretical discussion emerge within a historical context 
representing a change of structures and forms including those of productive activities. The 
emergence of the business model concept also overlaps with shortening product lives, rising 
costs and increasing complexity of innovation and its organization (Chesbrough, 2007); 
changing ways of profiting from innovation (Teece, 2010b); as well as the rising importance of 
information and communication technologies and more generally of the ‘new economy’ 
together with the emergence of new industries, new professions and new sources of potential 
revenue also due to regulatory and institutional changes all over the world (Rédis, 2007). Thus 
the rising complexity of the economic environment not solely due to technological 
developments but also the institutional transformations on a global scale, brings about the 
questioning of the sustainability of existing business forms and actions. 
Contrary to Porter’s (2001) early warning of the blurring character of the term spread through 
the internet bubble of late 1990s, the business model idea was quickly embraced by the 
literature with an aim to highlight the role of emerging technologies in value creation and 
capture process (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Mahadevan, 2000; discussed in detail in 
Zott et al., 2011). 
Following the slowdown of e-business fervor of early 2000s which helped the misuse of the 
term that bothered Porter to vanish pretty quickly (Magretta, 2002), the literature has 
expanded in an unfolding and deepening way. It started to include a big variety of old and new 
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perspectives, tools and concepts of business and strategy literature while the definitions and 
points of interest remained divergent. It can either be a tool to mediate between technology 
development and economic value creation to help firms find their way in the face of rapid 
technological change through different functions articulating, defining and describing the 
value proposition, value chain and the position within the value network (Chesbrough, 2007; 
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002). Or more simply it can be an abstraction of the strategy 
of a firm (Seddon and Lewis, 2003); a set of choices on how to mobilize internal and external 
resources and capabilities in order to generate revenues (Lecocq et al., 2006); a system of 
interdependent activities in a networked form that transcends the firm itself (Zott et al., 2011). 
In more elaborate definitions it can also be an apparatus to conceptualize and run the logic to 
create and deliver value to customers in exchange of profits (Teece, 2010b); or a mechanism 
to generate financial surplus through a network of information always channeled to the focal 
entity which is the business corporation (Haslam et al., 2012). Despite the limited effort to 
provide a framework based on early theoretical works on business strategy coming through 
industrial organization or resource-based perspectives (Morris et al., 2005) and the abundance 
of definitions and conceptual propositions, the subject remains theoretically underdeveloped 
and hardly distinguishable at a conceptual level from other business organizational forms 
continuously being used by business and economic literature (Teece, 2010b; Zott et al., 2011). 
1.9 Productive Models 
On the contrary, the productive models approach of Boyer and Freyssenet provides a much 
more rigorous explanation of value creation or in a loose way ‘business enterprise at work’, 
with a solid theoretical background. In their own words a productive model is defined ‘by the 
conjunction of a profit strategy and a company governance compromise in order to make 
coherent product policy, productive organization and employment relationships, along with 
the relevance with respect to the macroeconomic growth mode’ (Boyer and Freyssenet, 
2002). They are rather stable but not fully closed production systems as specific answers to 
common issues of firms in a specific industry. Major questions of productive models concern 
the product markets and labor (Bélis-Bergouignan et al., 2010) and the coherence of answers 
is embedded in the compromises established between stakeholders. The authors articulated 
the concept with their deep understanding of the functioning of Western capitalist economies 
of the after-war growth period. The links between the macroeconomic environment together 
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with fundamental dynamics of aggregate demand and productive models developed by 
economic actors provide a solidly built macro-level base which does not exist in the business 
models literature where the point of interest is mainly the specific demand for the specific 
commodity to be produced by the specific firm or network in question. The role of institutions 
in shaping productive models by creating constraints or enablers is critical (Lung, 2008). 
Positioning itself against the mainstream analytical perspectives which put markets at the 
center of the analysis as the conventional space of coordination between economic agents, 
regulation theory puts institutions as one of the bases of economic activity in the sense that 
these institutions like monetary regimes, forms of competition and employment relations 
shape the conditions of growth regimes. In this respect, market, as a social construct, is 
another institution which maintains the agreements on quality, the organization of exchange, 
the conditions of access to market and the regulation of transactions (Boyer, 2004). In 
addition, productive models’ emphasis on the compromise between different stakeholders as 
a determining component of profit strategy of firms which also give shape to their productive 
organization is fundamental. 
Within this perspective, an appropriate profit strategy is central to the applicability of certain 
models. The strategy should count in existing market and labor characteristics and the 
uncertainties attached them. It should be feasible and exploitable and in order to do so, it 
should admit the existing growth mode of the economy in which the businesses activities 
reside. The variety of growth modes are institutionally characterized and historically shaped 
(Boyer and Freyssenet, 2002). Competitive advantages that an economy possesses in terms of 
the strength of key actors like firms, labor force, infrastructure or financial stability, provide 
the necessary conditions or frameworks for generating specific profit strategies.  
On top of this macroeconomic context which conditions business firms’ ‘socio-productive 
configurations’, the authors present a three-pillar framework composed of product policy, 
productive organization and employment relationship, as components of productive models 
to implement the profit strategies that the firms desire to follow. Even though these aspects 
are strictly relevant to the general framework provided by the regulation theory, neither the 
details within existing elements nor the reasons why other factors that still have an impact on 
profit strategies are not deeply articulated beyond its application on automobile industries of 
the developed economies. Moreover, different than their early conceptualization of ‘industrial 
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models’ (Boyer & Freyssenet, 1995) which give a more egalitarian structure between the 
components of the model, the productive models approach rather represents a hierarchy 
among its components that the product policy which refers to the decisions over the choices 
over design, volume, quality, novelty, the only component with a ‘policy’ denomination, 
designates the choices over the productive organization referring to the methods and means 
chosen to enable product policy and the employment relations referring the system of 
recruitment, remuneration, promotion, as well as representation of the workforce (Boyer & 
Freyssenet, 2000a). The aim is to establish necessary complementarities between these 
components in the form of a governance compromise among all the stakeholders involved. 
The formulation and application of this compromise is the fundamental aspect of a working 
model (Lung, 2005). The opposite forces of compromises; conflicts or their management, are 
not integrated within the model framework. They can only threaten established models. 
1.10 Main issues of models 
1.10.1 What is different with strategy? 
One important point is the difference between business strategy and business/productive 
models. Even though the two terms are still used interchangeably, the efforts to distinguish 
them or the integration of business strategy in different forms within business models would 
be necessary to clarify certain aspects.  
In the business model literature, there is yet no agreement on the content of business strategy 
which help scholars to define their own business model frameworks. It is the analytical focus 
which mainly shapes the form of strategy and the focus is formed where the determinant 
action occurs. Depending on the point of interest, the action can be formulated around the 
relations between organizations within a value chain or network; the relations within 
organizations to create value; or value propositions to customers and the business model 
related to it. 
However, there are still efforts to distinguish the two. Magretta (2002) proposes business 
models as static patterns on which firms build their rather dynamic strategies to apply the 
model in order to sustain their competitive advantage or ‘to deal with the reality’. Similarly, 
Teece (2010) highlights the generic character of business models compared to business 
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strategies that the design of a successful business model should be complemented with a 
mindful competitive strategy in order to benefit from the innovation performed by the firm. 
However, there is no complete matching between a model and a strategy. While firms are 
following similar strategies in identical product markets, they may also have different business 
models. In this context, business models and strategies are complements (Zott et al., 2011). 
In the productive models perspective provided by regulation theorists, strategy has a central 
role in the functioning of the model followed. As it is explained above, productive models are 
built to implement profit strategies of individual firms. These strategies are not only limited 
to product policy but they cover a wide range of choices and preferences selected upon 
different aspects of productive activity either internal or external to the firm. The activities 
and topics covered under the components of models to be implemented through strategies 
are not very different than the business literature on strategy even though the construction 
of the links between these components and their relevance to the general macroeconomic 
structure structurally differ in productive models approach. In the face of extensive 
uncertainty, by mobilizing their resources firms seek for a certain designation which associate 
the external relevance within the given socio-economic context and the internal coherence 
between the varying organizational dimensions of the firm (Lung, 2005). For the automotive 
sector, these strategies may concern issues as broad as innovation, flexibility of production, 
productivity increases (permanent reduction of costs, production scale (volume) or product 
range (diversity) which have fundamental organizational, financial and employment 
implications like any corporate strategy over the course of productive activity may have. 
1.10.2 A different model for each firm? – The variety in models 
The second major issue with proposing models as analytical frameworks to study business 
organizations is to deal with the question over potential diversity of singular models within 
different contexts and time periods. The question if there exists a single model valid for a 
specific context or there is a potential to exist several models still valid for the same context 
is part of a major issue in economics and business and one of the main sources of the basic 
division between mainstream and heterodox perspectives in economics. Both the modelling 
of the optimizing firm of neoclassical economics and the mainstream ‘one best way’ business 
propositions reject the idea that the heterogeneity of firms is not theoretically valid as the 
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best performing model sooner or later dominates the market of its main activity. However, 
the research repeatedly confirms the diversity of models even among best performing firms 
of similar contexts (Boyer and Freyssenet, 1995; Lung, 2005).  
The diversity of organizational forms and performance which are conditioned due to 
institutional differences emerging from distinct socio-economic paradigms of primarily 
national contexts is a broad discussion in the literature (Chandler, 1990; Hall and Soskice, 
2001; Jessop, 2011; Lazonick, 1990a; Whitley; 1999). Diversity is also an integral part of the 
Regulation theory and its analysis over models of productive activity as the theory considers 
socio-economic conditions is the determining force for the growth modes of firms and their 
profit strategies in specific geographies (Boyer, 2004; Boyer and Freyssenet, 2002). 
Accordingly, variety in growth modes between nations, in profit strategies and in governance 
compromises between firms provide the unsurprising diversity in productive models 
(Freyssenet, 2003). Moreover, continuous restructurings of industries through the 
introduction of new technologies which create new subsectors and segments as well as the 
corporate rearrangements through unceasing mergers, acquisitions and alliances provide 
relevant inputs to consider the continuous metamorphosis of models of every type. 
The second point which gives support to the view that there is a diversity of models is the 
existence of firm-specific differences that are independent of the institutional contexts they 
act. These differences emerge from the different strategic orientations which guide decision 
making, different organizational structures of utilizing capabilities that result in distinctions in 
abilities to generate and gain from innovation (Nelson, 1991). More detailed observations of 
the qualitative features of firms including new entrants to an industry is a necessary condition 
to expose the variety along new model propositions which are always possible (Nelson, 2008). 
From a different interpretation which gives the same sense, the great variety in the ability to 
act on same institutional structures for company managers also implies the diversity in 
productive models (Boyer and Freyssenet, 2002). 
Lastly, the singularity of the models in the business model literature deductively assumes a 
great diversity of potential models as the source of competitive advantage (Zott et al., 2011). 
It is the general aim of firms to build distinct business models hard to be copied by others to 
create and appropriate value from its activities (Chesbrough, 2010; Teece, 2010b). 
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1.10.3 The role of technology in model formation 
The relation of business/productive models to technological change and innovation is another 
important dimension in models research. Some scholars put technological development in the 
center of the models analysis that, being the structure that plays a mediator’s role in the value 
creation process, a business model helps the firm to select and reconfigure technologies in 
transforming them into end products with commercial success (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 
2002; Teece, 2010b). The role of a business model in the association of technology 
development and value creation is so strong that despite advanced perception of specific 
technologies, any potential conﬂict between the existing business model, and any potential 
one required to exploit the emerging or disruptive technology would hinder firms to translate 
innovative strength into commercial success (Christensen, 1997; Teece, 2010b). Thus the 
business model, within this perspective, has a bridge role between a firm’s innovative 
capabilities to the other capabilities needed for competitive advantage (Zott et al., 2011). 
The link between technological advance through innovative capabilities and organizational 
configuration is also highlighted by economists. Differences between firms in how they 
organize innovative activities and how they gain from innovations result in myriad of 
differences among firm performances (Nelson, 1991). The endogenous character of 
technology and technological change in economic activity is also critical in regulationist 
perspective. The coherence between technology, organization of work and institutional 
patterns gives shape to a growth regime which conditions firm strategies (Amable, 2002). 
Technological progress emanates from the unending search for new sources of profits through 
new products, processes and markets which can only be implemented through coherent 
productive models (Boyer and Freyssenet, 2002). Resulting technological advancement 
further extends the market place and the division of labor. Innovations can only be considered 
successful through their market potential and organizational capability to react to this 
potential (Boyer and Freyssenet, 1995, 2000b) thus they cannot be considered independent 
of any propositions by firms in the form of productive models. 
1.10.4 Are business models subject to change? 
During major ideological transitions like the one from managerial capitalism to shareholder 
capitalism which accompanied reconsideration of value appropriation/extraction structured 
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with changing power relations, business model frameworks are also subject to change. In need 
of new value propositions through flexible structures in every aspects of productive 
organization (workforce and shop floor organization, R&D partnerships, outsourcing, etc.) in 
order to create more value and capture/extract more of it from others, to contrive moments 
of maximum leverage over stakeholders (workers, contractors/suppliers, state), it may be 
necessary to free productive activities/resources and strategic control from the hands of rigid 
structures of existing forms of management. 
On this issue Lazonick (2009) proposes a relevant distinction between an old and a new 
economy business model in a way that the modes of organizing business firms has 
dramatically changed not only the resource allocation for productive uses, but also the ways 
and terms of employment. Primarily dominating the US economy associated with volatile 
stock markets, unequal incomes, and unstable employment, it also has a great impact on the 
ways of doing business in around the world. The conflicting and contrasting elements of the 
strategic, organizational and financial categories of these two models underlie a rupture 
between the older and newer forms of productive activity. In the case of strategy for example, 
a prime shift is observed from vertical integration of production or big corporate R&D labs to 
vertical specialization and increasing outsourcing (Lazonick, 2010b). 
The power of change is also relevant for both business model and productive model 
perspectives. For some business scholars, business models are concepts to be innovated in 
order to renew growth prospects and competitiveness (Chesbrough, 2007, 2010; Mitchell and 
Coles, 2003). From the productive models perspective, even though a specific model is an 
outcome of a process during which some degree of coherency is established between the 
product policy, the productive organization, employment relationship, and the profit strategy 
that is being pursued, because all the process is unintended and unable to be designed in 
advance, change is inherent in all models (Boyer and Freyssenet, 2002). Even though it is not 
so easy to shift between two models, if an existing model, faced with constraints or changing 
objectives, starts to use new organizational, technical, managerial and social measures with 
‘superior’ results compared to the previous situation, it can be considered as a new one. There 
is an internal dynamic of the contradictions and possibilities that render models mortal (Boyer 
and Freyssenet, 1995). 
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1.10.5 The usefulness of models in economic research 
The lack of a business/productive models perspective in economic theory (Teece, 2010b) is a 
major handicap of any micro-level economic analysis trying to uncover the transformational 
dynamics of productive activity. Efforts of the proponents of regulation school to explore the 
dynamics of automobile industry in the 1990s through the productive models framework have 
to be enlarged and renewed with an updated view of 21st century capitalism. Such an updated 
framework has to be built around an alternative theory of the firm, once again, against 
mainstream perspectives and their hypothetical firm formulation. 
Ahistorical perspectives especially in the case of business models literature and resource 
based views make it difficult to understand the dynamics of change at different levels of 
economic activity and the role of innovation. The latter should be understood as a cumulative 
and collective process crucial for sustainable competitive advantage for companies and 
sustainable prosperity for economies which entail robust value chains, continuous skills 
development efforts of businesses and governments, healthy financial infrastructure 
supporting productive activity and egalitarian distribution of created value among 
stakeholders. 
One critical factor in shaping these models, the role of finance in redefining productive 
strategies and organization is largely missing in most part of the existing literature on 
business/productive models. Though it was present in their early work as an equally important 
element of industrial models as expressed in the relation between productive investment and 
access to finance including the capacity to self-finance (Boyer and Freyssenet, 1995), the 
productive model theorists, in their later conceptualization, the impact of financial constraints 
and/or motives on productive model building largely disappears even though finance as an 
institutional determinant is still available in their macro level analysis on social systems of 
innovation (Amable et al., 1997 in Lung, 2005). Their analysis is truly aware of the fact that 
financial sphere would have important consequences on governance compromises. On the 
other hand, productive models consider firms in a way that firms either have full control over 
their financial resources or the impact of finance in rebuilding the governance compromise 
may only appear when companies lose their control over their shareholders and finance 
mechanisms (Boyer and Freyssenet, 2002). The role of finance within the dynamics of business 
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organizations in distributing the value among stakeholders who created it through their 
collective and cumulative efforts is not highlighted. In effect, the financial mechanisms of 
value creation and value extraction are fundamental in reshaping this governance 
compromise acceptable for the actors/stakeholders involved. 
In a different vein, without any political economic perspective, business scholars studying 
business models as value creating mechanisms skip the value extraction and value sharing 
among stakeholders as a whole. Value is only ‘captured’ from internal and external innovative 
activities through a working business model without any socioeconomic mechanism explained 
(Chesbrough, 2010; Teece, 2010b). Very few attempts show that the efforts to empirically 
estimate the sharing of created value among stakeholders are very limited (Garcia-Castro 
et.al, 2013; Lieberman and Balasubramanian, 2007). 
On the role of finance in building business models, one exception provides important insights 
to the financial sphere of business/productive model discussion. Haslam et al. (2012) provides 
a perspective in that the purpose of establishing a business model is to generate financial 
surplus through leveraging stakeholders. From a different perspective, they provide some 
insight on the purpose of a business model still connected to the basic definition of business 
models within business literature. Rather than the emphasis on the role of business models 
as a construct that mediates the value creation process, they highlight the leveraging and 
manipulating role of corporate finance and it is the business model which generates the 
financial surplus out of the interactions between stakeholders involved. In that sense, their 
approach resonates to the one provided by the productive models framework in which a 
governance compromise between different actors of the productive activity including 
workers, managers, suppliers and shareholders (Boyer and Freyssenet, 2000a). Through a 
process of arbitrage, interactions between these stakeholders is used to extract financial 
leverage and it is the model which gives a certain coordination to these interactions (Haslam 
et al., 2012). However, their analysis still lacks an explanation over the representations of 
value extraction from the view of the leverage applied by certain stakeholder alliances over 
others and survival strategies of oppressed stakeholders. Nevertheless, they rightfully express 
the function of business models as the coordination of complex stakeholder interactions in 
order to facilitate rather indifferent utilization of resources and capabilities for value capture, 
as well as the translation of these interactions into financial leverage. In that sense, there is 
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no compromise but a continuous clash between stakeholders expressed in financial 
transactions and representations. 
Accordingly, employment relations should also be a major element of models discussion. The 
dynamics of employment or rapport salarial has long been a key element of analysis of 
Regulation theory and a major component of productive models framework (Boyer, 2002; 
Boyer and Freyssenet, 2000a; du Tertre, 2013; Grahl and Teague, 2000). Rapport salarial can 
only be defined by the interaction between the institutional framework around labor in 
general (legal and regulatory conditions) and social relations of work (Boyer, 2002; duTertre, 
2013). To regulationists, the social compromise established between workers and 
management is the fundamental motive over the course of economic development 
documented through the post-war upswing of Western capitalism. Like in the monetary 
regime and forms of competition, the two other institutional forms defined by the theory, 
rapport salarial is principally applied through macroeconomic analysis of economic activity. 
The diversity of labor at firm and industry level shaped by different forms product markets, 
intensity of technical change and the organization of work makes it a delicate work to propose 
definite categories of employment relations (Boyer, 2002).  
Indeed, employment relations or rapport salarial in its macro context should be rearticulated 
in model-type analyses of firms and industries of the 21st century in order to reestablish the 
interplays between value creation through the productive activity of workers and the outlook 
of its remuneration in a secure and equitable way. In order to do so, the analysis over 
employment relations should include not only the role of institutional framework. It should 
also assess the means by which the management deals with the workforce in the face of 
competitive pressures or distributional motives shaped with the help of discursive elements 
like core competencies, shareholder value or corporate social responsibility. 
Diversity of models across time and space is expressed by the whole business/productive 
models literature citing a wide range of organizational and institutional factors. In effect the 
diversity is the rule rather than exception even among firms within the same industry in the 
same geography during the same time period. Especially in the business models literature, 
models, where the sources of competitive advantage reside, are usually unique to firms while 
a successful one is always open to imitation by others (Teece, 2010b). 
47 
 
However, none of the existing perspectives discuss the possibility of a dominant paradigm 
across industries penetrating into different geographies with differentiating features in 
industries and economies in order to give model framework a potential to be a strong 
analytical tool. The discussion of the regulation theory over the dominant development model 
labelled ‘Fordism’ was pursued at the firm level through the application of productive models 
framework where Fordist model is reduced to one specific productive model in automobile 
industry among other models. The alternative explanations to distinguish models of firms of 
different geographies including Japanese model vs. American Model (Aoki, 2001), Varieties of 
Capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001), Diversity of Capitalism (Amable, 2003) and others (Jessop, 
2011; Lung, 2005) have been mainly focused on institutional factors and their relation to 
market forces. The research on organizational dynamics has not led to a general framework 
for the capitalistic change of the productive activity. As a result, the construction of new 
business/productive models and the relations and hierarchies among them due to distinct 
organizational and institutional factors are not well formulated within a historical context, 
different than the previous scholars like Marshall, Penrose or Chandler who embraced a 
historical perspective and analyzed features of business activity and firm organization. 
Perspectives formulated around world level phenomena like neoliberalism, globalization or 
financialization, have not so far led to shared frameworks among social scientists to analyze 
micro dynamics within, for example, business enterprise. 
1.11 Model proposition of this study 
As a result, an integrated methodological perspective is needed which discusses specific forms 
of business/productive models of the 21st century including the ones in commercial aircraft 
manufacturing. The divergence of scholarly concerns and analytical perspectives within this 
‘models’ literature hinder the potential to offer a methodological set to be applicable to 
different industries and firms. As previously stated, the empirical investigation of productive 
models’ was only on twentieth century auto industry and the atomized approaches to 
business models do not help to constitute a solid template to analyze a specific case within a 
broader model framework. As it is highlighted, a theoretical background is critically needed to 
put forward the fundamental elements of proposed models and to exert analytical rigor on an 
empirical study. 
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The proposition of this study is to analyze a superposition of certain generic activities to be 
detailed below during a specific period in a specific industry which becomes the dominant 
pattern for business activity at the global level. The pattern contains specific features 
dominant in certain aspects of productive activity like in product designs and related 
technological understandings, marketing strategies, value chains, relations with institutions 
among others. Its basic function is to deal with value creation and value extraction. 
Highly relevant to a models discussion for the research on certain industries and firms, 
Lazonick (2013) provides a comprehensive view of business enterprise which is involved in 
three generic activities to transform productive resources into commodities to be sold. These 
activities are;  
“Strategy allocates resources to investments in developing human and physical 
capabilities that, it is hoped, will enable the firm to compete for chosen product 
markets. Organization transforms technologies and accesses markets, and thereby 
develops and utilizes the value-creating capabilities of these resources to generate 
products that buyers want at prices that they are willing to pay. Finance sustains 
the process of developing technologies and accessing markets from the time at 
which investments in productive resources are made to the time at which financial 
returns are generated through the sale of products”. 
This study assumes that a business firm’s execution of each of these activities, or their modes 
of action in the regulationist sense, identify the guidelines of its business or productive model. 
To specify the framework of the analysis, within a specific industry for a certain period of time, 
there may be a dominant model adopted by prominent firms of the industry. However, certain 
aspects of the model may or may not exist in one firm or in another depending on their 
different orientations structured by their historically shaped organizational characteristics. In 
that sense, the proposition respects Boyer and Freyssenet’s (2000a) reminder that the context 
of the identification of a model as a response to new questions of economic profitability and 
social acceptability which are inherent in previous models’ dynamics as well as in the 
transformations of competitive, macroeconomic and societal contexts either at national or 
global levels. Equally important, the institutional environment may or may not allow firms to 
put forward certain aspects of the dominant model, compel them to modify it or apply its 
constituents differently. Despite a growing interest within the business literature, there is still 
a requisite to explain business/productive models within the domain of economic theory with 
an emphasis on technological change, industrial relations, financial orientations, and 
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regulatory frameworks. Each of these concepts is a major determinant of the particularities 
and boundaries of a model at a specific point in time, within defined geographies and 
industries (Montalban and Sakinc, 2013). 
Thus, for the purpose of this study, systems integration is proposed as a new 
business/productive model for commercial aircraft manufacturing that implies, in summary, a 
Chandlerian type organizational learning strategy in a regulationist macro environment 
highlighted with the orientation towards shareholder value in the last several decades. Within 
the framework of a model, business enterprises follow their basic aim of generating a surplus 
and reinvest or redistribute it to certain stakeholders while coping with different types of 
uncertainties and adapting to changes along new product development like new shop floor 
practices, new technologies, new communication forms and channels, and new product 
market environment, among others. 
Similar to the relation of organizational capabilities for the managerial capitalism of the 
twentieth century depicted by Chandler (1992), the new face of systems integration as a core 
capability of the modern corporation (Hobday et al., 2005) can only be understood if we 
establish the relation between the development of such new capabilities and the remaking of 
business enterprise. It is the centrality of the relation between the organization of production1 
and business strategy in systems integration (or in any other business orientation) that 
provides a research framework to analyze the meaning of systems integration for the 
commercial aircraft manufacturing primarily represented by Airbus and Boeing 1F2. 
Furthermore, in order to develop necessary productive and organizational resources and fund 
new product development, business enterprises together with their stakeholders are also 
required to provide financial commitment. As a third element, finance and its impact on 
strategic decision making and organizational integration should also be analyzed. This aspect, 
which has been restricted either to the research on financial performance or policy 
discussions, has been largely ignored by organization and technology scholars for a long time. 
                                                          
1 Organization of production should not be confused with productive organization of the productive models 
approach which largely refers to the strategy component of the systems integration business model detailed 
below. 
2 Commercial aircrafts or commercial jets are airliners with more than 100 seats. As of early 2016, only Airbus 
and Boeing are producing commercial jets of this type. In 2016, Bombardier will start to deliver its first 
commercial aircraft in smallest segments to become the third company of the industry after 19 years of a 
duopoly of Airbus and Boeing since the acquisition of McDonnell Douglas in 1997 by Boeing. 
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However, the commitment and the control over financial resources and the pursuit of financial 
objectives are vitally decisive over the integration of business strategy and organization of 
production. 
Therefore, a study on the implications of the systems integration approach in the commercial 
aircraft industry should first deconstruct the discourse of systems integration particularly 
embraced by Boeing and to a lesser extent by Airbus 2F3. Such an analysis should include the 
research on underlying motives and potential outcomes of their actions while they reorganize 
their productive organizations within and outside of their boundaries. At the end, systems 
integration can be understood as a business/productive model which can be explained 
through reformulated structures progressively embedded in their business strategy, 
productive organization and corporate finance. 
In effect, the interrelationship between business strategy and workplace organization/work 
system and corporate finance is a matter of debate. Several studies have so far tried to 
approach this relationship through one or two dimensional perspectives exploring the impact 
of one aspect on another. The aim of this study is to make a contribution to this debate 
through an empirical exploration of these issues in commercial aircraft manufacturing. In this 
case business strategies should be understood as firm location in product markets, firm 
location in capital markets (Froud et al., 2006) and also firm location in labor markets or more 
accurately labor dynamics. Due to the firm connections among these three dimensions and 
their dynamic nature, they are interdependent rather than one is dependent on the other. 
1.12 The concept of systems integration 
To define the topics of discussion of the second part of this study around the systems 
integration model, first it is necessary to describe the course of development of the concept 
in its historical context in order to prevent any misunderstanding around its designation. 
1.12.1 Conceptualization of the term  
The concept of systems integration is originally derived from systems engineering; the work 
of organizing and bringing together different processes of the development and production of 
                                                          
3 In the case of Airbus, the new orientation has been defined more technically as New Systems Policy which is 
detailed in Chapter Three. 
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complex new products i.e. systems (Johnson, 1997). The notion of ‘systems’ has a widespread 
utilization in theory and practice. Conceptualized as an engineering element of production 
process, systems integration was developed from 1940s to 1960s as a means to coordinate 
and control the development of complex aerospace and computing systems particularly 
utilized by the US government. Principally, systems engineering was the latest stage of 
systems/product development, the final integration of the components built by different 
organizations involved in a project. It also included testing and verification of the final product 
after all the components are integrated (Johnson, 2003). 
In the wake of systems engineering, systems integration emerged as the task to bring together 
different components of a weapon system which were previously performed within the walls 
of government owned and managed arsenals. Later, these tasks were progressively assigned 
to business firms, to let them develop weaponry and aircraft systems (Sapolsky, 2003). 
Consequently, the reliance of armed services on business contractors increased after the 
WWII. Rather different than the war time when the race was on weapon mass production, the 
military-technology race of the Cold War focused on new weaponry development in which 
technological performance mattered more than quantity of output produced (Jones, 1990; 
cited in Sapolsky, 2003). However, the rapid change of technologies and processes of systems 
made their development, integration and utilization major challenges to overcome. In order 
to reap the benefits of rapid progress in technologies, coordination had to be well established 
and continuous learning and the development of new skills became central to the work of 
system integrators. As a result, systems thinking started to define the standard method of 
organizing R&D in the aerospace industry. Subsequently its utilization expanded to other 
industries in and outside of the United States (Johnson, 1997). 
Specifically, in aerospace industry systems integration emerged as a standalone assignment 
to bring together different systems like electronics or weaponry that had to be designed along 
with the aircraft from the very beginning (Johnson, 2003). The prime contractor, main 
integrator of the final product as a complex system, had to develop the systems knowledge 
necessary to understand and coordinate diverse talents and technologies required to develop 
final systems by attracting and mobilizing skilled scientists and engineers (Sapolsky, 2003). 
This knowledge has always been the main tool that has to be heavily invested by firms in order 
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to cope with technological uncertainties which pervade the design and development of a new 
airframe or a new engine (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989). 
Thus the main function of systems integration is the ability to maintain necessary 
communication and coordination of a predominantly multi-actor project from the preliminary 
design till customer services confronted with a tremendous level of uncertainty due to the 
magnitude, novelty and complexity. It is primarily a social process which necessitates 
behavioral and cognitive solutions provided only by appropriate organizations which aim to 
improve and manage the communication and control of technical development. 
1.12.2 Capability-Based Discussion 
The implementation and the management of systems integration by business enterprise 
rather than the government and its transformation from a communications method to a 
source of competitive advantage require discussion on what social scientists and business 
scholars say on systems integration as a business strategy. In the last decade, a limited but 
focused body of research has been performed by a group of scholars embracing evolutionary 
and resource-based views on the coordination of technological capabilities and knowledge 
within and across the boundaries of firm (Acha et al., 2007; Brusoni et al., 2001; Brusoni and 
Prencipe, 2001; Hobday et al., 2005; Prencipe, 2001; Prencipe et al., 2003; see EMR Special 
Issue, 2009). The research is limited due to the nature of systems integration as a tool specific 
to multi-actor and multi-tech sectors. However, the rising importance of such sectors like 
telecommunications, electronics and aerospace and increasing relevance of the concept to 
the innovation strategy and knowledge management of corporations active in these sectors 
have made existing and further research valuable. 
The literature discusses systems integration mainly as an issue of capability management 
along changing firm boundaries. This change can either be through backwards disintegration 
as a result of increasing outsourcing including design and development of components or final 
products (Pavitt, 2003; Sturgeon, 2002) or forward integration into services and business 
solutions for existing or novel products by moving downstream into the provision of services 
to distribute, operate, maintain and finance a product through its life cycle (Davies, 2003; Wise 
and Baumgartner, 1999). In both cases, systems-integrator companies develop and utilize 
different problem-solving capabilities to deal with necessary integration of distinct systems 
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while they function in harmony when they are brought together. Adopting systems integration 
capabilities is understood as a competitive process of coordinating tasks for different sections 
of systems, integrating them and maintaining the continuity of the final product by supporting 
and offering necessary services and solutions. One basic question is how firms organize 
themselves to manage technological evolutions around complex products. Rising complexity, 
rapid technological change and the extension of knowledge paths to develop new systems 
force firms to adapt new forms of design, development and manufacturing in order to 
preserve their competitive advantage. Thus systems integration is embedded in the business 
strategy of a firm to manage value creation both internally and externally. 
In that regard, scholars of industrial organization and innovation have addressed the role of 
systems integration as a new stage in the life of the Chandlerian enterprise (Hobday et al., 
2005; Prencipe, et al., 2003). Basically driven by better understanding of technologies, and 
accumulated and codified knowledge, firms are enabled to hive off some of their in-house 
activities or to skip the option to develop new resources and capabilities necessary to design 
and develop parts of a technologically complex new product while keeping the coordination 
and final integration under control which may or may not include vertical integration through 
different phases of the new product life cycle (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001; Hobday et al., 
2005). At the end, armed with systems-integration capabilities, firms are able to choose 
whether or not to outsource specific elements of design and production (Prencipe, et al., 
2003) and they basically ‘know more than they do’ thanks to these capabilities needed to 
actively manage technological and organizational interfaces (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001). The 
feature that accompanies the technological aspect of systems integration is the organizational 
dimension which expresses the involvement of different organizational profiles like prime 
contractors and subcontractors as well as technical advisors and government bodies in a 
systems integration task (Gholz, 2003). These profiles bring their specific technical and 
management skills for the execution of integration. In this context, outsourcing is an integral 
feature of systems integration that the firms outsourcing parts of production have to possess 
necessary organizational capabilities to integrate components produced or knowledge 
generated by suppliers (Pavitt, 2003). 
Thus, systems integrators are the key actors of innovation by maintaining a diverse set of 
competences across a wide range of technologies and scientific disciplines (Acha et al., 2007). 
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Several studies have already documented the competence development through increased 
technology diversification provided by the increase in the diversity of patents filed by firms in 
high-tech industries in the last three decades (Acha and Brusoni, 2008; Brusoni and Prencipe, 
2001; Brusoni et al., 2001; Dibiaggio and Nasiriyar, 2009; Granstrand et al., 1997). These 
perspectives provided a variety of explanations for organizational solutions of firms faced with 
intense competition and rising demand for more complex and better quality designs. At the 
end, as an outcome of increasing specialization in knowledge production (Pavitt, 2003), 
systems integration is principally a capability either limited to coordinate the diverse and 
complex learning trajectories of suppliers and to orchestrate their network (Brusoni and 
Prencipe, 2001; Dosi, et al., 2003) or expanded to redesign of an existing system in order to 
take full advantage of a technical innovation which may involve not only product design but 
also the plant layout, production system, and business organization (Best, 2003). 
Systems engineering and systems integration are not new concepts in aerospace. In different 
ways they are expressed in terms of technical and organizational capabilities of corporations 
inclined to organize and run the design, development and operation of technologically 
complex, innovative, learning stage (in the sense that knowledge accumulated to develop and 
operate the final product and its components is new) and high cost programs performed by 
multiple actors. If systems integration is the organizing of innovation and production 
processes, the analysis should establish the links between new product development efforts 
of a productive organization and the broader business/productive model of the same industry. 
The development of capabilities and their utilization is the essence of a broader business 
strategy of acquiring competitive advantage. If these scholars correctly define systems 
integration as a capability, and highlight its importance for innovative performance, they fail 
to connect this capability development process to broader strategic, organizational and 
financial challenges that these corporations have to meet in order to sustain their 
innovativeness and transform it into prosperity for their stakeholders as the basic aim of 
business enterprises. In order to identify underlying reasons for shifting boundaries of firms 
or the passage from vertical to systems integration, a reformulation is needed which provides 
a broader framework unrestricted to the imperatives of technological transformations and 
resulting organizational changes. Any analysis which purports to reveal the underlying 
mechanisms of the organization of innovation should consider the deliberate action of 
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business firms to organize capability development of their own and their partners in a 
systematic way that acknowledges not only the technological requirements and future 
resource needs but also the shape of commercial, organizational, financial and even political 
conditions that usually cannot be measured quantitatively or technically. For example, inter-
firm relations can be considered as combinations of these internally produced and externally 
gained capabilities along new product development efforts. Systems integration as the 
outcome of these combinations is itself a new form of competence in the value-creation 
process and it has its own dynamics in control, organization and finance of a firm. 
The integration of capabilities into the production process is not automatic. The interactive 
social, hierarchical and power relations-related characteristics of the integration have to be 
highlighted as well. In essence innovation research has to have a human face. Not only 
engineering but also a social one. 
1.13 Why systems integration can be a business/productive model? 
First of all, in order to propose systems integration orientation of commercial aircraft 
manufacturers as a business/productive model, the role of organizational capabilities in 
shaping such models should be reformulated in a way that they are developed and deployed 
through the strategy, organization and finance superposition proposed as the main analytical 
tool of identifying specific business/productive models. 
Thus the research framework in the form of models discussion should be able to provide 
explanations to the questions from the more general to the more specific including: 
- What role do capabilities play in defining the R&D and manufacturing processes of 
firms? 
- What are the means of capability development efforts of business firms? 
- How do firms construct and coordinate complex systems of innovation, what are the 
implications of finance/governance/employment and what are their implications on 
innovation? 
- How do firms take their decisions to launch a new product development program? 
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- How do they define product & process strategies of the new product (the dynamic 
processes of integration, disintegration, externalization, internalization, upgrading, 
downgrading)? 
- How do they shape and reshape their value networks/chains? 
- How do they define in-house organization of production and the incentives for its 
continuity? How do shop-floor dynamics intervene? 
- How do they finance new product development and how do they distribute the 
benefits of innovation among different stakeholders? 
Around these generic questions, the second part of this study discusses the model around the 
three elements below. The theoretical, conceptual and historical discussions of the issues 
raised within the frame of each element are performed in earlier sections of each chapter 
before the empirical analyses are proceeded, and convergent and divergent practices of the 
two firms are explored with respect to the dominant systems integration perspective. 
1- Strategy: Detailed in Chapter Three, strategy is primarily about the planning and 
management of the new product development process as an innovative activity. In this 
sense, it largely overlaps with the ‘productive organization’ component of productive 
models framework which refers to the methods and means to pursue a specific product 
policy. It deals with the decision-making functions of corporate executives and their 
implementation through the planning and execution of the resource-allocation process 
among different parties to develop required capabilities for innovation. The decision-
making capacity of these actors includes but is not limited to the definition of the 
product policy in general; the reorganization of supply chains and collaborations; and 
the efforts to enhance internal R&D and other types of investments for new product 
development. Their ability to maintain a certain balance between internal and external 
allocation of resources, the positive impact of their decisions over a wide range of 
stakeholders involved in the productive organization, and the alignment of their 
interests with all these other productive actors unquestionably act on the competitive 
advantage of their business organizations and the prosperity of the societies they serve. 
2- Organization: Detailed in Chapter Four, organization represents the action of the 
workforce in transforming knowledge and technologies to generate products to be sold 
in the market. The basis of this action is the development of organizational and value-
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creating capabilities within a robustly functioning productive setting providing the 
means and incentives to these actors to apply their skills and efforts in line with strategic 
objectives. The setting deals with modes of compensation in the forms of work 
satisfaction, promotion, remuneration, and benefits as important instruments for 
organizational integration that should motivate employees as individuals to engage in 
collective learning (Lazonick, 2013). It decides on the ways in which a firm recruit, retain, 
motivate and reward its employees and how does the structure of incentives align 
individual behavior with organizational goals. Together with the compensation system, 
the collective representation and potential mechanisms to include workforce into 
decision making are essential for the realization of these goals. The power of the 
workforce representation and employee voice to have an impact over organizational 
issues like skills formation, flexibility of work, job security, besides remuneration and 
benefits are the major themes to analyze in order to reveal the organizational dynamics 
on the shop floor and their implications over the further strategic moves of business 
firms.  
3- Finance: Detailed in Chapter Five, finance is about the commitment to provide necessary 
funds for the process of developing products and accessing markets and the distribution 
of returns among stakeholders that are generated through the sale of products. One 
important point to highlight is the different means of finance depending on the facility 
of their access and their collective character due to a broad group of funders involved 
from investors to banks and sometimes, even more importantly, governments as 
discussed in Chapter Two. Beside the commitment of these actors, the degree of their 
power to extract the value created beyond or behind their contribution to the 
innovation process and productive activity is also decisive over the continuity of 
innovation in the long-run. How these actors build up their identity and how they impose 
it over corporate governance in order to consolidate their power over the control of 
value extraction are extremely relevant questions for the discussion of the concepts of 
maximization of shareholder value in modern capitalism and its impacts on productive 
capabilities. 
One last but highly relevant concern before concluding the chapter is to include the 
institutional impacts over corporate actions through each of these three elements of 
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business/productive models. Mainly because this study considers institutional elements as 
important explanatory factors as organizational ones, the role of government actions, legal 
rules or national, macro-level factors in general are highlighted whenever relevant but they 
don’t constitute the point of departure for an analysis of organizational dynamics of business 
firms as they are specified as the unit of analysis in the analytical methodology. One exception 
as it is deeply discussed in Chapter Two is the role of governments in funding the process of 
product development in commercial aircraft manufacturing as an indispensable source behind 
the success of Western manufacturing in aerospace. Nevertheless, even to compare 
institutional differences, a firm-level analysis should be the principal starting point to reveal 
the real differentials. The disequilibrium and conflicts at organizational levels call for a 
redefinition of the rules of the game (from firms to institutions) but they are usually left 
unanalyzed or unspecified as main analytical points. 
Thus, this study adopts a dynamic perspective that both organizations and institutions evolve 
together and one’s mutations, adaptations, inclinations characterize those of the other. The 
organizational setting within a business enterprise is always subject to evolve as their 
strategies and the speed and direction of change of organizations (enterprises) and 
institutions are not always congruent. Skeptical of the one-way determinism of Variety of 
Capitalism approach on the power of institutions over organizational boundaries by 
overlooking the dynamics of organizational strategy that may modify the nature of these 
institutions, Sako (2006) argues that while institutional constraints and opportunities shape 
the strategies in ways that differ across national business systems, strategic interactions may 
bring forth changing institutional structures. Similarly, Lazonick (2011) highlights the potential 
power of business enterprises to engage in collective action to reshape institutions in line with 
their strategic, organizational, and financial needs. Even though the national institutional 
arrangements, through differently organized and regulated firms and markets have certain 
power to impose on, business firms are still dynamic actors to come up with unexpected 
results beyond the reproduction of national systems (Lippert et al., 2014).  
As a result, in considering the role of institutions in a comparative-historical research, one 
should be careful not to fall into the trap of simplistic categorizations of Variety of Capitalism 
approaches or the dead-end of Regulation school’s empirical research on firms and industries 
because it leaves no space to focus on key determinants of success other than institutional 
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factors. This study, on the other hand, rejects institution-determinist perspectives and takes 
business enterprise as the starting point and the main unit of analysis. It basically compares a 
business firm which institutionally belongs to a single nation-state with another one which 
spread across four different countries in Europe having unique aspects in terms of corporate 
governance and related compromises.  
1.14 Conclusion of the chapter 
This chapter lays out a framework describing the elements of analysis of business firms from 
a comparative-historical perspective. The point of departure of the analysis is innovation as 
the engine of growth and productive capabilities as firm-specific enablers of innovation. In 
order to establish the link between innovation and productive organization, business firms 
have to develop capabilities specific to their industrial use in their efforts to create value. 
In this context, a model perspective is proposed to investigate the generic activities of business 
firms as an analytical tool and a research framework. To do so, a highly eclectic business 
literature on business models and institution based productive models perspective of 
Regulation school are described to explore the potential of a model methodology to identify 
the dynamics of productive activities of business firms and their orientation. Different aspects 
of models in terms of their relation to business strategy and technology, their variety with its 
reasoning, their dynamics of change and their usefulness as methodological tools are 
elaborated by referring to the correspondent discussion within business models, productive 
models and other relevant literature. 
To be detailed in the earlier sections of the chapters of the second part, the main proposition 
of this study is to analyze a superposition of strategy, organization and finance as the generic 
activities performed within a business/productive model framework shaped around shared or 
exclusive aspects depending on convergent and divergent practices around a dominant 
perspective followed by the main actors of a specific industry. 
Following, the chapter discusses the dominant pattern of business activity and productive 
organization in commercial aircraft manufacturing labelled as the systems-integration model. 
Before that, the concept of systems integration is elaborated first as an as an assignment and 
a pool of knowledge to coordinate diverse talents and technologies required to develop final 
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systems, and then as a core capability to understand and to manage the growing complexity 
of innovation processes. Following, the deficiencies of these the resource and technology-
based approaches due to their lack of a perspective connecting the capability development 
processes through systems integration to broader strategic, organizational and financial 
inclinations of the very same business organizations are highlighted. 
Finally, for the purpose of this study, systems integration is proposed as a new 
business/productive model for commercial aircraft manufacturing having distinct strategic, 
organizational and financial particularities stressed at different levels by firms depending on 
power dynamics, institutional restrictions or historical evolution of their productive 
organizations.
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Chapter Two 
 
Industrial Dynamics of Aerospace and 
Commercial Aircraft Manufacturing 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The aerospace industry is a high-technology manufacturing sector that produces aircraft, 
guided missiles, space vehicles, aircraft engines, propulsion units, and related parts. Besides 
manufacturing it also offers services related to product supply like aircraft conversion, and 
maintenance, repair and overhaul services for the entire product lines. The industry is 
dominated by a limited number of large firms whose customers are businesses like airline and 
cargo transportation companies and governments which predominantly seek for defense and 
space related products. Headed by two industry giants of commercial aircraft (CA) 
manufacturing Airbus and Boeing 3F4, major aerospace firms in the world are mainly composed 
of defense contractors of military aircraft manufacturing which are followed by aircraft engine 
manufacturers, other commercial aircraft producers of small aircraft segments and major 
components and systems suppliers. 
The history of aviation and aerospace manufacturing is an account of a colossal set of 
innovative efforts and their mass utilization in transportation and defense which have long 
been the two main sources of any form of economic and technological development in the 
history of humankind. Even communication, another major source, had long been an integral 
part of transportation and defense. Although the commercial utilization of the invention of 
heavier-than-air aircraft was initially for mail transport between different cities, air travel and 
air defense quickly became primary goals of further innovation in aircraft design and 
development for more than hundred years up until today. 
Thus the rapid increase in airmail transport and air travel quickly transformed aircraft 
manufacturing from an activity mainly held behind the closed doors of the workshops of 
                                                          
4 Commercial aircraft segment of aerospace industry consists of the production and sales of jet aircraft of more than 100 seats. 
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aviation enthusiasts to a large-scale industrial enterprise leaded by industrialists. The industry 
followed a similar path of development with other new industries of the twentieth century 
with some particular features. Together with its revolutionary impact on human transport, its 
firm connection to defense industry and national security is peculiar. Quick adoption of 
aircrafts as an integral element of wars and conflicts around the world made their industries 
strategic elements of so-called national military-industrial complexes of the early twentieth 
century. 
A major feature of the industry is the massive scale of investment needed to produce the 
commercial or military aircraft, the final product with all systems and components installed. 
Much more complicated than other manufacturing industries, the final product is composed 
of millions of different pieces manufactured. The integration of this massive number of 
components require a substantial set of design, development and manufacturing capabilities 
with necessary capital and human resources investment. As an example, one out of six 
manufacturing sector engineers in the US works for the aerospace industry. Another example, 
Boeing Everett factory where several aircraft models of Boeing are assembled is the biggest 
building in the world in terms of volume and floor area. 
As a result, aerospace is one the most pronounced sectors of economic activity in stressing 
the collective and cumulative character of innovation. Despite a limited room of ruptures and 
radical innovations since the early days of aviation, the control of original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs) over the course of innovation throughout the value chain is decisive. 
Besides, they are strictly responsible of the resilience of the supply chain, continuous inflow 
of skilled and qualified workforce with up-to-date knowledge, necessary financial and 
organizational commitment to launch new product development initiatives, and close 
coordination with customers. Their projections based on their innovative capabilities and 
product market estimations design the long-term structure of the entire industry from small 
scale component manufacturers to full systems developers. These organizations closely follow 
OEMs’ projections to build their decisions over capital spending, recruitment and further 
investment on their workforce. These interdependent aspects are equally important for 
organizational success of OEMs and resulting economic prosperity for all the stakeholders 
involved. For example, without detailing the transformation of the supply chain and its 
geographical evolution in time, the questions over the conditions of domestic workforce 
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cannot be identified. Equally, without detailing the role of financial commitment of different 
stakeholders in innovation, the true forces behind the innovative capabilities of business firms 
cannot be established. In order to explore the dynamics of productive activity within a specific 
field, each aspect should be elaborated in great detail along empirical analysis. 
Even though it is slower than many other industries, the geography of aerospace also gradually 
evolves. Historically restricted to advanced economies with superior technological and 
industrial capabilities required to maintain a network of aerospace suppliers organized around 
a small number of OEMs, the industry has been emerging as a global business with substantial 
efforts of developing economies. They either try to position in specific domains like materials, 
electronics and other specialized systems or support national companies with an aim to 
develop and manufacture final products in order to compete with established manufacturers 
of the West. Slowly integrated in established supply chains, these countries and their 
respective corporations have characteristic aims jointly shared: To upgrade productive 
capabilities and to become either an essential link in the supply chain with indispensable 
capabilities for OEMs or to produce the final product with domestic content as extended as 
possible. 
However, these efforts are gradual and slow. Top military and civil aerospace companies are 
still dominantly concentrated in the developed world. Among the top 100 world aerospace 
companies identified by PwC, there are only six aerospace companies from developing 
economies (Flight International, 2015). Table 2.1 presents the top 25 aerospace companies in 
the world in three parts. The first part (2.1a) compares compounded annual growth rates of 
basic revenue, investment and employment indicators. The second part (2.1b) compares 
selected profitability and payout ratios. Finally, the third part (2.1c) compares their most 
recent ownership structures. Thanks to the particularly giant US defense budget they trade 
on, American companies are overrepresented while the UK and France are the only countries 
represented with more than one company. Several different investment, performance and 
shareholding indicators represent a heterogeneous group with considerable divergence. 
Employment growth on average falls behind total or aerospace revenue growth during the 
period which implies rising productivity and potentially increasing outsourcing among OEMs. 
In contrast to the negative employment growth of several OEMs in the list which are 
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predominantly from the US, above average growth in several component and systems 
providers is striking. Nevertheless, major US systems providers like Honeywell and Rockwell 
Collins stay behind despite remarkable employment growth of other US or non-US suppliers. 
One interesting observation is the smaller growth of R&D and capital expenditures compared 
to revenue growth on average.  Superior growth of payouts in the form of share repurchases 
and dividend payments resulted in smaller investment in capabilities. Growth in share 
repurchases is particularly spectacular which is five times superior to the revenue growth 
during the period. The last three columns of 2.1b show that the total payout (dividends and 
share repurchases as a percentage of net income) of many US companies is either close or 
superior to 100 percent during the period. Because of the limited share repurchase activity of 
non-US companies, their payout levels remain inferior. Their main form of shareholder value 
distribution is dividend payments. 
Despite inconsistencies of the database which are reflected in higher ‘Other’ percentages 
especially for non-US companies, the divergence between companies is also represented in 
ownership concentration, shareholding of distinct actors like State, insiders or hedge fund 
managers and the total share of top aerospace and defense institutional investors. One 
observation: Top five aerospace investors hold between 10 to 30 percent of all US companies 
in the list while their holdings among non-US firms are to a great extent inferior. 
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Table 2.1a: Compounded annual growth rates of principal indicators of top 25 aerospace companies worldwide between 2000 and 2014 (in %) 
 Year 
Founded 
Home 
Country 
Work 
force 
Total 
Revenue  
Aerospace 
Revenue 
Net 
Income¹ 
Research 
and Dev. 
Capital 
Expend. 
Total 
Assets 
Total 
Debt 
Cash 
Total 
Dividends 
Total 
Share Rep.¹ 
Boeing 1916 USA -1.19 3.87 3.87  2.85 6.01 5.89 0.20 17.76 10.03  
Airbus 1970 Europe 3.01 8.13 8.13  8.20 4.95 7.57 3.35 7.34 23.74  
Lockheed Martin 1995 USA -0.78 4.00 4.00  -0.82 3.56 1.34 -3.14 -0.27 16.29  
United Technologies 1934 USA 2.15 6.15 7.42  4.81 4.10 8.91 9.89 13.85 11.75  
BAE Systems 1999 UK -0.12 3.47 -  -0.47 -2.05 1.14 0.06 3.31 7.60  
General Electric 1917 USA -0.17 0.90 5.48  5.61 -0.12 2.66 4.05 14.30 3.35  
Northrop Grumman 1994 USA 3.34 7.94 7.94  -4.95 4.89 7.01 9.06 18.09 11.23  
Raytheon 1922 USA -2.82 2.03 2.30  -0.34 -1.84 0.27 -4.06 9.11 6.85  
General Dynamics 1899 USA 5.70 7.55 8.26  6.31 4.03 10.43 14.67 23.87 9.81  
Safran* 2005 France 1.91 3.98 5.47  9.03 6.76 3.67 5.27 3.93 12.27  
Finmeccanica** 1948 Italy 1.47 6.21 8.25  4.55 6.93 5.25 9.14 4.65 -  
Thales 1893 France 0.39 4.55 -  5.01 2.75 2.69 -3.06 6.82 7.82  
Honeywell 1906 USA 0.11 3.23 3.02  5.75 1.67 4.02 2.94 12.46 6.36  
Rolls-Royce 1906 UK 1.43 6.13 4.86  2.11 6.76 8.56 3.85 12.67 12.32  
L-3 1997 USA 8.10 13.11 13.11  5.58 11.96 12.19 8.91 18.96 -  
Bombardier 1942 Canada 1.63 4.27 2.70  10.07 14.02 4.83 1.92 6.97 2.00  
Textron 1923 USA -4.79 0.39 3.17  -0.25 -1.36 -0.76 -4.10 6.56 -11.95  
Precision Castparts 1953 USA 5.09 10.21 10.21  - 11.39 14.43 10.31 17.9 7.31  
Spirit AeroSystems* 2005 USA 2.54 17.83 17.83  -10.15 3.39 12.05 4.81 4.59 -  
Embraer 1969 Brazil 4.20 5.24 5.24  -5.21 6.34 9.65 11.73 2.44 -1.89  
Zodiac 1929 France 7.40 10.94 12.99  36.15 9.52 10.68 5.64 11.00 13.44  
Rockwell Collins 2001 USA 0.89 4.67 4.67  3.39 3.45 8.42 - 20.38 17.47  
United Aircraft Corporation 2006 Russia n/a n/a n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a  
MTU Aero Engines 1968 Germany 0.44 5.49 5.49  6.95 2.20 10.15 36.19 7.92 -  
Mitsubishi Heavy Ind.** 1884 Japan 2.25 3.24 -  -2.61 2.12 3.07 -1.20 5.01 4.47  
Total of 21 companies*** 
between 2002 and 2014 
- - 0.84 4.83 5.20 17.18 2.71 3.70 4.65 1.89 9.44 8.65 23.10 
¹Single company net income and share repurchase CAGR values are not calculated because they occasionally give not-so-meaningful figures due to negative 
net income values and zero repurchases of several companies for specific years, *CAGR between 2005 and 2014, **CAGR between 2002 and 2014 due to 
some missing values prior to 2002, *** General Electric is excluded from the total due to its smaller focus on aerospace compared to other companies. Safran, 
Spirit AeroSystems and United Aircraft Corporation are also excluded due to their missing values before 2005, 2005 and 2008 respectively, 
Source: CapitalIQ and company annual reports  
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Table 2.1b: Average profitability and payout ratios of world’s top 25 aerospace companies between 2000 and 2014 (in percentages except 
inventory turnover and current ratio) 
 Gross 
Profit 
Margin 
Net 
Income 
Margin 
ROE 
% 
ROA 
% 
Return on 
capital emp. 
(ROCE) % 
Inventory 
Turnover 
Current 
Ratio 
Debt-to-
equity 
% 
Diluted EPS 
Excl. Extra 
Items 
Price-
Earnings 
Ratio 
Total 
Dividends / 
NI¹ 
Share 
Rep. / 
NI¹ 
Total 
Payout / 
NI¹ 
Boeing 16.4 4.2 63.2 4.1 6.4 4,9x 1,0x 196,8 3,8 21,6 0.37 0.59 0.95 
Airbus 15.7 1.3 6.0 1.0 1.5 4,7x 1,8x 47,9 1,1 26,1 0.41 0.26 0.67 
Lockheed Martin 8.7 4.5 79.4 6.5 10.4 15,4x 1,1x 1216,0 5,5 32,8 0.36 0.69 1.05 
United Technologies 28.0 7.9 22.4 8.0 12.3 5,2x 1,3x 52,1 4,0 17,1 0.29 0.35 0.65 
BAE Systems 43.2 2.9 11.2 2.9 4.6 9,2x 0,8x 74,9 0,2 -45,0 1.02 0.30 1.32 
General Electric 37.0 10.2 16.5 1.9 3.0 6,0x 2,0x 360,4 1,5 18,6 0.52 0.31 0.83 
Northrop Grumman 19.3 4.9 11.3 5.5 8.7 21,2x 1,2x 42,6 4,6 13,1 0.33 0.89 1.22 
Raytheon 19.5 5.0 13.0 5.5 8.8 33,3x 1,5x 51,1 3,4 292,9 0.40 0.61 1.01 
General Dynamics 13.9 6.9 19.0 7.8 11.8 11,9x 1,3x 34,0 4,4 9,1 0.28 0.43 0.71 
Safran* 43.7 2.6 6.9 2.0 3.3 2,0x 1,0x 53,3 1,2 152,4 0.60 0.04 0.64 
Finmeccanica 38.0 1.8 2.8 1.6 2.0 1,5x 1,1x 97,1 0,4 -1,2 0.88 0.00 0.88 
Thales 22.2 2.5 9.5 1.9 3.0 3,9x 1,0x 79,5 2,1 10,0 0.45 0.07 0.52 
Honeywell 24.4 6.0 18.2 6.5 10.1 6,4x 1,4x 62,3 2,5 -10,3 0.44 0.43 0.87 
Rolls-Royce 19.8 5.6 16.3 3.4 5.2 3,8x 1,5x 52,6 0,5 0,8 0.31 0.08 0.39 
L-3 11.6 5.5 13.0 6.4 9.6 38,0x 2,0x 80,8 5,5 17,9 0.18 0.69 0.87 
Bombardier 13.9 1.8 8.9 2.6 4.1 2,9x 1,3x 1184,4 0,2 12,5 0.56 0.13 0.69 
Textron 19.1 2.8 11.7 3.4 5.3 4,3x 2,0x 212,5 1,4 20,9 0.33 0.67 1.00 
Precision Castparts 27.4 11.4 16.5 10.3 15.5 3,9x 2,2x 39,1 5,5 20,9 0.02 0.19 0.21 
Spirit AeroSystems* 11.2 2.0 8.6 3.9 5.1 2,5x 2,8x 78,2 0,5 38,9 0.00 0.15 0.15 
Embraer 26.1 8.2 20.7 6.1 8.8 1,9x 1,8x 70,2 0,5 19,1 0.35 0.04 0.39 
Zodiac 55.6 8.4 15.3 6.9 10.5 2,2x 2,1x 98,2 0,8 16,8 0.28 0.05 0.32 
Rockwell Collins 28.4 11.6 36.5 11.1 17.0 3,1x 1,6x 33,2 3,0 17,6 0.22 0.65 0.87 
United Aircraft Corp. ** 17.4 (2.4) (11.4) 0.4 (0.4) 1,1x 1,3x 233,7 n/a n/a 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MTU Aero Engines*** 15.9 4.7 30.2 5.1 8.5 3,7x 1,0x 48,9 3,8 19,7 0.27 0.14 0.41 
Mitsubishi Heavy Ind. 14.6 1.4 3.1 1.6 2.6 2,3x 1,5x 86,2 0,1 44,7 0.41 0.00 0.41 
¹Total payout ratios for the whole period *Averages between 2005 and 2014, **Averages between 2002 and 2014, *** Averages between 2001 and 2014 
Source: CapitalIQ and company annual reports  
67 
 
Table 2.1c: Top 20 Aerospace companies’ share ownership structures as of mid-2015 
 Ownership 
concentration 
(total share of 
>5% shareholders) 
% share of 
ESOP / 401(k) 
PMT / 
Employees 
% share of 
Traditional 
Investment 
Managers* 
% share of 
the State 
(only home 
country) 
% share of 
insiders 
(chairpersons 
& executives.) 
% share of 
corporations 
% share of 
Banks/ 
Investment 
Banks 
% share of 
Hedge 
Fund 
Managers 
% share of 
Others** 
Total share of 
Top 5 A&D 
institutional 
investors*** 
Boeing 26.70 6.50 61.80 0.00 0.08 0.00 3.50 1.20 27.10 25.20 
Airbus 21.80 2.10 44.50 25.90 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 27.40 11.00 
Lockheed Martin 39.90 14.20 63.60 0.00 0.04 0.00 3.70 0.60 17.80 29.50 
United Technologies 18.20 7.10 65.60 0.00 0.16 0.00 5.00 1.60 20.50 18.60 
BAE Systems 18.60 3.60 75.40 0.00 0.09 0.07 2.00 0.20 18.40 13.50 
General Electric 11.10 0.00 49.10 0.10 0.06 0.00 3.00 1.10 46.70 16.40 
Northrop Grumman 32.90 7.40 81.80 0.20 0.70 0.00 2.60 1.80 5.60 19.10 
Raytheon 15.00 0.00 71.20 0.10 0.45 0.00 4.90 2.90 20.50 18.60 
General Dynamics 44.70 7.80 74.70 0.20 5.80 0.00 2.90 3.10 5.50 22.90 
Safran 25.40 13.80 38.50 18.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.20 29.40 7.60 
Finmeccanica 32.50 0.00 22.00 32.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 45.50 1.20 
Thales 51.50 2.00 20.40 26.30 0.00 25.25 0.00 0.00 51.30 2.40 
Honeywell 21.20 5.00 71.20 0.00 0.20 0.00 3.70 1.10 18.80 17.40 
Rolls-Royce 16.80 1.20 72.60 0.00 0.06 0.00 2.60 0.00 23.50 5.80 
L-3 28.60 0.00 73.40 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.80 2.80 20.00 14.10 
Bombardier 7.40 0.00 27.50 0.00 12.57 0.00 0.00 0.30 59.60 2.40 
Textron 33.70 0.00 75.90 0.10 0.30 0.00 0.90 3.70 19.20 30.90 
Precision Castparts 25.10 0.00 71.50 0.10 0.23 0.00 2.40 10.00 15.90 29.60 
Spirit AeroSystems 25.70 0.00 55.80 0.00 4.06 0.00 1.80 41.00 0.00 12.60 
Embraer 46.00 0.00 74.40 11.20 0.00 0.00 1.50 0.30 12.60 9.10 
Zodiac 19.30 1.00 33.80 0.00 9.88 11.80 0.00 0.00 55.30 2.40 
Rockwell Collins 23.20 0.00 70.70 0.10 0.28 0.00 2.20 1.80 25.00 23.60 
United Aircraft Corp. 94.00 0.00 0.10 94.00 0.04 0.15 0.00 0.00 5.90 0.00 
MTU Aero Engines 5.30 0.00 60.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.50 36.70 6.50 
Mitsubishi Heavy Ind. 10.8 0.0 20.2 0.0 0.02 8.45 17.3 0.1 62.4 4.4 
*Traditional Investment Managers include firms managing "traditional" portfolios of stocks and bonds such as pension funds, foundations, or endowments 
(CapitalIQ). **Others include Venture Capital/Private Equity firms, Family Offices/Trusts, Government Pension Sponsors, Corporate Pension Sponsors, 
Insurance companies and other unidentified institutional or individual shareholders. *** Top 5 A&D institutional investors include The Vanguard Group, 
BlackRock, Capital Research and Management Company, Wellington Management Company and T. Rowe Price Group 
Source: CapitalIQ and company annual reports
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2.2 Defense connection 
With a diverse range of technologies utilized and markets served, aerospace industry has 
strong connections with a big number of high-tech industries. Many aerospace companies 
serve for several different product markets and supply chains of aerospace OEMs contain 
many non-aerospace firms providing goods and services to help build the final product. 
However, the relationship of aerospace sectors with the defense industry has been rather 
symbiotic than cooperative. Even though the global defense and military aerospace industries 
in general follow their own logic with respect to product range and sales performance as long 
as the development costs of new products are covered by governments which are the 
principal source of demand for their products, many of the biggest companies operate in both 
military and civil segments with a greater concentration on one or the other. One major 
explanation of the persistent coexistence of civil and military segments within companies is to 
take advantage of newly developed technologies in each segment. Another explanation is the 
governments’ support schemes and allowances in specific areas that allow or even promote 
multiple uses of existing or future technologies. 
Dating back to early years of aviation, the “dual-use” of new technologies at systems level and 
the spillover effect of military designs on civilian aircrafts have remained as major patterns of 
aerospace-defense symbiosis with changing dynamics. Major systems level examples in the 
history of aerospace are Boeing B707, CASA CN235 and AgustaWestland AW609 (formerly 
Bell/Agusta BA609) which were previously designed and built for military purposes and later 
converted into commercial aircrafts for civilian use. In the systems level, examples of dual use 
are much more numerous. The first widespread success of the civil applications of 
technological systems developed through military contracts was in computers, nuclear energy 
and aerospace in the early years of the after-war period. It was followed by a second wave of 
migration of military research results in electronics, satellite technology and ICT to civil 
applications including the internet, advanced avionics systems, composite materials, GPS 
navigation, touch screens and numerous other applications. Later in the 1990s, US and 
European governments initiated explicit dual use support programs (Braddon, 1999; DoD, 
1997) which eventually became integral as part of a strategic vision of subsequent research 
programs supported by defense and space programs by governments (Fiott, 2014) as a means 
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to address rising defense R&D budgets and increasing international competition around 
leading edge technologies. Commercial gains expanded to a large array of applications at 
subsystem levels, materials or process technologies also in the aerospace industry. Given the 
high degree of civil and military aerospace integration in the US, American companies acquired 
important technology gains from military-funded R&D in specific fields including avionics and 
materials while such opportunities remained limited in scale and scope in Europe (Braddon, 
1999). 
Massive investment in military R&D and its migration to civil applications also helped 
companies to accumulate a tremendous knowledge base which can be reused for defense 
applications for the second wave of innovation. One latest trend in military applications in 
aerospace is the continuing convergence of the roles of defense and security into a single 
group of customer needs (Airbus, 2013 FR) with an increasing utilization of civil applications 
like intelligence, surveillance, secure communications and electronics. Dual use is especially 
highlighted in such areas due to the nature of technology which is open to widespread 
application with a broader range. Thus the military has changed its design philosophy, using 
commercially available, off-the-shelf technology when appropriate, rather than developing 
new customized components (BLS, 2006). 
Meanwhile, beside this "spillover" effect of military technologies, civilian aerospace has also 
benefited considerably from technological developments in numerous other industries 
(Mowery and Rosenberg, 1982). Electronics, IT and composite materials have a rising share of 
applications within new civil or military aerospace products. Large aerospace firms became 
active developers and acquirers of such technologies (see mergers and acquisitions and joint 
ventures of Airbus and Boeing in Chapter Three; Esposito and Passaro, 2009) which were also 
supported by government funds. As a simple example, Department of Commerce’s Federal 
R&D support for composite manufacturing research in the automobile industry was later 
successfully utilized by aerospace industry (Braddon, 1999). 
Moreover, the transfer of military technologies to civilian uses is not always one way. In many 
cases, civilian products are being extensively used for military purposes after necessary 
redesign and modifications. As a comparison, Boeing is much more advanced in utilizing 
similar technologies and platforms for both commercial and military uses compared to Airbus. 
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Beside a much broader product range in defense, security and space segments, it has also 
been highly successful in converting available commercial products for military uses thanks to 
keen government demand for such aircraft. Boeing’s commercial to defense conversions 
include 737 Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft (14 built until 2015); C-40 Clipper 
military transport aircraft (23 built until 2015); and P-8A Poseidon antisubmarine and anti-
surface warfare aircraft (27 built until 2015) converted from Boeing 737, and KC-46 Pegasus 
military aerial refueling aircraft converted from 767 (11 built for non-US customers and 179 
ordered/optioned by US Air Force). Airbus has only A310 MRTT (6 built until 2015) and A330 
MRTT (22 built until 2015) aerial refueling aircraft conversions in use. 
2.3 Demand, Product Markets and Competition 
As previously stated, aerospace and commercial aircraft manufacturing sectors mainly 
produce capital goods for government and business organizations. A particular feature of the 
industry is the small lot size of final products. Together with rising technological complexity 
and higher development costs, a small market of aerospace final products imposes a highly 
concentrated industrial structure with a very limited number of final product manufacturers 
in each segment of the industry. In specific segments the market may also be controlled by a 
single supplier for temporary or prolonged periods which provides a monopoly power. 
Examples include Boeing’s monopoly over wide body long range segment of commercial 
aircraft up until late 2000s with its 747 model and Russia’s current monopoly on human 
spaceflight which is provided by Soyuz rockets and crew capsules. Thus the level of 
competition is a controversial issue in civil and military aerospace. Due to their distinct 
character, as the demand is substantially composed of government contracts, the rivalry in 
defense and space segments mainly restricted to a competition between national firms. As an 
example, Table 2.2 shows the share of biggest US and non-US top aerospace and defense 
contractors for a selected group of US departments having highest obliged amounts in 
aerospace and defense. In 2013, procurement from non-US firms and organizations 
constituted only around 8 percent of the total defense and space spending of the US 
government among these departments.  
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Table 2.2: Share of top 100 US and non-US contractors for the major US aerospace and 
defense purchasing departments by dollars obligated in 2013 
Department 
Total amount 
obliged by the 
department 
(in millions USD) 
% share of the 
amount obliged 
to US 
organizations 
% share of the 
amount obliged 
to non-US 
organizations 
# of non-US 
firms in top 
100 
contractors 
DoD 202 419 91,9 8,1 20 
US Navy 73 344 94,9 5,1 9 
US Army 54 340 93,8 6,2 11 
US Air Force 45 953 95,7 4,3 12 
Defense Logistics 25 234 63,0 37,0 31 
NASA 13 384 96,1 3,9 4 
Homeland Security 8 335 89,5 10,5 11 
Missile Defense 7 610 99,9 0,1 4 
Defense Information 4 103 92,5 7,5 9 
US Special Operations 2 358 98,0 2,0 6 
Defense Commissary 1 399 94,6 5,4 11 
Defense Threat Reduction 914 95,2 4,8 7 
DARPA 704 87,8 12,2 7 
Defense Contract Management Agency 521 86,8 13,2 7 
Defense Microelectronics 520 81,3 18,7 9 
DoDEA 229 48,4 51,6 39 
Defense Finance 142 82,3 17,7 9 
Defense Media 91 96,5 3,5 7 
Defense Security 61 93,8 6,2 17 
TOTAL as a group 441 661 91,6 8,4  
Source: US General Services Administration Federal Procurement Data System 
The long-term market for aerospace and defense products and services also depends primarily 
on the characteristics of demand for each segment. In the case of military aerospace segments 
of the defense and security market, major drivers of demand are mainly restricted to political 
decision-making on defense and security spending and corresponding size of budgets. One 
major effect of the latest economic and financial crisis has been the pressure to reduce 
defense spending and the reduction in defense budgets in the West. In effect, between 2010 
and 2014, OECD defense budget R&D as a percentage of total government budget 
appropriations or outlays has decreased from 28.6 percent to 23.4 percent (OECD, 2015). 
Continuing convergence of the roles of defense and security has also an impact on industrial 
integration and resulting product range. Whether the global progress of budget cuts in 
defense and security spending is still blurry, the impact of such cuts on industrial performance 
and its subsequent reorganization may also have a great impact over marketing strategies of 
aerospace firms with varying performance figures. The rapid decrease in military spending 
during the post-Cold War period, resulted in a massive consolidation of aerospace industry 
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both in the US and in Europe which also reorganized the commercial segments of the industry 
around a handful of companies resulted in duopolies in major segments like commercial 
aircrafts or oligopolies in general aviation or helicopters. As a result, very high levels of 
producer concentration continue to persist in each segment. 
In the commercial and civil aviation segments, however, manufacturers compete on a global 
scale. The main determinant of the aircraft market and the demand for new aircraft in 
different sizes and configurations is the performance of the airline industry and their long-
term fleet planning. Mainly based on air traffic forecasts and trend estimates, CA 
manufacturers regularly publish market forecasts on demand for passenger aircrafts in 
different seating categories. Any change in national and international regulations on safety, 
emissions, noise limits and the rate of replacement and obsolescence of existing fleets of 
airline companies are also influential. Manufacturers base their decisions to increase or 
decrease their output on their existing orders as well as market outlook for their specific 
products. Such estimates are also important indicators to launch a new product in a specific 
CA segment as well as the interests of airlines to order new aircraft. Commercial airlines base 
their decisions to purchase a new aircraft model on a number of factors such as routes they 
fly, aircraft range, size, cargo capacity, type of engine, and seating arrangements and the 
selection is ultimately based on a manufacturer’s ability to deliver a reliable aircraft that best 
fit the purchaser’s stated market needs at the lowest cost and at favorable financing terms 
(BLS, 2006). Overall health of the economy, fuel prices, interest rates, and consumer 
confidence are also influential (Tortoriello, 2010). Airlines placing initial orders had and still 
have extensive power to dictate the performance characteristics which differ substantially 
depending on the route structures and technological preferences. Their commitment to 
purchase a specific number of aircrafts of the new model and their initial payments help 
manufacturers to reduce market uncertainty. Their expectations in terms of product 
performance, quality, and overall value have long been on the rise. They expect very high 
utilization of each aircraft to recover their investment requirements. For this reason, reliability 
and safety are rigorous. Moreover, an airline customer may expect decades of on-going 
technical support for maintenance, repairs, and further modifications (Sorscher, 2011). 
Explained by the gradual increase in commercial aircraft deliveries and the so-called 
democratization of air transport since the 1970s, the growth of air transport outpaced the 
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growth of the broader global economy. Between 1995 and 2012, the world GDP grew at an 
average annual rate of 2.8 percent while the world passenger air traffic expressed in revenue 
passenger-kilometers increased at an average annual growth rate of 5 percent (ICAO Facts 
and Figures, 2014). However, the growth of air transport was disrupted by several slowdowns 
directly or indirectly related to aviation. Figure 2.1 shows world air transport revenue between 
1950 and 2012 with major disruptions which led to one or more years of recession in the air 
transport business. 
Figure 2.1: The course of world air transport in terms of revenue passenger-kilometers 
growth, 1950-2012 
 
Source: ICAO web site, retrieved in December 2014 
The strong increase in air travel demand in the last two decades can be explained by two major 
factors. The first one is the rapid rise of air travel in developing economies and particularly in 
China. As of 2014, in the top 10 list of airlines by international and domestic passengers 
carried, there are two European low-cost and three Chinese national airlines (IATA, 2015, from 
WATS 59th edition). Figure 2.2 shows the growth in air travel in a selected group of countries 
with their compound annual growth rates indicated in percentages. The growth in China 
surpassed any other country between 1994 and 2013 and the number of passengers carried 
by Chinese airlines experienced nearly a ten-fold increase. The second factor is the rise of low-
cost airlines all over the world but especially in Europe. The substantial success of these 
carriers forced national airlines or flag carriers of the world to gradually introduce their own 
low-cost subsidiaries in order to compete in regional routes and short distance destinations. 
These new actors of the air transport industry quickly became a major source of demand for 
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commercial and regional aircraft sales. During the same period the increase in Europe was 
also spectacular especially compared to the US as the figure shows. 
Figure 2.2: Growth in air transport by passengers carried in the US, the EU, China, Brazil and 
India; 1995-2014 
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, 2015 
A specific character of the aerospace industry is its cyclicality. As a capital-intensive industry, 
both civil and defense segments are subject to multiple-year fluctuations owing to either 
general economic downturns, volatility of airlines profitability, defense budget cuts or industry 
specific downturns which have important corporate or organizational level consequences on 
firms and their competitiveness. Figure 2.3 below show the year-to-year percentage change 
in total commercial aircraft deliveries in the US and Europe since 1960. Except unusually 
positive change in deliveries in 2009 which prevented another downward trend despite the 
fact that it was a year of global economic recession, the irregular cyclical nature of the industry 
can easily be followed since the early years of passenger jets. For the latest period, continuous 
growth in commercial aircraft deliveries during the recession is mainly explained by rising 
deliveries to Asia.  
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Figure 2.3: Year-to-year percentage change in total commercial aircraft deliveries in the 
world, 1960-2015 
 
Deliveries include all Airbus, Boeing, McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed jet passenger models and 
Concorde (British Aircraft Corporation & Aérospatiale), Comet (de Havilland), Caravelle (Sud Aviation), 
Trident (Hawker Siddeley), VC-10 (Vickers-Armstrongs), BAC-111 (BAC), Mercure (Dassault Aviation), 
Convair 880 and Convair 990 (General Dynamics) models of their respective manufacturers. The curve 
indicates two-period moving averages 
Sources: Baldwin and Krugman (1988); Airbus and Boeing company websites. 
As of 2015, excluding miniscule sales of Tupolev Tu-204 predominantly in Russia by UAC, 
Airbus and Boeing represent a long-lasting equally shared duopoly of the commercial aircraft 
market which has had important consequences for the overall structure of the industry. Figure 
2.4 shows the market share of major CA manufacturers since the introduction of the first jet 
passenger Boeing 707 in 1958, and Figure 2.5 shows the number of deliveries by Airbus and 
Boeing. Airbus and Boeing share the market almost equally for the last ten years. The 
cyclicality in aircraft sales is observed much more strongly in Boeing with multiple supply and 
demand related reasons including production stoppages due to supplier deficiencies, labor 
strikes, organizational issues arising from rapid ramp-up of final assembly and a sharp fall in 
domestic aircraft orders resulted in large-scale cancellations. 
Figure 2.4: Commercial aircraft deliveries of major manufacturers, 1958-2015 
 
Sources: Baldwin and Krugman (1988); Airbus and Boeing company websites 
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Figure 2.5: Number of Airbus and Boeing commercial aircraft deliveries, 1958-2015 
 
Source: Airbus and Boeing company websites 
This increase in air travel in specific regions is also reflected in sales to these economies by 
main CA manufacturers. Figures 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 below show sales of Airbus and Boeing to 
specific regions for the periods with consistent and comparable sales figures available. The 
figures show that the competition between two companies is concentrated mostly in 
Asia/Pacific and Middle East regions. These regions continue to be cited as the highest growth 
markets for major aerospace companies (KPMG, 2012), and the share of these regions in total 
sales has substantially increased for both companies. Between 2000 and 2013, two regions’ 
share in total sales of Airbus and Boeing increased from 10 and 15 to 42 and 39 percent 
respectively. While they continue to dominate their home markets, sales of Airbus and Boeing 
in their rival’s domestic market proportionally decreased during the period. The scope of 
fierce competition, which is also the main source of decades-long subsidy conflict between 
the two companies, moved to the Asia-Pacific region. The two companies offer large price 
discounts to increase their sales volumes and maintain brand loyalty (Tortoriello, 2010). Thus, 
fierce price competition, very high levels of producer concentration and significant product 
differentiation as principal characteristics of the aircraft manufacturing continue to coexist 
more than thirty years after these characteristics were identified in the seminal work of 
Mowery and Rosenberg (1982) on the commercial aircraft industry.  
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Figure 2.6: Geographical distribution of total revenue between 2005 and 2014 (10-year 
total) 
 
Due to distinct regional calculations prior to 2005, sales figures before this year cannot be 
differentiated. The categorizations are based on Airbus’ less detailed classification. In the case of 
Boeing, Airbus’ North America group corresponds to Boeing’s Canada and the United States; Airbus’ 
Asia/Pacific group to Boeing’s China, Rest of Asia and Oceania groups combined; Airbus’ Latin America 
group to Boeing’s Rest of Western Hemisphere group; and Airbus’ Rest of the world group to Boeing’s 
only remaining category Africa 
Source: Airbus and Boeing company annual reports. 
Figure 2.7: Distribution of Airbus geographical segment revenue between 2000 and 2014 
 
Source: Airbus annual reports  
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Figure 2.8: Distribution of Boeing geographical segment revenue between 1991 and 2014 
 
Before 2005, Middle East was considered in Rest of Asia group and before 2004 Canada was in Rest of 
Western Hemisphere group Source: Boeing annual reports 
2.4 Technological characteristics and product development 
Development and manufacturing of civil and military aerospace products and services require 
advanced technology and quality requirements. The success of the sector mainly comes from 
the ability to benefit from technological developments in aviation and other industries based 
on substantial amounts of research initiatives of not only business firms but also public bodies 
like universities and government research institutes specialized in aerospace all over the 
world. Final products of aerospace can only be designed, developed and manufactured 
through the integration of colossal amount of knowledge generated by these different types 
of organizations. 
Primary features of the product development and production process include: 
• Product and process complexity – Following the massive integration of fundamental 
aerospace technologies with new technologies in other domains including but not limited to 
advanced materials, electronics, navigation and communications, aerospace industry today 
has a very high level of process and product complexity which has important implications over 
the industrial organization. In commercial aircrafts, the latest trends of new technology 
integration are widespread use of composite materials as a substitute to heavier metals and 
alloys, and replacement of aircraft systems utilizing hydraulic power to carry out major tasks 
like air pressurizing, air conditioning, flight control and operations with alternative systems 
dependent on electricity power. The efforts of global aerospace companies to tap these 
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technologies are gradually changing the structure of the industry. Different than prior times 
when most of the product development and manufacturing was performed in-house, 
mounting technological complexity to design and produce advanced components and systems 
has resulted in a complex web of production processes despite continuing efforts of OEMs to 
simplify their value chain networks. 
The dynamics of the integration of civil and military technologies and applications in different 
fields of aerospace continue to dominate new product development efforts as well. 
• Systems-type products – As a result of this technological super-integration, final products 
carry distinct features that have to be integrated, tested and utilized simultaneously. Major 
systems integrated to primary aerospace products like aircraft, spacecraft, satellites or 
missiles include structures, propulsion, flight controls and avionics, environmental control, 
navigation and communication systems and electrical network. The result is the growing role 
of suppliers of these systems which creates an established hierarchy within the supply chain 
as these systems providers have started to dictate their own specifications to lower-tier 
suppliers and cut their direct access to OEMs through their own contracts. 
• Very high development costs – A colossal scale of technological integration together with 
ever-growing safety, quality and performance requirements result in a spectacular rise in 
development costs for aerospace products as well as new aircraft models. Table 2.3 shows the 
exponential rise of development costs of commercial aircrafts since the early days of 
commercial aircraft manufacturing. The increase in costs after the integration of jet engines 
and advanced electronics together with other war-tested technologies after 1950s is 
especially remarkable. Nowadays, major aerospace companies devote a considerable amount 
of their revenues in R&D expenditures. This ratio is usually higher for civilian aircraft 
manufacturers as R&D costs for military aerospace products are generally externally financed. 
Suppliers have also started to devote bigger resources to research and development as they 
are more responsible with design and development. For substantially high-cost products with 
considerably large production runs like commercial aircraft, a certain amount of costs is 
incurred indirectly by the acceptance of losses during the initial phase of the learning curve 
(Baldwin and Krugman, 1988). One time charges due to unexpected development issues and 
resulted delays are also prevalent. 
80 
 
Table 2.3: Selected commercial aircraft development costs 
Model 
Entered 
service in 
Development 
costs in current 
USD (millions) 
Development 
costs in 2009 
USD (millions) 
Implicit Price 
Deflators for USA 
GNP (2009 = 100) 
DC-3 1936 0,3 3,8 7,99 
DC-6 1947 14 109 12,86 
DC-8 1959 112 651 17,20 
Boeing 747 1969 1200 5555 21,60 
Boeing 777 1995 6000 7969 75,29 
A380 2008 15500 15619 99,24 
Boeing 787 2011 18000 17402 103,44 
Source: Original DC-3, DC-6, DC-8 and Boeing 747 figures are from Competing Economies: 
America, Europe and the Pacific Rim (1991), report prepared by the US Congress Office of 
Technology Assessment. 777, 787 and Airbus A380 figures are estimates published by various 
business sources. Estimates of the last three programs do not include extra payments due to 
delays, work-in-process inventory and supplier advances. Figures for GNP Deflator are taken 
from US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis database 
Learning curve 
Popularized later by mainstream economics in their effort to interiorize knowledge into the 
production process (Arrow, 1962), learning is a critical feature of any productive activity, 
particularly relevant in commercial aircraft manufacturing. For the industry, learning curve 
shows the change in productivity gained through the learning process with cumulative 
production. It was observed first in military aircraft production (Wright, 1936) and studied by 
various economics scholars in the US after it received attention during the Second World War 
as US government contractors searched for ways to predict costs and time requirements for 
construction of military ships and aircraft (Yelle, 1979). Introduction of new products with 
intervals characterized by new technological content; massive development costs of these 
products and skilled labor force which requires constant training with progressive returns 
make aircraft manufacturing an excellent case of application of learning curves. These curves 
are represented in percentages and the 80 percent learning curve became an industry 
standard suggested by industrial experts (Hartley, 1965; Irwin and Pavcnik, 2004) and studied 
with empirical data with substantially similar figures (Benkard, 2000). It means that as the 
number of aircraft manufactured is doubled, the direct labor input per aircraft declines by 20 
percent. Besides the increase in direct labor productivity based on workers’ skill and efficiency 
through multiple repetition and dexterity; the complexity of the design, the introduction of 
modifications to existing design in production, regular organizational changes, inspections and 
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controls in the shop-floor and any discontinuities in the production may impact the curve 
adversely or favorably (Benkard, 2000; Hartley, 1965). Learning is not only limited to technical 
aspects of manufacturing. It can also be managerial and organizational (Hickie, 2006). 
Increasing outsourcing and strategic manufacturing alliances specifically highlight the 
collective character of learning and its managerial and organizational aspects. Finally, Benkard 
(2000) also shows the potential impact of human capital depreciation or ‘organizational 
forgetting’ on production performance when learning spillovers are incomplete. Critiques, 
however, emphasize that such studies of manufacturing productivity with estimated learning 
curves fail to include industrial-relations factors, and they may suffer from omitted variable 
bias and thus overstate the effect of the learning curve and other production processes 
(Kleiner et al., 2002). 
• Design-intensive process – Product development in aircraft and engines incorporates a 
rather long design period in which producers search the possibilities to integrate the newest 
technologies. Although breakthroughs are continuously sought for superior performance and 
efficiency, most of the technological breakthroughs are still introduced incrementally (Hoag, 
2000). Decisions about the moment when specific technologies are mature enough for 
application rest on careful monitoring and call for fine judgment (McIntyre, 1992). 
Manufacturers monitor each other closely and redesign their running development programs 
in case of technical reconsiderations. As an example Airbus decided first to switch back from 
already designed lithium-ion batteries on A350 XWB to nickel-cadmium ones following defects 
on lithium-ion models used in Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner which caused the entire 787 fleet to 
be grounded for around three months in early 2013. However, in late 2014, the company 
decided to bring back lithium-ion batteries beginning with 2016, ensuring safety and 
certification. Capabilities that enable an aerospace firm to manage each phase from initial 
design to assembly including later stage product improvements are highly decisive on 
commercial success considering the magnitude of a new development program. In 
commercial aircraft manufacturing, potential stretching for different seating configurations, 
updates of existing models and additional uses of existing commercial programs like 
freighters, aerial refueling, airborne early warning and control and executive aircrafts are also 
important. Design work is extended to entire life course of an aircraft or an engine. The power 
of a design is hidden in its potential to scale itself into different directions in order to meet a 
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variety of user needs (Frenken and Leydesdorff, 2000). This power provides to the firm an 
important degree of competitive advantage as long as it guarantees more orders from 
customers and reduces down its production costs along the learning curve. 
• Relatively low production rates and high customization – In many cases aerospace firms 
work on a specific contract with the customer with a large extent of modifications if they do 
not develop complete tailor-made products and services as in the case of spacecraft or 
infrastructural installations. Modifications according to customer needs are prevalent even in 
comparatively mass-produced products like commercial aircrafts and helicopters. 
Nevertheless, in order to take advantage of learning curves and to mitigate high development 
costs which impose long-term break-even points that have major impacts on overall 
profitability, firms need large production runs for any kind of product. The break-even point 
in manufacturing is the moment at which production costs and revenue are equal. In products 
like commercial aircraft with large-scale development costs, the break-even point 
corresponds to a certain number of final products sold to cover corresponding development 
and ongoing production expenses starting from the first aircraft produced. It is the basis of 
the success of an aircraft program as companies estimate their costs based on a certain 
number of units produced or program accounting. In the past, many aircraft models and 
especially various European ones remained unprofitable and thus discontinued without any 
possibility to create a family of aircraft by their producers. 
• Very long production and operational cycles – Due to its high technology content with 
massive amounts of knowledge input, development of a standard aerospace product may take 
several years. These products however, in most of the cases are capital goods for their end-
users and utilized for long periods. For example, the service life of a commercial aircraft is 
between 25 and 30 years on average (Forsberg, 2012). 
• High requirements for reliability and safety – Heavier-than-air aerospace products have to 
provide high degrees of safety, reliability and reactivity. Very strict requirements also 
necessitate high functional and safety standards that require testing and certification by 
national and international aviation authorities. While intensifying international relations 
stimulate initiatives to harmonize standards and procedures (Ecorys, 2009), certification is still 
a long and costly process which creates barriers for new entrants. For example, between the 
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first flight and Chinese certification, it took more than six years for China’s regional aircraft 
Comac ARJ21 due to multiple technical and certification problems. The aircraft has not been 
certified by the FAA or European EASA and until it is certified it cannot fly in the US or Europe. 
• Pervasive uncertainty – different forms of uncertainty are prevalent in every stages including 
operational period of a product. These forms can be categorized under technological, market 
and competitive uncertainties. Technological uncertainty corresponds to the potential 
inability of the firm of developing the higher quality processes and products envisaged in its 
innovative investment strategy. Market uncertainty corresponds to the unknown future 
reductions in product prices and increases in factor prices that may lower the returns to be 
generated by the investments. Lastly, competitive uncertainty corresponds to the possibility 
that a competitor will have invested in a strategy that generates an even higher quality, lower 
cost product (Lazonick, 2013). In many cases technological performance of a new aircraft 
cannot be predicted definitively before a certain period of utilization. Besides, operating cost 
reductions from the perspective of customers as a sign of innovativeness depend on learning 
about the performance characteristics of the system and its components (Mowery and 
Rosenberg, 1982). Moreover, especially for commercial equipment producers, orders are 
inconsistent as a result of competition or business cycles and return on investment is not 
guaranteed (Benkard, 2000). Such a market uncertainty assumes a potential failure to access 
a large enough share of the market to transform high fixed costs into low unit costs and to 
profit from the learning curve effect. Finally, aggressive competition which also forces 
manufacturers to periodically upgrade models as well as to simultaneously produce several 
variants also creates persistent competitive uncertainty as competitors may always produce 
similar products in a better and cheaper way. 
2.5 Industrial organization and supply chain 
A remarkable aspect of aerospace industry is a complex and highly dynamic supply chain 
organization. Compared to early decades of the jet age when most of the work was performed 
in-house and both airframe and engine producers developed and manufactured their 
products independently (Mowery, 1988), today the industry is organized around a complex 
system of collaboration and subcontracting in different forms. These forms include made-to-
order, multiyear contracts, technical partnerships, co-development and risk-sharing 
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agreements. In aircraft manufacturing the system is mainly vertically structured around a lead 
firm or the systems integrator which coordinates the whole production process of the 
program beginning with initial prototype design until certification and delivery of the aircraft 
while it also provides after-sales services to final users. It stores all the information relative to 
the product and is legally responsible for the aircraft (Esposito and Passaro, 2009). Airlines are 
involved in the preliminary phase as consultants for the speciﬁcation of the aircraft’s technical 
characteristics and partially provide financial commitment through their preliminary orders 
and down payments after the launch of the program. A remarkable aspect of today’s aircraft 
manufacturing, suppliers are increasingly involved in design and development of parts with 
high added-value and share the risks associated with the development of the program. 
Systems integrators have become more dependent upon the ability of suppliers and 
subcontractors to meet performance specifications and quality standards within the scope of 
delivery schedules. 
Interconnected reasons behind the extensive supply chain development include changing 
technological requirements of technically superior aircraft and resulting firm specialization 
like higher content of electronics, software or advanced materials in newer models; new 
suppliers from developing economies with increasing capabilities and strong governmental 
support; and most importantly, corporate strategies to reorganize production processes in 
line with organizational and financial motives. For the very same reasons, the supply chain 
organization is continuously being restructured with every new aerospace program of final 
product manufacturers. 
Thus, an important feature of aerospace industrial organization is supplier development. 
Supplier development can be defined as a company’s undertaking to improve capabilities of 
its suppliers, which also involves the willingness of the supplier company to allocate resources 
for new physical investments and for learning new skills (Sako, 2004). Starting with 
subcontracting of minor parts and components manufacturing, as well as offsetting 
agreements with international partners, systems integrators today outsource complete sub-
systems and aircraft sections to a small group of first-tier suppliers, which also organize their 
own supply chains in an increasingly similar manner. 
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However, as heavily engineered complex products, aerospace products require stringent 
coordination and communication in design, manufacture and operation (Sorscher, 2002) and 
outsourcing becomes a challenge for firms willing to externalize bigger and more complex 
sections of aircraft. Suppliers have to get through very large initial capital investments and 
extensive skills development which bring pressure to modify their business models and 
enlarge their scale and scope concurrently. OEMs’ efforts of supplier development in their 
latest programs have been remarkable. They have not only provided technical expertise and 
knowledge transfer through contracts, but also ceded in some instances their production units 
and manufacturing lines to their suppliers. While outsourcing increases, a consolidation in 
supply chain is also being advanced partly due to concessions and price reductions OEMs ask 
from their suppliers (Deloitte, 2014). In the meantime, controlling costs and managing 
development projects have become arduous for systems integrators, reflected in escalating 
development costs and extended development periods with delays. Experience and tacit 
knowledge provide invaluable advantage over companies. 
In contrast to other manufacturing sectors, low-cost supply from developing economies 
remain limited due to their lack of broad capabilities in aerospace. Moreover, highly 
automated aerospace manufacturing is another hurdle over the setting of operations in low-
cost countries (PMI, 2009). Also for aerospace; the main source of competitive advantage is 
capabilities and mostly the organizational ones. 
2.6 Workforce 
The most fundamental and quite unique characteristic of employment in aerospace is the 
coexistence of two large armies of highly skilled blue-collar workers and highly educated 
white-collar professionals. The industry has a larger proportion of workers with education 
beyond high school than many other manufacturing industries. It is on the leading edge of 
technology, constantly striving to create new products and improve existing ones (BLS, 2006) 
while it is involved in large-scale manufacturing. Moreover, the coordination of hundreds of 
thousands of parts that are assembled into an aerospace product and meeting regulatory and 
recordkeeping requirements entail a large group of managerial and administrative support 
occupations. Thus the industry is both knowledge and manufacturing intensive. 
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Such a distinct range of workforce types is clearly visible in the statistics. Table 2.4 provides a 
comparison of the distribution of a selected group of occupations in the aerospace with all 
other manufacturing industries and US economy as a whole. The most pronounced aspect of 
aerospace employment which shows the distinct character of the industry within the 
manufacturing sector is the narrow difference between the proportions of engineering and 
production occupations compared to other parts of the economy. One out of six 
manufacturing sector engineers works for the aerospace industry. The second remarkable 
aspect is the higher hourly and annual wages in aerospace which are significantly above the 
average of all manufacturing industries. Consistent with the high level of skills and the amount 
of training needed, average hourly earnings of production workers in the aircraft industry are 
significantly above the average of all manufacturing industries. The average annual wage in 
the sector is around 50 percent higher than the average manufacturing wage. Such highlights 
are quite similar for aerospace industries in other parts of the world. OECD Structural Analysis 
Database provides similar correlations between aerospace employment and higher wages in 
Europe (OECD STAN, 2012). 
Table 2.4: US Industry-Specific Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates in May 2013 
Sector Occupation title Workforce 
% of total 
workforce of 
the sector 
Mean 
hourly 
wage 
Annual 
mean 
wage 
NAICS 336400 - Aerospace Product 
and Parts Manufacturing 
Engineers 87,810 17.47 $46.13 $95,950 
NAICS 336400 - Aerospace Product 
and Parts Manufacturing 
Architecture and 
Engineering Occupations 
109,250 21.73 $43.36 $90,180 
NAICS 336400 - Aerospace Product 
and Parts Manufacturing 
Production Occupations 166,300 33.08 $23.31 $48,490 
NAICS 336400 - Aerospace Product 
and Parts Manufacturing 
All Occupations 502,740 100.00 $34.65 $72,070 
Sectors 31, 32, and 33 – 
Manufacturing 
Engineers 557,090 4.65 $42.71 $88,830 
Sectors 31, 32, and 33 – 
Manufacturing 
Architecture and 
Engineering Occupations 
777,790 6.49 $38.08 $79,200 
Sectors 31, 32, and 33 – 
Manufacturing 
Production Occupations 6,163,470 51.43 $17.11 $35,590 
Sectors 31, 32, and 33 – 
Manufacturing 
All Occupations 11,983,290 100.00 $23.00 $47,830 
Cross-industry, private, federal, 
state, and local 
Engineers 1,547,580 1.17 $44.31 $92,170 
Cross-industry, private, federal, 
state, and local 
Architecture and 
Engineering Occupations 
2,380,840 1.80 $38.51 $80,100 
Cross-industry, private, federal, 
state, and local 
Production Occupations 8,765,180 6.61 $16.79 $34,930 
Cross-industry, private, federal, 
state, and local 
All Occupations 132,588,810 100.00 $22.33 $46,440 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics of Occupational Employment 
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A main feature of Western aerospace employment is its rapid decrease at the end of the Cold 
War mainly due to sharp fall in defense budgets in the early 1990s. After this steep fall 
aerospace employment has been stabilized in Europe and the US, in contrast with the 
continuous decline in manufacturing employment in these regions (Figure A.5 in Appendix). 
Another marked feature is the decline in the proportion of production workers to total 
aerospace employment. Figure 2.9 shows the change in the composition of the US aerospace 
workforce between 1999 and 2013. While total employment in aerospace is almost 
unchanged (502,270 in 1999 vs. 502,740 in 2013) in BLS statistics, the composition has 
considerably changed. The decrease in production, construction and support occupations is 
compensated with more engineering, financial and computer related occupations. The reason 
for the limited decrease in production occupations may be the high-tech character of 
aerospace manufacturing that is still concentrated in developed economies. Western OEMs 
have only started in the last decade to outsource or offshore considerable work to developing 
economies which explains the stability of aerospace manufacturing compared to the free fall 
of manufacturing as a whole in Western economies. The proportional rise in engineering 
occupations is related to the increase in technological complexity and the massive integration 
of advanced systems into final products. The production process has also become much more 
automatized with advanced machinery and tooling. The last but not least, increasing 
outsourcing has put forward the role of specific professions like industrial engineering through 
the rising needs of operations management and systems engineering. Inspired from car 
manufacturing industry, the motivation to develop faster, better quality and lower cost 
products also led aerospace firms to utilize new management techniques like lean 
manufacturing which presumes low inventory levels with high levels of subcontracting. 
Figure 2.10 shows the changing structure in the employment of engineers in US aerospace. 
The total number of engineers has increased from approximately 86,000 to 109,000 between 
1999 and 2013. The main source of the overall increase comes from the rise in the 
employment of electronic, industrial and mechanical engineers while the number of 
aerospace engineers actually decreased. Demand for highly-skilled workforce with up-to-date 
knowledge in advanced technologies has long been a hot topic among industry 
representatives and policy makers (AIA, 2008; INSEE, 2010). 
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Figure 2.9: The comparison of the composition of US aerospace workforce in 1999 and 2013 
 
Source: BLS Occupational Employment Statistics 
Figure 2.10: The comparison of the composition of aerospace engineering workforce in 
1999, 2013
 
Source: BLS Occupational Employment Statistics 
Learning processes and retaining skills are also important to cope with shortcomings like costly 
rework, repair and to avoid bottlenecks and other interruptions in production. As an example, 
for Boeing 787, Boeing workers in Seattle and San Antonio worked hard on reworking parts 
with defects delivered by suppliers and refurbishment of early aircrafts produced by 
company’s inexperienced North Charleston employees. Maintaining enough qualified 
employees is one of the industry’s chief challenges (Kronemer and Henneberger, 1993). The 
high productivity of aerospace depends on skills retention, employment and career 
opportunities (Lynn, 1995).  
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2.7 Finance of the Industry 
The aerospace industry has both similar and distinct characteristics with other higher R&D 
spending manufacturing sectors in term of corporate finance. Uncertainty is prevalent in every 
stage of the innovation process as well as during the period after any product launch. Supplier 
involvement in product development and production increasingly includes financial 
participation in the success or failure of the project that entails suppliers to share financial 
risks involved in projects. As in other manufacturing sectors, the major issue of smaller 
suppliers and other small subcontractors is the difficulty in accessing finance which aggravates 
with any delay of the program and related financial pressures (INSEE, 2010). 
Financial risks are also shared by the airlines as long as they are involved in product 
development by providing commitment with upfront payments. Airlines usually buy new 
aircraft under long-term contracts which specify delivery dates. These contracts include 
upfront, progress and final payments while the biggest amount is paid when the aircraft is 
received. If the aircraft manufacturer does not meet the prescribed delivery date, it faces a 
penalty. Moreover, aircraft manufacturers do not recognize any revenues until the aircraft is 
delivered. Thus the long-term contracts primarily benefit the buyer and they put seller under 
pressure especially if the contracts are about a new aircraft program where the probability of 
a delay is much higher (Tortoriello, 2010). 
Tightly connected to the large set of uncertainties, estimates are fundamentally important in 
commercial aircraft manufacturing. Such estimates crucially differ from the other segments of 
the industry like defense or space programs where the amount of the order is tightly 
estimated and total sales are based on negotiated contract prices and quantities. In civil 
segments, changes in underlying estimates, supplier performance, or airline industry 
performance circumstances directly affect the financial performance of manufacturers. 
Another feature of commercial segments of aerospace is customer financing. Manufacturers 
also provide financing for their own products to customers as an alternative or complement 
of other financing mechanisms like commercial bank loans or export/import bank financing. 
While manufacturers commit large amounts of their own resources in new product 
development and following improvements, government support is still the single most 
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important source of innovation finance in aerospace industry which deserves a detailed 
discussion presented below. 
2.8 Government Presence 
“Without federal government [support] there would simply be no aircraft industry 
despite the fact that the commercial market is playing a much larger role than it 
has in the past”. 
(Bluestone, Jordan and Sullivan, 1981, p. 170, excerpted from Ruttan, 2006, p. 65) 
Diverging destiny of the aerospace industry from the rest of the manufacturing sector in the 
West is a primary incentive to analyze the extent of the role of government support to the 
industry. 
Adopting the idea that markets and international trade are outcomes of industrial 
development rather than a cause of it and the roots of industrial development nourished 
primarily from innovation, skills, and technological development; the role of government 
emerges as a fact more than a proposal. In effect, the role of government goes beyond the 
funding of basic or applied research and it also includes mobilizing resources and allowing 
knowledge and innovations to diffuse across the economy (Mazzucato, 2011) and it is the 
government investments in knowledge base that give the meaning of the term developmental 
state (Lazonick, 2012). To explain the dominance of a specific economy on a particular 
technology or industry, a view on the role of government is an integral part of any business 
history research. 
The aerospace industry is a genuine example to account the role of developmental states and 
their institutions in supporting innovative firms since the era of Wright Brothers’ monoplanes, 
until today’s all-composite jet airliners. A quick explanation of the role of governments can be 
given through massive government military investment both in the forms of manufacturing 
contracts and military or civilian research and development aid that also provided the 
aerospace industry with substantial incentives to bring affordable products to the civilian 
market (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1982). The strong ties with defense industry and still 
prevalent military-civilian interaction in aerospace research and development are basic 
factors that explain the strategic importance of the industry. It may also help to explain in part 
the persistence of the aerospace industry as one of the leading manufacturing industries in 
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terms of employment and sales and export revenues in developed economies. However, the 
role of government in promoting innovation and technological development extends beyond 
R&D support, procurement and other forms of assistance that help firms to achieve the 
benefits of generating and adopting new technologies. In effect, such a strategic character is 
the result of a combination of the size of its direct contribution to the economy (employment, 
taxes, domestic and international sales) and the extent of its technological and industrial base 
within an economy and a skilled and qualified labor force it maintains. An analysis of 
government support to the aerospace industry has to look from a developmental-state 
perspective that does not solely focus on the role of government in fostering technological 
development but also explains the development and maintaining of knowledge base as the 
fundamental source of the wealth of a nation that cannot be restricted only to financial 
success. 
Nevertheless, the power of government in determining the structure of the industry is not a 
unidirectional process. The source of innovation and economic growth in a capitalist world is 
principally based on the decisions taken by innovative enterprises. Thus, there is a 
complementarity between the developmental state and innovative enterprise in generating 
economic growth (Lazonick, 2012). It is this complementarity that provides motivation to go 
beyond the R&D support role and deepen the discussion of the role of governments in 
industrial development that also gives the opportunity to see conflicts that may also happen 
between the objectives of these two actors of economic life. A broader research framework 
is needed which combines a discussion on the role of government in fostering economic 
development to an analysis of innovative enterprise that a priori creates value and shares it 
with every contributing stakeholder.  
To identify the motives behind government support to aerospace industry from a historical 
perspective, it is necessary to explain the reasons and mechanisms of support and detail them 
in the context of the US and EU whether they are specific to Airbus and Boeing or they concern 
wider industrial community. In the case of a US-EU comparison, it is also crucial to document 
the decades long trade dispute between the two sides of Atlantic and its outcomes while 
putting it in a context that not only helps to explain specific mechanisms of support to Airbus 
and Boeing, but also to show the distinctive elements of the institutional settings in US and 
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European contexts. Such a distinction may also provide insights to explain different ways of 
functioning of these two firms. 
2.8.1 The role of government in aerospace, why and how? 
The reasons that explain the strong government support in the aerospace industry center on 
two interrelated factors, both of which consider the role of innovation, economic growth and 
established industrial characteristics that can be summarized in the combination of a high 
level of producer concentration with fierce price and quality competition (Mowery and 
Rosenberg, 1982), long lead times, high economic and industrial value of aerospace projects 
and their long term consequences for national economies (Hayward, 1975). The first factor 
focuses on the strategic character of the industry, especially considering its military content. 
National security considerations explain a majority of aerospace expenditures channeled to 
support military aerospace, which has had a significant impact on technological innovation in 
commercial aircraft (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989). Moreover, government support to the 
aerospace industry is a precondition to act as a strong state that is capable of realizing its 
commitments to the domestic and international economies (Francis and Pevzner, 2006). For 
example, in the case of France, the leading country in the formation of Airbus consortium as 
a Pan-European project, its ambition to support Airbus - and many other aerospace 
development programs in Western Europe in the period after the Second World War - was an 
explicit sign of challenging American hegemony in civil aerospace (Thornton, 1995). The 
second factor is the simple justification that government subsidies were either initiated or 
expanded in order to support domestic industries against much stronger rivals; for example, 
the dominant US aerospace against staggering European aerospace in the after-war period. 
Government support in different forms is necessary to nurture an infant industry against 
strong competitors that dominate the sector (Carbaugh and Olienyk, 2004) and to develop an 
R&D and manufacturing infrastructure and a pool of skilled labor that enable domestic firms 
to undertake ventures without bearing the full cost of development (Carbaugh and Olienyk, 
2001). 
The US and European government support in aerospace is a well-documented case not solely 
because of the strategic role the industry played along the twentieth century as an integral 
element of defense and armament or other strategic reasons maintained through different 
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institutional and organizational settings. The conflict between the US and European 
Community around government subsidies that started in the 1980s also provided a rich 
documentation of specific programs and support mechanisms. Thus the discussion can be 
divided into two periods. The first period starts from the very early days of aviation until early 
1980s when the trade dispute between the US and European companies and their respective 
governments started.  
2.8.2 From early years to 1980s – The rise of aviation and changing leadership 
In this first period, the extent of government support to aerospace industry was no less deep 
and diversified than today but the intervention was much more visible on both sides of the 
Atlantic mostly due to the disproportionate weight of military aircraft production. While the 
early period of aircraft production is marked by ‘dedicated enthusiasts’, they were still 
expecting a return on their investment as Rae (1965) puts: 
“It became manifest early that governments, in particular the military services, 
offered a more promising source of revenue than stunt flying at county fairs”. 
Europeans were the pioneers of investors in aviation and between 1908 and 1913 major 
European governments (excluding Russia) spent more than $70 million on aviation while the 
US spending was less than $400,000 during the same period (Ruttan, 2006). In some cases, US 
firms started to do business in Europe before they sold their airplanes to the US government 
(Rae, 1965). The US industry gathered its strength only during the First World War to fulfil 
military needs. In four years, the industry was transformed from a craft-oriented workshop 
operation into a manufacturing process geared to mass production (Todd and Simpson, 1986). 
During the war, a total of more than 150,000 airplanes were produced by British, French and 
German manufacturers while the number was close to 13,000 airplanes for the US during the 
18-month period between the time it entered the war and the end of the war (Ruttan, 2006; 
Todd and Simpson, 1986). 
However, the momentum that had developed during the war abruptly ended with the 
cessation of hostilities. Governments immediately cancelled their existing orders, and since 
commercial markets for airplanes had not yet been established to compensate, the result was 
an industrial collapse (O’Sullivan, 2007). In effect, while the military expenditure on 
aeronautics had almost vanished, commercial air transport was only coming into the world. 
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Remaining actors in the industry concentrated their efforts on advanced commercial aircraft 
models, and they helped to mark the 1920s as a period of significant technological change. 
The performance of different countries was not the same, and government action or inaction 
was critical. 
In the US, government action was through two channels. The first was regulation and related 
subsidies in airline development. For the main US players of the period, to become major 
actors in the creation of a commercial aircraft industry was not probable if they had to rely on 
their own private financial resources to develop new technologies in anticipation of an 
eventual demand. Also in the 1920s, it required huge capital expenditures on organization and 
technology to generate the possibility of providing passengers with high-quality, affordable 
air services and it was the US government’s explicit effort to build the nation’s 
communications infrastructure that led to the rapid growth of air transport and commercial 
aircraft industry. In the rapid evolution of the demand for new planes, the leading role was of 
the US Post Office. The two acts on mail transport authorized in 1925 and 1930 provided 
subsidies to carriers to develop airmail services that increased aircraft demand and incentives 
to order larger aircraft from manufacturers as they were getting more capable of providing 
passenger transport. The establishment of Civil Aeronautics Authority in 1938 contributed to 
the further success of US aerospace in the postwar years by creating strong incentives for 
rapid adoption of innovations (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989). Major US aircraft companies 
provided various models of high quality aircraft by virtue of their innovative activities as well 
as the latest aircraft technology developed beyond their in-house efforts (Ferleger and 
Lazonick, 1994). Leaning on their products’ superior technology, US manufacturers also 
campaigned for foreign business and established a dominant market for US-built aircraft (Rae, 
1965). 
The second channel of government action that fostered the development and growth of US 
commercial aircraft industry was the direct support of research through industry-friendly 
tailored institutional settings, crystallized with the support and conduct of the government 
organization National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) established as early as 
1915 shortly before the US entry into the First World War. Prior to 1940, or before the jet era 
started, NACA functioned primarily to provide research infrastructure in the form of 
experimental design data and testing facilities, such as wind tunnels which was very critical 
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considering the limited sources for research and limited capacity of the industry. The research 
either supported or conducted by NACA was not only confined to military domain. The steady 
flow of research coming through NACA facilities led to major improvements in airframe and 
engine design and efficiency (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989). One important aspect, it was 
NACA who defined the rules of providing incentives for applied research on generic 
technological innovations which is much more accessible to the industry as a whole compared 
to proprietary research. These incentives have worked in the same manner up until to the 
present in the US context. 
In Europe, the performance of national aircraft industries was not analogous during the period 
between the two world wars. In Britain and France, military aircraft demand was very limited 
until rearmament schemes commenced in mid-30s (Chapman, 1991; Todd and Simpson, 
1986). In the case of France, up until the generous subsidies to airlines initiated in the first half 
of the 1930s and the nationalizations in the second half, the industry was suffering from lack 
of demand by airlines, the early neglect of the state to support new designs and technology 
development, and fragmented and uncompetitive industry structure (Chapman, 1991). 
However, it was already time for the reorganization of production due to rearmament 
launched in 1937, and privately-held firms were also part of the military campaign either in 
the form of airframe builders of subcontractors (Chapman, 1991). 
After an enormous campaign of aircraft production serving only for military purposes 
expanded and transformed widely towards military needs during the Second World War, the 
industry went into a drastic retreat with the end of the hostilities once again. However, the 
large-scale research efforts led especially by Germany and Britain during the war left a 
substantial technological repertory that opened a new technological paradigm marked by jet 
propulsion, swept-back wings, and advanced metals technologies. 
In the US, the new era started with a design revolution owing to the advances in technology 
introduced primarily by Europeans (Ruttan, 2006). Different than the period after the First 
World War when military spending was sharply cut (Rae, 1965); the US military was prompt 
to fund a new line of military aircraft, utilizing newest technologies including the swept-wing. 
The industry was also concerned to develop a commercial aircraft utilizing same technologies 
in the wake of rising British jetliner industry. Main representatives of the industry pushed 
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Congress to pass a bill to provide government funding for a commercial aircraft, but the 
industry failed to unite behind the bill and the measure was cancelled (Lynn, 1995). However, 
Boeing was advancing its focus on jet technology. It had first-hand access to German 
aerodynamic research results and designs, after it signed contracts with US Air Force for 
different models of military aircraft. It also participated in the Air Force contest for a military 
jet refueling tanker with its prototype which had been designed before the contest and it was 
successful to win. Rapidly escalated profits during the military campaign of the Korean War 
helped Boeing to advance its efforts to develop a commercial aircraft version of the military 
jet tanker together with the Independent Research and Development funding provided by the 
Air Force to be used in prototype design and development. At the time, 82 percent of the 
profits earned had to be returned to government in the form of corporate tax if they were not 
spending on new aircraft development. This was also an important incentive for Boeing to 
further its development efforts. Even more, after negotiations with the Air Force, Boeing 
gained access to tooling and plant space used for the jet tanker (Rodgers, 1996). Strongly 
endorsed by mechanisms of government support, the audacity of Boeing to launch the 
commercial version named as B707 worked and the aircraft, which set the standard for 
modern commercial aircraft design to date, turned into a commercial success and the 
company initiated another development program before the end of the 1950s. Douglas which 
was active in the commercial aircraft business with a continuous decline of market share until 
it was acquired by Boeing in 1997 and Lockheed which left the business in 1981 after 
unsuccessful product launches only played the second and third fiddles during the jet era. In 
effect, federal loan guarantees were ready to help the merger of McDonnell and Douglas 
Aircraft which rescued Douglas from bankruptcy in 1967, and to prevent the collapse of 
Lockheed in 1971. The federal government, in essence was directly involved in determining 
the structure of the industry in the 1960s and 1970s (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1982). However, 
in the international level, US commercial aircraft industry was simply a great success story. By 
1980, sales by US producers captured more than 90 percent of world commercial aircraft 
market except East Bloc (Baldwin and Krugman, 1988). 
If military procurement contracts kept commercial aircraft producers financially afloat to take 
more risks to develop new aircraft models, another major source of innovation was the 
research and technology support of the US federal government through The National 
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Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and The Department of Defense (DoD) 
technology programs and research contracts. 
The successor of NACA with a broader horizon beyond supporting basic research, NASA was 
founded in 1958 with the main objective of preserving of US leadership in aeronautical 
technology, specified in its charter. During the postwar period, besides its research 
infrastructure in the form of test facilities and qualified personnel, NASA provided commercial 
aircraft industry long-range technology transfer through generic or focused research 
programs and technology demonstrations to assess the feasibility of real components, 
systems or platforms (Lawrence, 2001). 
Besides its fundamental role of funding military aircraft development, DoD also provided 
research funds for dual-use initiatives to promote the development of commercial 
technologies and improvements in production efficiency. Various innovations in fields like 
materials, avionics and also some manufacturing technologies were derived from military 
programs by commercial aircraft producers (Lawrence, 2001). 
According to one estimate of the cumulative investment in R&D in aeronautics from 1945 
through 1982, 83 percent came from federal sources; of which 90 percent was military R&D. 
Industry-financed R&D was only 17 percent of the total and its basic research accounted less 
than 1 percent of total aircraft R&D during this period (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989). 
While the commercial aircraft manufacturing emerged as a distinct segment of the aerospace 
industry in the US, the future was gloomy in Europe even though it was Britain, a European 
country which introduced the first but unsuccessful civilian jet aircraft Comet in early 1950s, 
earlier than any US company. In Europe, early post-war efforts to regenerate aircraft 
production once again focused on the military side, and thus governments were the main 
decision makers of resource allocation and product choice. Rejuvenating commercial 
manufacturing was not on top of the agenda. Limited financial resources were generally 
directed to military procurement and related research and development support. More than 
that, organizational difficulties were hindering a rapid growth. 
In the postwar period, European aerospace industry was highly fragmented even within 
national borders all around the continent. Not so irrational for the time, this fragmented 
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structure was even stimulated by governments. In Britain, France and Germany, common 
features of the industry policy were to encourage design, technical standardization and 
specialization with a relatively large number of selected firms. The second feature of 
organizational structure was the attempt to maintain collaborative aircraft programs 
especially on the military side. Having lack of sufficient financial strength and technological 
capabilities as well as markets big enough to absorb enough capacity, European governments 
launched several military programs not always provided satisfying results for the partners 
(Thornton, 1995). It was, however, an experimentation for the future civilian undertakings of 
collaboration. In the meantime, a series of industry consolidation within national economies 
was in the course. The governments had a prominent role in these efforts, not so unusual for 
the case that these companies also had military contracts or they were subcontractors of 
various running programs. 
The first attempt of European cooperation in civil aerospace was the Concorde. The project 
was launched after a strict binding agreement between British and French governments. 
While political considerations dominated the project’s difficult technical, administrative and 
financial aspects, governments failed to insure participating firms to have incentives to control 
costs (Thornton, 1995). The hesitation of national and international customers to invest in 
such a costly capital good put an end to one of the most audacious technological and industrial 
projects in the world to date. Lessons learned about technology and organization, both 
negative and positive, were, however, of great value for the next collaborative effort, namely 
Airbus. 
The limited success of some national efforts in civilian aircraft production in the 1960s, like 
French Caravelle or British BAC-111, were not sufficient for Europeans to keep even a modest 
share of the global market against big advances by the US companies during the same period. 
Both European politicians and industrialists were highly concerned with the erosion or simply 
underdevelopment of Europe’s competitiveness in the aerospace industry, and collaborative 
efforts were more important than ever to provide an answer to the US dominance considering 
the still inadequate scale of national resources and markets. After intense government-level 
negotiations, Airbus Industrie was established as a Groupement d’Intérêt Economique (GIE) 
under French law in 1970 by French and German shareholders Aerospatiale and Deutsche 
Airbus. The British government withdrew from the negotiations and only a private British 
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company joined Airbus as a business partner. Already configured by partners before the 
formation of GIE, A300, the first Airbus aircraft, was financed completely through government 
funding in the form of repayable loans that were to be repaid only if the program was 
successful. Whether the current Airbus organization of product development is substantially 
different, beginning with A300, for all of its development programs, Airbus used such funding 
with similar liabilities up until today. 
2.8.3 Since mid-1980s – World-level consolidation and decades long dispute 
In September 1985, several days after Boeing had lost a bid against Airbus to sell a number of 
aircraft to India while Airbus had successfully been making inroads into Boeing’s other markets 
including the US domestic market, US president Reagan gave a ‘much-publicized’ speech on 
trade policy and mentioned several alleged violations of trade agreements by US trade 
partners including Airbus (Tyson and Chin, 1993). Meanwhile, Boeing openly accused 
European governments of subsidizing Airbus and urged the US government to start 
negotiations over subsidies with Europe. In effect, the commercial aircraft industry had 
already been part of the trade negotiations between the United States and Europe, and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade treaty signed in 1979 had included a separate section 
on commercial aviation. This section, the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, abolished 
customs duties on aircraft and components and instituted multilateral controls on 
government procurement and public subsidies both for the development and the sale of 
aircraft (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989). Despite the agreement, during the second half of 
1980s, the US and European authorities continuously blamed each other for receiving illegal 
subsidies while they were holding official talks to reach a solution. 
Another development that has had implications for the industry in the long term was the 
deregulation of US airlines in 1978 which liberated US carriers by allowing them to decide 
which route they could fly at what cost to the passenger (Newhouse, 2007). The effect was 
increasing competition that created a cost pressure on airliners and thus a weakening demand 
for new aircraft that could not offer substantial cost reductions (Ruttan, 2006). In Europe, the 
deregulation was gradual. It was initiated in the second half of 1980s and completed only in 
the 1990s (Kawagoe, 2008). Aircraft producers were under great pressure to offer more 
efficient products with lower risk sharing with customers. In that sense, the US and European 
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aircraft producers were highly active in the 1980s in new product development. During the 
decade a total of 10 new commercial aircraft programs were either launched or put into 
service by Boeing, Airbus and MacDonnell Douglas (for a comparison, this number was only 
three in 2000s; A380, Boeing 787 and A350). 
From the early 1980s, despite the escalation of the anti-subsidy rhetoric in the US (Lawrence, 
2001), the rising competition stimulated by European efforts to elevate Airbus as a global 
player, and the US government’s concern with the US competitive position in the international 
commercial aircraft industry, led to a continuous increase in the allocation of government 
funds directed to commercial aircraft technology development especially through NASA and 
DoD. By the early 1990s, NASA and the Air Force were engaged in R&D in almost every 
dimension of aircraft technology (see Figure 2.11 as an example) and were devoting 
substantial resources to large commercial aircraft research (Ruttan, 2006). During the 1990s, 
a budget of more than $1 billion each year were devoted to generic or commercial aircraft 
research by NASA and the Department of Defense (Lawrence, 2001). Airbus has also been a 
beneficiary of the support funded by the US federal government either through open access 
to NASA research results as long as it is publicly available or through indirect help in the form 
of inputs with superior technology provided by NASA-funded US equipment and parts 
suppliers (for the role of NASA funding for aerospace suppliers see Sherry and Sarsfield, 2002). 
Figure 2.11: Application of NASA funded research on commercial aircraft  
 
Source: Shin, 2011 
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The rise of Airbus to become a global player was by far the most important development in 
commercial aircraft industry during the 1980s and 1990s. Its market share increased 
significantly at the expense of US manufacturers and especially McDonnell Douglas and 
Lockheed, and in only 11 years between 1981 and 1991, the company initiated the 
development of three different models of aircraft (A320 in 1981 and A330/A340 in 1986) and 
launched a market demand research for a super jumbo. These efforts in effect were only 
possible through generous subsidies provided by European governments. Launch aids 
provided for these three programs covered a substantial part of development expenditures. 
The 1992 Agreement put a ceiling to government support that it cannot exceed 33 percent of 
total development costs, and the rule was applied to A380 and A350. Recurring deficits of 
Airbus partners in the 1990s put an emphasis on the role of government support in the 
commercial segment of the aerospace industry in Europe. A fragmented industry hit by big 
cuts in military spending would not have been capable of sustaining such a successful 
commercial investment effort. 
Thus, there is a strong correlation between the strengthening competition, rapidly escalating 
product development costs and demand for deepened government support to the aerospace 
industry. Rising financial risks or hesitations of firms to launch costly R&D programs render 
government support even more critical to initiate such high-cost programs. The result for the 
commercial aircraft industry was the intensification of the trade dispute between the US and 
European countries. In 1990, the US Department of Commerce assigned a research company, 
Gellman Research Associates, to prepare a study on the economics of Airbus’ aircraft 
programs and after an examination of the support provided to Airbus Industrie and its partner 
companies for each development program, the study concluded that Airbus would not have 
been commercially viable or it would not have existed from the very beginning without 
substantial government support (GRA, 1990). Obliged to provide a response, in 1991, the 
European Commission hired Arnold and Porter, a US law firm, to prepare a report on US 
government support of its commercial aircraft industry. Drawing attention to the lack of 
transparency in the data available to measure the extent of support as the Gellman study also 
did, the EC report identified specific means of support and introduced the indirect support 
concept that US industry benefited extensively through its access to multiple forms of R&D 
and manufacturing support and specific provisions for civil aircraft programs (Arnold and 
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Porter, 1991). The US study reported a $25.8 billion subsidy in 1990 prices for the period 
between 1968 and 1990, while the EC report provided an estimated benefit for the US industry 
of between $33.5 billion and $41.5 billion for the period between 1976 and 1991 in 1991 
prices. While the calculations of the US and EC reports of the total amount of support for 
European and US civil aircraft industry were bewildering for the general public, the clash of 
studies on government subsidies implied a compromise between the two sides rather than a 
major trade conflict (Carbaugh and Olienyk, 2001; Lawrence, 2001; Thornton, 1995). In July 
1992, the EC and the US signed the agreement on the application of the GATT agreement on 
trade in civil aircraft. The deal clarified the forms of government support by separating indirect 
and direct support and set certain limits to existing subsidies as an admittance of the existence 
of a variety of support and their depth 4F5. After the GATT Uruguay Round and its replacement 
with WTO effective with 1995; 1992 rules related to subsidies that are applied to large civil 
aircraft were aligned with WTO rules. 
While the 1992 Agreement seemed to serve its purpose to some extent in decreasing the 
tension between the parties in the 1990s, Airbus’ launch of A380 which ended the US 
monopoly in the 400+ seat segment after partnering governments of Airbus committed their 
support to its development put an end to already the fragile compromise. The US argued that 
the A380 subsidy could be illegal under WTO rules as Airbus did not have any financial liability 
to the European governments (Pavcnik, 2002). Over the issue, the US filed a request to WTO 
for consultations to resolve the dispute in 2004; however, the US ended the consultations and 
withdrew from the 1992 agreement. 
It may be asked why the US did not withdraw from the agreement and then initiate the 
negotiations for a new bilateral agreement right after the official launch of the A380 program 
in 2000, but waited around four years to restart the dispute. The original US Trade 
Representative document answers this question in such a way: “For its own business reasons, 
however, Boeing did not support such a course” 5F6. However, the reasons are important to 
                                                          
5 The agreement set a limit of direct government support on aircraft development to 33 percent of program costs that is 
subject to full repayment on a royalty basis. Indirect supports should not exceed 3 percent of a nation’s total large civil 
aircraft industry’s annual turnover, or 4 percent of the annual turnover of any single aircraft manufacturer in that nation. In 
contrast to the system of direct government support on aircraft development, there was no requirement for 
reimbursement of indirect support. 
6 “U.S. Files WTO Case Against EU Over Unfair Airbus Subsidies”, Office of The United States Trade Representative, Press 
Release, October 6, 2004 
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reveal in order to understand the mutual character of the subsidy dispute that while one party 
attacks its rival, it has to position itself in such a way that its subsidies could either be disguised 
or excluded from the dispute. Boeing adopted a proactive approach and withdrew from the 
1992 Agreement while it was setting agreements with several US states regarding state-level 
subsidies and signing 787 workshare agreements with international partners like Italy or Japan 
manufacturers that are strongly supported by their respective governments. Especially the 
proposed support of Japanese government for the 787 program would initiate a WTO dispute 
not only because the support might be prohibited due to its export contingent nature, but also 
because a strong motivation of the Japanese aerospace industry to develop its indigenous 
capabilities in order to launch domestic programs (Pritchard and MacPherson, 2004). Quite 
expectedly after the appeal of Airbus to its respective governments for another round of direct 
government support for its new program A350 in early 2005, Boeing also filed a WTO suit 
against Airbus claiming that Airbus received illegal subsidies since its establishment. Airbus’ 
response was another suit filed the following day against Boeing similarly claiming that the 
federal and state subsidies for Boeing were illegal. In the meantime, both companies and their 
national and international allies kept reporting their rival’s unfair subsidies and their negative 
impact on competition (Boeing, 2009; Center for Security Policy, 2010; EADS, 2010; EC, 2007). 
After a long period of evaluation and appeal procedure, in 2010 and 2011, WTO clarified that 
both Airbus and Boeing received substantial amounts of subsidies since the late 1980s and 
some of these subsidies were actually illegal according to WTO rules (WTO, 2010, 2011a). 
Without rejecting the idea that they received subsidies, each company claimed victory over 
the other6F7. Each company argued that the illegal subsidies received by one company distorted 
trade to the detriment of the other. The WTO Appellate Body reports published one year after 
the panel reports for each case rejected the biggest part of both companies’ appeals of the 
WTO’s earlier findings and confirmed that Airbus and Boeing received illegal subsidies during 
the period investigated (WTO, 2011b, 2012). 
Table 2.5 provides a list of subsidies received by Boeing and Airbus. The first group of subsidies 
(A) in each table is the subject of the WTO cases filed against each company. The second group 
(B) is brought together after an inquiry of government support mechanisms for the aerospace 
                                                          
7 “Boeing Calls WTO Ruling a Landmark Decision and Sweeping Legal Victory”, Boeing Press Release, June 30, 
2010; “WTO final ruling: Decisive victory for Europe”, Airbus Press Release, May 18, 2011 
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industry in general or for the company in question. The inquiry remains incomplete, and it can 
be developed further with continuing government support to commercial aircraft 
manufacturing on both sides of the Atlantic. 
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Table 2.5a: Subsidies given to Airbus 
Subsidy source Subsidy details Period 
Sponsor 
authority 
Approximate 
amount of 
funding with 
current prices  
Approximate 
amount of 
repayment if 
available 
A.   Subsidies identified by WTO case as ‘specific’ to Airbus 
Launch Aid (term used by the 
US)/Member State Financing 
(term used by the EU) 
Finance of the development costs close to 100 percent for the early projects 
(A300 and A310) Finance a maximum of 33 percent of development costs for 
after the entry into force of the 1992 Agreement (specific versions of A330/A340 
and A380) 
1969-2006 national ~$15 billion unknown 
Loans from European 
Investment Bank (EIB) (a 
total of 12 loans) 
Loans provided to British Aerospace (A320 and A330/A340); Aérospatiale (Super 
Transporteurs and A330/340); Construcciones Aeronauticas SA (A320 and 
A330/340); Airbus Industrie (A321); and EADS (A380) 
1988-2002 international ~$1.2 billion ~$1.2 billion 
Infrastructure and 
infrastructure-related grants 
Grants or direct investments in industrial sites, road and airport improvements by 
German, French, British and Spanish national and regional governments and local 
authorities 
2000-2006 
national 
regional/state 
local 
unknown 0 
Research and Technological 
Development Funding 
Grants and loans for R&TD undertaken by Airbus (including framework 
programmes) 
1986-2006 
international 
national 
regional/state 
unknown unknown 
German and French 
restructuring measures: Debt 
forgiveness 
The forgiveness by the German Government of debt owned by Deutsche Airbus 1998 national unknown 0 
German and French 
restructuring measures: 
Equity infusions 
Capital investments made by the French Government 1987-1998 national unknown 0 
B.    Subsidies that are not subject to WTO dispute either because they are out of the scope of dispute or out of the time scope of the case 
1)    Other benefits not specific to aerospace industry but received by Airbus 
Tax credit for R&D expenses 
Income tax credits granted to Airbus for research and development activities that 
are deducted from corresponding expenses or from capitalized amounts when 
earned. 
2000-2014 national €795 million 0 
Interest free loan 
An interest free loan was granted by Lagardère and the French State to Airbus in 
2007 (The amount of € 29 million was repaid in 2011) 
2007 national €29 million €29 million 
State of Alabama 
An incentive package of $158.5 million supporting the construction of the plant, 
improving roads, regarding soil 
2015 
regional/state 
local 
$158.5 million 0 
2)    Other benefits specific to aerospace and airlines industries (Airbus may also be a direct or indirect beneficiary) 
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EC Framework Programmes Grants directed to civil aeronautics research 1987-2013 international €3.7 billion 
 
French Directorate General 
for Civil Aviation 
Grants and repayable advances for civil aviation projects annual national unknown 
  
Export Financing German, French and British export credit support provided to aircraft buyers 1975- national unknown - 
Export Financing European Investment Bank financing provided to aircraft buyers 1990- international unknown - 
 
Table 2.5b: Subsidies given to Boeing 
Subsidy source Subsidy details Period 
Sponsor 
authority 
Approximate 
amount of 
funding with 
current prices 
Approximate 
amount of 
repayment if 
available 
A. Subsidies identified by WTO case as ‘specific’ to Boeing 
The provision of tax incentives 
by the State of Washington 
and municipalities therein 
- Business and Occupation tax reduction; - B&O tax credits for preproduction 
development, computer software and hardware and property taxes; - Sales and 
use tax exemptions for computer hardware, peripherals and software; - City of 
Everett B&O tax reduction; - Workforce development program and employment 
resource center 
1989-2006 
regional/state 
local 
$77.7 million 
(future benefits 
are not 
included) 
0 
State of Kansas and 
Municipalities therein 
Property and sales tax abatements provided to Boeing pursuant to Industrial 
Revenue Bonds issued by the State of Kansas and municipalities therein 
1989-2006 
regional/state 
local 
$476 million 0 
State of Illinois and 
Municipalities therein 
- Reimbursement of a portion of Boeing's relocation expenses provided for in 
the Corporate Headquarters Relocation Act ("CHRA"); - 15-year Economic 
Development for a Growing Economy ("EDGE") tax credits provided for in the 
CHRA; - Abatement or refund of a portion of Boeing's property taxes provided 
for in the CHRA; - Payment to retire the lease of the previous tenant of Boeing's 
new headquarters building 
2002-2006 
regional/state 
local 
$11 million 0 
NASA 
- The payments made to Boeing pursuant to procurement contracts entered 
into under the eight aeronautics R&D programs; - Access to government 
facilities, equipment and employees provided to Boeing pursuant to 
procurement contracts and Space Act Agreements entered into under the 
aeronautics R&D programs 
1989-2006 national $2.6 billion 0 
Department of Defense 
-The payments made to Boeing pursuant to assistance instruments entered into 
under the RDT&E Program; 
- Access to government facilities provided to Boeing pursuant to assistance 
instruments entered into under the RDT&E Program 
1991-2006 national 
unknown (but 
equal to or 
greater than 
$308 million) 
0 
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US government Foreign Sales 
Corporation/ Extraterritorial 
Income export support 
-The tax exemptions and tax exclusions provided to Boeing under FSC/ETI 
legislation, including the transition and grandfather provisions of the ETI Act and 
the AJCA 
1989-2006 national $2.2 billion 0 
B. Subsidies that are not subject to WTO dispute either because they are out of the scope of dispute or out of the time scope of the case 
1) Other benefits not specific to aerospace industry but received by Boeing 
State of South Carolina 
Up-front payments for relocation, property and sales tax exemptions, income 
tax credits, utility tax discounts, targeted employment credits, training grants, 
infrastructural support 
2009- 
regional/state 
local 
>$500 million 0 
State of South Carolina - 
Charleston County 
Property tax abatements 2009- local 
$360 million 
(over 30 years) 
0 
State of Washington I 
Infrastructural support (addition to port or Seattle) Property tax abatements, 
sales tax exemptions, income tax credits, utility discounts, hiring assistance 
2006- 
regional/state 
local 
>$3 billion 
(over 20 years) 
0 
State of Washington II Business and occupation and property and sales tax exemptions 2024- 
regional/state 
local 
~$8.7 billion 
(over 16 years) 
0 
State of Illinois 
Property tax abatements, income tax credits, job training grants, energy grant, 
infrastructural support 
2001- 
regional/state 
local 
~$50 million 0 
R&D tax credits Tax breaks deducted from the federal income tax annual national 
Annually ~$150 
million on 
average 
between 2005-
2014 
0 
Excess tax benefits from stock 
options 
Tax breaks deducted from the federal income tax annual national 
Annually ~$100 
million on 
average 
between 2005-
2014 
0 
2) Other benefits specific to aerospace and airlines industries (Boeing may also be a direct or indirect beneficiary) 
US Department of Commerce 
R&D grants under the Advanced Technology Program, access to facilities, 
equipment and employees 
1991-2004 national unknown 0 
US Department of Labor Worker training grants Edmonds Community College (for Boeing 787) 2004 national $1.5 million - 
EX-IM Bank Cheap loans to foreign countries and companies seeking to buy US goods annual national unknown - 
Source: WTO reports, Airbus and Boeing annual reports and other internet sources
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The comparison of government subsidies for Boeing and Airbus shows that the role of the 
state in supporting business enterprises has multiple dimensions. Figure 2.12 below provides 
a categorization of three dimensions of government support for new aircraft development 
throughout the last 30 years that helps to understand the extent of the role of governments 
in encouraging business enterprises to invest in innovation and in complementing their efforts 
during the process. The spatial dimension defines the funding body’s geographical extent. The 
dimension of time defines the moment of subsidy involvement along the product 
development period which is the key activity supported by governments. The liability 
dimension defines the degree of the potential charges of the subsidy to the company. 
Figure 2.12: Categorization of government support to commercial aircraft industry 
Spatial Extent Temporal Extent Financial Liability Extent 
 Local 
(municipalities/ 
counties) 
 Infrastructural 
supports/investments 
before the program 
launch 
 Risk free grants 
Regional 
(states/regions) 
 
 
R&D supports/ 
permissions before or 
during the program 
development 
Tax 
credits/reductions 
National 
(countries) 
Tax breaks/ 
exemptions during or 
after the program 
development 
Debt forgiveness 
International  
(international 
organizations) 
Employee hiring and 
training supports 
during or after the 
program development 
and its execution 
Interest free or 
low-interest loans 
Equity infusions 
Source: Author 
2.9 Conclusion of the chapter 
Government support continues to be a major determinant for the well-being of national 
aerospace industries all over the world. The efforts to develop new capabilities in aircraft 
development and manufacturing will continue to be maintained through the financial 
commitment of governments. The regulatory role of governments will also continue to shape 
the structure of the industry with specific emphasis given on different aspects of aircraft. For 
example, the introduction of new air traffic control systems like Next Generation Air 
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Transportation System in the US and the ongoing Single European Sky ATM Research project 
in Europe will have important implications on aircraft manufacturing especially for avionics 
firms and OEMs. 
Long-term support is even more critical now than ever, due to a market transformation on the 
doorstep. The ongoing development programs of Chinese, Brazilian, Canadian, Japanese and 
Russian OEMs will bring a completely different product market structure in the 2020s. 
Forecasts predict a steady increase in commercial aircraft sales in the coming two decades 
assuming no negative events that would disrupt the order and production pattern (Deloitte, 
2014). After they overcome the challenges to finalize product development efforts, 
manufacturers have to maintain a steady flow of production and to establish a record of 
reliable and safe operating history. In these forecasts it is assumed that some of the orders 
will be meet by new entrants with small segments where more than 80 percent of the 
deliveries happen. The ongoing development programs of Chinese, Brazilian, Canadian, 
Japanese and Russian OEMs will bring a completely different product market structure in the 
2020s. Figure 2.13 below displays the latest situation of the commercial aircraft 
manufacturing’s short to medium range segment where the strongest competition is going to 
happen by the end of the decade. The second major challenge is the rising role of component 
suppliers and OEMs from the developing economies which will bring new dynamics to the 
competition in aerospace products. Having only smaller component manufacturing 
agreements so far in the latest programs of Airbus and Boeing, with the help of their respective 
governments, they would emerge as systems suppliers in the years to come. 
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Figure 2.13: In service or in development short to medium rage jet aircrafts in the world 
           Seat capacity: 
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E*2016    Embraer E-Jet E2 family            
                      
E 2016         Irkut MC-21   
                      
E 2016           Comac C919        
                      
2015   
Mitsubishi 
MRJ                 
                      
2013       Bombardier C-series          
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2008    Comac ARJ21               
                      
2008   Sukhoi Superjet 100               
                      
2002   Embraer ERJ-170 series              
                      
1999  Bombardier CRJ700 series                
                      
1987       Airbus A320 series  
                      
1967     Boeing 737 series    
  P
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1998      Boeing 717             
                      
1993           McDD MD-90       
                      
1986      Fokker 100              
                      
1981    BAe 146 / Avro RJ               
                      
1979         McDD MD-80         
                      
1975      Yakovlev Yak-42              
                      
1965    McDonnell Douglas DC-9            
The list contains only short to medium range, in service/in development, jet airliners, produced at 
least 50 or more units after 1960s when the jet propulsion aircraft design was established as a 
dominant aircraft technology. *E: expected 
Source: Airlines.net   
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Thus how dominant Western aerospace and its two leading firms Airbus and Boeing are going 
to be over the next decade is a major question of the future aerospace industry research to 
be answered. However, this study aims to analyze first how the business models of these two 
companies have changed over the past decade or so and the implications for innovation and 
competition between them. Only a comparative analysis of the recent history of Western 
commercial aircraft manufacturing may provide insights for the future prospects of the global 
aerospace industry. This chapter tried to show the major characteristics of aerospace and 
commercial aircraft manufacturing industries with an aim to cover the entirety of industrial 
dynamics which are, in general, selectively highlighted by different conceptions of industry 
with varying disciplinary lenses and analytical purposes (Sako, 2008). After this industry level 
discussion, the following chapters focus on the comparative dynamics of Airbus and Boeing 
utilizing the business model framework identified in the previous chapter.  
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Second Part 
 
Systems Integration as Business/Productive 
Model of Airbus and Boeing  
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Chapter Three 
 
‘Strategy’ component of Airbus and Boeing 
systems integration business/productive models 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Following Chandlerian tradition, strategy can be defined as the planning and carrying out of 
the growth of organizations (Chandler, 1962). The main purpose of modern business 
enterprise is to transform productive resources into goods and services to be sold. For a 
business enterprise, planning and carrying out productive activities depend on the set of 
decisions on resource allocation and their impacts on productive returns. These implications 
are conditioned by different types of uncertainties depending on the form of activity, by the 
environment in which the enterprise acts and most importantly, by the motives of corporate 
decision-making. 
Business firms need coherent strategies, to a large extent, defining the ways in which the firms 
are organized and governed (Nelson, 1991). Especially because it is confronted with 
uncertainties, a business form necessitates a coherent strategy to deal with innovation 
process as a whole (Lazonick, 2005). Actors who hold strategic control over the firm make 
decisions over the allocation of resources to create certain possibilities to cope with different 
types of uncertainties (Lazonick, 2013) that are mentioned in the previous chapter. The 
control, in that sense, constitute the set of relations that gives decision-makers the power to 
allocate resources. Innovation requires that the actors who exercise strategic control have the 
ability to recognize the strengths and weaknesses of their firm as well as technological 
opportunities and competitive challenges (Lazonick, 2013). 
In modern business enterprise, these actors are predominantly the top executives even 
though other forms of decision making like government involvement or workers’ control are 
still existing in different contexts under different social conditions. For example, aerospace 
and defense industries in the world were under tight control of national governments in terms 
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of their strategy and structures for a long time throughout the twentieth century (Lawrence 
and Braddon, 1999; Todd and Simpson, 1986). The extent of the government control has been 
effective on a wide range of activities and actions, from the content and execution of research 
partnerships to the selection of plant locations (Todd and Simpson, 1986), albeit with a 
decreasing intensity (Frigant et al., 2006; Moura, 2007). Compared to the US, the role of 
government as industry organizer had always been much more highlighted in Europe 
(Jalabert, 1974; Muller, 1988). The size and content of the decisions over the allocation of 
resources and the power of a specific firm within its industry or in general economy shape the 
magnitude of the impact of firm’s strategy. Decisions over outsourcing and the structure of 
value chains they shape, capital and R&D investments they realize, the extent of skills pool 
they control and further develop, and the financial power they exert to fund innovation are 
all outlined by the strategy of the firm. The involvement of Western manufacturing firms in 
changing their corporate strategies has had great implications over these aspects. This chapter 
discusses the impact of this change in Airbus and Boeing in the last two decades on strategy 
component of their business/productive models. 
3.2 Product policy in commercial aircraft manufacturing 
Strategy defines how a business firm acquires a certain share in the product markets where it 
competes with other firms or, in other words, how to establish an advantageous position in 
the market. For an innovative firm, the role of strategy is to render the firm capable to define 
its output and price while transforming technologies and accessing markets (Lazonick, 2013) 
or synonymously, the creation and use of competitive advantage (Teece, 2010a). Thus a major 
element of strategic decision concerns the scope of the business portfolio of products and the 
markets being served (Sako, 2006). The peculiarities of the commodity that the business firms 
produce are crucial to the discussion of the business/productive models within a specific 
industry. Markets for different products, their segments, design and range of the products on 
offer, and sales objectives are the elements that characterize productive models’ boundaries 
and dynamics of change (Boyer and Freyssenet, 2000a). The decisions over which capabilities 
are going to be built and how and when they are going to be deployed are conditioned by the 
positioning in product markets (Teece, 2010a). It is especially relevant for an industry like 
aerospace where the corporate strategy is strictly bounded to new product launch. 
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Today a new commercial aircraft costs more than $15 billion with a development period of 
five to seven years. The product life is slightly above 25 years on average (Forsberg, 2012) and 
together with its production period, it is not unusual for a successful aircraft program to stay 
in service for 40 to 50 years. Aerospace companies usually put at risk their own entity during 
a new product development. Any plans to initiate a new aircraft program bring along 
important strategic decisions on resource allocation, productive organization and financing. 
Airbus and Boeing follow the industry old logic of having commercial aircraft families with 
several aircraft models having different capacities to carry from 100 to 500+ passengers. The 
aim is to avoid being restricted to a single model that prevents any opportunity of economies 
of scale required to ease the heavy burden of high-cost investments, manufacturing and 
marketing as airlines generally prefer to have the same kind of aircraft families in their fleet. 
Today both companies have different aircraft models serving in every segment of the industry 
and continue to offer new or upgraded models as well as derivatives of existing ones. Faced 
with a very strong pre-market uncertainty, companies have to do a detailed market research 
and cost/benefit calculations that may extend over several years, sometimes without success. 
Response of customers to pre-launch propositions provides important feedback for product 
launch decisions7F8. Airline deregulation, fuel costs, and new entrants to the market are some 
historical factors affecting company decisions to initiate a new aircraft program (Gillett and 
Stekler, 1995). 
Another decisive factor is the availability of new technologies to be integrated and access to 
them (Szodruch et al., 2011). One of the biggest technological factors in a new product launch 
decision is the availability of new engine models or engine manufacturers’ existing plans for 
new product development. When OEMs plan to launch a new aircraft program, they have to 
consider a set of options which includes but is not limited to the segment choice depending 
on the current market needs (narrow body - wide body, short haul – long haul), degree of 
novelty (a highly innovative new product vs. an upgrade of an existing one), diversity of 
models/versions (different configurations with different numbers of seats, passenger and 
                                                          
8 For example, after three years of negotiations with its Japanese partners, Boeing cancelled its promising 7J7 
program due to a lack of interest in the changing economic climate in 1987. It also cancelled its Sonic Cruiser 
project in the early 2000s and opted for 787. Airbus, on the other hand, evaluated different options for around 
10 years after it finally decided to develop its super jumbo A380 in 2000. As another example from Airbus, after 
receiving dissatisfied returns from customers on its first A350 proposition as an upgraded version of its A330 
aircraft, the company had to come with a brand new design in late 2006. 
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cargo versions), targeted geographies (world market, home market, Asia, China), pre-launch 
negotiations and collaborations with potential partners, and a market research with sales 
objectives (a certain number of aircraft sales as a threshold for positive financial returns). The 
history of commercial aircraft manufacturing is basically an account of winners and losers with 
few successful and profitable aircraft programs and many failed attempts 8F9. Table 3.1 lists all 
successful models of Airbus and Boeing with program launch and introduction dates since the 
beginning of their jet aircraft manufacturing. One curious observation is the increase in the 
length of aircraft development since 1960s which is consistent with rising technological and 
organizational complexities thanks to the incessant introduction of new technologies and the 
challenges of sophisticated supply chains. Figure 3.1 shows the increase in the length of 
development period of new product launch of Airbus and Boeing in a historical order. 
Figure 3.1: Length of the development period for new aircraft models of Airbus and Boeing 
 
Source: Related Airbus and Boeing web pages and airliners.net 
  
                                                          
9 Limited success of some programs like Sud Aviation’s Caravelle, Hawker Siddeley’s Trident or British Aircraft’s 
BAC-111 helped these European manufacturers to keep and to upgrade jet aircraft manufacturing capabilities 
which enabled them or their successive companies to initiate and run the Airbus program. 
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Table 3.1: Launch, first flight and introduction dates of all successful Airbus and Boeing 
commercial aircraft programs 
AIRBUS  BOEING 
Model 
Program 
Launch First flight 
Intro-
duction 
Launch to 
Intro-
duction (in 
months)  Model 
Program 
Launch First flight 
Intro-
duction 
Launch to 
Intro-
duction (in 
months) 
A300B 01.05.1969 28.10.1972 30.05.1974 60  B707 30.08.1952* 20.12.1957 26.10.1958 74 
A300-600 1980 07.08.1983 03.01.1984   B707-220 ? 06.11.1959 12.01.1959  
A310-200 06.07.1978 03.04.1982 01.04.1983 57  B707-320 ? 01.11.1959 08.01.1959  
A310-300  08.07.1985 16.12.1985   B707-420 ? 20.05.1959 03.01.1960  
A320-100/200 02.03.1984 22.02.1987 28.03.1988 49  B720 07.01.1957 23.11.1959 07.05.1960 34 
A321-100 11.01.1989 11.03.1993 27.01.1994   B727 01.06.1959 09.02.1963 01.02.1964 56 
A319-100 1993 25.08.1995 04.01.1996   B727-200 08.01.1965 27.07.1967 12.01.1967  
A318-100 09.11.1998 15.01.2002 01.07.2003   B737 19.02.1965 09.04.1967 10.02.1968 36 
A320neo 12.01.2010 25.09.2014 25.01.2016   B737-200 04.05.1965 08.08.1967 28.04.1968  
A321neo 12.01.2010 09.03.2016    B737-300 26.03.1981 24.02.1984 28.11.1984  
A319neo 12.01.2010     B737-400 06.04.1986 19.02.1988 15.09.1988  
A340-300 05.06.1987 25.10.1991 15.03.1993 68  B737-500 20.05.1987 30.06.1989 28.02.1990  
A340-200 1987 04.01.1992 29.01.1993   B737-600 15.03.1995 22.01.1998 18.09.1998  
A340-500 16.06.1997 02.11.2002 23.10.2003   B737-700 11.01.1993 02.09.1997 17.12.1997  
A340-600 16.06.1997 23.04.2001 08.01.2002   B737-800 09.05.1994 31.07.1997 22.04.1998  
A330-300 05.06.1987 02.11.1992 17.01.1994 79  B737-900 09.10.1997 08.03.2000 15.05.2001  
A330-200 11.01.1995 13.08.1997 30.04.1998   B737-900ER 18.07.2005 09.05.2006 27.04.2007  
A330neo 14.07.2014     B737 MAX 7 30.08.2011    
A380-800 19.12.2000 27.04.2005 25.10.2007 82  B737 MAX 8 30.08.2011 29.01.2016   
A350-900 01.12.2006 14.06.2013 22.12.2014 97  B737 MAX 9 30.08.2011    
A350-800 01.12.2006     B747 25.07.1966 09.02.1969 22.01.1970 42 
A350-1000 01.12.2006     B747SP 09.10.1973 07.04.1975 03.05.1976  
      B747-200 19.12.1968 10.11.1970 15.01.1971  
      B747-300 06.11.1980 10.05.1982 03.01.1983  
      B747-400 22.10.1985 29.04.1988 29.01.1989  
      B747-400ER 19.12.2000 31.07.2002 31.10.2002  
      B747-8 14.11.2005 19.08.2011 10.12.2011  
      B757 31.08.1978 19.02.1982 01.01.1983 52 
      B757-300 15.09.1996 08.02.1998 03.10.1999  
      B767 01.02.1978 26.09.1981 08.09.1982 55 
      B767-200ER 02.01.1982 03.06.1984 26.03.1984  
      B767-300 09.01.1983 30.01.1986 25.09.1986  
      B767-300ER 01.01.1985 12.09.1986 19.02.1988  
      B767-400ER 01.01.1997 10.09.1999 29.08.2000  
      B777 08.12.1989 12.06.1994 07.06.1995 66 
      B777-200ER 29.10.1990 10.07.1996 02.06.1997  
      B777-200LR 29.02.2000 03.08.2005 27.02.2006  
      B777-300 26.06.1995 16.10.1997 22.05.1998  
      B777-300ER 29.02.2000 24.02.2003 29.04.2004  
      B777-9X 18.11.2013    
      B717 10/1/1995** 02.09.1998 12.10.1999 57 
      B787 26.04.2004 15.12.2009 26.10.2011 88 
      B787-9 10.01.2007 17.09.2013 07.08.2014  
      B787-10 18.06.2013    
Source: Related Airbus and Boeing web pages and airliners.net, *launch of Dash-80, the early 
prototype of B707, **launched as MD-95 by McDonnell Douglas before its merger with Boeing  
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3.3 Where to find capabilities? In-housing vs. outsourcing 
Beyond the simplification of cost and availability constrained make-or-buy decisions, during a 
new product launch or part of their reorganization efforts for ongoing production lines, OEMs 
may resort to restructuring their internal and external production organization in response to 
the magnitude of capital investments and resource reallocation. Technological requirements 
of a new design, the extent of accumulated in-house capabilities and existing opportunities in 
the form of R&D efforts of current or prospective partners are main factors of reorganization. 
These aspects are also the most elaborated ones by innovation studies. 
In the commercial aircraft industry, new product development has been strictly related to 
mobilize internal capabilities of firms including the efforts of thousands of designers and 
engineers to design and develop an innovative aircraft addressing new and sophisticated 
needs. It also includes the setting up an organization capable to manage the development of 
the aircraft and its production line to be commercially successful. Very large initial fixed capital 
investment, high unit costs, complexity of products, heavy-engineering, high expectations for 
safety, reliability and performance, and requirements of extensive coordination and 
communication entail very strong internal capabilities for OEMs (Sorscher, 2011). The basic 
success of Airbus and Boeing resides on their capabilities to address specific customer 
demands with sustained production runs that help them to convert their high fixed costs into 
low unit costs. 
Beside internal capabilities, OEMs increasingly form partnerships with other firms which 
provide complementary skills and resources for new product development. In the business 
literature (Freytag et al., 2012; Quélin and Duhamel, 2003; Quinn, 1999; Sako, 2005) the 
activity of collaboration is usually discussed around the concept of outsourcing which is 
generally defined as the operation of shifting a part or some parts of a complete production 
process to an external supplier in different forms of agreements depending on the cost, quality 
and extent of the work assigned to the supplier. It may also involve strategic decision-making 
as with outsourcing, companies transfer some part of their work already performed or can still 
be performed with the help of internal resources and capabilities. Mutual dependence, 
commitment, intense information exchange, and trust are main determinants of the 
governance of the relationship (Sako, 2005). 
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When corporate executives and business media started to use the word outsourcing in early 
1980s as an alternative to the word subcontracting which was the word used for 
externalization of productive activities, the highlighted reason was not so different from that 
of subcontracting. The purpose was to lower production costs when sourcing components 
from suppliers is cheaper than sourcing them internally. It was initially used to describe such 
practices in the US automobile industry which was under pressure of strong competition with 
Japanese counterparts (Sako, 2005). In the meantime, subcontracting continued to be defined 
mainly as a work order for manufacturing and a form of collaboration (Amesse, et al., 2001) 
inspired mainly by emerging approaches of the period including transaction costs economics 
(Williamson, 1981) which theorized inter-firm relationships as alternatives to vertical 
integration (Esposito and Passaro, 2009). In late 1990s and early 2000s, a group of business 
scholars introduced the concept of strategic outsourcing as a superior form of subcontracting 
in which firms should also resort to outsourcing of activities that create competitive advantage 
for the firm. It is not a choice but a necessity to outsource such activities in order to leverage 
the impact of internal investments and complementary capabilities (Alexander and Young, 
1996; Bryce and Useem, 1998; Quélin and Duhamel, 2003; Quinn, 1999, 2000) as well as to 
enlarge shareholder value (Bryce and Useem, 1998). It was the time to outsource even 
technologically critical parts and components as the interaction capabilities of companies 
substantially grew compared to previous periods of in-house research and development 
perspective (Quinn, 2000) and the access to the industry-leading external competencies and 
expertise has become more critical than ever for companies (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 
2002). Thus, outsourcing has become a requirement rather than a choice because of the 
technological advancements and specialized knowledge that are required to be integrated 
into the new products whereas they are beyond the reach of the companies’ existing 
capabilities. Planning and carrying out of innovative activities also involve the consideration 
of other organizations’ resources and potential (Hobday et.al, 2005; Pavitt, 2003; Prencipe et 
al., 2003). It is now a prerequisite that any investment decision need to consider this potential 
outside the walls of the organization. 
In its historical context outsourcing seems like an indispensable practice within broader 
productive organization. However, it contains a variety of unpredicted risks and potential 
damages to the performing company. 
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The greatest risks of outsourcing are the loss of strategic ﬂexibility, being leveraged by 
suppliers, supply interruptions and quality issues, a fall in employee morale, a loss of internal 
coherence, the loss of intellectual property rights (Lonsdale and Cox, 2000); poor judgment 
over the outsourcing decision, selection of the wrong supplier with limited capabilities, poor 
communication between parties, absence of exit strategy, overlooked hidden costs, losing 
control of the overview of the outsourcing process (Barthelemy, 2003); the risk of losing vital 
knowledge related to core competencies (Hoecht & Trott, 2006). 
More elaborative accounts on the risks of outsourcing emphasize the erosion of systems and 
components related competencies of the internal labor force due to lack of learning by doing 
opportunities beyond design activities as a ‘key lever for acquiring and maintaining the 
detailed knowledge’ (Zirpoli and Becker, 2011); and uncertainties over the resilience of the 
supply chain through sustainable allocation of R&D funding and necessary financial resources 
for other operational requirements with increasing role of suppliers in R&D, project 
management, certification, etc. (Sherry and Sarsfield, 2002). Some scholars also highlighted 
the risks related to the loss of capabilities which would help to develop next generation 
technologies. Because of the strong association of process and product innovation, 
outsourcing, and especially outsourcing abroad, would create a chain reaction of losing 
productive capabilities at home. Without necessary capabilities to maintain process 
innovation and manufacturing, economies and equivalently their OEMs can lose their ability 
to develop new products and to innovate in general (Pisano and Shih, 2009). 
The transformation of the old motive of cost-cutting, in the words of the business literature, 
into a general trend of acquiring the discipline of financial markets in their businesses and 
enlarging shareholder value (Bryce and Useem, 1998; Quélin & Duhamel, 2003) has also been 
criticized by scholars and industry experts. 
Defining the renewed approach to outsourcing as part of a corporate restructuring process 
started in the 1980s, these scholars and experts highlight the role of financial motives. As long 
as the governance of supply chains and outsourcing decisions are issues of corporate 
governance (Milberg, 2010; Sturgeon, 2008), the rise of the shareholder value model of 
corporate governance played a part in promoting this type of corporate restructuring (Sako, 
2005). The marriage of the reinterpretation of Japanese cost cutting strategies of permanent 
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reduction of costs and rapidly emerging Anglo-Saxon schemes of maximizing shareholder 
value led business firms of every type to act increasingly through financial motives at the 
expense of in-house investment and capability development. 
This model of shareholder value is mainly interpreted in the achievement of target cost savings 
and improved return on assets, cost of capital and certain ratios like Return on Net Assets 
(RONA). Outsourcing as well as divesting have helped to achieve these targets (Sako, 2005). 
The rising ability of firms to disintegrate production through outsourcing and offshoring has 
allowed business firms to maintain cost mark-ups and thus higher profits and higher 
shareholder value distribution (Milberg, 2008). 
In aerospace, similar concerns have been expressed by industry specialists. As early as 2001, 
a Boeing engineer at Phantom Works, the main R&D division of Boeing behind the 
conceptualization and creation of advanced technology products, criticized the potential 
inclination of Boeing towards extensive outsourcing by investigating the motives and potential 
outcomes through examples from McDonnell Douglas (Hart-Smith, 2001). His first critique was 
the inability of contemporary accounting practices to allow un-allocable costs of outsourcing 
which later appear in other items like product support or sales. Because it is no longer 
identified as an in-house work, charges related to integration of outsourced work are allocated 
as overhead to remaining in-house work. This misrepresentation of true costs furthers the 
illusion that outside production is cheaper than anything done inside, building the pressure to 
ship even more work offsite, until there isn’t any left in-house. His second critique was the 
excessive focus on Return on Net Assets as a popular performance metric of the time which 
led the aerospace industry into a state of massive outsourcing with the aim to keep necessary 
capital expenditures low. With lack of deep understanding by financial analysts on what makes 
companies different, the misapplication of such financial assessment tools has potential to do 
great harm to the livelihoods of far too many people (Hart-Smith, 2001). From a shop-floor 
perspective, the pursuit of lower costs would harm the engineering community who 
represents the source of intangible value, critical for the long-term success of an aerospace 
company. Any decision minimizing the value is a threat to long-term competitiveness 
(Sorscher, 2002). 
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Thus, outsourcing cannot be limited only to a cost calculation logic. It is part of a broader 
capitalist transformation since the late 1970s in manufacturing industries and it contains 
elements of innovation, organizational learning, corporate governance and mutual 
commitments to specific collaborations to extend the burden of value creation to all the 
parties involved. It is unsurprising that the development of these long-lasting inter-firm 
relations helped suppliers to gain necessary competences in specific fields and to maintain 
them, which led scholars and practitioners to highlight such terms as network relationships or 
strategic alliances from late 1980s and early 1990s and the internationalization of production 
as a major element of inter-firm relations and competitiveness (Sturgeon, 2008). 
Nevertheless, the basic questions around strategy are still the same for new contexts. The 
extent of outsourcing and offshoring and the likely impact of such decisions on organizations 
and the societies building these organizations can never be detached from the ability and 
actions of business firms to create and capture value in ever globalized production (Sako, 
2005). Thus starting the discussion with the basic questions of business strategy is still 
relevant. These questions are how do firms create and capture value in globalized productive 
organization? What activities and functions should be kept in-house and what activities and 
functions should be kept at home (i.e. within national borders)? What is the likely impact of 
these decisions on home and host societies, and in what ways should corporations take these 
impacts into account when they make their decisions? 
3.4 Organizing production in aerospace 
The literature on outsourcing in aerospace is no different than the general discussion on 
industrial outsourcing and collaborations (Dussauge and Garrette, 1995; Esposito and Passaro, 
2009; Monroy and Arto, 2010; Williams et al., 2002). Here again outsourcing is strictly 
connected to the integration of production activities within or outside the boundaries of a 
firm which is responsible for organizing the entire production process from conception to 
delivery of the product to customers. The integration also includes a joint capability 
development process for the actors involved. The sustainable growth of suppliers with the 
help of OEMs is the main outcome of collaboration and strategic decisions. Commercial 
aircraft production is a very appropriate example for explaining this industry-level integration 
with important particularities that are incompatible with mainstream approaches to 
outsourcing which mainly claim that it happens on a field with limited interaction until the 
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agreement is set between partners (Bryce and Useem, 1998; Kakabadse and Kakabadse 2000; 
Quinn, 2000). 
Aircraft manufacturing’s mass outsourcing which also includes design and development, in 
many instances, is the result of joint efforts of OEMs and suppliers to transfer existing 
capabilities to suppliers or to help them develop their own ones which are more than a search 
for advanced capabilities outside the boundaries of the OEM. Thus, in the commercial aircraft 
industry, outsourcing is rather a historical process of collective learning led by OEMs and 
facilitated by suppliers’ own efforts even though basic reasoning of cost-cutting is also 
relevant in many other situations. Product development in aircraft manufacturing has 
primarily become an industrial level undertaking decided on a global level. Compared to 30 
years ago, many companies from developing economies have also become important actors 
in aircraft supply chains with different capabilities in specific or broader areas within 
aerospace. 
The decisions on collaboration and outsourcing are based on a complex set of factors. Besides 
the historical course of collaboration between existing partners over specific areas, strategic 
decisions over new product development and its division of labor are influenced by the 
dynamics of capability development in response to technological change and resulting 
reallocation of resources; geographical expansion of production and consumption together 
with demand-related elements like offsetting; IPR-related issues; industrial relations; 
government involvement into decision-making in different forms; and existing sources of 
finance for the new aircraft development. 
Thus, in the case of commercial aircraft industry, corporate decisions on which capabilities are 
developed in-house and which ones are procured during a new product development program 
are shaped historically and usually characterized by social and political factors. The industry is 
dominated by a limited number of OEMs and specialized component makers from a limited 
number of economies, predominantly from the industrialized world while the share of 
developing world is slowly increasing. China and Brazil are the two countries from the so-called 
Third World with OEM capabilities (PMI, 2009). Each of these aerospace giants, either an OEM 
or a major component/systems provider manages its own global supplier network. 
Traditionally, manufacturers of original equipment have defined main requirements of a 
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specific component/part of an aircraft, designed it and then assigned a supplier to develop 
and manufacture in collaboration. Considering the increasingly complex and integrated 
architecture of commercial aircrafts, procurement has been performed through partnerships 
and collaborations which usually continued in following programs. New designs containing 
advanced technologies like those in electronics or materials require new capabilities that can 
also be developed and utilized outside of the walls of OEMs. In the case of the US aerospace, 
development of the US industrial base as well as the military industrial complex throughout 
the twentieth century accumulated a tremendous skill base utilized by firms which 
experienced a steady growth through rising commercial aviation and increasing defense 
budgets. Dual applications of aerospace technologies on civilian and military products 
provided these firms with desired flexibility to advance their R&D activities and related skills 
development efforts including suppliers. The cooperation among US firms helped them to 
develop their capabilities in specific areas and also provided them to procure for foreign OEMs 
like Airbus and other global actors producing airplanes of different sizes. Like Brazilian, 
Chinese or Russian OEMs today, Airbus was also helped by US suppliers of critical components 
for its early programs (McGuire, 2007). Later, the collaboration between OEMs and suppliers 
progressively extended beyond national borders. Strictly connected to national efforts to build 
and maintain a domestic aerospace industry which is generally organized around a single 
company or a few of them, countries which do not have an OEM, established strong aerospace 
footholds thanks to their participation to collaborative civilian and military projects. 
In the meantime, integration or disintegration have had different forms depending on national 
contexts, the course of development of domestic actors and choices over corporate strategy. 
In effect, a study on the comparison of integration and supplier organization of Airbus and 
Boeing is a collection of differences and similarities. Before their convergence towards 
systems integration with their latest programs in the second half of 2000s, they followed quite 
opposite directions between 1970 and 2000. Being a Pan-European project, Airbus was 
formed as a joint venture of four different aerospace firms from four European countries and 
the history of the company is marked with a progressive integration of different functions 
scattered across different plants and units managed with different methods, rules and 
regulations. Nevertheless, the work share among partners was not arbitrary. The 
specialization of different countries in different parts of the complete Airbus aircraft family 
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reinforced economies of scale with otherwise expensive automated and cost-saving 
equipment (Hart-Smith, 2001). EADS, the previous name of today’s Airbus Group, founded in 
1999 to further consolidate existing manufacturing and administrative functions while 
reorganizing its supply chain with larger duties for a smaller number of suppliers in its new 
programs. In contrast, Boeing as a highly integrated company until late 1970s progressively 
outsourced large sections of new models particularly to its Italian and Japanese partners. 
Starting with 747 offset-style outsourcing to Japan in the late 1960s, in its latest program 787, 
Boeing outsourced more than two-thirds of the value of the aircraft to its Japanese, Italian 
and other national and global partners. Due to the fact that even a modest advance of 
technology is obtained through large investments (Esposito, 2004), long lasting partnerships 
are an important way to confront both technological and financial challenges. 
As a result, the stronger than ever emphasis on globalized supply chain organization and 
service and communications-related capabilities in the systems integration business model 
has been progressively created by OEMs/systems integrators throughout their product 
development efforts. With stabilized and extended networks beyond single development 
programs, OEMs had the possibility to forgo in-house capabilities in developing and producing 
many complex systems. Early explanations to explain outsourcing due to the increasing risks 
because of rising development costs or acquiring access to foreign markets through offsetting 
(Mowery, 1988) later supplemented with further role of internationalization of productive 
efforts in outsourcing through new opportunities (Esposito and Passaro, 2009; Kechidi and 
Talbot, 2013). 
While the current orientation towards systems integration looks similar for both firms, there 
are important differences between two firms depending either on existing competences or 
the willingness to develop new ones. For example, when Airbus decided to launch A350, it was 
highly probable that it would develop and produce the composite wings in-house (in its UK 
plants) as the company already accumulated necessary capabilities to design and develop all-
composite wings through its previous work on A400M military transport aircraft. In contrast, 
Boeing outsourced the development and production of B787 composite wings to its Japanese 
partners as a further stage of the collaboration. Neither Boeing nor its Japanese partners had 
a fully developed capability package for an all-composite wing in advance but the extensive 
financial support provided by Japanese government for the development of wings and other 
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necessary infrastructural measures gave them necessary impetus to bid for Boeing contracts 
(Pritchard and MacPherson, 2004). Only in 2014, Boeing turned to develop composite wing 
manufacturing capabilities in-house with a controversial decision linked to a labor relations 
dispute to upgrade its 777 model. The details of the dispute are provided in the following 
chapter. 
Thus the systems integration model depends upon the commitment of OEMs to share their 
work with others together with the willingness of those partners to develop required 
capabilities. As a result, in the last two decades, we observe a convergence of two firms 
considering extensive outsourcing of design, development and manufacturing which give its 
essence to systems integration although the extent of it may vary. Risk-sharing partnerships 
in the very early stages of product development over ever larger components and systems 
became a norm for both firms. Earlier involvement of partners to design and develop 
integrated components has also allowed suppliers to consolidate their own supply chains. 
However, this new orientation also brought potential risks and uncertainties over the 
resilience of these chains either in the development or production periods. Contracts with 
suppliers contain certain elements including tightly fixed delivery dates of specific amounts of 
parts and components. Multiple examples in the development and production of aircraft by 
Airbus and Boeing show that extensive outsourcing or networking bring about their own 
authentic contingencies. Any problem occurring at some part of the chain could cause the 
entire program to come to a halt or at least diverge from its schedule. The growth prospects 
of firms also became interdependent with the sharing of innovation. 
Another issue is the degree of power that OEMs exert their suppliers either at the time of the 
contract signed or afterwards. Airbus and Boeing today have extensive power over their 
suppliers in not only defining the specifications of parts, components and systems to be 
produced but also the form of contracts signed, costs and profits shared. Increasing degree of 
interdependence through tight delivery schedules, quality and cost reduction requirements 
highlight the tense character of supply chains. Depending on the degree of power asymmetry 
between partners (Gereffi et al., 2005), Airbus and Boeing’s ability to impose continuous 
quality improvements or cost reductions defines the pressure on suppliers to profit from their 
efforts not only to manufacture, but also progressively to design and develop assigned parts 
and components. As in the case of Boeing, OEMs even have the power to regulate merger and 
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acquisition activities of their suppliers through assignability clauses that they include in 
contracts. The high degree of involvement of financial objectives like increasing margins 
through asking cost reductions creates extra stress and problems of confidence between 
parties9F10. 
On the other hand, the dynamics between suppliers and OEMs are not always unidirectional 
and based on captive or relational forms highlighted by the GVC literature in general (Starosta, 
2010). Other examples include McDonnell Douglas’ excessive outsourcing which resulted in 
suppliers’ capture of most part of the profits and the failure of the OEM to sustain the 
conditions that make launching new products possible (Hart-Smith, 2001). In that sense, 
suppliers are not always passive and obedient, and technology transfer is not always one way 
(Amesse et al., 2001). They regularly look for upgrading opportunities and in the case of 
aerospace this is even more the case because technological potential which provides 
opportunities for firms in an exponential manner. The progressive involvement of Japanese 
manufacturers in Boeing’s 7-series since the early 1960s, supported by Japanese government 
(Sakai, 2004; US Congress, 1991), until they became capable of developing and manufacturing 
cutting edge technologies like composite wings or power systems in Boeing’s latest 787 
program. Similarly, companies from countries that traditionally have lacked aerospace 
capabilities like Malaysia, Turkey or South Africa are trying to enter in and later move further 
in supply chains of latest programs of Airbus and Boeing. The best illustrative cases are their 
latest programs of Boeing 787 and Airbus A350. 
3.4.1 Development strategy of Boeing 787 
Before it was officially launched 787 as a new commercial aircraft development program in 
early 2004, Boeing had already performed a long but usual process of market research on 
different designs of different models. In the first place the company proposed its Sonic Cruiser 
program in 2001, built on NASA-funded supersonic small commercial aircraft research project 
Super Sonic Transport in the 1990s. But later in 2002, Boeing discarded the program due to 
lack of customer interest for a faster but costly airplane as rising operating and fuel costs 
attracted airline companies for more efficient designs. As a result, Boeing launched another 
research program called Project Yellowstone that it had been working alongside Sonic Cruiser 
                                                          
10 “Boeing’s Partnership for Success strains supplier relationship” February 16, 2014, Leeham News 
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utilizing similar technologies. It was later renamed 7E7 in 2003 and finally 787 Dreamliner in 
early 2005 after the official launch. 
Before the launch of the program Boeing had to figure out the sources of finance for the 
product R&D and the organization of the supply chain. Alongside the early designs of Sonic 
Cruiser and 7E7, long before the official launch of 787, Boeing signed various technology 
development agreements with its Italian and Japanese partners as well as several US 
component suppliers. In effect, as early as 1997, the year in which it merged with McDonnell 
Douglas, the company set its Aircraft Creation Process Strategy (ACPS) which laid the 
conceptual groundwork for 787’s global production system through the lessons learned from 
777 and 747-500X/600X programs (Wagner and Norris, 2009). The aim was to develop a new 
aircraft in a faster and cheaper way. While faster meant improved design and development 
techniques through standardized processes and platforms, cheaper was mainly about 
assigning more responsibility to suppliers 10F11. Advocated by ex-McDonnell-Douglas CEO 
Stonecipher, return on net assets, a ratio which is utilized to identify how much money is being 
made in terms of the work required, was again the main motivation to keep development and 
production costs low (Ostrower, 2011). In effect, the plan allowed Boeing to keep capital 
expenditures unusually low during the development of 787 compared to its previous programs 
and Airbus’ concurrent ones. 
To keep costs down, early involvement of suppliers was essential. After the initial design of 
the aircraft, Boeing announced its major suppliers before the official launch of the program in 
order to figure out the potential program costs to Boeing and let suppliers organize their own 
supply chains and search for funding from their respective governments. As early as 2003, it 
established a council to work jointly with suppliers on the program and set up a virtual 
network linking together different labs around the world to coordinate design, tooling and 
development of parts and components 11F12. Unlike previous programs, Boeing let suppliers 
perform necessary tests in their own labs for the components they produce before integrating 
them at Boeing’s facilities (FAA, 2014). In the case of 777, its previous program before 787, 
every system was tested simultaneously in a single systems integration lab of Boeing (Condit, 
                                                          
11One major motivation of Boeing was the MD-95 outsourcing model which kept development costs 
substantially low for McDonnell Douglas (Wagner and Norris, 2009) 
12 “Boeing Establishes 7E7 Council” Boeing New Release, October 8, 2003  
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1994). The aim was to assemble a 787 in only three days after the arrival of completed parts 
to the final assembly line after an initial ramp-up period with as few employees as possible, 
counted only in hundreds compared to thousands needed to produce previous models with 
up to several weeks needed for each aircraft (Wagner and Norris, 2009). Besides extensive 
outsourcing, the company divested its Kansas and Oklahoma commercial aircraft divisions that 
were initially assigned to produce aerostructures of 787. Built its capabilities on Boeing’s 
previous assets and resources, Spirit AeroSystems emerged quickly as the biggest 
aerostructures manufacturer in the world after it received important 787 as well as A350 
work. In a short time, it opened up new aerostructure facilities or bought other companies in 
the US and in Europe. 
According to the estimates Boeing outsourced more than 70% of the development and 
production of 787 to several hundred firms all around the world. The greater responsibility 
assigned allowed suppliers to own their intellectual property gained through their R&D efforts 
(Tang and Zimmerman, 2009). 
Subsequently Boeing encountered several problems during the development of the aircraft, 
and it had to delay its first delivery for more than three years with billions of dollars of cost 
overrun. The new method of product development based on an ill-structured supply chain 
organization with heavy and early outsourcing caused various design, development and 
assembly defects, parts shortage, erroneous component and subsystems testing and other 
technical challenges that might not occur under a well-defined product development 
process12F13. Boeing’s insistence on reducing costs of development as well as management of the 
program, according to some estimates doubled the total costs of the aircraft including buying 
back some assets from its suppliers including a $1 billion plant producing aft fuselage of the 
aircraft13F14. Even after several years of product launch, a large number of Boeing employees is 
onsite at some suppliers helping them to solve development and production related issues 
(FAA, 2014). 
                                                          
13The delay of 787 and other problems occurred after deliveries started deserve a detailed discussion which is 
linked to Boeing’s systems integration mismanagement but here only the major reasons of delays are 
highlighted. For a detailed list of 787 delays and their technical and organizational reasons, see Zhao, 2012 
14 “Boeing celebrates 787 delivery as program's costs top $32 billion”, Dominic Gates, Seattle Times, September 
24, 2011 
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One last issue with the 787 is the impact of program accounting practice on the profitability 
of the company, a matter which has been widely discussed by industry analysts and business 
press questioning whether the 787 program will ever be profitable 14F15. The deferred accounting 
system spreads the development costs of a new program across an accounting block of a 
certain number of aircraft and eases the pressure on company’s balance sheet. As an example: 
If Boeing reported individual losses on the 114 787s delivered in 2014 based on the 
discrete costs of building each aircraft, the commercial aircraft division would have 
reported an overall operating loss of $122 million last year. Instead, the practice of 
bringing forward average unit profits over a production run of 1,300 aircraft onto 
current deliveries helped the division post a $6.4 billion profit in 2014 instead 15F16. 
The practice has been questioned by the US Securities and Exchange Commission, although it 
has been utilized by US aerospace companies for decades to address this development costs 
problem and is fully compliant with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles of the US. In 
February 2016, the commission asked Boeing whether Boeing its income figures relied on too 
optimistic sales forecasts as part of an ongoing investigation.16F17 
3.4.2 Development strategy of Airbus A350 
In terms of strategies on supplier organization, Airbus has many commonalities with Boeing. 
When the company decided to introduce a new wide body to compete with Boeing 787, Airbus 
was already under heavy pressure due to substantially increased R&D costs and consecutive 
delays of its superjumbo A380 mostly originated from internal organizational problems 17F18. Its 
first attempt to introduce an upgraded A330 received harsh criticism from customers and 
forced the company to offer a brand new design with new technologies aboard. Afterwards 
the company came with a new design, A350 XWB. With the new program, Airbus introduced 
a ‘New Systems Policy’ which aimed to receive components and systems at an earlier stage in 
the production cycle and with a greater degree of maturity, having already been tested by the 
                                                          
15 “Will Boeing 787 ever break-even?”, Javier Irastorza, theblogbyjavier.com, October 28, 2011; “Why Boeing 
Keeps Losing Money on Each 787 Dreamliner”, Justin Bachman, Businessweek, October 22, 2014; “Boeing 
reports new cost increases on 787 programme”, Stephen Trimble, Flightglobal, January 28, 2015; “Will 787 
program ever show an overall profit? Analysts grow more skeptical”, Dominic Gates, Seattle Times, October 17, 
2015 
16 “Boeing reports new cost increases on 787 programme”, Stephen Trimble, Flightglobal, January 28, 2015 
17 “Boeing to Face SEC Probe of Dreamliner and 747 Accounting”, Robert Schmidt, Julie Johnsson and Matt 
Robinson, Bloomberg, February 11, 2016 
18 “The Airbus saga: Crossed wires and a multibillion-euro delay”, Nicola Clark, International Herald Tribune, 
December 11, 2006 
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supplier (interview with A350 XWB programme director Didier Evrard, in Beauclair, 2007) even 
though many of the suppliers at the date of the program launch were not prepared materially 
and technically to be fully involved (Kechidi, 2008). To enable a solid cooperation from the 
beginning of the program, they were assigned same processes, methods and even toolsets to 
maintain stronger collaboration with Airbus and with other suppliers in their workpackages 
(d’Apollonia, 2010). Like Boeing, it also aimed to reduce the number of its suppliers and assign 
them more design and manufacturing work, although the degree of outsourcing has not been 
the same for each system. The ‘focus on core’ policy of the company foresees in-house 
sourcing when the work is especially key for architecture, integration and technology 
leadership (Doerfler et al., 2012). In this New Systems Policy model, not only design and 
development (at a stage when the system of component is not fully defined), but also initial 
testing and readiness for mass production are performed by supplier firms 18F19. The aim is 
twofold. The first motivation is to shorten the flight test phase and receive certification by 
reducing risks related to potential supplier deficiencies before the introduction of the aircraft 
to the market and to avoid any costs related to potential delays. The second motivation is to 
ramp up production as quickly as possible through greater maturity of suppliers’ parts in order 
to fulfill much higher pre-introduction orders of new aircraft models compared to previous 
aircraft programs. Cost reduction through a rapid moving down the learning curve is an 
essential element of manufacturing strategy of aerospace firms. Another element of cost 
reduction, similar to Boeing, was divestments which include assets related to the 
manufacturing of A350. Harmonized with its multi-year cost-cutting and restructuring 
program Power 8, Airbus attempted to sell several components, subassembly and 
aerostructure sites in France, Germany and the UK and managed to sell only two out of seven 
planned site sales between 2008 and 2009. Large-scale supplier involvement in development 
and manufacturing was also under strain. Suppliers were under great pressure to fulfil their 
promises on time, and they encountered delays. In addition, they were asked price cuts for 
their sales to Airbus as part of the Power 8 program in order to share more of their productivity 
gains with Airbus. Learning from the mistakes of its earlier development program A380 and 
                                                          
19 Tier 1 suppliers are selected according to their overall capability, including performance, cost and weight 
objectives and the ability to meet commitments. Following the selection, the supplier enters the Joint 
Definition Phase (JDP) where teams work together on a common design over a six-to-nine month period. After 
this period of close collaboration, individual partner companies can pursue development work at their home 
facilities, delivering their equipment two years later for bench testing (Beauclair, 2007).  
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continuing problems with Boeing 78719F20, Airbus established a close coordination with its 
suppliers and tried to solve problems on site before the subassemblies were delivered to the 
final assembly line. Despite such efforts, the program encountered a delay of one and a half 
years before the company finally delivered the first aircraft in December 2014 20F21. 
3.5 Supply Chain 787 vs. A350 - similarities more than differences 
The Table 3.2 below shows the geographical distribution of 787 contracts in comparison with 
those of A350. In comparison to limited outsourcing of A350 out of Europe, Japan and North 
America (traditional centers of aerospace), Boeing created a much more extended network of 
suppliers leveraging its previous civil and military collaborations as well as brand new 
partnerships even though the contracts it signed with domestic firms represent the majority 
of 787 work. US firms are still important suppliers of Airbus. 43 percent of A350 contracts 
signed with US firms, only 17 percent of Boeing 787 contracts signed with four Airbus home 
countries. Concerning the direct procurement by OEM, more than half of these contracts are 
assigned directly by Airbus (148 contracts out of 268) and Boeing (204 contracts out of 397). 
The rest of the contracts are signed between first-tier and sub-tier suppliers. Around 10% of 
the contracts are assigned to jet engine suppliers and their contractors in both cases. Because 
several contracts are sometimes assigned to the same supplier, the total number of suppliers 
are less than the number of contracts. In the case of Boeing 787, this number is equal to 325 
suppliers from 22 different countries. For Airbus it is 222 suppliers from 23 different countries. 
Beside these contractors, a number of joint ventures in China and Russia for both companies 
plus Malaysia for Boeing are particularly involved in 787 and A350 networks.  
                                                          
20 “To Avoid Delay, Airbus Drops Lithium-Ion Batteries”, Christopher Drew, Nicola Clark, The New York Times, 
February 15, 2013 
21 “Premier retard officiel pour le lancement de l'Airbus A350”, Bruno Trevidic, Les Echos, November 15, 2010; 
“Reality Bites; Airbus delays A350-900 entry into service and terminates A340 production”, Jens Flottau, 
Aviation Week & Space Technology, Volume 173, Issue 40, November 14, 2011; “EADS announces delay to 
Airbus A350”, Andrew Parker, Financial Times, July 27, 2012 
135 
 
Table 3.2: Geographical distribution of Airbus A350 and Boeing 787 outsourcing contracts 
Countries Boeing 787 Airbus A350 
USA 255 115 
UK 30 47 
France 19 30 
Germany 13 22 
Spain 5 11 
Airbus home countries 67 110 
Japan 13 6 
Italy 7 5 
Canada 14 2 
Austria 5 6 
Belgium 3 5 
Czech Republic 0 1 
Denmark 0 1 
Greece 1 0 
Netherlands 5 3 
Poland 0 1 
Russia 0 1 
Sweden 4 4 
Switzerland 1 2 
Turkey 1 1 
China 2 1 
India 3 0 
Israel 7 0 
Malaysia 2 1 
South Korea 4 1 
Taiwan 1 0 
Thailand 1 0 
UAE 1 1 
South Africa 0 1 
Total number of contracts 397 268 
Source: Airframer + author’s collection through company news releases and company web 
sites. The lists do not represent the entire supply chain of each program although the biggest 
workpackages in terms of contract value and technological content together with their major 
suppliers are all represented 
Even though the great majority of suppliers are fully or largely positioned in the aerospace 
business, there are quite a large number of specialized suppliers for both programs which have 
trans-industry capabilities, serving multiple industries with their products and services. 
Materials, machinery and electronics are the industries many of the Airbus and Boeing 
suppliers are actively present. Many suppliers are either the subsidiaries or business units of 
major industrial firms. Table 3.3a provides information on the organizational and ownership 
forms. While smaller contracts are generally signed with independent and mostly private 
firms, the majority of contracts are signed with subsidiaries or business units of large public 
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or private firms. Table 3.3b shows the age distribution of contractor firms. Belonging to 
mature industries like aerospace, materials or machinery, around half of the contractors’ 
parent firms are in business for more than half a century. In both cases average age of parent 
firms is above 60. 
Table 3.3a: Organizational forms and ownership structures of Airbus A350 and Boeing 787 
suppliers 
Contractor's organizational form Boeing Airbus 
Parent company 130 83 
Joint venture 2 1 
Subsidiary of a company 142 105 
Unit of a company 50 33 
Private Equity Investment 1 0 
Total 325 222 
Contractor's ownership form   
Public 26 23 
Parent is public 146 99 
Private 98 63 
Parent is private 43 31 
State-owned 5 2 
Parent is state-owned 3 2 
Employee-owned 2 1 
Parent is employee-owned 1 0 
Not-for-profit 1 1 
Total 325 222 
Source: Airframer + author’s collection through company news releases and company web 
sites 
Table 3.3b: Age distribution of the parent firms of Airbus A350 and Boeing 787 suppliers 
Year of inception of parent firms Boeing Airbus 
before 1901 26 27 
1901-1920 18 15 
1921-1940 19 13 
1941-1960 52 32 
1961-1980 48 27 
1981-2000 59 49 
after 2001 11 13 
unknown 2 1 
Total 235 177 
Average age 62 63 
Source: Airframer + author’s collection through company news releases and company web 
sites 
The geography of A350 and 787 parts manufacturing more or less represents a similar picture 
to the distribution of contractor firms’ origins with some distinctions. Table 4.4 below provides 
locations of major design, development or manufacturing sites of the contracts signed. The 
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technological and organizational dominance of US aircraft manufacturing is also highlighted 
even though the number of actual sites where the work is performed is smaller compared to 
the number of contracts signed with US firms. In many cases, the work is either performed in 
multiple locations in the US and Europe or directly by foreign companies’ local subsidiaries. 
There is a considerable number of contracts geographically distributed across the world in 
terms of their realization. It reflects the increasingly global character of the design, 
development and manufacturing of commercial aircraft and parts. Low-cost arguments at 
least for bigger workpackages available in these lists are not valid. There are only a few low-
cost production sites available including Mexico and Philippines which are two new 
manufacturing geographies for A350 and 787 work. 
Table 3.4: Geographical distribution major sites for Airbus A350 and Boeing 787 contracts 
Location of major design/development/ 
manufacturing site for the contract 
Boeing Airbus 
USA 228 83 
UK 20 44 
France 15 24 
Germany 10 17 
Spain 4 10 
Airbus home countries 49 94 
Japan 11 5 
Italy 7 5 
Canada 7 2 
Mexico 2 1 
Austria 5 6 
Belgium 3 5 
Czech Republic 0 1 
Denmark 0 1 
Greece 1 0 
Netherlands 5 2 
Poland 0 1 
Russia 0 1 
Sweden 4 4 
Switzerland 1 2 
Turkey 1 1 
China 2 3 
India 3 0 
Israel 7 0 
Malaysia 2 1 
South Korea 4 1 
Taiwan 1 0 
Thailand 1 0 
UAE 1 1 
Philippines 0 1 
South Africa 0 1 
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US & France 0 1 
US & UK 1 0 
US & Canada 3 0 
US & Mexico 2 0 
multiple sites in Europe 4 3 
multiple world locations 42 41 
Total 397 268 
Source: Airframer + author’s collection through company news releases and company web 
sites 
It has been widely discussed that Airbus and Boeing have decreased the number of contractors 
in their latest aircraft programs by outsourcing bigger workpackages to specific companies 
compared to smaller work attributed to multiple firms in their previous programs. It is actually 
not the size of the workpackages that matter. They have worked with big suppliers in their 
previous programs as well. What is different in their latest programs is the degree of 
completeness of the systems delivered Airbus and Boeing final production lines to be 
assembled. That is how they have managed to considerably reduce production lead times. 
And this model is simultaneously applied to their other models assisted with lean production 
techniques, substantially reducing the aircraft’s final assembly time. It is beyond the scope of 
this study to conduct a detailed analysis of the capability dynamics of suppliers in a 
comprehensive way mostly due to lack of available data on the details of OEM-supplier 
relations such as clauses of contracts. One curious observation of the data collected, however, 
shows that around a quarter of A350 and Boeing 787 suppliers are working for both programs. 
This is a sign of the transfer of the experience gained in one program to the other one. Due to 
the chronological order, this is mostly through Boeing 787 towards Airbus A350. Considering 
the large number of US suppliers in both programs, it can be guessed that the main recipients 
of such cumulative capability enhancement are US firms. Next to historically important US 
engine and aircraft systems and parts suppliers like Pratt Whitney, GE Aviation or Honeywell, 
the development and production period of Boeing 787 and A350 witnessed a rapid growth of 
an important group of US aerospace suppliers like Rockwell Collins, UTC Aerospace Systems, 
Parker Aerospace, Moog, Hexcel and Ducommun which participate to both programs. US 
companies are leading partners of Airbus in the fuel, hydraulics and avionics systems on the 
A350 XWB program as they already gained substantial experience with newest technologies 
by their involvement in 787.  
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3.6 Insourcing 787 vs. 350 - differences more than similarities 
In order to have a complete picture of supply chain organization, the outsourcing comparison 
should be complemented with the structure of insourcing of the same product in question. 
Beside in-house design and development of an aircraft, the size and complexity of the parts 
and components manufactured and assembled within the walls of company sites and plants 
including the final assembly line show the depth of key manufacturing skills and capabilities 
directly related to the resilience of the productive organization in the long-run capable of 
developing and manufacturing ever more innovative products in the future. 
Table 3.5 shows the major parts and components of Boeing 787 and Airbus A350 produced in-
house. Highly criticized by industry specialists, extensive outsourcing of Boeing 787 has been 
proposed as the major element of its systems integration model in which everything except 
final assembly can be outsourced. At the beginning of the program, except for some flat 
composite surfaces like vertical tail fins, trailing edge wing surfaces and a few airframe and 
engine assemblies like wing to body fairings and engine strut pylons, all other systems and 
components including wings, fuselage sections, nose and avionics and electronic systems were 
outsourced. Only after the company bought the operations of Vought producing aft fuselage 
sections in 2009 and further investments after 2011 to produce specific composite sections, 
its manufacturing share has slightly increased. Even after these investments domestic in-
house production remained highly limited as most of the existing manufacturing is held in 
subsidiaries and units abroad. 
On the contrary, Airbus continued to develop and manufacture major assemblies (wings, most 
of fuselage, nose and doors) and various other critical and non-critical sections predominantly 
in its domestic production sites. China is the only country where both companies’ subsidiaries 
contribute to these programs. Other than outsourcing to Chinese origin firms and joint 
ventures, both companies strategically decided to allocate some manufacturing within China 
in exchange of potential orders by Chinese airlines.  
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Table 3.5a: Boeing 787 parts and components manufactured in-house 
Company Manufactured product categories 
Ownership 
Type 
Location of Major Design/ 
Development /Manufacturing 
site for the contract 
BHA Aero Composite Parts Co., Ltd Aircraft Control Surfaces: Trailing edge panels for vertical fin Subsidiary Tanggu District, Tianjin, China 
Boeing Aerostructures Australia Wing Flaps: Moveable trailing edge wing surfaces Subsidiary Melbourne, Australia 
Boeing Canada Winnipeg Division 
Fairings: Wing to body & vertical fin fairings; 
Aircraft Doors: Main landing gear doors 
Unit Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada 
Boeing Canada Winnipeg Division Engine Pylons: Engine strut forward & aft pylons Unit Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada 
Boeing Fabrication Services 
Wings: Vertical fin; moveable trailing edges; 
Fairings: Wing to body fairings 
Unit Auburn, Washington, USA 
Boeing South Carolina Fuselage Sections: Aft fuselage Unit 
North Charleston, South 
Carolina, USA 
Boeing South Carolina & Boeing 
Everett 
Final assembly Unit 
North Charleston, South 
Carolina & Everett, Washington, 
USA 
Source: Airframer + author’s collection through company news releases and company web sites  
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Table 3.5b: Airbus A350 XWB parts and components manufactured in-house  
Company Manufactured product categories 
Ownership 
Type 
Location of Major Design/ 
Development /Manufacturing 
site for the contract 
Airbus Group Innovations Research/Consulting Services: RHEA virtual reality design software Unit 
Suresnes, France & Ottobrunn, 
Germany 
Airbus Deutschland GmbH Wing Spars: Wing stringers Subsidiary multiple sites in Germany 
Airbus Deutschland GmbH 
Wings: Composite upper wing shells; 
Empennages: Vertical tailplane; 
Fuselage Sections: CFRP fuselage shells 
Subsidiary multiple sites in Germany 
Airbus Helicopters Deutschland Aircraft Doors: Passenger & cargo doors Subsidiary Donauwörth, Germany 
Premium AEROTEC GmbH 
Aircraft Flooring: Floor crossbars, floor structure in aft fuselage; Fuselage 
Sections: Sections 13/14 & 16/18; 
Aircraft Interior Bulkheads: Aft pressure bulkhead 
Subsidiary multiple sites in Germany 
Premium AEROTEC GmbH Aircraft Landing Gear: Main landing gear attachments Subsidiary Augsburg, Germany 
PFW Aerospace AG Metal Tubing: Fuel & bleed air tubing systems for wings & fuselage Subsidiary multiple sites in the world 
Airbus UK Wings: Wings Subsidiary multiple sites in the UK 
Airbus UK Testing Services: Landing gear systems testing Subsidiary Filton, UK 
Alestis Aerospace SL Fairings: Belly fairing Subsidiary Puerto de Santa Maria, Spain 
Harbin Hafei Airbus Composite 
Manufacturing Centre 
Fairings: Belly fairing parts; 
Aircraft Control Surfaces: Rudders, elevators; 
Aircraft Doors: Section 19 maintenance doors 
Joint 
Venture 
Harbin, China 
Stelia Aerospace (Aerolia) 
Nose Cones: Nose fuselage; 
Fuselage Sections: Mechanically milled 3D fuselage panels, 
composite fuselage panels 
Subsidiary Méaulte, France 
Stelia Aerospace (Aerolia) Hydraulic Systems & Equipment: Hydraulic & cabin systems tubes & pipes Subsidiary Méaulte, France 
Stelia Aerospace (Sogerma) Passenger Seating: "Equinox" premium seats Subsidiary multiple sites in the world 
Stelia Aerospace (Sogerma) Crew Seating: Cockpit seating Subsidiary multiple sites in the world 
Cassidian SAS Automated Test Equipment: Subsidiary multiple sites in France 
Intespace Environmental Test Equipment: Static test monitoring Subsidiary Toulouse, France 
Airbus France Final assembly Subsidiary Toulouse, France 
Source: Airframer + author’s collection through company news releases and company web sites 
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3.7 Capability development through knowledge acquisition 
The systems integration orientations of and heavy outsourcing by both firms raise questions 
about their degrees of commitment to develop necessary technological and organizational 
capabilities configured around their business strategies. Cognitive human skills are the 
principal indispensable requisites to develop and deploy those capabilities for specific 
purposes like setting up a product development organization. 
The widening gap between knowledge and manufacturing bases of large companies has 
attracted some interest of scholars of technology and innovation (Acha et al., 2007; Brusoni 
et al., 2001; Granstrand, et al., 1997). Risks related to outsourcing technological knowledge 
and innovation aroused interest in exploring the knowledge dynamics of firms outsourcing 
large sections of their product development and manufacturing efforts which have long been 
labelled as systems integrator firms. In order to keep up with rapid technological change, even 
though they resort to extensive outsourcing, these firms try to continue developing 
technological knowledge in-house in order to be able to coordinate their value chains and 
maintain their technological superiority, at least in terms of their knowledge base and systems 
integration capabilities (Brusoni et al., 2001; Granstrand, et al., 1997). 
3.7.1 Boosting patent applications 
The efforts to measure technological competencies of firms have popularized the micro-level 
work on patents. Patents supposedly signify that the holder has the competence to improve 
technology in a given field and patenting is a fairly operational and universal system of 
classification of corporate competencies in different technological fields (Granstrand, et al., 
1997). Firms, especially large ones, have been building broader technology bases in order to 
explore and experiment with them for their potential deployment (Granstrand, et al., 1997; 
Kortum and Lerner, 1999). Strategy-related motivations and better innovation management 
practices have also helped firms to build large patent portfolios in the last decades (Hall and 
Ziedonis, 2001). 
However, detecting the gap between knowledge base of companies and their manufacturing 
capabilities is not an easy job. The evidence is mainly documented through patent analysis of 
firms, and it is usually not complemented with further research on other qualitative and 
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quantitative aspects of companies’ investments in skills and technologies, the integration of 
those with ongoing development and manufacturing programs, and the impact of their 
broader business strategies on their innovative capabilities. Systems integration is mostly 
about concurrent organizing of design and production integration into the final product. The 
depth of knowledge of a systems integrator over the entire design and production process can 
only be estimated with the measure of the degree of involvement in research, development 
and manufacturing. To possess technological expertise in any part of productive activity, any 
theoretical knowledge documented through patents should be coupled with the knowledge 
over how to realize those technologies and integrate them into production process (Acha et 
al., 2007). If a technology is understood as ‘the body of knowledge underlying the design, 
development, and manufacture of the product’ (Prencipe, 2001) then a firm, in many of the 
cases, also needs to manufacture the product in order to have a complete understanding of 
the technology. Furthermore, exploiting technological opportunities is related to the degree 
of organizational capabilities of firms to cope with innovation challenges (Christensen and 
Rosenbloom, 1995; Granstrand, et al., 1997). That is, next to the capabilities related to 
knowledge accumulation and manufacturing, companies are required to have the necessary 
organizational capabilities to bring both internal and external knowledge and manufacturing 
skills together in order to sustain their innovative performance. 
The B787 and A350 examples show that in order to sustain their long-run competitive 
advantage, OEMs have to maintain a delicate balance between their in-house and external 
capabilities. In-house capacity is required to meet technical performance requirements of 
advanced aerospace products. External capabilities developed by partners are also crucial as 
they can be superior or unreachable for systems integrators, and they have to rely on 
numerous other technologies developed outside their walls. Moreover, they have to possess 
the necessary organizational capabilities to establish a steady flow of information running in 
and out of the firm to guarantee product development. In some cases, any issue with the flow 
of information within the boundaries of the firm may also cause problems, as the A380 
example has shown. These capabilities help them to maintain full control over innovation 
through accumulated knowledge, skills, experience, and the diffusion of control and authority 
to minimize related risks. In the systems integration business model as it is expressed in the 
144 
 
latest programs of Airbus and Boeing, there is a focused capability development effort in 
commercial aircraft production which is extensive in knowledge but selective in application.  
In effect both firms have been harnessing knowledge dispersed in different domains of 
technology and patenting them at an accelerated speed in the last three decades. The analysis 
of patent applications show that Airbus has been following an energetic strategy to publish 
more patents than Boeing in the last decade. These patents are especially concentrated in 
technological fields important for new aircraft designs. The gap between the two companied 
widens in specific technology classes within commercial technologies.  
Figure 4.2 shows the number of patents issued by Boeing and Airbus as current assignees. 
These numbers also include non-commercial aircraft segments of the firms. The patents 
assigned to Airbus either before the inception of EADS in 1999 or Airbus Industrie in 1969 refer 
to those issued by predecessor companies of partners which formed Airbus in 1969. Mostly 
state-owned and defense related, these companies were not so willing to publish the results 
of their research at least until the early 1990s, when large scale privatization of aerospace and 
defense companies started all over Europe. 
Figure 3.2: Number of patents issued by Boeing and Airbus as current assignees, 2015 
included 
 
Source: Questel Orbit patent search engine. To generate a complete number of patents issued 
by both firms, first, the necessary keyword adjustments on the list of subsidiaries of both 
companies available in the database were performed in order to extract the patents issued by 
right group of companies. Later, a certain number of patents omitted from the total numbers 
after a detailed check of assignees of each patent issued by both companies. As a result of the 
second adjustment, a total of 333 and 736 patents are omitted from the Airbus and Boeing 
lists respectively 
145 
 
The difference between the number of patents issued by parent companies during the 
development of A320 and A330/A340 programs and those numbers when Airbus worked on 
A380 and A350 programs is remarkable. After the foundation of EADS as a public company, 
since early 2000s, there has been a potent increase in patenting when the company focused 
on the development of its A380 and A350 programs. In addition, Airbus continued to heavily 
invest in other aerospace business segments, while Boeing completely left the commercial 
helicopter and turboprop aircraft businesses in the last two decades. 
During the same period Boeing has also shown remarkable performance in patenting even 
though it was not as spectacular as Airbus until the last two years. The rise in the number of 
patents during the development period of the 787 remained limited and quickly disappeared 
after the aircraft was put into service in 2011. A very rapid increase in the number of issued 
patents in 2014 and 2015 helped company to catch up with Airbus. The two companies issued 
almost the same number of patents in 2015 (1030 for Boeing and 1024 for Airbus). 
Figures 3.3a and 3.3b detail the number of patents issued by Airbus and Boeing in their top 15 
patent groups in the last 30 years. These groups largely correspond to the commercial aircraft 
segments of the two companies, with the growth of patenting of Airbus increasing 
substantially over the last three decades. While there are specific domains in which Boeing is 
patenting more than Airbus such as digital computing, radio transmission, and semiconductor 
devices, in major commercial aircraft fields like fuselages, frames, wings, passenger or crew 
accommodation, and composites Airbus has been performing much stronger than Boeing in 
terms of knowledge generation within these fields. These are also the areas Boeing has largely 
outsourced in its latest program 787 while Airbus has kept these activities in-house. However, 
the relation between patenting and outsourcing in commercial aircraft manufacturing is not 
always linear. In avionics, one of the most technologically complicated fields in aerospace, 
Boeing patented as much as Airbus during the same period while it also outsourced some 
major elements within the field such as flight controls. In contrast, Airbus continued to 
develop in-house some of these technologies and it even insourced some elements of the 
avionics technology in its latest program. The company has a balanced strategy of avionics 
outsourcing and insourcing (Beaugency, Sakinc and Talbot, 2015).  
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Figure 3.3a: Growth in the number of patents issued by Airbus in top 15 patent groups 
between 1986 and 2015 
 
Figure 3.3b: Growth in the number of patents issued by Boeing in top 15 patent groups 
between 1986 and 2015 
 
Source: Questel Orbit patent search engine  
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As stated, the difference of patenting performance in performing operations which are 
directly related to aircraft design and development is especially striking. Figure 3.4 below 
provides comparisons of the number of patents issued in four critical patent subclasses and 
groups related to commercial aircraft manufacturing. The first chart (4.4a) shows the number 
of patents issued each year in two major aircraft related subclasses namely B64C (Aeroplanes, 
Helicopters) and B64D (Equipment for Fitting in or to Aircraft; Flying Suits; Parachutes; 
Arrangements or Mounting of Power Plants or Propulsion Transmissions in Aircraft). The 
second (4.4b) and the third (4.4c) compare the number of patents in B64C-003 (Wings) and 
B29C-070 (Shaping composites, i.e. plastics material comprising reinforcements, fillers or 
preformed parts) subgroups respectively. 
Figure 3.4a: Number of patents issued by Boeing and Airbus as current assignees in B64C 
and B64D subclasses combined between 1964 and 2015 
 
Figure 3.4b: Number of patents issued by Boeing and Airbus as current assignees in B64C-
003 Wings patent group between 1990 and 2015 
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Figure 3.4c: Number of patents issued by Boeing and Airbus as current assignees in B29C-
070 Shaping composites, i.e. plastics material comprising reinforcements, fillers or 
preformed parts patent group between 1990 and 2015 
 
Source: Questel Orbit patent search engine 
While the early literature on patents claims that there is no clear association between 
technology diversification and product diversification (Brusoni et al., 2001; Granstrand, et al., 
1997), the statistics show a certain degree of relation between the number of inputs (patents) 
provided by the two companies and the degree of outsourcing in their latest programs. 
Extensive outsourcing of Boeing 787 including its wings and most of its aerostructure 
(fuselages, stabilizers, tail, etc.) is expressed in the low level of patent applications in related 
fields during its development period which spans the period between 2003 and 2011. In 
contrast, during the period between 2006 and 2014 when Airbus designed and developed its 
A350 XWB and kept most of the development of those structures and components in-house, 
a big surge in patent applications is observed. 
If the low level of patenting in 2000s can be explained by the high level of outsourcing, what 
is the reason behind Boeing’s most recent surge in patenting? An answer can be found in the 
upgrading of two old models which are largely insourced compared to the 787. The upgrades, 
737 MAX and 777X, have been under development since 2012 and 2014 respectively and the 
significant improvements are to the wing for both programs, the interface of the wing and the 
engine, the use of winglets (737 MAX), and folding wingtips (777X). Boeing’s decision to bring 
777X wings in-house is a clear indication of the desire to be able to continue component 
manufacturing. It might have had systems integration knowledge about composite wings, but 
it does not know how to manufacture them. It is most probable that the high level of patenting 
in specific fields like wings or composites will sustain during the development of the 777X for 
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a couple of years or more. There is a question mark in the case of Airbus which currently has 
two upgrading programs A330neo wide-body and A320neo while A320neo upgrading is close 
to completion. Except composites which have a much wider application, that is they are not 
only specific to airframes, there has been a continuous decrease in aircraft patenting since the 
early development period of A350. 
In the last part of the patent discussion some information can be provided on the geography 
of patenting activity of the two firms. Unsurprisingly a great majority of patents are produced 
in their home countries. Figure 3.5 shows that 94 percent of Airbus patents and 95 percent of 
Boeing patents are produced in their home countries. Apparently the locations of research 
and development labs and centers of two companies and the prominent role of home-country 
public R&D are possible explanations of the ‘homebound’ nature of industrial patenting 
(Mowery, 2009). Germany is the leading country of Airbus in terms of knowledge generation. 
Figure 3.5: Priority country distribution of the patents issued by Airbus and Boeing 
 
Source: Questel Orbit patent search engine 
The literature on the sources and impact of innovation utilizes patents as information 
providing outputs of innovative activities with certain limitations when they are aggregated 
as indicators of innovation (OECD, 2001). However, patents should rather be conceptualized 
as an input to the innovation process, rather than an output (Mowery, 2009) especially in 
manufacturing activities where patenting on product innovation is mostly about product 
design and development. Moreover, limitations such as the highly variable economic and 
technological value of patents, their skewed distribution, and the close links between 
patenting activity and institutional structure such as laws and regulations regarding patents 
(OECD, 2001) make it difficult to make industrial comparisons from a historical perspective. 
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The quasi absence of patenting activity of Airbus for more than 20 years after it was founded 
in late 1960s is an example. 
Creating this input necessitates an appropriate knowledge base reinforced with required 
investments in knowledge, skills and infrastructure. Thus for an inquiry into the degree of 
knowledge depth and the capabilities to transform these resources into final products, it is 
necessary to measure how much these companies actually spend on new product 
development. Two main items of measurement are related capital expenditures and R&D 
expenses. 
3.7.2 Research and Development Costs 
In the commercial aircraft sector, R&D expenditures and capital investments rapidly increase 
with a new aircraft development program and then gradually decrease when the program gets 
closer to completion. The extent of the program in terms of its technological sophistication, 
infrastructural requirements and the participation of program partners in development costs 
determine the size of expenditures for the parent firm. Figure 3.6 and 3.7 show commercial 
segments and total R&D expenditures of Boeing and Airbus and their proportions of 
commercial and total sales in the last two decades 21F22. The monetary amount of resources 
allocated by OEMs and their partners substantially increased in line with the increase in 
technological complexity and tightening regulations required to produce safer and higher 
quality aircraft. Even though outsourcing might help to control their R&D spending in their 
latest programs, given the requirements to integrate an increasing number of technological 
fields (Granstrand, et al., 1997), their R&D levels are rather expected to increase. After a swift 
decline at the end of the development of 777, R&D expenditures of Boeing have risen once 
again along with the B787 R&D program which cost Boeing a minimum of $12 billion despite 
early plans to spend as little as $5.8 billion22F23 to develop the airplane mostly due to missteps of 
                                                          
22 Boeing started to publish segmented R&D figures only in 1994 and Airbus data is available starting with 1999. 
The difference between commercial aircraft segment and total reflects higher R&D spending of Boeing on 
military products. Between 2000 and 2015, Boeing devoted 64% of its total R&D on commercial aircraft 
programs while this ratio reaches 80% for Airbus. 
23 The low level of projected spending reflects cost sharing agreements with some of Boeing suppliers. These 
agreements make suppliers fund their own development expenditures as well as reimburse Boeing for its 
experimentation, basic design and testing activities during the 787 development. These payments are recorded 
as a reduction to Boeing’s research and development expenses. Similar agreements also apply to Airbus. 
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the company23F24. After a steep increase during the development of the 787, total and 
commercial segment R&D expenditures of Boeing decreased quickly after 2011 even though 
there has been a recent surge in expenditures due to the investments on 737 MAX and 777X. 
In contrast, R&D expenditures of Airbus were mostly stable and but usually higher than 
Boeing’s while they were only slightly increased during the years the company developed its 
wide-body airplanes, A380 and A350. The decrease in the last years is primarily due to the 
appreciation of the US dollar against the euro. 
Beside new programs, upgrades of existing programs or new derivatives also contribute R&D 
costs of two firms. As of 2016 both firms have only derivative or upgrade programs leaving 
them without any planned aircraft program for the coming years. At present, Airbus is 
upgrading its A320 and A330 models with A320neo and A330neo and it continue to develop 
A350-1000 model of its newest aircraft program A350XWB. After completing its work on 787-
9 version of its newest program 787 Dreamliner, Boeing is working on 737 MAX and 777X as 
upgrades of its existing models and the new 787-10 which is the extended version of 787. 
Figure 3.6a: Research and Development Expenditures of Boeing and Airbus in the 
commercial aircraft segment as a proportion of commercial aircraft sales 
 
Months in parenthesis indicate the length of the development period represented with red and blue 
columns starting with the launch of the program until the delivery of the first aircraft. 
Source: Company annual reports.   
                                                          
24 “Boeing celebrates 787 delivery as program's costs top $32 billion”, Dominic Gates, Seattle Times, September 
24, 2011 
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Figure 3.6b: Total Research and Development Expenditures of Boeing and Airbus in the 
commercial aircraft segment, in current US$ 
 
Source: Company annual reports. For Airbus yearly average exchange rates are utilized. 
Figure 3.7a: Total Research and Development Expenditures of Boeing and Airbus as a 
proportion to total sales 
 
Source: Company annual reports. 
Figure 3.7b: Total R&D Expenditures of Boeing and Airbus, in current US$ 
 
Source: Company annual reports. For Airbus yearly average exchange rates are utilized.  
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3.7.3 Capital Expenditures 
Aerospace companies have to mobilize substantial amounts of financial resources for their 
spending on new machinery, tooling and new assembly lines or manufacturing plants as well. 
Details on the expenditures on new production sites, engineering centers, assembly lines and 
advanced machinery provide valuable information on growth strategies regarding the 
projected market share and value-added amounts, and the extent of desired capabilities in 
specific fields of aircraft manufacturing. The degree of financial commitment is tightly 
connected to the allocation of funds for material utilization through the links between 
investment strategies and long-term commitment of finance to innovation. Through new sites, 
centers and production lines, an OEM demonstrates its commitment to both product and 
process innovation and learning capacity of its workforce who will utilize their productive 
capabilities with advanced machinery tools and techniques together with required training. 
Figure 3.8 provides a comparison of commercial aircraft segment capital expenditures of 
Boeing and Airbus in the last two decades. The rapid increase in capital expenditures in their 
earlier programs of B777 and A380 has not been replicated in their latest programs B787 and 
A350 because activities are outsourced at unprecedented levels. The increase in capital 
expenditures of Boeing during the development of B787 stayed particularly minimal. The 
acquisition of several operations of 787 subcontractors in the US in 2008 and 2009 represents 
a forced capital investment for Boeing as a response to mounting 787 supply problems that 
contributed to the delay of the aircraft. In the period after 2011, the company continued to 
spend on capital investment in the form of new production and R&D centers that helped it to 
keep the level of capital expenditures stable. Compared to Boeing, investment strategy of 
Airbus is more diversified both geographically and segmentally. In the last fifteen years Airbus 
spent twice as much as Boeing on plant, property and equipment while it ran two new 
commercial aircraft programs compared to a single one by Boeing.  
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Figure 3.8a: Capital Expenditures of Boeing and Airbus in the commercial aircraft segment as 
proportion to commercial aircraft sales 
 
Source: Company annual reports. Unallocated capital expenditures, which are substantially 
higher in the case of Boeing, are distributed to each segment according to their relative weight 
as a proportion to total allocated capital expenditures 
Figure 3.8b: Total Capital Expenditures of Boeing and Airbus in the commercial aircraft 
segment, in current US$ 
 
Source: Company annual reports. For Airbus yearly average exchange rates are utilized 
To go into detail, a setback in Boeing’s capital expenditures and a decline in real terms can be 
observed since late 1990s. Figures 3.9a and 3.9b show that Airbus’ investment on new 
machinery and equipment is far larger than that of Boeing. Between 2000 and 2015, Airbus 
increased its investment on new technical equipment and machinery from €3.3 billion to €20.3 
billion (or from $3.1 billion to $22 billion in US dollar terms) compared to around 25% increase 
of Boeing during the same period from $10.4 billion to $13.2 billion in current US dollars. One 
explanation offered was the lower level of investments of Boeing into the new generation of 
155 
 
tools and equipment which Airbus was heavily investing in the late 1990s and early 2000s for 
its new programs (MacPherson and Pritchard, 2003)24F25. The access of Boeing to NASA and 
Department of Defense facilities and equipment through its research and development 
contracts may also explain its low level of investment in equipment (US Congress, 1991). In 
addition, in its latest program, Airbus’ investment in new technologies exceeded Boeing’s 
similar investments because the extent of outsourcing parts utilizing composite technology, 
new materials, and electronics is much higher in the case of Boeing compared to Airbus. The 
spending of Boeing on land and new buildings also remained very low compared to Airbus. 
Boeing’s floor space numbers in Figure 3.10 show that since 2000, the company shrank close 
to 30% in terms of physical space through divestments and closure of production sites. Airbus 
does not publish floor space information on its land and building. 
Figure 3.9a: Gross Plant, Property and Equipment Expenditures of Boeing, current US$ 
 
Source: Company annual reports  
                                                          
25 Pritchard (2002) provides a discussion of aircraft assembly technologies utilized by Airbus and Boeing and 
conclude that the passage of Airbus to newer assembly technologies was prompt and extended especially due 
to incessant introduction of new models in the 1990s and 2000s. 
156 
 
Figure 3.9b: Gross Plant, Property and Equipment Expenditures of Airbus, current euros 
 
Source: Company annual reports 
Figure 3.10: Floor Space of Boeing from 1995 to 2015 
 
Source: Company annual reports. The substantial increase between 1995 and 2000 reflects 
Boeing’s major acquisitions including McDonnell Douglas and Rockwell Aerospace during the 
period. 
Another aspect to discuss is the degree of commitment of Airbus and Boeing in investing 
productive capabilities in their home countries. While Boeing does not publish data on 
geographical distribution of its capital expenditures, in 2015, 96% of its floor space was located 
in the US and its capital investment has been largely concentrated in its home country. 
Represented in Figure 3.11, Airbus published its capital expenditure figures per country 
between 2004 and 2013 and the most striking developments are the rise of expenditures in 
France which basically reflects the investments in the A350 assembly line and the considerable 
decrease in spending in the UK quickly following the exit of BAE from Airbus as a strategic 
partner and major shareholder. While the fall in investment in other countries at the beginning 
of the period following the rapid decrease in expenditures related to A380 superjumbo 
157 
 
reversed upward with A350XWB and other investments, the low level of investment persisted 
for the UK, also related to divestment of some commercial aircraft production units within the 
country. The company stopped publishing details about geographical distribution of its capital 
expenditures since 2013. 
Figure 3.11: Airbus Total Capital Expenditures by country 
 
Source: Company annual reports 
Since late 1990s, there has been a widening gap between the investments done by Airbus and 
Boeing. Table 3.6 summarizes major investments of Airbus and Boeing since 2000 with specific 
details on their technical and segmental categories, geographical distribution and value if 
provided. Airbus’ investments are generally much greater in monetary values and represent 
broad-scale facilities as first-time investments including new final assembly lines. Moreover, 
Airbus’ investments are geographically more diverse both for commercial aircraft and other 
segments. Out of a total of 40 major capital investments since 2000, the biggest number of 
investments was on commercial aircraft divisions (22) and Eurocopter (10 - today Airbus 
Helicopters) and more than half of these investments are located out of Airbus home 
countries. During the period, the company opened 10 engineering, research and technology 
centers and six of them are located outside of Europe. All of these investments are active or 
in construction as of early 2016. 
During the same period capital investments of Boeing remained limited at least until 2015. In 
the first half of 2000s the company divested several of its new investments and only with 
2010s, the company made several important investments including those for 787. It opened 
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several research and technology centers within or outside the US but mostly inside, in line 
with the restructuring of its research organization. As part of its plan to reduce the weight of 
Washington State in commercial aircraft research and engineering, the company made several 
investments in the last two years in other states. Several production sites for commercial 
aircraft parts including for new programs like 777X show the efforts of the company to keep 
in-house manufacturing capabilities related to advanced technologies. Another difference 
with Airbus is that Boeing mainly resorted to expansions of existing sites and capabilities while 
Airbus opens up completely new sites as a result of its superior geographical and segmental 
expansion.
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Table 3.6a: Major Investments of Airbus between 2000 and 2015 
Year of 
Completion Type of investment Core activity of the investment Location City 
Location 
Country 
Initial cost of 
investment 
(in millions) 
Subsidiary (in the 
year of investment) 
Division (in the 
year of 
investment) 
Current 
situation 
Part of an 
existing 
facility? 
2000 Assembly facility 
TBM series single-engine turboprop light business and utility 
aircraft Tarbes France n/a EADS Socata Aeronautics 
Active with 
reduced 
ownership Yes 
2002 Design & Engineering ctr 
Design and engineering work for new commercial aircraft 
models Wichita KS USA n/a Airbus SAS Airbus Active First invest. 
2002 Production center Propulsion systems for the European launcher Ariane Ottobrunn Germany € 20 Astrium Space Infr. Space Active Yes 
2003 Production center A380 wing manufacturing Broughton UK £73 Airbus SAS Airbus Active Yes 
2003 Assembly facility A380 sections structural assembly Hamburg Germany n/a Airbus SAS Airbus Active Yes 
2003 Assembly facility A380 wing assembly Broughton UK £350 Airbus SAS Airbus Active Yes 
2004 Assembly facility Final assembly and flight-testing of A-Star helicopter series Columbus MS USA $11 
American 
Eurocopter Aeronautics Active First invest. 
2004 Final Assembly facility A380 FAL Toulouse France n/a Airbus SAS Airbus Active First invest. 
2004 Transport vehicle Transport of A380 sections by sea n/a Europe $30 Airbus SAS Airbus Active First invest. 
2005 Engineering center Specific design work for the A350 Beijing China n/a Airbus SAS Airbus Active as a JV First invest. 
2006 R&T center 
Joint projects with Singaporean Research Institutions and 
Universities Singapore Singapore n/a - - Active First invest. 
2006 MRO center MRO services for Eurocopter helicopters in Russia Moscow Russia n/a Eurocopter Vostok Eurocopter Active First invest. 
2006 Production center Assembly plant for A400M wings Filton UK € 100 Airbus UK Airbus Active First invest. 
2006 MRO center MRO services for Eurocopter helicopters in Malaysia Subang Malaysia n/a Eurocopter Malaysia Eurocopter Active Yes 
2007 Engineering center A350 XWB interior design and definition work Mobile AL USA n/a 
EADS North America 
Inc Airbus Active First invest. 
2007 Production center EC135, NH90, and Tiger FAL Albacete Spain € 60 Eurocopter Eurocopter Active First invest. 
2007 Assembly facility Eurocopter MRH-90 assembly line Brisbane Australia n/a 
Australian 
Aerospace Eurocopter Active Yes 
2008 Transport vehicle Transport of A380 sections by sea n/a Europe n/a Airbus SAS Airbus Active First invest. 
2008 Final Assembly facility A400M FAL Seville Spain n/a Airbus SAS Airbus Military Active Yes 
2008 Final Assembly facility A320 FAL Tianjin China n/a Airbus SAS Airbus Active JV invest. 
2009 Machinery 
Autoclaves for the production of A350 forward fuselage 
sections Nordenham Germany € 6 Premium AEROTEC Airbus Active First invest. 
2009 MRO center MRO for C-212 and CN-235 tactical transports Mobile AL USA n/a 
EADS North America 
Inc Airbus Military Active Yes 
2009 R&T center 
Joint projects in the areas of engineering and information 
technology & cooperation with Indian research institutions Bangalore India n/a - - Active First invest. 
2010 Assembly hangar 
Assembly of aft fuselage and system installations of forward 
fuselage sections for A350 XWB aircraft Hamburg Germany € 150 Airbus SAS Airbus Active Yes 
2011 Engineering center 
Developing products and providing consultancy and other 
services to the aerospace and defense companies in India Bangalore India n/a - Cassidian Active First invest. 
2011 Production center 
Production and assembly of metal components for all Airbus 
programs  Ghimbav Romania € 40 Premium AEROTEC Airbus Active First invest. 
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2011 Assembly facility Assembly plant for A350 XWB wings Broughton UK £400 Airbus SAS Airbus Active First invest. 
2011 Logistics center 
Support to industrial exchanges between China and the rest 
of world Tianjin China n/a Airbus SAS Airbus Active First invest. 
2012 Assembly facility 
Producing, assembling and maintaining the EC725s being 
acquired by Brazil’s three armed forces Itajubá Brazil € 160 Helibras Eurocopter Active Yes 
2012 Final Assembly facility A350 XWB FAL Toulouse France € 140 Airbus SAS Airbus Active First invest. 
2013 Production center 
Production site for structures used in jetliner cargo and 
emergency exit doors along with tail booms to equip 
Eurocopter Ecureuil helicopters Querétaro Mexico $100 Eurocopter Eurocopter Active First invest. 
2013 Engineering center Lightweight construction and the use of new materials Augsburg Germany € 7 Premium AEROTEC Airbus Active First invest. 
2013 R&T center 
Reinvestment on testing and research facilities including 
simulators, avionics trainers, laboratories, test centers and a 
prototype shop Donauwörth Germany € 100 Eurocopter 
Airbus 
Helicopters Active First invest. 
2015 Final Assembly facility A320 FAL Mobile AL USA $ 600 Airbus SAS Airbus Active First invest. 
2015 Production center Helicopter blade production and to research on composite 
materials 
Paris-Le 
Bourget 
France € 130 Eurocopter Eurocopter Active Replacement 
2015 Design & Engineering ctr. Design activities in rotorcraft drive systems and equipment Łódź Poland n/a Eurocopter Eurocopter Active First invest. 
2016 Final Assembly facility Final assembly of the E-Fan 2.0 all-electric aircraft in Pau Pau France n/a - - In construction First invest. 
2017 Final Assembly facility H215 helicopters final assembly Brasov Romania n/a Eurocopter Eurocopter In construction First invest. 
2017 R&T center Development and testing centre for large structural wing 
parts 
Filton UK € 49 Airbus SAS Airbus In construction Yes 
2017 Completion & Deliv. ctr. Completion and delivery of A330 Tianjin China n/a Airbus SAS Airbus In construction First invest. 
Source: Airbus press releases and annual reports 
Table 3.6b: Major Investments of Boeing between 1988 and 2014 
Year of 
Completion 
Type of 
investment 
Core activity of the investment Location City 
Location 
Country 
Initial cost of 
investment 
(in millions) 
Subsidiary (in 
the year 
ofinvestment) 
Division (during the year of 
the investment) 
Current 
situation 
Part of an 
existing 
facility? 
1998 R&T center 
Design and engineering work for new commercial aircraft 
models 
Moscow Russia n/a   Commercial Airplanes Active First invest. 
1998 MRO center 
Support center for C-17 Globemaster III MRO and modification 
work 
San Antonio TX USA n/a - Integrated Defense Systems  Active First invest. 
2000 Assembly facility Assembly of RS-68 rocket engines 
Hancock County 
MS 
USA $11 Rocketdyne Network & Space Systems 
Divested in 
2005 
Yes 
2001 Machinery 
Rotomold machines to manufacture Environmental Control 
System (ECS) ducts 
Spokane WA USA n/a - 
Commercial Airplanes 
Aircraft Systems & Interiors 
Divested in 
2003 
Yes 
2002 Production center C-17 sub-assembly facility St. Louis MO USA n/a - M. Aircraft & Missile Sys. Closed in 2015 Yes 
2002 R&T center 
Research on environmentally progressive materials and energy 
sources, safety and air-space management in collaboration 
with European R&D partners 
Madrid Spain $10 - Phantom Works Active First invest. 
2002 Production center 
On demand low-cost fabrication of small lots of complex, hard-
to-manufacture parts with selective laser sintering technology 
Camarillo CA USA n/a - Phantom Works 
Divested in 
2005 
First invest. 
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2004 R&T center Ramp and flight test as customer support services St. Louis MO USA $200 - Integrated Defense Systems  Active Yes 
2005 R&T center 
Simulation environment supporting design and product 
integration decisions for defense programs 
Philadelphia PA USA $4,5 - Integrated Defense Systems  Active Yes 
2006 MRO center MRO services of commercial aircrafts Shanghai China $85 - Commercial Airplanes Active as a JV JV invest. 
2008 R&T center 
Test and evaluation providing technology and capability to 
support both current and future radar-based weapon systems 
Huntington 
Beach CA 
USA $10 - Integrated Defense Systems  Active First invest. 
2009 R&T center 
Innovation and research in collaboration with Indian R&D 
organizations, including government agencies, businesses and 
universities 
Bengaluru India n/a - 
Research & Technology 
Communications 
Active First invest. 
2010 FAL FAL for P-8 Poseidon military aircraft Seattle WA USA n/a - Defense, Space & Security Active Yes 
2011 Production center Production of composites components for all Boeing programs Tianjin China $21 - Commercial Airplanes Active as a JV Yes 
2011 FAL FAL for Boeing 787 Dreamliner N. Charleston SC USA $750 - Commercial Airplanes Active First invest. 
2011 Assembly facility Boeing 787 vertical fin assembly line Salt Lake CityUT USA n/a - Commercial Airplanes Active First invest. 
2011 Assembly facility H-47 Chinook assembly in renovated manufacturing facility Ridley PA USA $130 - Defense, Space & Security Active Yes 
2011 Production center Fabrication of Boeing 787 interior parts N. Charleston SC USA n/a - Commercial Airplanes Active Yes 
2012 R&T center 
B-1 program upgrading and C-130 Avionics modernization 
program 
Oklahoma City 
OK 
USA n/a - Defense, Space & Security Active Yes 
2012 Production center 
Processing for machined parts for all Boeing commercial 
aircrafts 
Gresham OR USA n/a - Commercial Airplanes Active Yes 
2013 Production center 
Fabrication of composite horizontal stabilizer components for 
Boeing 787-9 
Salt Lake City UT USA n/a - Commercial Airplanes Active Yes 
2013 R&T center Research on new materials and composites manufacturing  Port Melbourne Australia $5 - - Active Yes 
2014 R&T center 
Research on the development of aerospace technologies in 
collaboration with Brazilian researchers and scientists 
São José dos 
Campos 
Brazil n/a - - Active First invest. 
2015 R&T center Research on aviation biofuel in collaboration with Embraer 
São José dos 
Campos 
Brazil n/a - - Active JV invest. 
2015 Assembly facility Design and assembly of the 737 MAX engine nacelle inlet, 
design of nacelle fan cowl and engineering integration for the 
777X nacelle 
N. Charleston SC USA n/a - Commercial Airplanes Active First invest. 
2015 Production center Manufacturing of complex parts for the 7-series from hard 
metals like titanium 
Helena MO USA $35 - Commercial Airplanes Active Yes 
2015 R&T center Technologies related to simulation, avionics, materials and 
communications 
Huntsville AL USA n/a - Research & Technology Active Yes 
2015 R&T center R&D on composite airplane fuselage and propulsion 
improvements 
N. Charleston SC USA n/a - Research & Technology Active First invest. 
2015 R&T center Non-Destructive Test Lab, Human SI Center and Polymer 
Synthesis Lab 
St. Louis MO USA n/a - Research & Technology Active Yes 
2016 Production center 777X wing and empennage parts St. Louis MO USA n/a - Commercial Airplanes In construction Yes 
2016 Production center Composite wing fabrication for 777X Everett WA USA $1 000 - Commercial Airplanes In construction First invest. 
2018 Production center Manufacturing and assembly of 747 fuselage panels Macon GA USA $80 - Commercial Airplanes In construction Yes 
Source: Boeing press releases and annual reports 
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3.8 Boundaries in movement – enlarging and shrinking capabilities 
As it is previously mentioned, part of the new product development strategies of Airbus and 
Boeing includes divestments in specific areas which are not core or low value according to 
their systems integration business strategy. Both firms divested a significant amount of their 
assets and related capabilities in 2000s. Table 3.7 provides a list of Airbus and Boeing 
divestments in the forms of the sales of complete business units, subsidiaries or parts of them 
since 1999. The comparison of divestments in detail reveals multiple dynamics with their 
impact on their paths of integration. In the case of Airbus which has a much larger number of 
divestments during the period between 1999 and 2014, sale of assets, business units or 
subsidiaries principally reflects its interest in consolidating its business around specific 
domains after the establishment of EADS as a standalone company. In the first half of 2000s, 
the company principally divested its IT, software and communication businesses in France and 
Germany while in the second half its divestments were more diversified in terms of domain 
and geography. General or specialized aerospace products and services, MRO services and 
aircraft systems and components are main segments that Airbus withdrew mainly from its 
home countries. Moreover, the company executed asset sales or transfers to its joint ventures 
especially in space and defense segments in mid 2000s. On the other hand, a solid intention 
to divest several major sites came in 2008 with the Power 8 restructuring program which 
aimed to accumulate €5 billion of cash from 2007 to 2010 and the bulk of the monetary gains 
were up to internal organization restructuring through divestments, overhead reduction in 
the form of downsizing and other measures to increase productivity. The program was actually 
a guideline for the company to enable a seamless A350 development in strong compliance 
with its New Systems Policy. Divestments in commercial aircraft segments are mostly 
performed in sections that are considered low value-added by both firms. In 2007, Airbus put 
seven production sites up for sale particularly producing parts and aerostructure components 
for its commercial aircraft programs including those that are responsible to produce parts for 
new A350. The company managed to sell only two of them in the time of global financial crisis 
and it decided to reorganize remaining sites around two big aerostructures subsidiaries one 
in France and the other one in Germany. Divestment of a complete unit, production site or a 
subsidiary is the main form for both firms while Airbus has also been involved in financial 
transactions that change shareholding structures of units in question. The smaller number of 
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divestments performed by Boeing in the same period tells both similar and different stories 
compared with Airbus. During the period the company mainly divested complete business 
segments such as commercial helicopters or rocket engines with the transfer of hundreds and 
in some cases thousands of employees. This choice shows its intention to divest 
manufacturing units with integrated expertise in specific fields as the company focuses on 
core competences and large-scale systems integration. Table 3.8 provides a list of divestments 
in commercial aircraft and parts manufacturing of two firms. Only Power 8 divestments of 
Airbus are comparable in terms of their size to Boeing’s large scale downsizing through 
divestitures. In all of these cases, a previous subsidiary or plant becomes a supplier to the OEM 
as part of the acquisition deal with the acquiring company. During the period, Boeing also 
divested several of McDD businesses as part of its consolidation efforts after its big 
acquisitions in late 1990s and early 2000s. Being a substantially US-based company in contrast 
with Airbus’ multinational efforts, its divestments are also concentrated in the US. Another 
clear difference is the concentration of Boeing’s divestments in the first half of 2000s, before 
the financial crisis, and the virtually nonexistent divestments during and after the recession. 
This reminds us of the potential financial motivations and valuation concerns as factors for 
divestment decision. In the case of Airbus, divestments are equally distributed between the 
periods before and after the crisis. Both companies have also been very active in the 
divestments in defense, electronics and services segments.  
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Table 3.7: Divestments of units, subsidiaries and plants by Airbus (58) and Boeing (26) 
between 1999 and 2015 
Categories Airbus Boeing 
By sector     
Aircraft systems, components and equipment 6 6 
General aerospace products and services 4   
Helicopter manufacturing and related services   1 
Communications equipment and/or services 9   
Electronic equipment and/or services   3 
IT, software and related services 9 6 
Space and defense products/parts manufacturing and services 8 6 
Specialized aerospace products and services 11 1 
MRO services 7   
Other industries 4 3 
By unit/subsidiary/plant location     
France 21   
Germany 18   
Spain 2   
UK 3  1 
USA 7 24 
Canada   1 
Brazil 1   
Portugal 1   
Russia 1   
Netherlands 1   
Belgium 1  
Finland 1  
Malaysia 1  
By purchaser's country     
France, Germany, Spain and the UK (Airbus home countries) 31 4 
USA (Boeing home country) 9 20 
Other European countries 6 1 
Canada 5 1 
Russia 1   
Israel 1   
Singapore 2   
Brazil 2   
Malaysia 1  
By the type of divestment     
complete unit/subsidiary divestment 25 21 
plant/production site/IP divestment 8 4 
divestment of existing majority share of an investment 7   
divestment of existing majority share of an investment to its JV 4   
divestment of existing minority share of an investment 11 1 
divestment of newly issued minority shares of an investment 2   
resale of investment to its majority owner 1   
By current relation with the divested entity     
current contractor for commercial aircraft programs 10 8 
current contractor for other programs 4 2 
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unknown/no relation 44 16 
By the number of divestments per year   
1999 0 5 
2000 0 1 
2001 3 3 
2002 0 2 
2003 4 2 
2004 1 3 
2005 5 5 
2006 7 0 
2007 6 2 
2008 5 0 
2009 3 0 
2010 2 0 
2011 3 0 
2012 2 0 
2013 4 1 
2014 5 1 
2015 8 1 
Total number of divestments 58 26 
Source: S&P Capital IQ and company press releases 
Table 3.8: Major divestments of Airbus and Boeing in commercial aircraft and parts 
manufacturing between 1999 and 2015 
Airbus 
Airbus sold its cabins factory in Laupheim to newly formed Diehl Stiftung and Thales joint venture 
Diehl Aircabin GmbH for €200 million in 2008 (1100) 
Airbus Filton wing component manufacturing and assemblies unit was sold to GKN plc for £136 
million in 2009 (1500) 
Airbus sold Hamburg-based DASELL Cabin Interior GmbH, a subsidiary for aircraft cabin elements 
to Diehl in 2009 (650) 
PFW Aerospace AG, an Airbus subsidiary, sold Specitubes tubes manufacturer for aerospace and 
commercial sectors to Leggett & Platt in 2013 (175) 
Boeing 
Boeing St Louis Fabrication Operations was sold to GKN plc in 2001 (1200) 
Boeing sold its Spokane Fabrication Operation to Triumph Group Inc. in 2003 (400) 
Boeing sold its wiring assembly plant in Corinth, Texas to Labinal Inc. in 2003 (800) 
Boeing sold its Commercial Electronics unit based in Irving, Texas to BAE Systems North America 
in 2004 (800) 
Boeing sold its Commercial Airplanes operations in Kansas and Oklahoma to Onex Corp (now Spirit 
AeroSystems) in 2005 (9000) 
Boeing sold its precision-machined and sheet metal supply unit in Arnprior, Canada to Arnprior 
Aerospace Inc. in 2005 (370) 
Boeing sold On Demand Manufacturing Inc. in Fountain, Colorado to RMB Products in 2005 (?) 
Boeing closed its parts production operations at the Oak Ridge, Tennessee in 2008 (265) 
Source: S&P Capital IQ and company press releases. Numbers in parentheses indicate the 
number of employees in units/subsidiaries at the time of divestment  
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In order to have a complete picture of the shifting boundaries of two companies and their 
systems-integration orientation, the analysis on divestments has to be complemented with 
the one on mergers and acquisitions. It is also necessary to understand the growth strategies 
of the two firms and to show the dual role of divestments and acquisitions. 
Companies resort to mergers and acquisitions for several reasons including competence 
development in specific fields. This is also true for Airbus and Boeing as they are active 
acquirers of firms in aerospace and other industries all over the world. Table 3.9 provides a 
detailed list of Airbus and Boeing acquisitions between 1999 and 2015. Similar to divestments, 
Airbus has been much more active in acquiring different types of firms within different 
geographies in different forms. For both firms, it is rather a heterogeneous group of 
businesses being acquired in a variety of forms including financial investments such as 
acquisitions of minority stakes. Sectors such as IT, electronics of specialized aerospace 
products and services are highly represented. The company is equally active in acquiring MRO 
businesses and in divesting them. For Boeing, more than half of its acquisitions are in IT, 
communications and electronics fields. The intention of both companies to keep enlarging 
their technological capabilities in a great variety of fields shows their interest in using systems 
integration as part of their extended corporate strategies which are principally about 
leveraging existing capabilities, knowledge and experience in newly developing business 
segments within aerospace which are highly connected to IT, electronics and communications 
technologies. Whether systems integration is principally used as a narrative to focus on core 
competencies that two companies have been developing for decades, it is observed, on the 
contrary a diversification of businesses especially in aircraft systems, components and 
equipment that are still connected to traditional aerospace manufacturing.  
As a result, in contrast with the systems integration perspective, these companies are trying 
to extend their knowledge base beyond their core competencies. Such a strategy also helps 
them to keep these units close to the outer boundaries of the firm that they can rather easily 
divest them as long as they are not inseparably integrated into their existing business areas. 
For example, one of the biggest acquisitions of Boeing as part of its strategic growth plan was 
the purchase of Jeppesen Sanderson in 2000 which is a provider of flight information services 
to airlines and other operators. The new subsidiary kept acquiring smaller other firms in the 
US or Europe to extend its access to different fields and geographies. The company still 
167 
 
operates as a separate, distinct unit within Boeing. Connexion, another separate unit of in-
flight online internet connectivity service was dissolved in 2006 due to lack of market for such 
services at that time according to the company. As early as 2002, it was counted by the 
company as one of the major business areas where Boeing could leverage its core 
competencies25F26. Thus the relations between integration, technology development and market 
success are crucially important for companies. Divesting and acquiring similar lines of 
businesses should have other reasons than ‘strengthening core business’ like subsidiary level 
profitability. Especially Airbus is an active acquirer of the MRO, communications and IT and 
software businesses while it is also divesting similar businesses in same domains. 
Compared to other fields, acquisitions in commercial aircraft segments constitute a smaller 
percentage for both firms showing their willingness to diversify their activities within 
aerospace. Nevertheless, Airbus is more active than Boeing in acquiring specialized businesses 
in different segments within aerospace and commercial aircraft manufacturing. 
Similar to divestments, Boeing is much more concentrated on its home country in acquiring 
new businesses. More than three-fourths of its acquisitions are located in the US and during 
the past fifteen years it did not acquire any businesses from Airbus’ home countries. Airbus, 
on the contrary has a greater diversity of acquisitions in terms of their locations while it has a 
strong concentration on its home countries and Europe as a whole. 
Table 3.9: Acquisitions of Airbus (87) and Boeing (48) between 1999 and 2015 
Categories Airbus Boeing 
By sector     
Aircraft systems, components and equipment 11 8 
Specialized aerospace products and services 13 2 
Space and defense products/parts manufacturing and services 7 1 
Helicopter manufacturing and related services 3  
All aerospace products and services 3  
IT, software and services 11 23 
Communications equipment and/or services 5 6 
Electronic equipment and/or services 11 3 
MRO services 11 1 
Diversified metals and mining  1 
Other industries  12 3 
                                                          
26 “Speech of the Executive Vice President, Chief People and Administration Officer Laurette Koellner”, The 
Boeing Company, September 18, 2002 
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By country of acquired entity   
France, Germany, Spain and the UK (Airbus home countries) 48 2 
USA (Boeing home country) 8 35 
Other European countries 14 3 
Canada 1 1 
Russia 1 1 
Japan 3 1 
China 3 1 
South Korea  1 
Malaysia 1 1 
Saudi Arabia 1  
Brazil 2  
Argentina 1  
South Africa 2  
Australia 1 2 
New Zealand 1  
By previous relation to the acquirer   
First time acquisition with majority stake 49 40 
First time acquisition with minority stake 16 3 
Completion to 100% of existing investment 12  
Already invested with minority holding 5  
Acquisition is performed by an existing JV 3  
Already invested as a JV 2 5 
By current situation of the acquisition   
Still active as a subsidiary 58 32 
Inactive/merged with other business units/subsidiaries 16 13 
Divested/dissolved 9 2 
Plant/production site purchase only 4 1 
By the number of acquisitions per year   
1999 0 2 
2000 2 9 
2001 7 1 
2002 5 1 
2003 6 1 
2004 2 1 
2005 5 0 
2006 11 3 
2007 2 2 
2008 8 11 
2009 6 5 
2010 7 4 
2011 13 1 
2012 5 2 
2013 2 1 
2014 3 3 
2015 3 3 
Total number of acquisitions 87 48 
Source: S&P Capital IQ and company press releases  
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While there is a comparatively limited interest by the two companies in acquisitions abroad, 
their capability development efforts have been largely extended beyond national borders 
during the same period. Like any other big manufacturing company, aerospace companies 
including Airbus and Boeing have gained an important global foothold in the last two decades. 
National efforts of emerging countries to build their own aerospace industries have also 
played a strong role in the expansion of Airbus and Boeing. Today both companies are 
investing in aerospace capabilities in other countries including developing economies and 
especially in China. They have two major strategies for foreign expansion. First of all, they 
continue to form joint ventures with partner firms, a historically important form of 
collaboration prevalent in aerospace (Deloitte, 2013; Dussauge and Garrette 1995; Mowery, 
1988). When partners get through the organizational and technical challenges, joint ventures 
in aerospace generally promise enhanced economic performance, better co-monitoring, 
reduced opportunistic behavior (Mowery, 1988), and scale economies (Dussauge and Garrette 
1995). Usually consolidated in company accounts as subsidiaries, these ventures are 
important mechanisms for the countries they are located in order to take part in aerospace 
supply chains. Table 3.10 shows active joint ventures of Airbus and Boeing with related 
information. Besides considerably old ventures formed in the 1980s and 1990s with national 
partners (also with Italy in the case of Airbus), starting with the second half of 1990s, Airbus 
and Boeing established a number of joint ventures with companies from the developing world. 
Similar to acquisitions, Airbus is much more active in launching such initiatives than Boeing 
(34 active joint ventures for Airbus compared to 16 for Boeing). Its willingness to form joint 
venture partnerships as long-term collaborations with these economies in non-commercial 
aircraft areas like defense and space markets is different than that of Boeing which mainly 
prefers contract specific collaborations with partners out of the US in such fields. Advanced 
metals, biofuels and innovative designs for future aircraft are other commercial fields in which 
these companies collaborate with other entities. 
In commercial aircraft manufacturing, national firms of China and to a lesser extent Russia, 
India and Malaysia are important partners for both firms. In China, joint ventures are 
historically important business partnerships to adapt to new technologies and to help 
capability development efforts of the economy (MacPherson and Pritchard, 2003). Airbus and 
Boeing formed several ventures with Chinese aerospace companies especially in composite 
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manufacturing and Airbus also has a final assembly line in Tianjin, China manufacturing A320s 
primarily for Chinese airlines. The company opened its fourth A320 final assembly line in 
Alabama, USA in 2015 after Toulouse, Hamburg and Tianjin. In addition, thanks to its strong 
presence in helicopter manufacturing, Airbus has its own civil and military helicopter 
manufacturing assembly sites established in collaboration with local partners in Mexico, 
Brazil, Australia and the US. 
Last but not least, next to their joint ventures, Airbus and Boeing have also been active in 
establishing research and technology centers in countries with available aerospace 
capabilities. Managed with an internal network perspective, their aim is to utilize local 
technological expertise by developing partnerships with local universities and research 
centers. Reconfigured several times in the last two decades, both companies currently have a 
web of independently operating technology research centers specialized in specific fields 
depending on the manufacturing focus of other business units in the same location or the 
capabilities offered by these regions. Table 3.11 provides a list of national and international 
technology and research centers of Airbus and Boeing. One explicit similarity is the presence 
of R&D centers of both companies in China, Russia and India. In these three regions, even the 
chronological order is the same for Airbus and Boeing in establishing research and technology 
centers. First they landed in Moscow, Russia, then in China (in the case of Boeing in a joint 
venture form) and finally in Bengaluru, India. In addition to that Airbus has had a technology 
center in Singapore since 2006 while Boeing established a similar center in Brazil in 2012. 
Internationalization efforts picked up in the 2000s parallel to increasing aerospace capability 
development efforts of these regions.  
Both companies reorganized their national and international research centers around specific 
themes within aerospace. Such a trend also implies an effort to move, at least partially, 
innovative capabilities and the workforce that generate them away from traditional centers 
where their final assemblies are located. This effort is more visible in the case of Boeing which 
already started to reduce its R&D workforce in Washington and Southern California to relocate 
them in newly emerging and lower-pay, non-union centers in Alabama and South Carolina. At 
the beginning of 2016, the company will only have 40% of its research engineers in 
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Washington State and California compared to 71% at the beginning of 2014 26F27. According to 
the same plans, there won’t be a significant increase in the number of engineers abroad. The 
company sees faster and more efficient new technology integration into production 
processes27F28 while it accepts that the move also aims at labor-cost savings and to “reduce our 
footprint where we are not as productive as we should be” 28F29. 
In the case of Airbus, reorganization of R&D reminds us of the story of gradual integration of 
Airbus Industrie and its evolution to EADS and Airbus Group. Similar of its consolidation efforts 
to reduce duplications at every layer of management including top management, the company 
founded ‘Innovation Works’ in 2006 to consolidate specific fields of research in one or few 
centers compared to many before. Currently under the name of Airbus Group Innovations, 
research and engineering are organized around capability centers with specific themes mainly 
located in regions without assembly activity. It is rather a coordinated R&D centralization 
effort at least in its home countries. 
                                                          
27 “Boeing sees big savings, others see big risks in job transfers”, Dominic Gates, Seattle Times, April 26, 2014 
28 “Boeing Realigns Research & Technology Unit for Growth and Productivity”, Boeing New Release, December 
12, 2013  
29 “Boeing sees big savings, others see big risks in job transfers”, Dominic Gates, Seattle Times, April 26, 2014 
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Table 3.10a: Active joint ventures of Airbus with its partners 
Name of the JV 
Country 
located 
Founded 
in 
JV with Industry Main focus of collaboration Main customers 
Total 
sales (in 
millions)* 
% owned 
by Airbus 
Partners' 
Country 
Panavia Aircraft GmbH Germany 1969 BAE Systems / Finmeccanica Aircrafts and parts 
Production and service support of 
Tornado military aircraft 
UK, German, Italian and 
S. Arabian governments 
n/a 42.5 UK & Italy 
GIE Avions de Transport 
Régional 
France & 
Italy 
1981 Finmeccanica group Aircrafts and parts 
Turboprop regional aircraft 
production 
 $1,630 50 Italy 
Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug 
Gmbh 
Germany 1986 BAE Systems / Finmeccanica 
Military aircrafts and 
parts 
Development and production of 
Eurofighter Typhoon fighter aircraft 
UK, German, Italian, 
Spanish, Austrian and S. 
Arabian governments 
$7,300 46 UK & Italy 
Eurockot Launch 
Services GmbH 
Germany 1995 
Khrunichev State Research and 
Production Space Center 
Aerospace and defense 
Low earth orbit satellite launch 
services using the Rockot system 
Worldwide 51 51 Russia 
Vinaero Ltd. Vietnam 1995 Openasia Group MRO services 
MRO services for helicopters and 
leasing 
 n/a 50 Vietnam 
UMS Holding S.A.S 
France & 
Germany 
1996 Thales 
Semiconductor 
Equipment 
Radio frequency, ultra wave, and 
mm wave components and systems 
 n/a 50 France 
Hua-Ou Aviation 
Training Centre Ltd. 
China 1996 
China Aviation Supplies Holding 
Company 
Aerospace and defense Customer services 
Asia-Pacific and Chinese 
airlines 
$19 50 China 
Hua-Ou Aviation 
Support Centre Ltd. 
China 1996 
China Aviation Supplies Holding 
Company 
Aerospace and defense Customer services 
Asia-Pacific and Chinese 
airlines 
n/a 50 China 
Maîtrise d’Œuvre 
Système S.A.S 
France 1999 Thales 
Professional, Scientific, 
and Technical Services 
PM and engineering for Air 
Command and Control System 
French army € 55 50 France 
COHC General Aviation 
Maintenance & 
Engineering Company 
China 2001 
CITIC Offshore Helicopter 
Company (COHC) / Samwell 
Aviation Ltd Co 
MRO services MRO services for helicopters  n/a 21 China 
MBDA Holdings SAS France 2001 BAE Systems / Finmeccanica 
Guided Missiles and 
Components 
Missiles and missile systems for 
army, navy, and air force sectors 
Worldwide $3,717 37.5 UK & Italy 
Inmize Sistemas S.L. Spain 2002 Indra / MBDA / Izar Aerospace and defense 
contractor for the European 
METEOR missile programme 
European governments n/a 25 Spain 
S.C. Eurocopter Romania Romania 2002 IAR S.A. Brasov MRO services MRO services for helicopters Local and reg. customers $48,7 51 Romania 
Matrium GmbH Germany 2003 
Logistikzentrum Allgäu GmbH & 
Co. KG  
Air Freight and Logistics 
Logistics services for defense 
industry, aerospace specialists and 
manufacturers 
Airbus and major 
European industrial firms  
€ 39 49 Germany 
The Engineering Centre 
Airbus Russia 
Russia 2003 Kaskol Group 
Aircraft Systems, 
Components and 
Equipment 
Design work for concepts, 
aerostructures, systems installation 
and serial activity 
Airbus n/a 50 Russia 
AEROChain Brazil 2004 Embraer IT, software and services 
IT and communication tools for 
supply chain, technical support and 
maintenance management 
Embraer n/a 50 Brazil 
Atlas Elektronik GmBH Germany 1902** 
ThyssenKrupp Technologies 
Beteiligungen GmbH 
Defense electronics 
Electronics and communication 
equipment for defense systems 
Original defense 
equipment 
manufacturers 
$550 49 Germany 
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Airbus (Beijing) 
Engineering Centre 
China 2005 
Hafei Aviation Industry Company 
Limited (HAI, 18%) / Jiangxi 
Hongdu Aviation Industry 
Company Limited (7%) / China 
Aviation Industry Corp I (5%).  
Aircrafts and parts 
Design work for Airbus current and 
future Aircraft programmes.  
Airbus $12 70 China 
AirTanker UK 2007 
Babcock/ Cobham / Rolls-Royce 
/ Thales 
Aerospace and defense 
Air-to-air refuelling and air transport 
aircraft for the UK Royal Air Force 
UK Royal Air Force $360 40 
UK & 
France 
Tarmac Aerosave SAS France 2007 
SITA (GDF Suez Group) / 
SNECMA (Safran Group) / 
EQUIP’AERO Ind. 
Aerospace and defense 
Storage, maintenance, and recycling 
of aircrafts 
Worldwide airlines € 10 n/a France 
Airbus (Tianjin) Final 
Assembly Co., Ltd 
China 2007 
China Aviation Industry 
Corporation 
Aircrafts and parts 
Final assembly of A320 commercial 
aircrafts 
Chinese airlines n/a 51 China 
Harbin Hafei Airbus 
Composite 
Manufacturing Centre 
China 2009 
Harbin Aircraft Industry Group 
Co Ltd / Hafei Aviation Industry 
Co Ltd / AviChina Industry&Tech 
Co Ltd / Harbin Development 
Zone Infrastructure Dev. Co Ltd 
Aircraft Systems, 
Components, Equipment 
Manufacturing composite material 
parts and components for the Airbus 
A350 XWB programme and Airbus 
A320 Family aircraft 
Airbus n/a 25 China 
Emiraje Systems L.L.C. UAE 2009 C4 Advanced Solutions Engineering Services 
Customized communications and 
control systems 
Middle East defense 
markets 
n/a 49 UAE 
L & T Cassidian Limited India 2011 Larsen & Toubro Limited 
Electronic Equipment and 
Instruments 
Defense electronics  n/a 26 India 
Signalis Germany 2011 Atlas Elektronik Surveillance systems 
Maritime safety and security  
solutions 
Port Authorities, Cost 
Guards, etc. 
$29 79.6 Germany 
Eurocopter Kazakhstan 
Engineering 
Kazakhstan 2011 Kazakhstan Engineering Aerospace and defense 
Assembly and customization of 
EC145 helicopters 
 n/a 50 Kazakhstan 
EuroCryospace 
Deutschland 
Germany 2012 Air Liquide Aerospace and defense 
Production of the cryogenic tanks of 
the upper stage of Ariane 5 ME 
European Space Agency n/a 50 France 
EuroCryospace GIE France 2012 Air Liquide Aerospace and defense 
Design, development, marketing and 
qualification of cryogenic tanks 
European Space Agency n/a 50 France 
Cassidian Airborne 
Solutions GmbH 
Germany 2012 Rheinmetall 
Electrical Equipment and 
Component Manuf. 
Manufacturing of the unmanned 
reconnaissance system KZO 
German Armed Forces n/a 51 Germany 
Energia Satellite 
Technologies Ltd. 
Russia 2013 Energia 
Spacecrafts, Space 
Structures and 
Components 
Telecommunication and Earth 
observation satellites for Russia 
Gazprom Space Systems, 
Russian Satellite 
Communications Co  
n/a 49 Russia 
Space Launcher France 2014 Safran 
Spacecrafts, Space 
Structures and 
Components 
Development of Ariane 5 ME 
launcher and Ariane 6 launcher 
variants 
ESA, National Space 
Agencies, Arianespace 
and satellite operators. 
n/a 50 France 
Airbus Helicopters 
Simulation Center 
Malaysia 
Malaysia 2015 
BHIC Defence Technologies Sdn 
Bhd 
Aerospace and defense Customer services 
Military, paramilitary, 
and civil helicopter 
operators in Asia-Pacific 
n/a 70 Malaysia 
Airbus Asia Training 
Centre 
Singapore 2015 Singapore Airlines Aerospace and defense Customer services 
Aircraft pilot training 
services in the region 
n/a 55 Singapore 
*in 2013 or latest available year, **Became an Airbus joint venture in 2005 
Source: Company web sites, news releases and annual reports 
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Table 3.10b: Active joint ventures of Boeing with its partners 
Name of the JV 
Country 
located 
Founded 
in 
JV with Industry Main focus of collaboration Main customers 
Total 
sales (in 
millions)* 
% owned 
by Boeing 
Partner's 
Country 
HRL Laboratories, LLC USA 1948** General Motors Electronic Components 
Microelectronics, sensors and 
materials for automotive, aerospace, 
defense applications 
US Navy, DARPA, 
Boeing and General 
Motors 
$46.1 50 USA 
Hellfire Systems LLC USA 1974*** Lockheed Martin  Missiles and Components 
Production of the AGM-114 Hellfire, 
an air-to-surface missile 
US and other armies n/a 50 USA 
Bell-Boeing Joint 
Program Office 
USA 1981 Textron Inc. Military Aircraft 
Development and production of Bell 
Boeing V-22 Osprey military tiltrotor 
aircraft 
US Army n/a 50 USA 
Alsalam Aircraft Co. 
Saudi 
Arabia 
1988 
The Cooperation Council for 
the Arab States of the Gulf 
MRO Services 
MRO for Boeing manufactured 
aircrafts 
Royal Saudi Air Force 
and miscall. airlines 
n/a unknown 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Boeing Sikorsky Aircraft 
Support 
USA 1993 United Technologies Corp. Air Freight and Logistics 
Logistic and engineering assistance to 
army special operations forces 
US Army $21.6 50 USA 
United Space Alliance, 
LLC 
USA 1996 Lockheed Martin  Spacecraft and Satellites 
Space operations, services, and 
technologies 
NASA and NASA 
suppliers 
$1817 50 USA 
Aerospace Composites 
Malaysia Sdn Bhd 
Malaysia 1998 Hexcel Corporation 
Aircraft Systems, 
Components, Equipment 
Manufacturer of flat and contoured 
structure composite bond assemblies 
Boeing suppliers $50.3 50 USA 
Aviation Training 
International Limited 
UK 1998 
AgustaWestland 
Finmeccanica 
Education Services 
Aircrew, Groundcrew and 
Maintenance Training 
UK Ministry of 
Defence 
$48.3 50 UK & Italy 
Aviation Partners 
Boeing, Inc 
USA 1999 Aviation Partners, Inc. 
Aircraft Systems, 
Components, Equipment 
Advanced technology blended 
winglets 
Boeing $10.2 50 USA 
Boeing Tianjin 
Composites Co., Ltd. 
China 1999 
Aviation Industry 
Corporation of China 
Aircraft Systems, 
Components, Equipment 
Composite parts for secondary 
structures and interior applications 
Boeing n/a 80 China 
Morocco Aero-Technical 
Interconnect Systems 
Morocco 2001 Labinal Snecma Safran 
Aircraft Systems, 
Components, Equipment 
Manufacturing general-purpose wire 
bundles 
Boeing, Labinal 
Snecma 
$73.9 50 France 
United Launch Alliance, 
LLC 
USA 2006 Lockheed Martin  Spacecraft and Satellites 
Spacecraft manufacturing and launch 
services 
DoD, NASA, National 
Reconnaissance 
Office, U.S. Air Force 
$488 50 USA 
Boeing Shanghai 
Aviation Services Co. Ltd 
China 2006 
Shanghai Airport Authority 
& China Eastern Airlines 
MRO Services 
MRO for Boeing manufactured 
aircrafts 
Miscellaneous airlines n/a 60 China 
CJSC Ural Boeing 
Manufacturing 
Russia 2007 
VSMPO-AVISMA 
Corporation 
Diversified Metals and 
Mining 
Titanium parts for its 787 Dreamliner 
jets 
Boeing n/a 69.5 Russia 
SoftBank Satellite 
Planning Corp. 
Japan 2015 SoftBank Group Spacecraft and Satellites 
Satellite based response 
communications systems 
Japan’s Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and 
Communications 
n/a unknown Japan 
Boeing - Tata Joint 
Venture 
India 2015 Tata Advanced Systems 
Aircraft Systems, 
Components, Equipment 
Manufacturing of aerostructures Indian Air Force n/a unknown India 
*in 2013 or latest available year, **Became a Boeing joint venture in 2000, ***Became a Boeing joint venture in 1996 
Source: Company web sites, news releases and annual reports 
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Table 3.11a: Major design, research and technology centers of Airbus 
Country City 
Launch year of 
research activity 
Site type Main focus of new or existing research activity 
France Toulouse before 2000 Design office 
Integrator architecture, general design, integration tests and systems, propulsion, 
structural design and computation 
France Suresnes before 2000 R&T center Main Airbus Group Innovations site with several technologies researched 
Germany Hamburg before 2000 Design office Cabin and cabin systems, structural design and testing 
Germany Bremen before 2000 Design office 
Entire process chain of high-lift systems, design and engineering of the cargo loading 
systems for commercial programs 
Germany Ottobrunn 2002 R&T center Main Airbus Group Innovations site with several technologies researched 
Germany Donauwörth 2013 R&T center 
Airbus Helicopters research facilities which include simulators, avionics trainers, 
laboratories, test centers and a prototype shop 
Spain Getafe before 2000 R&T center Composites and tooling design and development 
UK Filton before 2000 
Design & 
Engineering center 
Systems integration design for manufacturability, structures and aerodynamics 
technologies, aircraft sub-system integration and technologies 
USA Wichita, KS 2002 
Design & 
Engineering center 
Wing design and engineering for the A380 and other Airbus long-range aircraft 
Russia Moscow 2003 Engineering center 
Design on fuselage structure, stress and systems installation, cabin interiors and freight 
compartments. Development of 3D digital mock-ups for the design of Airbus aircraft 
China Beijing 2005 Engineering center Specific design packages for new aircraft programmes 
Singapore Singapore 2006 R&T center 
Joint projects in the areas of aeronautics, security, computing and communication, and 
cooperation with Singaporean research institutions 
USA Mobile, AL 2007 Engineering center 
Engineering for various interior elements of commercial programs including design and 
engineering of the cabin, crew rest, lavatories and galleys 
India Bengaluru 2009 Engineering center 
Modeling and simulation covering such components as flight management systems, 
computational fluid dynamics (CFD) and digital simulation and visualization 
India Bengaluru 2011 Engineering center Defense oriented center of excellence 
Poland Łódź 2015 
Design & 
Engineering center 
Mechanical design activities in rotorcraft drive systems and equipment of future 
military and commercial helicopters and modernization of existing rotorcraft types 
The list does not contain final assembly lines, other assembly facilities, production and MRO centers. 
Source: Company web sites and press releases. 
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Table 3.11b: Major design, research and technology centers of Boeing 
Country City 
Launch year of 
research activity 
Site type Main focus of new or existing research activity 
USA Huntsville, AL before 2000 R&T and design center 
Simulation, avionics, decision analytics; metals and chemical 
technology 
USA California State  before 2000 R&T and design center Flight sciences, electronics and networked systems, structures 
USA St. Louis, MO before 2000 R&T and design center 
Systems technology, digital aviation and support technology, metallics 
and fabrication development, nonmetals synthesis lab 
USA Washington State before 2000 R&T and design center Manufacturing technology integration 
USA North Charleston, SC 2015 R&T and design center Manufacturing technology and improvements 
Russia Moscow 1993 R&T and design center 
Design of aerospace structures, engineering work on commercial 
aviation, IT and space 
Spain Madrid 2002 R&T center 
Air traffic control, safety, security, energy sources and 
environmentally progressive materials 
Australia Melbourne 2008 R&T center 
Research and engineering on aerostructures, composite materials, 
and robotics for manufacturing automation 
India Bengaluru 2009 R&T center 
Research and engineering on aerostructures, aerodynamics and 
electronic networks 
Brazil 
São José dos 
Campos 
2014 R&T center 
Research in sustainable aviation biofuels, advanced air traffic 
management, advanced metals and bio-materials 
Source: Company web sites and press releases. The list does not contain final assembly lines, other assembly facilities, production 
and MRO centers. 
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3.9 Conclusion of the chapter 
As stated almost two decades ago by Boeing President of Boeing Commercial Airplanes that 
large airplanes were approaching theoretical perfection, in terms of physics, aerodynamics, 
and overall performance; in the new global supplier business model, process improvements 
and innovations would be the responsibility of suppliers (Soscher, 2011). As the principal 
decision makers who hold strategic control over the allocation of resources (Lazonick, 2010b), 
corporate top executives are the main actors who give direction to the product strategy of 
their companies and required reallocations during or after each new product is developed. 
Accordingly, crystallized in their latest aircraft programs A350 and B787, Airbus and Boeing 
have been adopting new strategies of product development and production organization 
since the late 1990s. Having redefined their supplier organizations and introduced new 
mechanisms of procurement and coordination, their common aim has been to cut 
development costs, to focus on final integration of aircraft systems and to reduce production 
lead times. Today, both companies claim that they have adopted a systems integration 
perspective in which, together with their design and development, manufacturing of major 
aircraft sections and systems is mainly performed by suppliers. And the two companies claim 
to focus on their ‘core competencies’ primarily restricted to final assembly and supply chain 
management. Accordantly, they have been pursuing several cost-cutting programs in order to 
keep product development and manufacturing costs under control and to boost earnings, with 
important employment and financial implications.  
In the case of Boeing, the systems integration perspective is much more pronounced and 
applied at the strategic level. In terms of the basic definition of systems integration, both firms’ 
orientation towards extensive outsourcing and divestment of ‘non-core’ elements are 
remarkable. In the meantime, the patent analysis as well as the research on their acquisitions 
and investment have shown that the intention of both companies to keep enlarging their 
technological capabilities in a great variety of fields reflects their interest to use systems 
integration only as a part of their extended corporate strategies which are principally about 
leveraging existing capabilities; acquiring knowledge and experience in newly developing 
business segments within aerospace which are highly connected to IT, electronics and 
communications technologies; and extending collaboration with other entities in a rather 
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cumulative way based mostly on their historical connections than a radical overhaul of their 
value chains. 
The research has revealed that the orientation towards leaner industrial base is questionable 
when the companies are compared. There is equally relevant evidence of integration and 
disintegration depending on the highly normative understanding of the term “systems 
integration” by the companies. Especially in investments related to soft businesses like 
electronics, IT or services, the definition of systems integration is highly ambiguous as both 
companies invest and divest in these domains simultaneously. 
Contrary to earlier assumptions of geographical shrinkage of productive activity of Boeing 
(MacPherson and Pritchard, 2007) after major divestments all around, we see a reshuffling 
and further dispersion of R&D and production sites of both firms. Increasing global footholds 
in terms of rising out-of-home R&D investment and joint ventures to tap local skills, resources 
and markets works against some systems integration perspectives arguing increasing 
specialization (Pavitt, 2003) or enlarging gap between ‘know’ and ‘do’ (Brusoni et al., 2001). 
But the analysis confirms other approaches to systems integration such as the ‘visible hand of 
the Chandlerian organizations’ to coordinate learning trajectories of suppliers (Dosi et al., 
2003) or a redesign of an existing production system and business organization in order to 
take full advantage of product and process innovations (Best, 2003). 
Broadly speaking, one of the major differences between the two firms is in geographical 
extension of their knowledge and production bases. Compared to Airbus’ much more active 
strategy to enlarge and contract its boundaries through higher numbers of acquisitions and 
divestments as well as investments out of its home countries, Boeing’s investment strategy is 
largely restricted to the US while its outsourcing is characterized by a greater geographical 
dispersion compared to Airbus. 
An important structural difference which is represented in their divergent growth rates in 
employment, revenue and innovation investment in the last 15 years, is the broader and more 
integrated productive base of Airbus in commercial segments independent of any defense or 
space base which is still a major source of innovation and revenue for both firms. Even in its 
latest and most outsourced program, the company still keeps important parts and sections 
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manufacturing next to its final assembly. Its strong presence in helicopters, turboprop aircrafts 
and electronics shows its strength in civilian segments of aerospace industry as a whole. 
In the meantime, the growth of suppliers from all over the world through bigger and more 
complex workpackages assigned by Airbus and Boeing is a new phenomenon and the winners 
are US suppliers in terms of their massive participation in all Airbus and Boeing programs. 
Decentralization, at least in the case of aerospace manufacturing, is not relevant so far. 
Compared to many other sectors, upgrading of developing economies remained a slow and 
challenging process in the case of aerospace due to the distinct characteristics of the industry 
discussed in Chapter Two.  
Discussing the decision-making process of introducing technically advanced products by 
McDonnell Douglas when the company was still an independent entity, and documenting the 
reluctance of the firm to invest in innovation, Gillett and Stekler (1995) concluded their paper 
with the assumption that strategic decision-making is conditioned by the historical path of the 
company, its vision of its core business of building large commercial transports, and its 
willingness to tolerate risk despite Wall Street pressures. This is equally true for Airbus and 
Boeing and their history is still being written by their deliberate actions and decisions over the 
extent of their productive organizations. The architectures of their latest programs together 
with their convergent and divergent practices continue to provide important insights over 
their future course of action. The abilities, incentives and the willingness of the corporate 
actors who hold strategic decision-making positions in allocating resources to innovative 
activities will continue to largely define the future prosperity of their companies. However, 
the implementation of innovative strategies requires more than decision-making. An analysis 
strictly based on their business strategies is insufficient to give a clear picture of the broader 
orientations of the two companies’ productive activities in the last two decades.  
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Chapter Four 
 
‘Organization’ component of Airbus and Boeing 
systems-integration business/productive models 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, strategy was presented as the process of resource allocation within 
and across the boundaries of the enterprise through skills and capital investments, knowledge 
generation, acquisitions, divestments, relocations, restructurings and reorganizations of value 
chains that are constantly redefined by corporate decision-makers. In the case of innovative 
firms, the decisions over the reallocation of resources primarily aim at progress of their 
product and process development efforts and related investments in physical and human 
capital. However, defining boundaries and innovative capacities cannot be explained only with 
an analysis of corporate resource allocation and knowledge management. In order to execute 
these efforts, a business enterprise has to reconfigure constantly its organizational structure 
in terms of its resources inseparably attached to its employees and managers. More precisely, 
resource allocation cannot be explained independently from organizational dynamics of labor. 
A primary action of strategy remaking and boundary redefinition is the effort of a business 
enterprise to invest in its own organizational capabilities. A firm’s competitiveness depends 
above all on its innovative capacity and the ability to utilize this capacity within a broader 
corporate environment. Any effort to extend innovative capacity and to follow different 
actions in doing so depends on the success of the firm’s personnel in enabling and running the 
mechanisms of value creation in the form of innovative ideas, processes and at the end 
innovative final products. 
Thus, in order to comprehend the functioning of corporate strategy and the sources of 
organizational and technological change and its social determinants, it is indispensable to 
understand how firms mobilize their resources and their workforce to transform invested 
resources into products (Lazonick, 1990b). In designing resource allocation, an enterprise has 
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to set up a working organization that utilizes the value-creating capabilities of resources to 
innovate (Lazonick, 2012). Thus a shop-floor focus is an inseparable part of the research on 
innovation, business models and industrial dynamics. 
Thus, organization is the second dimension of the systems integration model presented in this 
study. The study understands organization as the functioning of the productive setting that 
develops and utilizes the value-creating capabilities of productive resources. The aim is to 
coordinate and to exploit these resources in order to generate goods and services to be sold 
in product markets. Thus, besides a broader strategy that decides on the resource allocation 
within and across the boundaries of a business enterprise, organizational integration is 
needed to create incentives for people possessing such resources with different hierarchical 
responsibilities and functional capabilities to develop and utilize the firm’s productive 
capabilities (Lazonick, 2013). 
4.2 Elements of analysis for organizational integration 
However, the integration of capabilities into the production process is not automatic. As a 
kind of dynamic setting, this division of labor frames the forms of integration and 
transformation of capabilities and in doing so, it defines the skill base of the firm (Lazonick, 
2005) to be mobilized. The integration of skills and the efforts of large numbers of people with 
different hierarchical responsibilities and functional capabilities into the organizational 
learning processes is the essence of innovation (Lazonick, 2013). In the final analysis, the skill 
formation and the access to different types of skills are central to the long-term success of a 
business organization (Lippert et al., 2014). 
As important as skill formation and its utilization, the retention of these skills within a secure 
organizational structure backed up with unrestrictive career opportunities is also needed. 
Access to training is a crucial element of this integration process. Several studies have found 
an important degree of correlation between training and innovative capacities of firms in 
different parts of the world (Bauernschuster et al., 2009; Dostie, 2014; Gonzàlez et al., 2012). 
The integration of career schemes and current and future incentives are also strictly 
connected to skill development and training opportunities (Burchell et al., 2001; Osterman et 
al., 2001; Rubery et al., 2002). 
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Moreover, the engagement of the workforce in the development and utilization of productive 
resources requires organizational integration to provide incentives for workers to apply the 
skills and efforts toward the achievement of the business’s goals. Thus skill development, 
incentives, and participation are keys elements of an organization’s structure. 
The organizational setting is also framed by employee-employer relations as well as the 
contestations between them. In a modern business enterprise, the duties of the workforce to 
create value and the incentives provided to do so are continuously negotiated by means of 
different mechanisms depending on organizational and institutional architectures. This aspect 
of the business model is particularly important in manufacturing industries where workforce 
engagement and its regulation through negotiations/contestations are predominantly 
realized through worker representation (unions) and labor’s participation in decision-making 
(unions, work councils). In this context, Sako (2006) provides an important perspective on the 
importance of labor organizations’ role in corporate strategy and structure and vice versa. 
Focused on organizational boundaries, she shows that such boundaries of corporations and 
unions emerge as a result of political contestation between management and labor. In effect, 
the conflicting strategies and structures of labor and management lead to a power play 
between the two sides which results in a negotiated boundary or a boundary which one party 
imposes on the other (Sako, 2006, p. 24). The formation of workforce representation also has 
important implications over organizational integration and skill development. The forms of 
representation and its strengths and weaknesses do not only have an impact on the functional 
and hierarchical division of labor. Depending on the level of influence they impose, such forms 
are also critical to the long-term orientation of the organization and its innovative success as 
long as they have an impact over the decisions on resource allocation. (Brinkmann and 
Nachtwey, 2013) That is workforce participation in defining organizational boundaries and 
innovative strategies is also fundamental. 
The collective voice of labor through specific mechanisms but most importantly through their 
own representative organizations including employee unions are central to industrial 
capitalism to promote the interests of employees and to form a stable communication 
platform with the management. Moreover, national employment institutions also determine 
how a society develops the capabilities of its present and future labor forces as well as the 
level of employment and the conditions of work and remuneration besides internal dynamics 
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that are specific to each business organization. For example, the practice of co-determination 
in Germany is an important mechanism of institutional integration of the welfare state with 
work on the shop floor (Brinkmann and Nachtwey, 2013; Lippert et al., 2014). Or with the 
substantial decline of union representation in the US, employees have lost their voice in 
workplaces to advance their interests, while government regulation has taken over many 
functions of unions with controversial consequences (Osterman et al., 2001). By influencing 
the means of organizing for labor, mechanisms of voice or lack of them have a powerful impact 
on work systems and related corporate strategies (Lippert et al., 2014). 
Institutions, indeed, have an influence on how societies develop the capabilities of their labor 
forces as well as the level of employment and the conditions of work and remuneration 
(Lazonick, 2012). How forms of remuneration, workforce representation and its participation 
in decision making and other traditional arrangements are shaped within national contexts 
across decades have had great implications over the interpretations of different stakeholders 
of industrial transformations and related changes. For example, reactions against more 
flexible schemes and other workplace reorganizations can be reacted in much different ways 
by unions in different countries depending on their existing institutional anchors of labor 
rights. Similar issues like flexibility, changes in work organization, job security or career 
trajectories can be addressed in a variety of ways conditioned by such institutional ‘rigidities’ 
(Locke and Thelen, 1995). 
The power dynamics also matter. The decisions over resource allocations are strongly driven 
by the power relations between the actors involved and the forms of corporate governance 
that specify the character of the reconciliations (Lippert et al., 2014). Employment relations 
are also structured by social norms and the values present in specific geographies. The relation 
between the changing social norms along the dynamics of different social groups attached to 
such norms in different geographies and the orientation of managers and corporate 
management cannot be overlooked (Jacoby, 2007). This aspect is especially relevant in the 
context of US economy as the epicenter of world capitalism and the rise of the maximizing 
shareholder value ideology together with its social and corporate outcomes in the last several 
decades. 
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Thus, within a business organization, value creation by deploying productive resources is 
socially constructed and institutionally shaped. The organization of work in a firm is structured 
through career schemes and skills development, modes of remuneration, seniority, benefits, 
and collective representation and participation into decision-making. These last two aspects 
of organization also form up the central link between the employee voice mechanisms and 
corporate governance in general (Boyer and Freyssenet, 2000a, Lippert et al., 2014). If 
functional and hierarchical divisions of labor that characterizes the skill base and its 
integration into production processes (Lazonick, 2005) is one part of this setting, collective 
employee representation and interests of labor that the organization protects and promotes 
(Sako, 2006) is the other part. As a whole, there is a coordination between functional and 
hierarchical divisions and company-level social processes including individual or collective 
bargaining, contract negotiations, and compromises which evolve in time depending on power 
relations in and out of the firm between different economic groups. However, the ways in 
which these processes are defined, are also institutionally characterized and they are subject 
to change from one geography to another and from one period to another. 
4.3 Historical context of organizational transformations 
Accordingly, it is crucial to understand organizational-institutional transformation of 
corporate resource allocation which is necessary to describe the changing nature of work 
organization and industrial relations and its connections to concurrent strategic and financial 
orientations. A systematic exploration of how corporate strategies interact with 
organizational and institutional transformation of employment might also help explain their 
implications over industrial relations. 
Rising international competition in the 1970s and 1980s, especially through the organizational 
superiority of Japan and structural drawbacks of corporate governance in the United States 
(Boyer and Freyssenet, 1995; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000) brought forward the necessity of 
new corporate governance forms together with the reformulation of existing work 
organization mechanisms. Inspired by Japanese production techniques including widely 
popularized lean manufacturing methods and backed up with rapidly developing IT tools to 
be integrated into production processes, work organization and implementation on the shop-
floor dramatically changed (Jacoby, 2007). The transformation of organization coupled with a 
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transformation of managerial functions. The concurrent rise of the shareholder value 
perspective which aimed to align shareholder and managerial interests had substantial impact 
over the corporate governance of the business enterprise globally (Christensen et al., 2008; 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000; Shin, 2012). Intertwined with financial transformations and the 
shift to shareholder value logic, a detachment occurred between management’s objectives 
from work expressed in higher performance of workers and the emerging employment 
practices that shift the burden of risk from capital to labor (Thompson, 2003, 2011). 
Including the firms which preserved some aspects of the old New Deal system like better job 
security, many corporations have abandoned such New Deal business models and the 
business actions have become subject to continual financial calculation (Osterman et al., 
2001). To reap quick returns, dominant stakeholders controlling corporations exerted 
pressures on the labor force through flexible and insecure work schemes (Ladipo and 
Wilkinson, 2002 in Burchell, 2002). Treating employees as costs to be minimized became a 
norm or a component of new business models (Jacoby, 2007). 
Last but not least, the tendency towards the abandonment of full employment and the 
changing institutional context of industrial relations in the developed economies in the period 
after 1970s led to weakening labor unions, eroding employment protections, collective 
bargaining system and employee rights (Brinkmann and Nachtwey, 2013; Osterman et al., 
2001; Palley, 2007; Visser, 2006). Employment relationships became less certain and labor 
policies and related institutions have been less capable to handle increasingly difficult work 
environment (Osterman et al., 2001). 
These transformations in technological, institutional and organizational contexts had major 
implications over work organization within manufacturing firms all over the world. One 
implication was on the integration of internal and external skill base into the production 
process. Whether it was sustained by the steady inflow of well-educated international labor 
into Western corporations in knowledge-intensive sectors like ICT and pharmaceuticals, the 
manufacturing industries of the West went under a selective stress test of competitiveness 
resulting in a massive wave of merger and acquisition in major manufacturing sectors 
including aerospace. Such a rationalization eliminated massive numbers of well-paid, 
unionized blue-collar jobs (Lazonick, 2012). 
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On the contrary, individual employees in many different occupations have long been in need 
of urgent learning opportunities in order to match their career trajectories and future 
employability to their possession of up-to-date skills (Osterman et al., 2001). The impact of 
such transformations in work organization on the implementation of skill development is 
another important issue to investigate the changing dynamics of work and employment in 
Western manufacturing. Treating employees as material costs to be minimized has had great 
implications over the pay of work as well as the current and future benefits assigned to 
workers. 
During the same period, job insecurity has become a major issue for organizational integration 
(Burchell, 2002; Danford et al., 2004; Mankelow, 2002) with diverse features. Including the 
loss over the control over the flow of work, redesign of work and other changes at work place, 
insecurity can be more than a fear of losing a job. They also include the decline in employee 
commitment and morale (Burchell et al., 2002; Danford et al., 2004). 
The long-term view of work organization is shaped by its relation to job security and the 
contractual agreements on working hours, actual and post-employment benefits and their 
different features (bonuses as profit-sharing, healthcare benefits, pensions). The employer-
employee relationships are also characterized by the emergence and further evolution of 
different forms of reward systems. Sometimes these forms may also be undermined by 
counteracting mechanisms. For example, bonuses that enable workers to share in the 
economic success of the firm and are among the main demands of the workforce from the 
management (Monthly Labor Review, 1964) can become controversial within the 
shareholder-value orientation when economic performance is measured mostly with short-
term financial performance. On the contrary, it is the long-term sustainability of the business 
which is crucial for employees who devote their years to earn a specific profession to be 
deployed within a sustainable organization. Thus, corporate restructuring has become a major 
driver of employment instability and job security (Sako, 2006). 
Employment relations, collective representation and unions have also been part of the 
transformation. In many countries, employment relations have come under mounting 
pressure primarily due to the tension between insecurity spreading through new forms of 
corporate governance and old forms of collective representation and bargaining structures 
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institutionally and culturally embedded in national economies. For example, the development 
of new organizational forms like networking, alliances, use of external agencies and multi-
employer sites has made a clearly defined employer–employee relationship difficult to 
maintain under conditions where employees work under different arrangements such as 
project teams or as on-site employees from different organizations (Rubery et al., 2002). 
Inconsistency between the instability created by the efforts to downsize or restructure and 
the required workforce stability for work practices like ‘high performance work systems’ 
became widespread (Thompson, 2003).  
Historically, such reorganizations of work are among the main issues handled by the collective 
representation of the workforce through unions. However, with shrinking unionization and 
coverage of collective bargaining hand in hand with declining manufacturing in Western 
economies, employees have lost their voice which they need for job security and protection 
of their rights in an insecure work environment characterized with volatile and high-turnover 
labor markets (Osterman et al., 2001). As a result, the power and influence of organized labor 
diminished throughout the developed economies (Milkman, 2013; Visser, 2006). As an 
indicator, large-scale strikes - historically the most effective expression of union power and 
leverage - largely disappeared (Milkman, 2013). 
To summarize, the main issues necessary to be discussed in an industrial study in a certain 
context are a) the integration of the workforce into the value creation process through their 
skills formation and the utilization of their value-creating capabilities along the production 
process; b) the establishment of the motivation of the workforce through necessary incentive 
mechanisms or its destruction; and c) job security with the supportive or undermining 
institutional mechanisms. As a result, in order to comprehend the relation between the 
development of productive capabilities of Airbus and Boeing through their innovation and 
technological development efforts, an analysis of the dynamics of work organization is crucial. 
4.4 Features of organizational strength and workforce characteristics: Airbus vs. Boeing 
Compared to a large number of failed cases of commercial aircraft manufacturing on both 
sides of the Atlantic including technologically advanced initiatives (BAC, Comet, Concorde, 
Fokker, Lockheed Martin among others), superior performance of Airbus and Boeing resides 
in its managerial and organizational capabilities that transform their knowledge and skill base 
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into commercial success. Hickie (2006) emphasizes the source of success as an outcome of 
organizational integration of different parties:  
“Boeing’s capability to enter the jet age with such rapidity and to such 
competitive effect, was significantly due to the way its research, design and 
manufacturing activities were managed, and on its focus on relationship 
marketing with key customers. Nor was such management simply a matter of 
formal structures and processes. It was also firmly rooted in tacit knowledge 
(e.g. when designers appreciate the needs of production engineers) and cultural 
understandings (e.g. what are reasonably demands to make of a supplier). 
Similarly, the teams involved in Airbus design and manufacture can draw on 35 
years of direct collaboration, which have developed relationships of mutual 
trust and understanding. The strength of the relationships has critically 
underpinned the Airbus partners’ willingness to move towards a more united 
decision-making structure”. 
To develop and build technically advanced commercial (or military) aircraft, a long learning 
and training period, including on-the-job training, is indispensable for the acquisition of the 
specific skills and necessary knowledge. Training is strictly connected to the job performed 
where people with different levels of experience interact. Thus, the design, development and 
manufacturing environment operates largely as a community of designers, engineers and 
machinists who deploy their skills within an integral technical organization in which 
competence and expertise are acquired and shared with a steady flow of information 
(Sorscher, 2002). Moreover, on the shop floor, each airframe assembly requires unique 
processes and tooling, and workers need a fair amount of time to familiarize themselves with 
these new techniques (Kronemer and Henneberger, 1993). Continuous training is again 
fundamental to develop new skills strongly needed with new technologies and tooling. 
Learning curves as practical estimates of value creation, measure productivity improvements 
resulting from accumulated knowledge and networks of relationships (Sorscher, 2002). In the 
case of a new aircraft program skill development and retention become substantially 
important as a new innovative product necessitates workers who are familiar with new 
techniques and processes. They need training, motivation to collaborate for the new project 
and motivation to stay in the company if they are newly hired. The integrity of the program 
depends on the effective organization of the workforce, well-organized coordination and 
communication, and a thorough management of recruitment, training and internal mobility. 
In effect, internal and external coordination and communication problems were among the 
major reasons for repeated delays of Boeing’s B787 and Airbus’ previous program A380. 
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Learning and skill development are expressed in terms of career paths, seniority, incentives 
and collective representation. All professions in aerospace and particularly engineering 
require a long period of development. For an aerospace engineer, it takes up to 20 years to 
lead an engineering team depending on her permanent access to training at every stage of 
her career29F30. And employees of a company try to make decisions about their career 
development with a long-term perspective. Knowledge workers need to have unambiguous 
avenues of professional advancement as a major motivator (Imberman, 2001).  
Maintaining a sufficient number of qualified employees in technical positions is one of the 
chief challenges of the industry. Recurring layoffs are not desired due to skill loss as well as 
the considerable investment on training (Kronemer and Henneberger, 1993). Voluntary quit 
rates are also low compared to other industries (Kleiner et al., 2002). Average length of service 
in aerospace industry is substantially higher than other manufacturing industries. In the US, 
the median years of tenure for aircraft industry workers was 9.7 years in 2000 compared to 
6.4 years for ‘Transportation equipment’ which also includes aircraft manufacturing and only 
5.0 years for manufacturing in general. Since 2000, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics provides 
only the number for transportation equipment and in 2014, it increased to 7.1 years with 5.9 
years for overall manufacturing. The average length of service of Boeing employees in Puget 
Sound, which is one of the oldest production sites of Boeing, was 16 years in 2012. The same 
figure was 13.5 years in 2013 for entire Airbus workforce. 
In effect, in Europe the EU directives require big companies to disclose information on social 
and employment aspects including but not limited to gender balance of employees, 
percentage of employees having benefited from training or the duration of training per 
employee, rate of injuries, absenteeism. In Airbus, average number of hours of training per 
year increased from 12 hours in 2004 to 27 hours in 2013. Such figures are not available for 
Boeing or US companies in general. 
Figures 4.1a and 4.1b provide total and commercial aircraft employment figures of Airbus and 
Boeing. After the substantial increase in employment due to major acquisitions in late 1990s, 
Boeing’s employment gradually decreased until the mid-2000s and stabilized in the last 10 
years with minor fluctuations as a result of incessant increases in commercial aircraft orders 
                                                          
30 “Crucial Boeing talent nearing retirement” Michelle Dunlop, Daily Herald, May 23, 2010 
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in this period even though defense and space share of employment has substantially 
decreased from its peak 51 percent in 2003 to only 30 percent at the end of 2015. The 
company employs today around 30,000 less defense and space workers compared to 2003 
figures. Overall, Boeing’s total employment in 2015 is 31% smaller compared to its peak in 
1997 after the McDonnell Douglas acquisition. 
The total number of Airbus employees increased more than 50% since the inception of EADS 
in 1999 while a stabilization of employment is also observed in the last three years despite 
sharply increased commercial backlog. Figure 4.1b shows the stronger increase in commercial 
aircraft employment in both firms in the same period. Between 1999 and 2015, the ratio of 
Airbus commercial aircraft employment to total employment has increased from 36 to 53 
percent. For Boeing the same ratio moved from 48 to 52 percent for the same period even 
though it decreased to as low as 32 percent in 2005. 
For both companies, the bulk of their workforce is located in their home countries. In the case 
of Airbus, the proportion of domestic workforce (employees in France, Germany, Spain and 
the UK) to total workforce was 90 percent in 2014. Its employment abroad, especially in China 
and in the US where its final assembly lines are located ascended considerably in the last five 
years. As late as 2009, its home country employment was 93.5 percent, close to Boeing’s latest 
estimate which was 95 percent in 2013. The company does not officially publish the total 
figures of its US employment. Its ‘other locations’ category which includes both international 
and other smaller US employment figures other than the nine States where the company has 
its biggest part of workforce, was 17 percent at the end of 2015. 
Figure 4.1a: Total workforce of Airbus and Boeing 
Source: Company annual reports  
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Figure 4.1b: Total commercial aircraft workforce of Airbus and Boeing 
Source: Company annual reports 
Relative stability in commercial aircraft employment in recent years has had a major impact 
on the productivity of both firms. Figure 4.2 shows the continuing decrease in the number of 
employees per aircraft delivered for Airbus and Boeing. Even though increased outsourcing 
and related divestments may explain a large part of the decrease, increased automation and 
higher utilization of technological advances in manufacturing also have had an important role 
in generating higher productivity figures, contrary to earlier assessments that aerospace is a 
labor-intensive industry with specific disincentives to the acquisition of labor-saving 
technology (Kronemer and Henneberger, 1993). As it is stated in the previous chapter, Airbus 
started investing in new production technologies much earlier than Boeing (Pritchard, 2002), 
and the introduction of new aircraft programs has always been accompanied by higher 
automation of manufacturing activities for the entire production process of the new program 
which later implemented in older programs 30F31. 
Figure 4.2: Commercial aircraft employees per aircraft delivered at Airbus and Boeing 
 
Source: Company annual reports  
                                                          
31 “Rising Production Spurs Automation of Airbus Consortium Facilities”, Jeffrey Lenorovitz, Aviation Week & 
Space Technology, Vol. 125, No. 18, November 3, 1986; “Airbus is building the wings for its new A380 jumbo 
aircraft with the help of a fully automated drilling and riveting machine”, Adam Cort, Assembly, Vol. 49, Issue 7, 
July 1, 2006; “How Electroimpact is reshaping aerospace automation”, Stephen Trimble, Flight International, 
February 29, 2016 
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Lastly, Figure 4.3 shows the ratio of staff costs to total costs. For both companies, the ratio 
fluctuates around 25% while Boeing stopped disclosing personnel expense figures since 2012 
without any explanation. Considering the gradual increase in total costs in line with revenues 
and the decrease in employment from 174,000 to 161,400 between 2012 and 2015, the ratio 
should now be somewhere between 25 and 30 percent. Over the years their business 
strategies have shifted in favor of financial performance through cost-cutting, asset sales and 
increasing outsourcing (Sorscher, 2002; Trevidic, 201131F32). 
Figure 4.3: Personnel costs as a proportion of total costs at Airbus and Boeing 
 
Source: Company annual reports 
In recent years, one of the most important concerns of the industry is the aging workforce in 
aerospace and defense sectors (AIA, 2011; Sorscher, 2011). The average age of a Boeing 
worker is 48, compared with 43 of an Airbus worker. About 28 percent of Boeing’s employees 
are 55 or older, hence eligible to retire, and their proportion is rising rapidly (Burreson, 2013). 
In the presence of globalization of production, ongoing technological change and the longer 
term possibility of new entrants in commercial aircraft markets, a key question is the extent 
to which Boeing and Airbus are investing in the long-term careers of their younger employees, 
an investment that will be required for global leadership over the next generation. In a survey 
conducted at the beginning of the last decade among US aerospace engineers, managers, 
production workers, and technical specialists, to the question whether they would 
recommend that their children work in this industry, less than 20 percent agreed or strongly 
agreed (MIT Labor Aerospace Research Agenda and Lean Aerospace Initiative, 2001). 
                                                          
32 “Fabrice Brégier: «Airbus a largement dépassé ses objectifs d'économies» ”, Bruno Trevidic, Les Echos, April 
22, 2011 
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Besides career opportunities, aerospace employees seek appropriate incentive mechanisms 
in the form of promotion, remuneration and other benefits. Accordingly, compensation 
structure and policies must be clear and in accord with the professional criteria of their 
technical community (Imberman, 2001). The aerospace workforce is highly organized in 
unions all over the world. These incentive mechanisms have long been the main subjects of 
contract negotiations and collective representation. Industrial relations within aerospace, and 
especially within US aerospace, contain a history of contestations and compromises that are 
integral to broader managerial strategies and corporate decision-making. Employees strongly 
link these processes to their long term career goals and increasingly to job security. One of the 
most marked similarities between Airbus and Boeing is the emphasis of their workforce on job 
security. Similar concerns exist for every type of aerospace profession and every region the 
companies operate. With the rise of outsourcing as a corporate strategy (especially with more 
design and development outsourcing), job security has become the main topic of contract 
negotiations and other communication. However, the differences between the mechanisms 
of collective representation and employee participation on two sides of the Atlantic result in 
different forms of resolutions in employee-employer relationships to be detailed in the 
following sections.  
Thus, aircraft manufacturing is a long-term proposition. Through preliminary long-term 
investments in education and training with major emphasis in math and science, the 
aerospace industry has to have constant access to a scientifically and technologically trained 
workforce (US Aerospace Commission, 2002). The wealth of companies primarily comes from 
skill retention, employment and career opportunities 32F33. Manufacturers’ reaction to short-
term cycles through layoffs and divestments as well as postponing and cancelling new projects 
would hamper innovative capabilities of firms in the long run (Kronemer and Henneberger, 
1993). 
4.5 Work organization in Boeing 
Boeing has been historically known as a paternalistic firm with structured internal promotion. 
Most of the company’s management was composed of Boeing’s professional engineers that 
                                                          
33 “The success story of Airbus, Expansion 1991-1992”, originally from a speech of Jean Pierson in 1991, the 
CEO of Airbus Industrie from 1985 to 1998, Airbus Website, 
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‘regard themselves more as members of a learned society than as mere employees of a 
corporation’ (Imberman, 2001). In the periods before and after the World War II, seniority 
issues were important elements of employment relationships that are marked with a strong 
presence of union membership to protect rights and benefits of the workforce and negotiate 
over them at each contract. Unionization at Boeing dates back to mid-1930s when the Wagner 
Act guaranteed the US workforce the right to organize in unions and to engage in collective 
bargaining. Right after the Second World War, engineers and other professionals also formed 
their unions with similar aims to machinists and other assembly workers. 
The engineering mindset was also decisive over most of the top management decision-
making. ‘Scientific’ decisions based on factual analysis were imposed on factory floor that all 
employees should logically follow orders based on the ‘truths’ formulated by senior Boeing 
management (Imberman, 2001). Such strict command thinking was also the result of its close 
relationship with the Defense Department (Newhouse, 2007). 
In Boeing, contract talks with unions have always been very important to set the main topics 
of discussion between management and labor and negotiate various issues. These 
negotiations are especially critical considering the prevalent problems of communication 
between management and employees (Imberman, 2001), and they go beyond the traditional 
topics of wages and benefits and involve corporate strategies including outsourcing and 
productivity measures. They provide the consent of the workforce for new work and 
management practices to increase productivity as well as the decisions on externalization 
imposed by the company management. 
Related to the tense relationship between management and labor, contract talks are always 
prone to disagreements during negotiations, which often results in strikes during the 
negotiations for new collective agreement 33F34. The history of workforce unionizing at Boeing is 
also marked with a series of strikes and other major conflicts with management. Table 4.1 
provides a chronology of unionization, main workplace conflicts and related issues with their 
reasons at Boeing. These conflicts, in effect, provide important insights to understanding the 
tense relation between corporate strategies and organizational integration as well as the 
                                                          
34 Similar to most union contracts in the US, Boeing contracts also contains a ‘no strike’ provision which prohibit 
covered employees to engage in strike activities during the contract term (Lueke, 2014) 
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changing dynamics of company and national power relations. Workforce conflicts at Boeing 
have a long history with various reasons expressed mostly during the periods of new contract 
negotiations. As an example, when Boeing engineers went on a real strike in 2000 for the first 
time in the history of Boeing, the reasons were not specifically different than those of 
machinists’. Engineers claimed that the contract offered by Boeing would cause lower salaries 
and bonuses, reduced benefits with increased employee participation to costs, and 
redefinition of workers' responsibilities with reduced decision-making power34F35. Having a 
longer history of organization and strike practice, machinists’ unions have had a larger variety 
of concerns over which to strike. As early as 1990s, outsourcing became a major concern of 
the blue-collar workforce, posing a direct threat to their job security35F36. Later in the next 
decade, more non-wage related reasons together with the aging of the workforce especially 
pensions and other retirement benefits have grown into one of the biggest issues of industrial 
relations at Boeing. It was the single most important topic in latest contract negotiations with 
the company in late 2013 which were turned into a major source of conflict between several 
parties involved. Its relation to new product development and work relocation is detailed 
below. 
In Boeing’s history of employment relations, there are other conflicts which resulted in strikes 
in its non-core production sites, including those located abroad. The reasons which are more 
or less similar to those in core sites show the extent of conflicting employment relations 
spread over other Boeing sites.  
                                                          
35 “Thousands Strike at Boeing's Seattle-Area Plants”, Jeff Cole, The Wall Street Journal, February 10, 2000; 
“Engineers Union Rejects New Contract from Boeing”, Mike Maharry, World Reporter, February 27, 2000; 
“Unions Predict Gain from Boeing Strike”, Steven Greenhouse, The New York Times, March 21, 2000 
36 “Machinists, Boeing Open Contract Talks”, George Tibbits, The Associated Press, August 4, 1992; “Boeing 
union authorizes strike as talks heat up”, Martin Wolk, Reuters News, September 13, 1995; “'Outsource' work 
still a sore spot”, Jennifer Brody, Valley Daily News, December 5, 1995 
197 
 
Table 4.1: Chronology of unionization, workplace and contract conflicts and related issues at 
Boeing 
year event major concerns 
1935 US Congress passes the Wagner Act that encouraged the formation of unions unionization 
1935 
Newly formed District Lodge 751 of the International Association of Machinists of 
the AF of L notifies Boeing that it signed up 70 percent of Boeing's plant workers 
unionization 
1943 Machinists in Washington protest a wage freeze enacted by the War Labor Board 
war time wage 
freezes 
1945 Boeing lays off as many as 70,000 workers as the war ends layoffs 
1946 SPEEA organizes at Boeing unionization 
1948 
The Machinists union stages its first strike over wages, seniority and organizing 
issues. The 140-day strike remains the longest in Machinists’ history 
seniority 
1955 Boeing agrees to a pension plan for IAM pensions 
1965 Machinists strike for 19 days over seniority issues and medical coverage seniority 
1977 
A total of more than 40,000 machinists including 24,000 from Boeing (also at 
Lockheed) stage a 44-day work stoppage over wages, health and welfare benefits, 
and retirement provisions 
wages and other 
benefits 
1981 
More than 900 machinists at the Kennedy space center stage an unsuccessful 
two-month strike sparked by the elimination of a cost-of-living allowance 
other benefits (cost-
of-living allowance) 
1981 
More than 400 Boeing of Canada workers, members of the United Auto Workers 
union go on strike for 30-days due to wage and cost of living discontent 
wages and other 
benefits (cost-of-
living allowance) 
1987 
Canadian Auto Workers members go on strike for 70 days due to imposition of a 
US-style management system on Canadian workers that would reduce job 
security and undermine the local unions' effectiveness 
job security and job 
descriptions 
1989 Machinists strike for 48 days concerned about overtime issues overtime 
1993 
SPEEA members go on strike for one day for lump-sum disbursements and cost-
of-living adjustments 
cost-of-living wage 
adjustments 
1995 Machinists strike for 69 days over job security and benefits 
job security and 
healthcare benefits 
1996 
More than 800 machinists in Winnipeg, Canada strike for 35 days over pensions 
and wages 
pensions 
2000 
SPEEA’s engineers and technical workers go on strike for 40 days over wages and 
healthcare benefits 
wages and other 
benefits 
2002 
1400 production workers at Boeing's helicopter plant near Philadelphia strike for 
8 days over health-insurance benefits and work rules after contract talks failed 
benefits and work 
rules 
2005 
Machinists go on strike for 28 days over retirement and health benefits in their 
new contract 
pensions 
2005 
1,500 machinists at Boeing's aerospace and defense operations in three different 
states set a strike for three months after failing to reach terms on a contract 
pensions 
2005-
2006 
More than 30 Boeing Australia maintenance engineers in Williamtown stage a 37-
week strike over the company's refusal to negotiate a collective agreement or 
accept arbitration 
collective 
agreement 
2006 
Some 300 machinists at a Boeing Tennessee components factory strike after 
rejecting a labor contract over job security and benefits 
job security 
2008 
About 660 workers at de Havilland Australia set a strike sparked by the recent 
dismissal of a supervisor  
workplace conflicts 
2008 
Boeing de Havilland engineers in Australia set short-lasting strikes several times in 
a month to push the company into negotiating a new collective agreement 
collective 
agreement 
2008 
Machinists strike for 57 days over job security, health care and retired member 
benefits 
job security and 
retirement benefits 
2010 
Boeing defense unit workers in California set a month-long strike over pensions 
and healthcare benefits 
pensions and 
healthcare benefits 
Source: Dow Jones Factiva; Rodgers (1996) for years before 1980  
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Prior to 1980s, major topics in contract negotiations as well as the sources of conflict were 
remuneration of employees and seniority (Fridie, 1961). In the following period, the company 
progressively offered more flexible pay schemes consisting of bonuses and profit-sharing that 
may change according to manufacturing upturns and downturns. Management believed that 
such schemes would also minimize layoffs. In addition, bonuses cost less than increases in 
base wages, because they do not count toward sick pay, overtime, vacation pay and pension 
benefits36F37. Such payments were especially popular among young employees who are more 
interested in immediate cash than pensions or sick pay. Later in the late 1980s, however, 
unions wanted Boeing to abandon the bonus system as the company tied it to productivity 
improvements and more importantly to profitability. 
On the contrary, Boeing extended its non-fixed payment schemes including share-based 
compensation plans to a broader group of employees in the 1990s with an aim “to link their 
interests and efforts to the long-term interests of the Company's shareholders” (Boeing 10-K, 
1993). In 1996, the company also established a 12-year trust called ShareValue Trust that was 
‘designed to allow substantially all employees to share in the results of increasing shareholder 
value over the long term’ (Boeing 10-K, 1996). The aim was to distribute every four years a 
certain amount of stock depending on the level of average annual stock return. Interestingly, 
workers’ representatives expressed content that they also became eligible to receive stocks 
as a form of compensation like executives37F38. Concordant with the widespread trend among US 
firms, stock-based compensation became a prevalent form of remuneration especially for 
executives. Table 4.2 shows a classification of different forms of worker and executive 
compensation of Airbus and Boeing. Compared to less complex compensation schemes at 
Airbus introduced after its IPO in 2000, in the period after 1990, Boeing introduced multiple 
forms of compensation for employees and executives with specific conditions of eligibility. 
The use of the stock market as a compensation mechanism for employees is much more 
prevalent in the case of Boeing compared to Airbus as these options and awards in the form 
of company shares are distributed to a much larger group of employees. For Airbus, the 
number of eligible staff has never exceeded more than 1.5 percent of the total workforce. The 
quantitative measures of executive compensation are detailed in the following chapter.
                                                          
37 “Above All, Boeing Wants to Slow Wage Increases” Louis Uchitelle, The New York Times October 6, 1989  
38 “Boeing sets up $1 billion stock fund for employees”, Martin Wolk, Reuters News, July 11, 1996  
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Table 4.2: Previous and active compensation schemes of Airbus and Boeing for employees and executives 
A
IR
B
U
S 
Form of 
compensation 
Year of 
introduction Paid in Given to Conditions 
Wages & salaries - Cash All employees - 
Profit sharing 
plans (Bonuses) - Cash All employees 
Airbus France has proﬁt sharing plans (accords de participation), in accordance with French law, and speciﬁc 
incentive plans (accords d’intéressement), which provide bonuses to employees based on the achievement 
of productivity, technical or administrative milestones. Airbus Deutschland GmbH’s remuneration policy is, 
to a large extent, ﬂexible and strongly linked to the operating proﬁt of the company, the increase in value of 
the company and the achievement of individual objectives. Airbus CASA, which does not have a proﬁt 
sharing policy, allows technicians and management to receive proﬁt-related pay, subject to the achievement 
of the general company objectives and individual performance. 
Employee stock 
ownership plans 
(ESOPs) 2000 Stock All employees 
Until 2011, eligible employees (at least five months' seniority) were able to purchase a certain amount of 
shares per employee of previously unissued shares for a certain price lower than the market price. In 2011, 
the ESOP was changed to a matching plan concept that the company matched each fixed number of shares 
purchased by employees with a number of free Airbus shares based on a determining ratio. Besides ESOP, in 
2013, 10 Free Shares were granted to all eligible employees of the Group to reward them for their 
'engagement and commitment to the Company'. 
Annual Variable 
Remuneration 2000 Cash Executives 
Variable Remuneration (VR) rewards annual performance based on achievement of company performance 
measures and individual objectives. Performance Measures; Collective (50% of VR): divided between EBIT 
(45%); FCF (45%) and RoCE (10%). Individual (50% of VR): Achievement of annual individual objectives, 
divided between Outcomes and Behaviour. The VR is targeted at 100% of Base Salary for the CEO and, 
depending on the performance assessment, ranges from 0% to 200% of target. The VR is capped at 200% of 
Base Salary (2013) 
Long-Term 
Incentive Plan 
(LTIP) Awards (as 
performance 
units) 2000 Stock Executives 
LTIPs rewards long term commitment and company performance, and engagement on financial targets, over 
a five-year period. Vesting ranges from 0% to 150% of initial grant, subject to cumulative performance over a 
three-year period (positive EBIT). When EBIT is positive, vesting ranges from 50% to 150% of the grant based 
on EPS (75%) and Free Cash Flow (25%). The original allocation to the CEO is capped at 100% of Base Salary 
at the time of grant. The overall pay-out is capped at a maximum 250% of the original value at the date of 
grant. (2013) 
Stock options 2001 Stock 
Executives 
and senior 
management 
Stock option plans provided to the members of the Executive Committee as well as to the Group’s senior 
management the grant of options for the purchase of Airbus shares aimed the alignment with shareholders’ 
interest for value creation. Performance measures: Variation of the value of Airbus share compared to a 
grant price set at 110% of the Fair Market Value at grant date to exercise options 
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Performance units 2006 
Cash or 
Stock  Executives 
Performance units are conditioned to the achievement of long-term operational profit, measured through 
cumulative EBIT (and EPS & FCF for CEO only). Based on 100% target performance achievement, a minimum 
of 50% of performance units vest; 100% in case of on-target performance achievement; and up to a 
maximum of 150% in case of overachievement of performance criteria. The performance and restricted 
shares will vest if the participant is still employed by a group company and, in the case of performance units, 
upon achievement of mid-term business performance. 
Restricted shares 2006 Cash 
Executives and 
senior man. 
Restricted units plan is a cash settled share-based payment plan. Restricted units vest if the participant is still 
employed by a Group company at the respective vesting dates 
Executive 
termination 
package 2000 Cash Executives 
The Executive Committee members are entitled to a termination package when they leave the Company as a 
result of a decision of the Company. The employment contracts for the Executive Committee members are 
concluded for an indefinite term with an indemnity of up to a maximum of 24 months of their target income. 
      
B
O
EI
N
G
 
Form of 
compensation 
Year of 
introduction Paid in Given to Conditions 
Wages & salaries - Cash All employees - 
Bonuses - Cash All employees - 
Stock options before 1990 Stock 
Eligible 
employees 
The options are granted with an exercise price equal to the fair market value of our stock on the date of 
grant and expire ten years after the date of grant. The stock options vest over a period of three years, with 
34% vesting after the first year, 33% vesting after the second year and the remaining 33% vesting after the 
third year 
Stock Appreciation 
Rights before 1990 
Cash & 
Stock 
Eligible 
employees 
Stock Appreciation Rights are given to employees who are granted stock options. They are the right to 
receive payment per share of the SAR exercised in shares of equivalent value or in cash. Upon the exercise of 
a SAR, a Participant shall be entitled to receive payment from the Company in an amount determined by 
multiplying (a) the difference between the Fair Market Value of the Common Stock for the date of exercise 
over the grant price by (b) the number of shares with respect to which the SAR is exercised. 
Restricted Stock 
and Stock Units before 1990 Stock 
Eligible 
employees 
The RSUs are granted to employees for various achievements and they vest on the third anniversary of the 
grant date. The fair values of all stock units are estimated using the average stock price on the date of grant. 
Stock units settle in common stock on a one-for-one basis and are not contingent upon stock price. 
LTIP Shares 1990-1995 Stock Executives 
For the years 1990 through 1995, executives received long-term incentive program performance shares 
(LTIP Shares). LTIP Shares are converted into shares of Boeing common stock four years after they are 
awarded. The officers cannot vote any of these types of share interests or transfer them unless and until 
they are converted into Boeing common stock, and they may be forfeited on termination of employment 
prior to vesting. 
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Boeing Stock Units 1994-2006 
Cash & 
Stock Executives 
BSUs, which were awarded for years prior to 2006 in payment of a portion of the annual incentive award, 
are stock units that earn dividend equivalents, which are accrued in the form of additional BSUs each 
quarter. BSUs vest and are payable three years after the award or upon earlier retirement, or may be 
deferred, and are payable in either cash or stock at the election of the executive. Vesting of the BSUs will be 
fully accelerated if employment is terminated due to death, disability or layoff. 
ShareValue Trust 1996-2010 Stock 
Eligible 
employees 
Designed to allow substantially all employees to share in the results of increasing shareholder value over the 
long term. The program ran for 14 years under four periods. For each fund period, the value of the trust that 
exceeds 3 percent annual growth is distributed to eligible participants in the form of stock (with partial 
shares in cash). Participants on non-U.S. payrolls will receive cash in lieu of stock. Shares of common stock 
held by the Trust are legally outstanding and entitled to receive dividends 
Stock equivalent 
units 
1997 
(after McDD 
acquisition) Cash Stonecipher 
Stock equivalent units ("SEUs") granted to Mr. Stonecipher by McDonnell Douglas prior to the Merger were 
converted into 477,415 SEUs upon the consummation of the Merger. Dividend equivalents were converted 
into an additional 2,488 SEUs after the Merger. These units, which do not have voting rights but earn 
dividend equivalents that are reinvested in additional SEUs, are payable in cash. 
Career Shares 1998-2006 Stock Executives 
Career Shares (CS), which were granted prior to 2006, are stock units which are payable in shares of Boeing 
common stock and earn dividend equivalents, which accrue in the form of additional CS which vest upon 
termination of employment due to death, disability, retirement or layoff and are paid out in stock upon vesting. 
Performance 
Shares 1998 Stock Executives 
Stock units that are convertible to common stock contingent upon stock price performance, on a one-to-one 
basis. Beginning with our 2003 grants, all new Performance Shares awarded are subject to different terms 
and conditions from those previously reported 
Executive Layoff 
Benefits Plan 1998 Cash Executives 
A Layoff Event is an involuntary layoff from employment with the Company between the Effective Date and 
June 30, 1999, pursuant to a merger-related staffing decision 
An Employee's Layoff Benefit is equal to: 
a) One year of salary (base salary at time of layoff), plus 
b) Incentive target under the Incentive Compensation Plan for Officers and Employees of The Boeing 
Company and Subsidiaries or the McDonnell Douglas Senior Executive Performance Sharing Plan or the 
Performance Sharing Plan effective at the time of the Layoff Event, plus 
c) The Company paid portion of the cost (grossed up for taxes) for the current medical and dental coverage 
for the Employee and dependents for twelve months 
Performance 
Awards 2006 
Cash & 
Stock Executives 
Performance Awards are cash units that payout based on the achievement of long-term financial goals at 
the end of a three-year period. Each unit has an initial value of $100 dollars. The amount payable at the end 
of the three-year performance period may be anywhere from zero to $200 dollars per unit, depending on 
the Company’s performance against plan for the three years ended December 31, 2008. The Compensation 
Committee has the discretion to pay these awards in cash, stock, or a combination of both after the three-
year performance period. 
Source: Company annual reports and proxy statements
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As stated, the issue of pensions for Boeing workers has become a hot topic of discussion 
between the management and labor in time. Because of perpetual layoffs of younger 
employees, Boeing had and still has a rapidly aging workforce and employees became more 
and more concerned about their post-employment earnings, which remained pretty much the 
same in real terms from the late 1980s. Progressively employee-funded pensions and health 
care benefits have become major sources of conflict in the last two decades and have resulted 
in several strikes after the failure of contract talks in the 2000s. However, one of the most 
striking conflicts between the management and labor around pension schemes erupted in late 
2013. In the early part of the year, after a long contract negotiation period, Boeing engineers 
and technical workers finally accepted Boeing’s offer which eliminated defined-benefit 
pension plans for new hires, leaving them only with a defined-contribution 401(k) plan. In 
effect, Boeing wanted to join the already entrenched trend in the US to substitute 401(k) plans 
for defined-benefit plans over the last two decades. The claim was to reduce its already 
underfunded pension liability and increase corporate performance in terms of earnings-per-
share38F39. The second and the biggest part of the dispute occurred at the end of the same year 
when Boeing’s commercial aircraft production workers, who are also members of the 
International Association of Machinists, voted down a new contract proposal that would have 
guaranteed the 777X be built in the Seattle region but would have frozen the pension 
program, raised the cost of health care and created an adjusted wage scale for new hires 39F40. In 
the first days of 2014, however, also after Boeing’s initiative to search for a new place to 
produce the new aircraft outside Washington, the members of the union approved the 
contract with a 51% in favor of the agreement which freeze pension contributions in 2016 and 
shift to a 401(k) plan with defined employer contributions instead of their previous program 
of fixed benefit payments 40F41. Then Boeing also eliminated defined-benefit pensions of non-
union workers. The new contract was especially welcomed by younger workers who were 
more concerned about job security issues than older ones, those who were more concerned 
with the elimination of the defined-benefit pension plan. However, it also caused a 
disagreement between the local union and its national center in terms of accepting or 
rejecting the second offer. While the national center thought that the newest offer should be 
                                                          
39 “Why Boeing’s fighting to retire pensions”, Steve Wilhelm, Puget Sound Business Journal, January 11, 2013 
40 “Why Boeing is Going to War With Its Employees”, Bill Saporito, Time, November 19, 2013 
41 “Boeing Union Accepts Concessions to Keep 777X in Seattle”, Julie Johnsson, Brendan Case and Peter 
Robison, Bloomberg Business, January 4, 2014 
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accepted, the local union was not that sure41F42. In the meantime, Washington State offered the 
largest corporate tax relief in US history, an $8.7 billion package extended to 2040 after 
existing tax breaks expire by 2024 in order to keep the new 777 line within the State. By pitting 
taxpayers, local unions, national unions, younger and older workers all against each other, 
Boeing management was not unintentional. At the end Boeing accomplished to a strike-free 
launch for its 777 upgrade, elimination of defined benefit pension plan which is still offered 
by only less than 10 percent of US companies and the biggest tax breaks offered by the State. 
With respect to employment relations, the generational difference among workers also 
provided a potential future issue with the dominance of a less militant labor force (Lueke, 
2014). This example of putting different stakeholders one against other was not the first in 
the recent history of the company. As Lueke (2014) narrates; 
“Boeing wasn’t bluffing in 2009, when it demanded a 10 year no-strike deal to keep 
the second 787 Dreamliner production line at Everett. When rejected by the IAM, 
Boeing took its $1 billion U.S. investment to West Charleston, South Carolina, a 
“right to work” state. Boeing now manufacturers the 787 Dreamliner with non-
union South Carolina workers, as well as in Puget Sound. Based upon unfair labor 
practice charges then filed against Boeing by the IAM, the NLRB issued a politically 
charged complaint alleging that Boeing had opened the South Carolina plant “in 
order to punish the (IAM)” for past strikes that shut down the aircraft maker’s 
production lines in the Seattle area. The NLRB later withdrew the complaint as a 
result of settlement between the IAM and Boeing. At the time, the NLRB complaint 
was a major political issue, with U.S. Republicans charging that the Democratic 
Obama administration, through the NLRB, was “more interested in pleasing unions 
than creating new jobs.”” 
From the perspective of governance compromises which mediate the impact of institutions 
on work (Boyer and Freyssenet, 2000a; Lippert et al., 2014), the NLRB decision on the 777 
conflict is beyond the scope of a compromise between labor and management. It is rather a 
defeat of labor and under a different context with more balanced power relations, the results 
would have been very different even though the institutions and their functions remain all the 
same in these contexts. 
Another example of this pitting one against another strategy happened in 2015. When the US 
Congress decided to eliminate Ex-Im Bank finance for importers of US products by providing 
loans to exporters at below market interest rates, the Boeing CEO declared in early 2015 that 
                                                          
42 “Machinists To Vote Again on 777X Contract Jan. 3”, Dominic Gates, The Seattle Times, December 21, 2013 
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job cuts would be unavoidable because of loss of sales due to lack of customer funding 42F43. Later 
in the year, the new CEO announced that they already downsized some of their satellite 
business 43F44 with several hundred layoffs and a relocation of work would also be considered. 44F45 
Besides issues around seniority, remuneration and other benefits, the topics related to 
production process have also become hot topics of Boeing’s industrial relations. As early as 
1984, the company agreed to brief the unions annually on its plans for industrial robots, 
flexible manufacturing systems, computer-aided design, computer-aided manufacturing, and 
automation in the area of graphite composites, which have been increasingly used to replace 
metal in airplane structures. From the early 1990s, Boeing started to employ lean 
manufacturing practices and continuous work flow in order to boost productivity, to reduce 
inventories, to reduce delivery times (order to delivery) as an aim to free cash flow. The 
workforce cooperated with management as long as improved productivity brought them 
more secure jobs and better remuneration. However, the cyclical nature of the commercial 
aircraft business, continuous and rapid layoffs of employees during downturns and rising 
outsourcing (another issue emerged as a hot topic of discussion in the 1990s and 2000s) made 
it hard to estimate the long-term real impact of productivity increases and sharing of its 
benefits. Information exchange between the management and workforce remained very 
limited contrary to terms specified in contracts. 
Having lack of established means to maintain the steady flow of information and two-way 
communication channels so that the company management can listen and respond to the 
needs and suggestions of the workforce (Imberman, 2001), Boeing was faced with numerous 
workplace conflicts especially accelerated during its systems integration period. Their impact 
on productive and financial performance led Boeing to introduce new methods to solve them, 
such as relocation of work (relocation of 787 assemble line in South Carolina) or binding 
employment benefits to decisions over plant location. 
Together with massive layoffs intensified during the period after 1990, job security became a 
very important concern also for the Boeing workforce. Organized labor started to seek explicit 
                                                          
43 “Boeing CEO warns of job relocations if U.S. Ex-Im Bank disappears”, David Morgan, Reuters, April 23, 2015 
44 “Boeing Begins Issuing 60-Day Layoff Notices at Satellite Business, Company Says”, Jon Ostrower, Dow Jones 
Institutional News, August 25, 2015 
45 “Boeing CEO warns of job relocations if U.S. Ex-Im Bank disappears”, David Morgan, Reuters, April 23, 2015 
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job-protection measures without particular success. Since 1990, Boeing has laid off thousands 
of workers each year without rehiring incentive in general. Table 4.3 shows executed – not 
announced – layoffs of Boeing found through newspaper articles in comparison with Airbus. 
The numbers exclude reduction in workforce due to divestments of Boeing which are detailed 
in the previous chapter. In effect, the federal and state governments provided millions of 
dollars for the needs of the displaced workers and for their longer-term retraining spending in 
a way to help Boeing to ease its layoffs in the early 1990s (Mueller et al., 1998) as well as 
during other massive layoffs in 2000s through different mechanisms always funded with 
taxpayer’s money45F46. 
The discussion over layoffs has to be developed in a way that it is part of corporate strategy 
to keep costs down while receiving government aid in different forms. Even in the boom years 
like the last three years when Boeing increased its commercial aircraft deliveries 25 percent 
and its total revenue 18 percent, layoffs at Boeing continued at full speed with different 
reasons. Layoffs are indicators of the level of job security offered to workers and engineers in 
Airbus and Boeing. For a basic comparison, as a frequently applied method extended before 
the 1980s, Boeing has laid off thousands of workers in face with decreasing orders either for 
its commercial or defense/space products. When Airbus’ orders decreased for similar reasons, 
forced layoffs have never been applied as Airbus strategy to deal with excess labor in painful 
situations has always been strikingly different than Boeing. These strategies are discussed in 
the following section. 
Laying off experienced workers in the past has caused Boeing important problems of meeting 
delivery schedules (Freeman, 1998). It has a similar effect with outsourcing that with less 
opportunities for workers, Boeing becomes less capable to perform specific work as its 
workers have limited opportunities to learn new skills (Peterson, 2011). Moreover, in many 
cases, as a kind of chain reaction, suppliers have to resort to layoffs when OEMs impose job 
reductions either because of productivity increases through automation or business 
downturns.  
                                                          
46 « Good Union Benefits, Government Aid Help to Ease Pain of Boeing Layoffs”, Kyung M. Song, Seattle Times, 
October 10, 2001; “Feds give laid-off Boeing workers a big helping hand”, Dominic Gates, Seattle Times, July 31, 
2013 
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Table 4.3: Executed layoffs of Airbus and Boeing 
B
O
EI
N
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Year 
Year-end 
workforce Reasons cited for layoffs 
# of 
workers 
laid off 
Notes on changes 
in workforce 
figures 
1981 101000 Decreasing commercial aircraft orders 6600  
1982 95700 
Lack of work for the commercial aircraft division/unit, 
cancellation/ reduction/end of government contract 
1512  
1983 81600 Decreasing commercial aircraft orders 9000  
1984 93000     
1985 104000    
year of major 
acquisition 
1986 125000     
1987 143700 
Reduced commercial demand for the company's 
information processing system  
60 
year of major 
acquisition 
1988 154200     
1989 164500 
Decreasing demand for defense products, aim to 
reduce production costs 
2200  
1990 160500 Lack of work for the commercial aircraft division/unit 2500  
1991 155700 
Decreasing commercial aircraft orders, lack of work for 
the defense division/unit, cancellation/ reduction/end 
of government contract, downsizing at subsidiary (De 
Havilland Aircraft of Canada) due to decreasing orders 
2759  
1992 142000 
Decreasing commercial aircraft orders, lack of work for 
the defense division/unit, cancellation/reduction/end 
of government contract, downsizing at subsidiary (De 
Havilland Aircraft of Canada) due to decreasing orders 
4087 
year of major 
divestment 
1993 123000 
Decreasing commercial aircraft orders, decreasing 
demand for defense products 
11073  
1994 115000 
Decreasing commercial aircraft orders, decreasing 
demand for defense products 
6835  
1995 105000 Aim to reduce production costs 5700  
1996 143000 Work relocation 212 
year of major 
acquisition 
1997 238000 End of work for the space unit 83 
year of major 
acquisition 
1998 231000 Restructuring after McDD merger 1100 
year of major 
divestment 
1999 197000 
Restructuring after McDD merger, lack of work for the 
defense division/unit, decreasing demand for defense 
products 
28598 
year of major 
divestment 
2000 198000 
Aim to reduce production costs, decreasing commercial 
aircraft orders 
908 
year of major 
acquisition 
2001 188000 Decreasing commercial orders after Sep 11th attacks 5000 
year of major 
divestment 
2002 165000 Decreasing commercial orders after Sep 11th attacks 12049  
2003 157000 Decreasing commercial orders after Sep 11th attacks 5435 
year of major 
divestment 
2004 159000 
Aim to reduce production costs, cancellation/ 
reduction/end of government contract 
360  
2005 153000 
Decreasing Boeing 717 commercial aircraft orders, pre-
divestment layoffs 
700 
year of major 
divestment 
2006 154000 
Aim to reduce production costs, 
cancellation/reduction/end of government contract 
395 
year of major 
acquisition 
2007 159300 Work relocation 260  
2008 162200 Aim to reduce production costs, service outsourcing 236  
207 
 
2009 157100 
Work relocation, aim to reduce production costs, 
cancellation/reduction/end of government contract 
3001  
2010 160500 
Cancellation/reduction/end of government contract, 
aim to reduce production costs, end of work for the 
space unit 
1851 
year of major 
acquisition 
2011 171700 
Cancellation/reduction/end of government contract, 
work relocation, end of work for the space unit 
211  
2012 174400 
Decreasing demand for defense products, end of work 
for the space unit 
39  
2013 168400 Aim to reduce production costs 2460  
2014 165500 Cancellation/reduction/end of government contract 1160  
2015 161400 
Work relocation + lack of orders due to Ex-Im Bank 
shutdown 
153 + 
>100 
 
      
A
IR
B
U
S 
A
IR
B
U
S 
Year 
Year-end 
workforce 
Reasons cited for layoffs 
Number 
of 
workers 
laid off 
Notes on changes 
in workforce 
figures 
befo
re 
1999 
n/a 
During the 1990s, founding corporations of EADS 
(Predecessor of Airbus Group) downsized a substantial 
amount of their workforce due to massive cutbacks of 
defense spending together with consolidation and 
restructuring of the aerospace and defense industries 
all over Europe. The continent lost one third of its 
aerospace (civil and military) workforce between 1990 
and 1996 (ASD statistics). 
  
1999 88631     
2000 88879     
2001 102967     
2002 103967     
2003 109135 
Between 2003 and 2008 more than 3000 jobs at the 
Space division cancelled as part of a restructuring 
program to cut costs without any forced layoffs 
n/a  
2004 110662     
2005 113210     
2006 116805 
Non-renewal of 1000 temporary contracts at Airbus 
Germany 
1000 
Consolidation of 
Airbus UK 
2007 116493 
In 2007 Airbus announced to cut 10000 jobs by 2010 as 
part of its restructuring program Power 8. Job cuts did 
not include termination of employment but they were 
composed of non-renewal of temporary workers' 
contracts, elimination of subcontracting work, voluntary 
leaves and 2 major divestments done as part of 
restructuring. At the end of the program in 2010, Airbus 
employed more people than in 2007. 
n/a  
2008 118349    
year of major 
divestment 
2009 119506    
year of major 
divestment 
2010 121691     
2011 133115    
year of major 
acquisition 
2012 140405     
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2013 144061* 
In late 2013 Airbus announced to cut 5800 jobs in 
Defense and Space divisions by 2017 which may include 
1000-1450 layoffs. Later in 2014, the company pledged 
not to implement any layoffs before the end of 2016 
n/a  
2014 138133    
 
 2015 136574    
*readjusted in 2014 to apply new IFRS rules 
Source: Dow Jones Factiva 
4.6 Work organization in Airbus 
Compared to Boeing, Airbus’ workforce represents a nonhomogeneous and less unified 
structure mainly due to differences in the historical development of industrial relations in 
countries where Airbus operates. In each country, the labor force is represented by several 
distinct unions and issues of collective bargaining may vary considerably depending on 
national differences. For Airbus, it has always been a major challenge to harmonize internal 
employment policies and related procedures due to differing frameworks between countries. 
As late as the 1980s, the largest part of Airbus workforce was officially hired and paid by 
partnering companies which formed up Airbus. The company had to develop organizational 
identity from scratch. It had to provide a job guarantee with full appreciation of their time and 
work. To prevent conflicts between Airbus and its partners, precise and equitable rules had to 
be drawn (Koenig and Thietart, 1988) despite a diverse set of norms, rules and traditions 
spread over four countries of the continent. 
National diversification is not the sole difficulty for employment relations. Selection of 
executives including the CEO has always been a hot topic. Many times during elections, 
national governments as major shareholders were also involved with their prerequisites 
regarding choices over nationalities of candidates. Many issues related to employment 
relations have been politically characterized. 
One important mechanism to maintain management – workforce communications is the 
European Work Council (EWC) that was established in 2000, one year after the incorporation 
of EADS. EWCs are bodies representing the employees of a company at European level. They 
are responsible towards workers in informing them about any significant decision at the 
European level that could affect their employment or working conditions. They complement 
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national work councils functioning in line with national employment regulations. Workers 
directly select their representatives in councils. 
Signed with Airbus Industrie as early as 1992 under French law, two years before the EU 
Council directive which established EWCs at the EU level, Airbus EWC has largely been 
composed of union representatives even though these councils are institutionally separate 
from unions. The Council has primarily been in charge of maintaining communication and 
consultation about the restructuring programs of the company such as Power 8 or the latest 
defense and space restructuring in late 2013. Besides the Council, union representatives and 
the company management agreed to form a European Negotiating Group in 2010 to conduct 
negotiations of any transnational matter. 
The Council was established to maintain a permanent dialogue and cross-border exchange of 
views between the Airbus workforce and its central management over the prospects of the 
company and general business conditions, and over specific topics including the group's 
structure, the economic and financial situation of the group, substantial organizational 
changes, new working methods or production processes, industrial restructuring, 
investments, relocations and employment situations and trends 46F47. However, the success of 
the Council in maintaining a dialogue in a proactive and coordinated manner is questionable. 
Despite early efforts of the Council to convey the message on the details of the Power 8 
restructuring program, between 2007 and 2008 Airbus workers set various strikes and work 
stoppages in France and Germany to protest the program and the plans for job cuts and plant 
closures. Table 4.4 shows this conflict and other conflicts happened between Airbus workforce 
and management since the early 1990s. Concerns over job security are also growing. For 
example, IG Metall, the strongest labor union of Airbus from Germany, tries to include clauses 
over job security and flexible practices each time during negotiations over collective 
agreement. Job insecurity is one of the biggest shared issues for Airbus and Boeing employees 
in comparison to differences in other areas of industrial relations.  
                                                          
47 “EADS establishes European Works Council - Chairman and Co-Chairman elected”, EADS Press Release, 
November 8, 2000 
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Table 4.4: Chronology of workplace and contract conflicts and related issues at Airbus 
year event major concerns 
1989-
1990 
UK Engineering unions strike for 18 weeks for a shortened work week in major 
industrial sites including Airbus plants of BAe 
working week 
hours 
1990 
Workers of Aerospatiale stage a protest on the eve of a key Airbus Industrie 
board meeting expected to approve a transfer of production facilities for A321 to 
Hamburg from Toulouse 
relocation of work 
within Airbus 
partners 
1992 
About 163,000 metal workers including those of Deutsche Airbus stage walkouts 
in Germany to demonstrate solidarity with striking public service workers solidarity walkouts 
1995 
More than 1000 workers at the Airbus plant of Daimler-Benz Aerospace in 
Bremen walk off for several hours in solidarity with the IG Metall union 
metalworkers strike for pay rise solidarity walkouts 
1995 
Employees of Deutsche Airbus plants hold a one-day strike to protest against job 
cuts planned by Daimler-Benz AG job cuts 
1999 
Unions at Airbus Industrie call for a one-hour work stoppage in Toulouse to 
protest the management's policy on pay wages 
2002 
2,000 Airbus UK of the Deeside factory workers stage an unofficial walk out over 
pay and overtime freeze to save jobs wages 
2002 
Airbus Germany workers join to nationwide warning strike of several hours to 
pressure employers to heed their salary demands wages 
2002 
Unions at Airbus France organize a strike of several hours to press their claim for 
a bigger wage increase wages 
2004 
German union IG Metall stage stoppages across Germany between one and two 
hours in a pay dispute, targeting some 200 firms including various Airbus plants wages 
2006 
About 65,000 workers take part in warning strikes at 290 firms including Airbus 
Germany after wage negotiations with industry leaders in five German states 
broke down wages 
2007 
*25,000 Airbus Germany workers mobilize to protest job cut announcements to 
implement Power8 restructuring program (February 2) 
*Airbus plants in German towns of Varel and Nordenham stop work for the 
second day while 1,200 workers in the southern town of Laupheim rally against 
the planned sell-off of their factory (March 1) 
*Thousands of Airbus France, Germany and Spain workers stop work and staged 
rallies to protest against job cuts (March 16) 
*Thousands of Airbus UK workers stage an unofficial strike amid concerns over 
job cuts and disappointment surrounding poor results in a company profit-share 
scheme (March 23) 
*Thousands of Airbus France workers organize a strike in Toulouse to protest 
Power8's job cuts plan (April 3) 
*Airbus Germany workers at three Varel, Nordenham and Laupheim plants walk 
off the job to protest against planned restructuring measures (June 6) 
------- 
*Several hundred Airbus France workers down tools at factories in Toulouse over 
the lack of profit-sharing bonus (April 25) 
*85% of blue-collar workers of Airbus France Saint-Nazaire and Nantes plants 
hold a series of strikes for 2 weeks to protest inadequate profit-sharing bonuses 
(April 27 - May 11) 
job cuts, plant 
closures, 
divestments 
(Power8), bonuses 
2008 
*Several thousand Airbus France workers stage two four-hour strikes to protest 
at plans to sell two sites under Power 8 (April 24 and 29) 
*Several hundred employees of Airbus France stage a strike to protest at 
management's plans to transfer the activities of its Meaulte and Saint-Nazaire 
sites in France to a separate subsidiary (September 30) 
*Airbus Germany workers at Varel, Nordenham and Augsburg facilities stage 
wildcat strikes over plans to spin off the factories into a new subsidiary 
(November 20) 
job cuts, plant 
closures, 
divestments 
(Power8) 
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2009 
Around one hundred Airbus France, Saint-Nazaire workers stop work for less than 
two hours to warn the company for low bonus offered for 2009 (April 4) bonuses 
2010 
Unions at three Airbus plants organize rotating strikes for a total of 5 days on 
assembly lines to press demands for higher pay and oppose moves to shift some 
production to Germany (April) wages 
2011 
Airbus Germany workers set a one-day strike after negotiations broke down after 
a year and a half of efforts to reach a deal on a range of issues from an 
employment guarantee to a ceiling on the number of temporary workers that can 
be hired (October 7) job security 
2014 
Each time more than 1000 Astrium France workers stage four four-hour walkouts 
to protest management plans to lay off hundreds of employees due to Airbus 
Defense and Space restructuring (January 31, February 6, March 27, April 25) job cuts 
2015 
Workers of Airbus ex-subsidiary Cimpa from different cities of France stage a one 
day strike against company's plan to sell its subsidiary (January 29) divestments 
2015 
Country level walkouts organized by IG Metall in Germany to raise metallurgy 
workers' salaries as a pressure on continuing country level negotiations (January 
29) 
solidarity walkouts 
wages 
Source: Dow Jones Factiva 
In the Airbus collective agreement talks with employees are more formal and less prone to 
escalated conflicts and still represent national differences as contract negotiations are 
performed at the country level with national unions. A vibrant topic of collective agreements 
in each country is working time arrangements. Since its establishment as a standalone 
corporation in 1999, Airbus has utilized flexible employment practices regardless of the 
country of operation. Besides the changing working hours of full-time workers depending on 
rising and decreasing workloads, the company also promoted part-time and temporary work 
schemes and extensive utilization of contract work at company sites as part of its productivity 
measures. 
The relative success of flexible employment practices in crisis management in Europe and 
especially in Germany attracts many firms to resort to more precarious employment with 
important organization and representation hurdles for employees (Brinkmann and Nachtwey, 
2013). 
For Airbus, there are several forms of action to gain flexibility. Beside continuously increasing 
automation to reduce the impact of any labor imbalances, Airbus also changed the 
composition of its workforce through temporary contracts, on-site subcontracting, flexible 
working hours and increasing number of part-time workers. It has not yet resorted to any 
forced layoffs in its history as a standalone company since 1999, but it managed to deal with 
downturns through the elimination of all those nonconventional contracts and reducing the 
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working hours of its staff when necessary. This provided the company with greater flexibility 
and continuous revenue growth (8.1 percent CAGR between 2000 and 2014) which is far 
higher than its employment growth for the same period (3 percent CAGR). 
While the measures like flexible working hours have been negotiated between parties without 
major disputes, hiring more and more employees on temporary contracts and increasing on-
site subcontracting distress organized labor as it is seen as a direct threat to their existence47F48. 
Without any common measure of hiring, the company has continuously increased the size of 
its temporary and part-time workforce, especially for tasks requiring less complex skills both 
in Germany and France as a buffering mechanism to adjust employment levels during 
downturns and restructurings and to avoid redundancies. The degree of flexibility that the 
company reached in 2009 would have allowed it to reduce output by 20 percent without firing 
any full-time workers 48F49. In a similar vein, during the downturn in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
the company offered voluntary early retirement, part-time work with some compensation for 
non-worked hours, or for some employee groups a shift from full-time to part-time 
employment for a certain period of time (Igalens and Vicens, 2006) while Boeing laid of more 
than 50,000 of its employees during the same period as a result of after-merger restructuring 
and decreasing orders following 9/11 attacks in 2001. 
In Germany, where Airbus workers are represented by a single labor union but the level of 
temporary workers is enormously high compared to France, the company agreed to limit the 
ratio of temporary workers to the total workforce, stating they must not make up more than 
20 percent of the workforce on each German Airbus site between 2012 and 2015, and going 
down to 15 percent between 2015 and 2020 in exchange for commitments to predefined 
productivity increases which eventually means less labor required in the coming period for 
the same or even an increased amount of output 49F50. As a result, Airbus has been a direct 
beneficiary of rising flexible but increasingly precarious work schemes and the widening gap 
                                                          
48 “Airbus: la CGT dénonce la montée de l'intérim et de la sous-traitance”, Emmanuel Guimard, Les Echos, July 
12, 2005; “Airbus Nantes: les syndicats veulent plus d’embauches”, Élisabeth Bureau, Ouest France, May 30, 
2012 
49 “Leading the News: Airbus eases on the brakes to avoid a stall: Despite falling orders, jet maker tries to save 
suppliers, skilled staff”, Daniel Michaels, The Wall Street Journal Europe, April 6, 2009 
50 “Airbus Workers, Union Reach Deal, Jobs of 16,500 workers are guaranteed”, Agence France-Presse, October 
20, 2011 
213 
 
among different groups of workers in terms of job security in Europe and specifically in 
Germany. 
4.7 Conclusion of the chapter 
This chapter focused on the most controversial component of the systems integration 
business/productive model in terms of the complexity of institutional and organizational 
dynamics of work systems and their implications over the corporate governance mechanisms 
of two companies. It is the component where conflicting relations between stakeholders are 
the most highlighted and institutional interventions are the most visible. The enormous 
difficulty of measuring the degree of change in balance of power relations between the labor 
and the management within a comparison of two institutionally and historically different 
cases makes the component of the model highly complex and multi-faceted. Adding to this 
issue, the spread of the production activities and their management in Airbus across four 
different countries within Europe makes the comparative analysis even more difficult due to 
national differences in work-related norms, regulations and general practices. 
Nevertheless, the analysis above has shown that the organizational aspects of two companies 
are the most divergent in terms of their application and impact. It is a reminder highlighted in 
Chapter One that the context of the identification of a model are inherent in the 
transformations of competitive, macroeconomic and societal contexts either at national or 
global levels (Boyer and Freyssenet, 2000a). Degrading practices of work in the systems 
integration period are not equally highlighted in two companies and certain aspects of the 
model like leveraging over stakeholders to extract gains through managing required flexibility 
and conflict resolution have considerably different forms. 
Acknowledging these observations, after a brief discussion of the elements of analysis for 
organizational integration such as skill development, incentives, remuneration and any 
potential participation to decision-making and employee representation, the transformations 
of these elements in their historical context have been depicted. The dominance of the cost 
logic of the new era of industrial relations (treating employees as costs to be minimized) has 
been highlighted as an important component of new business models and the actions of 
Airbus and Boeing have been compared and contrasted. Contrary to fairly easy layoffs for 
Boeing as a quick solution to enable flexibility of work, different tools and mechanisms used 
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by Airbus have been detailed. As an integral element of such practices, the channels of 
communication between management and labor have been emphasized and the role of 
institutional frameworks facilitating or undermining these channels have been underlined. 
In the end, the main observation is a continuous redefinition of industrial relations highly 
structured by the power dynamics within the two companies. Management of both 
companies continuously try to modify work schemes and practices in line with work schedules, 
cost and market performance of their products. The adaptation of labor to these changes and 
their power to influence these modifications either during contract negotiations or any other 
time is structured to a large extent by national institutional contexts and power dynamics. 
One fully shared concern of the Airbus and Boeing workforces is job security. Its impact over 
the organizational integration will continue to be the main issue of the future course of 
commercial aircraft manufacturing on both sides of the Atlantic. In both cases, the ability of 
labor to have an influence over the decisions on the organization of production is conditioned 
by the degree of power of workers’ representation and participation despite institutional 
differences and their varying impact that may strengthen or undermine labor power in the 
long run.
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Chapter Five 
 
‘Finance’ component of Airbus and Boeing 
systems integration business/productive models 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The third element of the business/productive model framework is the extent of financial 
commitment that sustains the flow of funds required for new product development in the 
systems integration model. Next to this commitment, corporate decision makers also carry 
out certain activities to rearrange the distribution of value created through productive activity, 
expressed in financial terms. A coherent comparison of two companies can only be completed 
if these two points are identified. The similarities and differences in the degree of financial 
commitment required for innovation and capability development through the integration of 
strategy and organization, and the pursuit of financial objectives that may support or 
undermine this integration can only be conceived through such a comparative investigation.  
5.2 Finance of innovation 
To sustain the development of necessary technologies for superior products and the 
subsequent production process in manufacturing require high-cost investments of each type. 
Any business undertaking necessitates finance to keep itself afloat during the investment 
period until the time at which financial returns are generated through the sale of products 
(Lazonick, 2012). Decision makers of a company who control over the allocation of corporate 
resources have to guarantee the steady inflow of financial resources. These resources may 
either be generated through internal cash accumulated through the returns of previous 
investments, or bond and stock issues with favorable terms which also reflect previous 
achievements considering productivity and innovation. In addition, companies can also share 
some part of their product development and subsequent costs with their existing or potential 
partners; they may receive progress payments from their customers; or they may resort to 
governments for any form of subsidy to fund their productive efforts. 
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Financial commitment of corporate decision-makers and other stakeholders including 
governments is rather a condition than a proposition. It is the set of relations that ensures the 
allocation of funds to sustain innovation (Lazonick, 2013) and its level of significance is directly 
proportional to the magnitude of the investments in innovation bearing high uncertainty. The 
degree of commitment to different sources of finance may eventually condition the depth and 
the length of innovative efforts. 
Specifically, relevant to large scale corporation cases of this study, once a business becomes a 
going concern after it starts generating a steady stream of revenues, the most important 
sources of finance are retained earnings and retentions through depreciation allowances 
(O’Sullivan, 2000). These earnings are yielded by organizational capabilities businesses 
possess, and they finance their further growth (Chandler, 1990). 
While retained earnings are the major source of innovation finance for established companies, 
equity finance in the form of venture capital, private equity and the issuance of public equity 
can still be very important for young innovative firms. There is a strong link between such 
forms of finance and innovation which has been massively elaborated in the last decades by 
scholars from the US and other advanced economies. 
Together with the rise of R&D expenditures all over the world especially in most productive 
sectors of economies including manufacturing, finance of innovation has become a standalone 
topic of discussion, analyzed separately from ordinary investment like capital expenditures 
even though they are strongly interconnected especially for industries like aircraft 
manufacturing where both types of spending quantitatively and qualitatively follow each 
other closely. 
One distinct feature of innovation spending is the degree of uncertainty associated with the 
output. Standard finance theories may not work as long as the probability of future success of 
an R&D project cannot be fully estimated (Hall, 2009). Not only business analysts but also 
corporate decision makers may be misled by using methods of discounted cash flow (DCF) and 
net present value (NPV) to evaluate investment opportunities, underestimating the returns of 
investments in innovation. The present success of a company does not mean that it will persist 
in the future if the company, misinformed by these methods, does not invest in innovation 
(Christensen et al., 2008). 
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The last but not the least, government support in numerous forms including R&D tax credits 
can be an invaluable source of innovation finance not only for small firms but also for 
established ones as it was discussed in Chapter Two in the case of commercial aircraft 
manufacturing. And in many cases, the support does not appear at all in publicly available 
company statements or in government documents either for confidentiality reasons or the 
form of support is largely qualitative and not always measured like the use of government 
research labs, training of soon-to-be-hired future employees, current or even laid off staff by 
government programs, and the purchase of innovative goods and services by the government 
on favorable terms. 
However, commitment does not solely refer to the control over financial input to be spent for 
the sake of innovation. If providing and sustaining necessary funds for R&D and other 
investments is one side of the coin; the other side is the control over the benefits from 
innovation in the form of sales revenues and their distribution among stakeholders who 
participate in these efforts by bearing risk with their commitment. How firms retain and 
distribute their revenues is strictly related to the interests of groups who control the business 
strategies and organizational structures of firms. The question over the control of financial 
resources is one of the core issues of the transformations of corporate finance in the last 
decades. 
5.3 Recent historical context of the role of finance 
For the sake of simplicity, the discussion of the evolution of finance and its role in the 
accumulation of the productive activities of business firms is presented here as the discussion 
of the topics deeply elaborated by the financialization literature. 
Studied with a growing interest in the last two decades by scholars from a variety of 
disciplines, financialization became a convenient word to describe the rising importance of 
any financial tool, measure, motive or actor within the functioning of any economic activity. 
The impact of financialization can be extended to any act aiming to reap the returns of any 
investment through these tools and measures which also includes ideological and discourse-
based instruments. Depending on the extent of power that is to be exerted by a specific 
economic actor, the benefits and the perils of financialization is unequally distributed. 
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The rich literature on financialization investigated a variety of actors of economic activity 
including but not limited to institutions, households, nations and corporations as creators and 
users of financial resources. An overall discussion on the findings of these studies is beyond 
the scope of this study, however it is necessary to highlight the major elements of this 
discussion with a focus on the relation between financialization and corporate behavior, in 
other words financialization at the corporate level with its roots in business activity and the 
consequences for different actors involved. In any case, the financial systems of advanced 
economies exerted an important influence on the development of corporate structure in 
facilitating organizational transformations (Mowery, 1992). 
The roots of financialization can only be found within real economic or productive sectors 
where the value is created. The greatest success of twentieth century capitalism that gave it 
a renewed impetus for massive value creation was the managerial revolution which started in 
the US, the twentieth century leader of the world economy (Chandler, 1990). This successful 
model of capitalistic production stumbled with internal problems and the innovative 
competition coming through foreign economies especially in major consumer and capital 
goods sectors. Another impetus to reorganize the faltering value creation of the US economy 
was needed. A finance-led growth perspective was built in response to these productivity and 
profitability questions (Boyer, 2000). 
5.3.1 The myth, the discourse and the roots of financial motives 
The shift in managerial priorities along the transformation of global capitalism over the last 
four decades had direct implications for the utilization of retained earnings as the primary 
source of innovation funding for large corporations all over the world. Presented as an ‘agency 
problem’ by mainstream financial economists including Jensen (1986), as the main cause 
behind organizational problems of corporations or corporate governance, the conflict 
between shareholders (principals) and managers (agents) over the utilization of corporate 
resources. The ability of opportunistic agents controlling corporate resources to follow their 
own interests at the expense of principals could not contested by any market force (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976). As they have no contractual guarantee of rewards on investment, 
shareholders are assumed to be the only the residual claimants of the value created by 
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corporations and the aim of a corporation should be to maximize the return of shareholders 
(Batt and Appelbaum, 2013; Lazonick, 2013; O’Sullivan, 2009). 
Offered as a solution by economists known as agency theorists to the corporate management 
problems of the day, shareholder value creation gradually turned into a discursive construct 
independent of a firm’s productive performance (Froud et al., 2006). Turning into a principle 
of corporate governance first among Anglo Saxon corporations, it was also entered into 
discussion in Europe. In 1999, the OECD issued ‘The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance’ 
emphasizing that corporations should be run, first and foremost, in the interests of 
shareholders (OECD 1999, in Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000) and its similar tone has continued 
in the 2014-2015 review of the principles (Lazonick, 2015b). 
5.3.2 Shifting roles of actors 
Also connected to the proposed agency solution, another reaction to the problem of declining 
returns from productive investment was the shift of capital from production to financial assets 
in search of superior returns (Krippner, 2005). In effect, this shift was only possible through 
the acts of a specific group of shareholders; the institutional investor who was potentially 
capable of imposing collective power (Dobbin and Zorn, 2005; Morin, 2006; Williams, 2000). 
The imposition was through influencing the value of their own investments; corporate stocks 
and to facilitate necessary regulatory changes to render their activities eased and expanded 
together with other actors of the finance capitalism. The primary instrument these investors 
or other financial actors drew on was corporate bonds or stocks. Under the financialization, 
the grade of bonds and the value of stocks became the principal measures of corporate 
success and the means of value transfer. Starting with complete takeovers and corporate 
control to enhance ‘market value’ of corporations which was independent of their real 
productive or innovative success, the transfer continued in a more fundamentally through 
downsizing and distributing corporate resources and returns of productive activities (Lazonick 
and O’Sullivan, 2000). 
The discourse of returning the value back to shareholders was not only asked by academics or 
by institutional investors. Together with the orientation towards finance to foster value, 
specific actors like business or securities analysts further articulated the shareholder value and 
asked for fundamental changes in corporate strategy like selling off unrelated assets to the 
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core business and shifting investment decisions (Froud et al., 2006; Zuckerman, 2000). Some 
of them even gained executive positions to convince insiders to adopt their strategies 
(Fligstein, 1990). In early 1990s shareholder value was eventually specified as the capacity to 
meet security analysts' profit projections (Dobbin and Zorn, 2005). In describing the identity 
building efforts of these groups through narratives, Hansen (2014) says: 
“At least part of what made the financial sector’s rent-seeking activities successful 
was the narrative that enabled vested interests to perform a cultural capture, 
where decision-makers, analysts, and many others came to see the world in the 
same way as the financial industry. The result has been that policymakers and 
regulators have not lived up to the public’s expectations that finance would be 
properly regulated”. … 
To him, narratives are defined as: 
“[Narratives are] important instruments in this development because they co-
construct and legitimize regimes by framing the way we see the world. Narratives 
are not author-less discourses, but represent specific, powerful interests and make 
cultural capture by the financial sector of the political system possible”. 
These narratives, in effect, have been co-authored by stock-market analysts, business 
journalists and even by company CEOs (Froud et al., 2006). Key to them, some terms and 
indicators to be understood by the financial community as a whole. 
5.3.3 Reign of ratios – formulas of value maximization 
Beginning with 1990s, shareholder value and value-based management gained its full strength 
in the US and the UK. To form up a common language and to easily compare restructuring 
corporations, consultancy firms introduced their proprietary value metrics to measure the 
performance of a firm that may give insights for rapidly growing institutional investor 
community to provide them with a story of purpose and achievement. In the meantime, value 
management was complemented with corporate governance tools to control managers so 
that they pursue shareholder value (Froud et al., 2006) as the requirements to solve agency 
problems. The most commonly used metrics and ratios have been Economic Value Added™, 
Return on Net Assets, Return on Capital Employed and Earnings per share. The last one is also 
used intensively to set targets for executive compensation and encouraged further the 
management to implement larger share repurchase programs in order to improve its value. 
Executives themselves consider that EPS is the most crucial measure in financial reporting and 
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they are ready to forgo costly investments in order to deliver higher EPS figures (Christensen 
et al., 2008; Graham et al., 2006). 
As a result, the performance of companies all over the word is evaluated today with a handful 
of profitability and market ratios that measure companies’ success to use their assets to 
generate returns. The aim of a public company is to boost earnings while protecting the 
interests of shareholders in the form of valuable stocks and necessary returns in the form of 
dividends and share repurchases. Indeed, when the corporate success has been attached 
primarily to the share price performance, the primary role of stock markets became to deliver 
returns in the forms of dividends and share repurchases to principals. Such actions were 
accompanied with the rise in stock options and other share-based compensation methods. 
5.3.4 CEOs as principals 
When the rhetoric of shareholder value married with the corporate downsizing and 
distributing activity, the stage was also set for corporate executives. From now on corporate 
productive activities had to be aligned with the ultimate aim to maximize shareholder value 
and to deliver it. However, it was still managers’ duty to establish this alignment as long as 
they continue to hold strategic control and related decision making power over their 
corporations. For the mainstream principal-agent problem of shareholder value this was a 
paradox (Boyer, 2005) because the suggested monitoring mechanisms and incentive 
compensation policies to solve the problem failed to prevent executive entrenchment and 
excessive pay awards. On the contrary, the aim of alignment made firms award their 
executives with much greater compensation packages (Shin, 2012). As a result, with a massive 
shift from salaries to stock options, executive pay has risen exponentially (Boyer, 2005; 
Lazonick, 2014b; Martin, 2003; Shin, 2012) suggesting that ‘the power of managers has been 
more significant than the power of financiers’ (Boyer, 2005, p. 40). ‘They are politically savvy 
and resourceful enough to align their rhetorical positions and material interests with the new 
dominant discourse of the time’. (Shin, 2012, p. 555). 
Managers themselves became the major proponents of shareholder value and offered 
generous stock-based incentive packages in exchange of their critical service in corporate 
resource allocation and generating competitive advantage. At the end it was ‘a marked shift 
in the strategic orientation of top corporate managers in the allocation of corporate resources 
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and returns away from ‘‘retain and reinvest’’ and towards ‘‘downsize and distribute’’’ 
(Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000).  
5.3.5 The impact on expectations, culture, everyday life 
In the era of maximizing shareholder value, the success of a company is tied practically to its 
financial performance measured through increasingly metrics like quarterly earnings per share 
and the constant distribution of these earnings to its principals. Short-termism, however, is 
not only pertaining to executives. In pursuit of short-term gains, shareholders steadily load 
and unload their portfolios as long as they have no reasons to be concerned with the value-
creating success of the companies (Crotty, 2003). In return, companies should disgorge the 
cash to the shareholders through dividends and share repurchases diverting resources away 
from investments whose shareholder return is beyond the immediate horizon (Christensen et 
al., 2008; Salento et al., 2013). 
Short-termism or the changing perceptions over time and objectives are not restricted to 
corporate world. Throughout the period financial services were offered to groups who had no 
connections to elites living on stock market appreciations or other forms of financial returns 
(Erturk et al., 2007). The efforts of a diverse group of intermediaries to establish links between 
these groups and global financial markets have gained multiple forms and actions (Erturk and 
Solari, 2007). It became rather a cultural process driven by narratives that reshape social 
reality in line with the ideas of Wall Street and its collaborators which shaped the world in its 
own image by spreading the narrative of efficient markets, meritocracy and shareholder value 
(Hansen, 2014). 
5.3.6 Institutional & organizational change accompanied 
Financialization is linked to a wide array of changes in modern capitalism in the last quarter of 
the twentieth century and it cannot be considered to be independent of accompanying 
institutional and organizational changes within capitalist economies. But the idea, as the main 
aim of this thesis, should be a co-evolution of financial, institutional and organizational 
transformations rather than one’s power imposed on others even though the bulk of the 
literature over financialization starts with the change within the sphere of finance and its 
implications over other domains. Even though the great majority of these studies start with 
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the changing and ascending role of finance, there is still a need to shed light from different 
angles to highlight the accompanying rather than the determining role of finance. Fortunately, 
there is a considerable research effort that help to understand these underlying links between 
financial, institutional and organizational transformations. 
Organizational changes of corporate capitalism accompanied with financialization have not 
only had an impact on the structure of internal organization of firms. To foster shareholder 
value, corporations have to boost their profits to be distributed later in the form of dividends 
and share repurchases. In that respect, from a mainstream perspective, the age-old aim of 
profit maximization and increased competitiveness through the search of cost reduction 
opportunities is given a new momentum (Bryce and Useem, 1998). As a result, outsourcing 
and offshoring became integral parts of corporate business strategy beginning with 
transnationals but followed by small-scale firms as well. Increasing their profits with lowered 
costs through offshoring and international outsourcing, globalization of production also 
helped Western corporations to reduce the need for domestic reinvestment of profits, freeing 
earnings for financial transactions and raising shareholder returns (Milberg and Winkler, 
2010). Shifting bigger parts of production risks and investment needs to suppliers, outsourcing 
and offshoring through enlarged global value chains are increasingly justified by shareholder-
value ideas remanufactured at the corporate headquarters (Froud et al., 2014; Milberg, 2008; 
Sako, 2005; Sturgeon, 2008). The inter-firm dynamics have been adding further pressure on 
suppliers which are usually small and medium size firms to follow similar financial rationale. 
In the end, the entire value chain has to lean on similar ‘financially oriented rules’ (Salento et 
al., 2013). 
Such a direct link between shifting business strategies and changing financial motives renders 
industry and firm-level research highly valuable because it explores how firms reshape their 
productive organization through financial expectations and vice versa. However, also due to 
the lack of firm-level data on the monetary values of offshoring activities, their growth, and 
the extent of benefits they bring compared to the possibility of maintaining those same 
activities in-house, it is possible to quantitatively estimate the correlations among 
outsourcing/offshoring, earnings growth and shareholder value distribution. The increasing 
share of outsourcing in total costs can either be explained through rising outsourcing to 
suppliers or the productivity gains at home which reduce the share of internal labor costs. 
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Moreover, qualitative correlations between in-house and outsourced work refer to the 
difficulties of estimating the separate sources of productivity gains that result in higher 
earnings, especially given the limits of existing accounting methods to measure such gains. 
As stated earlier, a major impetus to financialization was the shift in management strategies 
from ‘retain and invest’ to ‘downsize and distribute’, especially in the US context (Lazonick, 
2015a; Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). The shift brought about an integral impact on the 
corporate governance with important implications for labor and employment (Lippert et al., 
2014). Corporate restructuring, downsizing and all types of cost reduction efforts originally 
stemmed from this shift, rationalized by shareholder value ideology (Batt and Appelbaum, 
2013; Froud et al., 2000; Fligstein and Shin, 2007; Salento et al., 2013; Thomson, 2003). 
Disconnected from established practices of industrial relations, the focus of corporate 
management has shifted towards the interests of shareholders (Thomson, 2003). This 
disconnection has had substantial implications on the incentives for the management to invest 
in skills and capabilities of their labor force, to engage in productive labor-management 
relations (Batt and Appelbaum, 2013). A growing body of research suggests a strong link 
between the emphasis on shareholder value and downsizing, restructuring and the gains of 
management over the rest of the workforce among US and UK firms (Froud et al., 2000; 
Goldstein, 2012; Jung, 2012) while their respective governments increasingly promote an 
‘equity culture’ and equity ownership (Dore, 2008). In the case of continental Europe and 
Japan, the impact of the shareholder-value perspective on the corporate governance and to 
some extent labor-union policy has been elements of social compromises, but, except in the 
UK, this impact was still limited at the beginning of the century (Dupuy and Lung, 2002; Jacoby, 
2008; Jürgens et al., 2000). 
As a summary of all these transformations represented in financial figures, Figure 5.1 provides 
the uses of funds represented in earnings before tax by non-financial corporations in the 
period after the World War II in the US. There is a marked shift in the early 1980s from the 
general trend. Even though capital expenditures had much higher levels compared to previous 
period, since the second half of 2000s they returned back to the level in 1970s. What is 
completely different from the period before 1980s is the persisting net negative values of new 
equity issues. This means that since the early 1980s, it is the corporations which funded the 
stock market through share repurchases in total, not the other way around (Lazonick, 2015a). 
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Again beginning with the 1980s, the proportion of dividends to profits before tax shifted 
upwards from ratios below 20 percent to the ones over 40 percent and as a form of finance 
net lending on average is insignificantly low since the early 1990s. The ratio of tax to profit 
before tax also reached historic lows in 2010s. 
Figure 5.1: Selected Figures of Nonfinancial Corporations in the US (Table F.102) as a 
proportion to total corporate profits before tax, 1946-2013 
 
Source: Historical Annual Tables of Flow of Funds, Financial Account of the United States 
5.4 Finance of innovation vs. Finance of shareholder value at Airbus and Boeing 
Contrary to the mainstream views and their application over last three decades, innovation 
and technology development require long-term commitment of all stakeholders who should 
collectively benefit from the returns to innovation in the form of goods and services with 
superior quality and lower costs. 
5.4.1 Sources of finance for innovation 
For a large corporation in global capitalism like Airbus or Boeing, the decisions on new product 
development and accompanying efforts over innovation process and productive 
reorganization do not just depend on the magnitude of internal and external funds and the 
control over them. The choices of decision-makers to retain corporate resources for 
reinvestment in innovation or, alternatively, distribute cash to shareholders are also decisive. 
The reconfiguration of these choices has had direct implications on the production processes 
and related business strategies of manufacturing industries all over the world. As stated, 
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corporate decisions which are primarily concentrated on cost-cutting and organizational 
restructuring have become integral to maximizing shareholder value ideology. Therefore, in 
order to understand the strategic orientation towards systems integration of Airbus and 
Boeing from the perspective of the association of financial commitment and strategic control, 
it is necessary to interpret the repercussions of this perspective on the commercial aircraft 
industry. 
The analysis should now focus on the commitment of stakeholders to invest in the 
development of productive resources and their utilization, and the distribution of returns from 
innovation among stakeholders by the executives who retain control over these returns. 
In commercial aircraft manufacturing, financial commitment is primarily about providing 
substantial amount of funds necessary to develop a new aircraft model which starts with 
preliminary conceptual design stage and may last until the point where, by attaining a large 
market share, unit costs of each aircraft become low enough for the profitability of the 
program. For companies large enough to be profitable in a sustained way like Airbus and 
Boeing, the primary source of finance is the retained earnings which are being generated 
through existing profitable programs. Shown in Figure 5.2, the operating cash flow of Airbus 
and Boeing is an indication to generate sufficient cash flow to maintain their operations 
including research and development and employment of its productive labor force more 
generally. Except for Boeing in 2008 due to substantial increase in inventories driven by the 
787 program, a consistently positive OFC to Sales ratio is observed for both firms during the 
periods when they were developing their wide body aircraft, helping them cover a large part 
of their investment costs.  
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Figure 5.2: Operating Cash Flow as a proportion of Sales at Airbus and Boeing 
 
Source: Company annual reports 
For public companies, another form of internal finance can be the capital increase through 
share issues. However, large industrial companies generally do not finance their activities by 
selling newly issued stock. To the contrary, in the last three decades, these corporations have 
funded stock markets through their share repurchases to be discussed below. In the case of 
Airbus and Boeing, except Airbus’ IPO in 2000 with a limited amount of common shares issued 
(a capital increase of only €1.5 billion), their equity finance is negative for the last 15 years. 
Hence any discussion that these companies require equity funding to finance innovation is 
groundless. 
Big or small, business firms may also resort to loans to finance their investment and other 
related activities until they reap the returns of their investment and pay back their debts 
Moreover, within the context of financialization, debt finance until a certain level was 
proposed as a disciplining measure for managers to focus on maximizing shareholder value 
(Batt and Appelbaum, 2013; Froud et al., 2000; Jensen, 1986) although a high level of long-
term debt compared to capital invested may also have a negative effect on investment as it 
increases financial fragility (Orhangazi, 2008). 
For very large firms like Airbus and Boeing, the need to finance their investments through 
long-term debt may sound logical considering the substantial amounts of funds needed to 
finance new product development during a program. In Figure 5.3, the year-to-year changes 
in long-term debt of Airbus and Boeing are compared. Contrary to the reasoning that these 
two firms might have been full debtors especially during the early years of new product 
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development, except the period Boeing developed its 777, both companies have been net 
payers of their existing debts while they were developing their airliners and burning big 
amounts of cash for their capital and R&D expenditures. For Airbus, the year-to-year change 
in its long-term debt is negligible for any production-related reasons even though the 
company resorted to European Investment Bank in its earlier programs which can be discussed 
under government support as these loans were criticized for being allocated at favorable 
terms. Only between 2011 and 2016 did the company receive €1.6 billion from the bank 
primarily to fund its R&D programs 50F51. Beside EIB loans, the company has continuously received 
government refundable advances for its development programs on a risk-sharing basis, paying 
them back from its revenue-generating programs with interest on pre-agreed rates. These 
loans have to be repaid to the home-country governments according to the success of the 
project. In the case of A340, its only unsuccessful program in terms of these advances, the 
company settled €406 million with respective governments in 2011, directly resulting in 
increased operating income (+€192) and net interest results (+€120) in the same year. In 2013 
(the last year Airbus detailed its European government refundable advances), A380, its 
double-decker which is still below the breakeven point, had refundable advances outstanding 
amounting to €3.6 billion to be repaid in the years ahead, if the A380 does not share the same 
fate (or worse) of the A340. 
For Boeing, the periods when it increased its debt were actually the years of instability due to 
different non-innovation reasons including merger-related expenses (1996 and 1997), abrupt 
declines in demand and inventory build-up (between 2000 and 2003), and delayed advance 
payments and mounting penalties for 787 to customers and suppliers (2009). As analyzed in 
Chapter Two, a major part of R&D finance of Boeing comes through unpaid/cancelled federal 
and state-level income, utility, sales and property taxes, NASA and DoD research contracts and 
capital expenditures sponsored by state governments.  
                                                          
51 “EIB reinforces its support of Airbus Group's innovation programmes”, EIB Press Release, March 8, 2016 
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Figure 5.3: Year-to-year change in long-term debt for Airbus and Boeing, current US$ in bill. 
 
Source: Capital IQ51F52 
5.4.2 Use of finance generated by innovation 
If the aim is to create value through financial commitment to fund required expenses and 
investments for innovation, the creation has to be complemented with the distribution of its 
returns to the parties who have committed their resources. However, when value creation is 
reduced to shareholder value creation in a financialized corporation, the ultimate aim of a 
public corporation is also equalized to maximizing shareholder value (Mauboussin, 2010). 
Beside stock price appreciation to increase capital gains, two main forms of maximizing 
shareholder value are the distributions in the form of dividends and share repurchases. In the 
last 20 years, especially in the United States, share repurchases became ‘systemic and 
massive’ and together with dividends they reached more than 90% of net income among large 
US corporations between 2003 and 2012 (Lazonick, 2014a). In Europe, they were also 
intensified after regulatory changes in late 1990s and early 2000s facilitating the share 
repurchase activity of large European corporations (Sakinc, 2012). Figure 5.4a shows that the 
main form of shareholder value distribution in Europe is common and preferred dividend 
payments. The extent of stock buybacks in Europe is still limited compared to the US as is 
shown in Figure 6.4b. Shown in Figure 6.4c, large European companies distribute as much as 
US companies on average when share repurchases and dividends are added together. The 
                                                          
52 Capital IQ provides harmonized numbers for financial values which are calculated through multiple items like 
long-term debt, free cash flow or EBIT and EBITDA. For comparison purposes, in cases where companies may 
calculate the value of the same item differently, Capital IQ numbers are used. In other cases, the values are 
directly taken from company annual reports  
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widening gap in 2014 can be explained by record high share repurchases by large US firms and 
the depreciation of euro against US dollar in the last two years.  
Figure 5.4a: Mean Dividends of US S&P500 (427) and European S&P350 (298) companies  
 
Figure 5.4b: Mean Share Repurchases of US S&P500 (399) and European S&P350 (302) 
companies  
 
Figure 5.4c: Mean Dividends + Share Repurchases of US S&P500 (399) and European S&P350 
(302) companies 
 
Source: Compustat and CapitalIQ databases and company annual reports  
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Representative of financialized US corporations, in the last two decades Boeing has also 
distributed large sums of cash in the form of share repurchases and dividends while Airbus’ 
distribution remained modest at least until 2013. As a proportion of cumulative net earnings 
in the period between 2001 and 2015, Boeing distributed 103 percent of its earnings while 
this ratio was 58 percent for Airbus also due to its not-so-unusual negative income figures in 
specific years during the same period. 
Figure 5.5a compares share repurchases of the two firms. For Boeing it indicates three periods 
of mass repurchases interrupted with two intervals of industry level and economy-wide crises. 
The last period, however, dwarfed the previous two periods in terms of the amount spent on 
repurchases. In the last three years the company has spent $15.5 billion on share repurchases, 
more than half of the total amount of $29 billion spent between 2001 and 2015 (or 64 percent 
of its net income). Figure 5.5b compares two companies’ dividend payments. Boeing is also a 
generous distributor of cash in the form of dividends to its shareholders. Between 2001 and 
2015, it spent a total of $17.5 billion on dividend payments (or 39 percent of its net income) 
with an increasing trend. The same trend is also valid for dividends per share amounts since 
the late 1980s. 
On the contrary Airbus’ shareholder value distribution does not follow any specific trend 
except the gradual increase in its dividend payments in the last five years. Since its IPO in 2000, 
the company distributed limited amounts of cash in the form of dividends and share 
repurchases. In the case of share repurchases, up to year 2013, the total amount spent on 
stock buybacks remained below the amount obtained through capital increases and option 
and warrant exercises. Only in 2013, as a result of the shakeout in share ownership through 
the exit of strategic shareholders Daimler AG and Lagardère SCA and a reduction in state 
ownership, the company administered a large share repurchase program and spent more than 
$2.6 billion. In the same year an Airbus executive, for the first time in the history of the 
company, defined the creation of shareholder value as the centerpiece of company’s 
strategy52F53. In May 2014, the board was authorized by the Annual General Meeting to 
repurchase up to 10 percent of company shares. The company started to buy its shares back 
only in late 2015. In addition to €264 million spent on share repurchases in 2015, the company 
                                                          
53 “Hedge Fund Urges EADS to Sell Dassault Stake”, The New York Times, August 5, 2013 
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spent another €320 million only in the period between January 1, 2016 and March 16, 2016. 
European Union regulations oblige companies to disclose daily amounts of shares repurchased 
and the amounts spent no later than the end of the seventh daily market session following 
the date of execution of such transactions (EC, 2003, 2016). The accounts of Airbus show that 
the company repurchased its shares on a daily basis since it started its buyback activity on 
November 2, 2015. Except on a small interval in the first week of March 2016, the company 
bought its shares back almost every single working day since November 2015. Airbus share 
price during the same period and especially in the last two months of 2015 reached a record 
high level. As discussed in the following section below, a late 2012 agreement among major 
shareholders and the board of the company has considerably changed the shareholding 
structure of the company. One of the most highlighted points by the CEO of the company was 
the intention of the company to launch a share repurchase program in the coming period.  
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Figure 5.5a: Share repurchases of Airbus and Boeing, current prices 
 
Figure 5.5b: Dividend payments of Airbus and Boeing, current prices 
 
Figure 5.5c: Total Payout of Boeing and Airbus (dividends + share repurchases), current 
prices 
 
Figure 5.5d: Dividends per share of Boeing and Airbus, current prices 
 
Source: Company annual reports  
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5.4.3 Share ownership structure and change 
The fact that the sources and uses of finance are principally decided through corporate 
governance practices of public companies, the characteristics of their ownership structures 
should also be questioned. The conditions under which companies like Airbus and Boeing 
undertake uncertain and expensive investments in technological development are also 
conditioned by the demands of public shareholders. 
To start with Airbus, the company had a momentous shareholder structure and governance 
change in 2013 after its board of directors and core shareholders agreed on it in late 2012. 
According to the agreement: 
-Present shareholder pact expected to be replaced by a normal company governance 
scheme 
-Daimler AG and Lagardère SCA to largely reduce their stakes, Germany and France 
intending to ultimately hold up to 12% each, Spain circa 4% 
-EADS intends to propose a share buy-back of up to 15% of outstanding shares – subject 
to market conditions and shareholder approval 
-Free Float of EADS shares should therefore ultimately increase from 49% to over 70% 53F54 
Figure 5.6a below shows the shareholder structure of Airbus during the period between 2004 
and 2015. Following the agreement, these two corporations, Daimler and Lagardère exited the 
company by selling their entire shareholdings on the market and the government shareholding 
also decreased to some degree in order to comply with the percentage caps decided by the 
agreement. The agreement put an ownership and voting restriction from crossing the 15 
percent threshold by any shareholder and more importantly, under the new governance 
scheme, no veto right is given to any group of directors or any shareholder individually or 
collectively. The French and German governments lost their rights to veto over strategic 
management decisions including acquisitions and launching new programs. Only certain rights 
of governments over national security interests are protected under the new scheme even 
though the governments will most probably continue to fund new product development 
efforts of the company as they always have. Such an important government function will also 
                                                          
54 “EADS Governance and Shareholding Structure Receives Far-Reaching Overhaul”, Airbus Press Release, 
December 5, 2012 
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have an influence on any decision over restructuring, investments across home countries, and 
reorganization of workforce. 
During the same period Boeing’s shareholding structure did not change very much. Ownership 
of parties holding one percent or more of Boeing shares oscillated around a combined total of 
40 percent in the last 12 years. The company’s voluntary investment for employees has held 
around six to seven percent of company shares in the last years even though it increased above 
ten percent of total shares during the financial crisis. Other shareholder groups such as banks 
and hedge funds do not have significant percentages of company shares. 
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Figure 5.6a: Airbus shareholding concentration between 2004 and 2015 
 
The categories other than ‘Public and other small shareholders’ represent the shareholders who held one percent or more of Airbus shares for 
at least one quarter since March 2004. The numbers in parentheses represented the numbers of shareholders in each category. 
Source: Capital IQ. 
Figure 5.6b: Boeing shareholding concentration between 2004 and 2015 
 
The categories other than ‘Public and other small shareholders’ represent the shareholders who held one percent or more of Boeing shares for 
at least one quarter since March 2004. The numbers in parentheses represented the numbers of shareholders in each category. 
Source: Capital IQ
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Figure 5.7a show that, as of December 2015, compared to 69 percent at the beginning of 2001, 
only 31 percent of Airbus shares are held by governments, employees and other insiders 
including executives and directors. The rest is held by a large group of small shareholders as 
well as other institutional investors. Figure 5.7b shows the large shareholders who hold more 
than one percent of company shares and the remaining small shareholders including general 
public. Immediately after the exit of strategic corporate shareholders in early 2013, traditional 
investment managers such as Capital Research and Management Company and Blackrock 
almost doubled their shareholdings. Many other asset managers who hold smaller amounts of 
Airbus stock also increased their shares in the same period. 
Figure 5.8a show that the dominance of traditional investment managers is also the case for 
Boeing shareholding structure. With over 60 percent of Boeing shares held by this group of 
investors in 2015, they constitute by far the largest shareholder group. As shown in Figure 
5.8b, large asset managers such as Capital Research and Management, Blackrock, Vanguard 
and T. Rowe Price are also largely present among Boeing’s shareholders.  
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Figure 5.7a: Types of Airbus shareholders with their proportion in December 2015, in % 
 
Source: Capital IQ 
Figure 5.7b: Major shareholders (>1%) of Airbus in December 2015, in % 
 
Source: Capital IQ  
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Figure 5.8a: Types of Boeing shareholders with their proportion in December 2015, in % 
 
Source: Capital IQ 
Figure 5.8b: Major shareholders (>1%) of Boeing in December 2015, in % 
 
Source: Capital IQ  
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5.4.4 The functions of the stock market for Airbus and Boeing 
The analysis so far has shown that in the case of Airbus and Boeing, the creation and cash 
functions of stock market formulated by Lazonick (2007) are not valid for either company. The 
creation function refers to the facility to provide finance for new ventures and the prospect 
of financial liquidity for financiers to exit at a later point in time. Even though Airbus did its 
IPO only in 2000, the main purpose was not to raise funds, and none of the companies issued 
shares on the stock market primarily to fund certain venture creation. The same is valid for 
the cash function of the stock market.  Neither of the companies resorted to the stock market 
to fund their new product development efforts in the last 20 years. 
Combination and control functions, however have different meanings for Airbus and Boeing. 
The Combination function enables a public company to use its own stock as a form of payment 
in mergers and acquisitions. Boeing utilized this function two times in its modern history when 
it acquired McDonnell Douglas Corporation and Rockwell’s aerospace and defense business, 
the first and third biggest acquisitions of the company, by issuing company stock to replace 
the acquired companies’ shares. During the same period, the company acquired five other 
companies with a value above $1 billion, using only cash. Airbus has never used this function 
in its history as a public company. The company, on the other hand, is exposed to the control 
function of the stock market. This function refers to the ability of the stock market to affect 
the concentration or fragmentation of shareholding by enabling the selling and buying of 
shares. As explained above, Airbus shareholding concentration has largely changed in recent 
years even though a board decision was still needed to agree on the change. Only after the 
agreement was signed did the shareholders act accordingly and sell their shares on the 
market. The change in control over the allocation of corporate resources was also decided by 
the agreement, with a limit of 15 percent on shareholding by each three governments and the 
cancellation of veto rights. 
The last function of the stock market is Compensation, and it is the only function strongly 
embraced by both companies. It refers to the use of a company’s own stock as a form of 
employee and executive compensation. Detailed in the previous chapter, stock options and 
awards have been increasingly used by both companies even though these modes of 
compensation are much more utilized by Boeing, not only for senior management and stock 
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ownership plans but also for many of its employees and their pension plans. The following 
section details the executive compensation practices of two companies. 
5.4.5 The compensation function and executive compensation of Airbus and Boeing 
One major argument proposed by corporations to perform stock buybacks is to offset the 
dilution from exercising stock options which are disproportionately granted to top executives 
and other employees as a form of compensation and conditioned to financial performance of 
the firm. Granting stock options has a long tradition in the US. But its boom in the 1990s 
marked a new era of executive compensation principally based on company stock (Monks, 
2005) and it supposedly helped to solve the principal-agent problem by aligning the interests 
of top management and shareholders. On the contrary, firms that appear to empower 
shareholder value by increased monitoring and incentive-alignment mechanisms pay systems, 
increased the CEO pay even more in the following periods (Shin, 2012). Moreover, the 
transactions and valuations are based on expectations of future real earnings and instead of 
providing an incentive for these managers to increase real earnings, stock-based 
compensation creates incentives to raise expectations of future earnings and then to sell the 
stock before expectations fall (Martin, 2003). Because so much of executive compensation 
comes from stock options, top executives have a strong incentive to take steps to avoid 
dilution of earnings per share, and can use share repurchases to offset dilution (Bhargava, 
2013). Thus the stock options and stock buybacks are inherently interrelated. Because the 
earnings per share is one of the most important metrics used for company valuations (and 
also for the determination of executive compensation), stock buybacks become the most 
powerful tool to keep stock prices and executive compensation levels high. High stock prices 
inflated mostly through unrealistic expectations created by company managers and circulated 
by financial advisors motivate executives to exercise options and sell their stock at these 
higher prices while they also administer large-scale stock buyback programs. Consequently, 
expenditures on research and development and long-term investments have been negatively 
affected by stock options share repurchases due to the lower funds available (Bhargava, 
2013). The relation between stock options and stock buybacks is also reflected in the 
difference between American and European corporations. According to an estimate 
comparing executive compensation in major corporations of the two sides of the Atlantic in 
the first half of 2000s, a top European executive holds options worth €1.3 million while the 
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amount of options a US executive holds worth €18 million. Income of a top European 
executive rises around €85,000 as a result of a one percent increase in company stock price 
versus €2.2 million for a US executive (Muslu, 2010). 
As a result, company executives and especially US executives have strong incentives to make 
decisions that have an impact on their companies’ stock prices as share-based incomes 
constitute a large part of their total compensation. Through extensive utilization of stock 
options and stock awards for compensation, executives became less aligned to other 
stakeholders’ interests and corporate productive success as their remuneration is mainly 
connected to financial success. Golden parachutes in the form of stock options and special 
retirement benefits show that they are becoming a distinct group who spend their time 
thinking about how to boost stock prices rather than keep the money and the people together 
to deliver new sources of value to customers (Lazonick, 2014a). 
In the case of commercial aircraft manufacturing, Figure 5.9a shows that for Boeing, the total 
number of stock options and stock awards granted to CEOs averaged around 3 per mil of total 
number of outstanding shares on average between 2000 and 2013. The same figure is around 
2 per mil for Airbus for the same period. Beginning in 2014, Boeing stopped granting stock 
options for its executives or employees and replaced them with performance awards for 
executives and performance-based restricted stock units for executives and eligible 
employees. Because of that, the 2014 grants only contain stock awards.  
Figure 5.9b compares the exercise of stock options/awards and vested performance shares of 
CEOs during the same period. It shows that the exercise of stock options by Boeing executives 
is quite regular while Airbus executives have exercised their options only during the period of 
2005 and 2006 which was actually the golden parachute for the outgoing CEO who was also 
accused of insider trading together with several other executives and previous corporate 
shareholders Daimler and Lagardère. In 2006 they sold their shares before the news of Airbus 
A380 delays was released but they were later cleared by France’s stock market regulator.  
The existing CEO of the company started to receive vested performance shares in 2010, and 
in 2013 and 2014 (after the shuffle in corporate governance), beside vested shares, he also 
exercised his stock options for the first time after the golden parachute exercises of the 
previous CEO.  
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Figure 5.9a: Proportion of stock options/awards granted to Airbus and Boeing CEOs 
 
Figure 5.9b: Number of Airbus and Boeing CEO stock options/performance shares 
executed/vested 
 
Source: Company annual reports and proxy statements 
While it should be taken very cautiously because of very different rules and regulations of 
different forms of executive remuneration, Figure 5.10 compares the total CEO remuneration 
of two companies for the same period.  
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Figure 5.10: Total CEO remuneration for Airbus and Boeing 
 
Source: Company annual reports and proxy statements 
5.5 Conclusion of the chapter 
This final chapter explored finance, the third component of the systems integration 
business/productive model proposed as an analytical framework of this study. Divided in two 
parts, the component was analyzed both through the two lenses of financial commitment, the 
first one that sustains the flow of funds required for new product development and the second 
one that pursues certain objectives that support or undermine the equal distribution of their 
fruits of the value created among stakeholders who participate in these efforts by bearing risk 
with their commitment. 
In order to detail the transformation of the financial objectives and motives which increasingly 
prevent corporations from keeping their side of any bargain with employees (Thomson, 2003), 
the concept of financialization as a systemic transformation in corporate governance and 
business activity within capitalist economies was discussed from its different (but interrelated) 
aspects. Its discursive character together with the changing role of certain actors involved in 
decisions on financial orientations were discussed. Its impact on the expectations of other 
segments of the society was highlighted and related institutional and organizational changes 
at macro and micro levels were elaborated. 
In the second part of the chapter, after identifying retained earnings and government support 
as the major sources of finance for innovation for Airbus and Boeing, their uses of finance 
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were put under the spotlight. The impact of the shareholder value paradigm was examined 
through their shareholder value distribution practices in parallel to the practices being 
followed by other large firms of their home country/region. After mentioning the role of 
changing corporate governance forms and related ownership structures, the five functions of 
stock market (Lazonick, 2007) are compared and contrasted. Lastly, the compensation 
function was detailed by comparing CEO remuneration practices of two firms and the varying 
degree of stock based compensation practices is highlighted. An emphasis is underlined on 
convergence potential of two firms in terms of their shareholder value distribution and 
executive compensation practices. 
Without any role attributed to the transformation of finance and work organization/industrial 
relations in executing these so-called systems integration strategies prevent any scholarly 
work from identifying distinct constructive and destructive processes of any 
integration/disintegration strategy.  
The general results of this research show that there is a strong correlation between extensive 
outsourcing, financialization of business strategies and conflicting employment relations.  
In the case of Boeing, while the company aims to reduce spending through outsourcing and 
increasingly conflicting labor practices, it has also extended its shareholder value orientation 
through dividends and stock buybacks and enlarged and diversified compensation 
mechanisms provided to executives and other high-ranking employees as means of value 
extraction. Financialization has deep roots in the company.  
Compared to Boeing, Airbus has followed a balanced strategy, mitigating conflicting interests 
up until the present day. Despite the facts that it outsourced 50% of its latest aircraft program 
A350 and divested several business units as part of cost-cutting programs, the tension with 
the workforce and distribution of corporate cash to shareholders has so far remained under 
control. However, its most recent discourse and practices provides strong evidence that a 
more financialized business strategy is on the way together with ever-rising concerns of the 
workforce over job security.  
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General Conclusion 
 
This thesis shows the interconnections between the three main elements of firm-level 
productive activity under modern capitalism, namely corporate strategy, organizational 
structure and financial commitment. The firm-level case studies in the thesis are Airbus and 
Boeing, the two biggest firms in the commercial aircraft manufacturing industry. Each 
productive activity is analyzed through the lens of the systems integration 
business/productive model framework developed in the first chapter. The latest 
transformations in corporate strategies, industrial relations, and financial actions of firms in 
advanced economies are briefly discussed before the application of the model framework to 
the two case firms through a comparative-historical approach. The study follows the work of 
Chandler (1962, 1977) and Penrose (1959, 1960) and more recently Froud et al. (2006) and 
Lippert et al. (2014) in presenting detailed historical accounts of business firms in action, in 
the form of a comparative case study laid out in its second part.  
Through this approach, the study also identifies the industrial dynamics of the most recent 
restructuring of aerospace and commercial aircraft manufacturing industries. The process is 
in general slow but it is profound and in many of the cases irreversible, such as the loss of 
Russian or Dutch aerospace capabilities in the last two decades, with neither national industry 
reaching their previous levels of integrated capacity of aircraft production. Depending on the 
featured role of technological or political-economic factors, the great transformations within 
the industry like the introduction of the jet era after the Second World War or the 
consolidation of the global aerospace industry after the end of the Cold War are rare but 
decisive points in the history of aviation.  
In contrast to the technology literature which understands systems integration as a new form 
of capability to address the development and production of more complex and high-cost 
products having a systems character in the sense that they involve multiple technologies and 
collaboration between a large number of organizations (Hobday et al., 2005; Prencipe et al., 
2003), this thesis investigated systems integration as a business/productive model which has 
important strategic, organizational and financial attributes. The nature of the systems 
integration orientation of both firms in the last two decades not only defines their 
248 
 
reorganization of R&D and production activities in technology intensive industries, but also 
has important organizational and financial consequences. With a conceptual framework based 
on the productive models approach of the Regulation theory and the theory of innovative 
enterprise proposed by W. Lazonick, this study identifies distinct constructive and destructive 
processes of integration or disintegration strategies followed by Airbus and Boeing, with 
important roles attributed to the new orientations in finance and work organization/industrial 
relations in executing these so-called systems integration strategies. 
The results of this research show that there is a strong correlation between extensive 
outsourcing, financialization of business strategies and conflicting employment relations. 
Outsourcing more than 70% of its latest innovation program B787 and aiming to keep capital 
expenditures and R&D costs under control, Boeing has been exerting pressure on its 
employees through recurring layoffs, relocation and cuts in employment and post-
employment benefits. Job security has become the most important concern of the workforce 
and the reorganization of new product development extends tensions between the 
management and workforce. While the company aims to reduce spending through 
outsourcing and tightening labor practices, it has also extended its shareholder value 
orientation through increased dividends and share repurchases as well as stock options 
granted to executives and other high-ranking employees as means of value extraction. 
Financialization has deep roots in the company. Compared to Boeing, Airbus has followed a 
balanced strategy, mitigating conflicting interests up until the present day. Despite 
outsourcing 50% of its latest aircraft program A350 and divesting several business units as a 
part of its cost-cutting programs, the tension with the workforce and massive distribution of 
shareholder value have so far remained under control. However, its most recent discourse 
and shareholder value distribution practices provide some evidence that a more financialized 
business strategy is on the way. The concerns of the workforce over job security are also on 
the rise. 
Evidence detailed throughout the study suggests that systems integration à la Boeing and à la 
Airbus are harmful to their long-term competitive capabilities, and neither of them is immune 
to the perils of financialization and deteriorating employment practices. The future course of 
their actions will have important implications for the future of aerospace and commercial 
aircraft manufacturing in their home countries. 
249 
 
Summary of the Findings 
The introductory chapter laid out the structure of the thesis with the identification of the 
general problem addressed, how and why the comparative analysis of Boeing and Airbus was 
chosen, the theoretical approach that has been deployed, and the methodological positioning 
with an argument on how a comparative historical perspective integrates theory and history. 
The first chapter provided the general theoretical perspective utilized for the industrial and 
firm-level analyses performed in the following chapters. Innovation was identified as an 
organizational engagement that should be described in terms of the emergence and diffusion 
of different organizational forms of productive activity and their corresponding management 
forms. After a brief discussion of the organizational foundations of innovation highlighted by 
the economics and business literature of the last twenty years, organizational capabilities 
were identified as firm-specific enablers of innovation. To develop and employ these 
capabilities, the business enterprise, the main actor of productive activity in modern 
capitalism, requires a framework for generating a surplus and reinvesting or redistributing it. 
The process has to be identified through a certain methodological perspective and in the 
following sections of the chapter, the business literature and productive models framework 
of the Régulation school were identified in order to construct an analytical model to be used 
for the case study research in the second part of the thesis. With the help of the theory of 
innovative enterprise developed by W. Lazonick, the systems integration business/productive 
model was proposed as a specific way of interaction of certain generic activities in commercial 
aircraft manufacturing during a specific period which becomes the dominant pattern for 
business activity at the global level. 
At the end of the chapter, the historical course of systems integration as a productive activity 
and its capability-based discussion made by technology scholars were discussed. Finally, the 
reasoning for the proposition of systems integration as a business/productive model was 
explained, and the general research framework was presented. 
The second chapter was focused on the industrial characteristics of aerospace and commercial 
aircraft manufacturing and their evolution. After a brief description of the industry and its 
major actors in terms of their growth dynamics and shareholding structures, with remarkable 
similarities and differences between these actors in distinct geographies, the main features of 
250 
 
the industry were discussed with a focus on the latest transformations at the industry level, 
with detailed descriptive information provided. The last section of the chapter is devoted to 
the role of government support as a dominant feature of aerospace and commercial 
manufacturing, fully influential in the emergence and the growth of the industry throughout 
the world. After a brief historical background of the role of government in the development 
of the aerospace and commercial aviation, the rest of the discussion was focused on trade 
conflict in commercial aircraft manufacturing between the US and Europe since the 1980s. 
The US and EU governments and their top aerospace companies Boeing and Airbus have long 
been blaming each other for providing and receiving large amounts of government subsidies, 
some part of which have been proven to be illegal by the WTO after an investigation which 
lasted more than ten years. It was shown in this chapter and in the next part of the thesis that, 
despite these WTO-level decisions, both companies continued to receive subsidies in a 
quantitatively and qualitatively increasing manner. The current subsidies provided by different 
forms of government not only have provided larger amounts of funding in the context of ever 
increasing costs of product development programs, but also have taken multiple forms in 
helping firms to sustain their productive activities and increase their competitiveness. 
The second part of the thesis was devoted to discussion of the three fundamental elements 
of the systems integration business/productive model of Airbus and Boeing. Each one of three 
chapters focused on one pillar of the model embraced by the two firms, with marked 
similarities and differences. 
The third chapter of the thesis was on the comparison of the strategy component of the 
systems integration model at Airbus and Boeing. It provided a detailed overview of the 
corporate strategies of the two firms with a focus on their latest product development 
programs. The comparisons on the two companies’ knowledge bases, investments, 
expenditures on research and development, and collaborations with other actors of 
aerospace and commercial aircraft manufacturing show that the systems integration and 
focusing on core competences strategies are switched on and off as they are determined by 
the companies’ broader aims that can only be analyzed within a business/productive model 
framework. The companies usually extended their knowledge base beyond their core 
competencies in line with their corresponding capital investments. There is equally relevant 
evidence of integration and disintegration continuously shifting their boundaries. 
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Nevertheless, there are marked differences between the two companies such as greater 
global extension of Airbus in the form of joint ventures, research and technology centers 
compared to Boeing’s extensive outsourcing and other forms of program-based partnerships 
with global aerospace companies. Moreover, Airbus’ investment in its commercial programs 
knowledge base has been much greater compared to Boeing, expressed in extensive patent 
applications and capital investments in the last two decades. 
The main claim of this thesis is that an analysis that is strictly based on corporations’ business 
and technology strategies is insufficient to give a clear picture of the orientations of their 
broader productive activities. For this reason, the thesis proposes the business/productive 
models analytical framework which focuses on not only the strategies related to technology 
development and supply chain organization but also the industrial organization of the 
companies investigated and the degree of their financial commitment to support innovation 
as a whole. The framework, different than the technology and business strategy literatures, 
includes organizational and financial components. As a result, the strategy component of 
these two companies’ business/productive models were complemented with the research on 
their organizational and financial structures that is available in the fourth and fifth chapters of 
the thesis. 
The fourth chapter on organization discussed the organizational dynamics of the work systems 
of the two companies and their implications over their corporate governance mechanisms. 
The organization element of the systems integration business/productive model is the 
component where conflicting relations between stakeholders are the most highlighted and 
institutional interventions are the most visible. It is also the component where the differences 
between the two companies in terms of their employee-employer relationships, industrial 
relations and the means and forms of conflict resolution are the most prevalent. Nevertheless, 
whether the forms of negotiation, employee representation and workers’ participation in 
decision making widely differ, the two companies have shared aims to increase productivity, 
to maintain flexibility of work for production downturns and to relocate work due to internal 
restructuring efforts. To do so, they continuously try to modify work schemes and practices in 
line with work schedule, cost and market performance of their products. Concerns over job 
security and the employee benefits are shared issues for both companies’ workforce. In both 
cases, the ability of labor to have an influence over the decisions on the organization of 
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production is primarily conditioned by the degree of power of workers’ representation and 
participation despite institutional differences. 
The final chapter was on the comparison of the degree of financial commitment at Airbus and 
Boeing and the differences and similarities in their approaches to value creation and value 
extraction. The comparison was made in the light of the recent transformations in financial 
motives and objectives of business firms and in corporate finance which was discussed around 
the financialization concept introduced and developed mostly by heterodox scholars in the 
last two decades. 
The comparison was made in two parts. First the sources of finance in developing a new 
aircraft were identified. Second, the uses of finance of two companies were compared and 
contrasted in terms of their shareholder value distribution practices and their uses of the 
functions of stock markets. Between the two firms, there is a slow but gradual conversion in 
terms of extensive shareholder value distribution through dividends and share repurchases, 
and increasing stock-based compensation for their CEOs and other top executives.  
To repeat, general results of this research show that there is a strong correlation between 
extensive outsourcing, financialization of business strategies and conflicting employment 
relations. In analyzing these so-called systems integration strategies, one has to identify the 
role of the transformations of finance and work organization/industrial relations in the last 
three decades and their implications over specific business firms in order to explore distinct 
constructive and destructive processes of any corporate strategy. 
Implications for Policy and Corporate Governance 
While the developments of the previous period turned the commercial aircraft manufacturing 
into a global duopoly in civil aircraft segments and an oligopoly in defense aerospace, the 
future is set for another global overhaul of commercial aircraft manufacturing and aerospace. 
In that context, the future of Western aerospace is strongly linked to the future of general 
Western industrial and manufacturing success. The increasing role of the product markets 
such as the rise of Asian markets, colossal costs of product development, the massive 
knowledge base required and technological and organizational skills for ever complex 
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products, make the long-term future of the industry in the US and Europe even more 
uncertain. 
Detailed in the Appendix of this thesis, the worries over deindustrialization in the West recall 
the bygone debate on industrial policy. On both sides of the Atlantic the disinterest of policy 
makers and scholars since the early 1980s (Francis and Pevzner, 2006) largely disappeared 
with the heated debate over deindustrialization during the global financial crisis. The critics 
over the failure of national policies on industry or their nonexistence brought about open calls 
for a new generation of industrial or macroeconomic policies (Atkinson, 2012; Bertrand et al., 
2012; Ezell and Atkinson, 2011; Gaffard, 2013; MIT, 2013). 
The analysis in the second chapter on the role of government shows that government support 
has rendered aerospace industries of the West immune to the rapid fall in manufacturing in 
the last three decades. The multiplication of the forms of government support shows that 
policy inaction to support manufacturing is not valid in the case of aerospace and commercial 
aircraft manufacturing. Government support is one of the major reasons behind the success 
of the industry in terms of innovation and economic value added provided to the national 
economies. However, besides any form of financial support to be granted to national firms 
and regulatory changes, as a response to the aging aerospace workforce highlighted in the 
fourth chapter, strong attention must also be given to the training of a new generation of the 
workforce capable of developing and handling new technologies. The mounting concerns of 
industry experts, government representatives and the informed public for the future of 
aerospace in the US and Europe, and the lack of integrated consensus to guide industrial 
policies and programs, call for new business models to promote a healthy transition to the 
development and utilization of next-generation aerospace technologies. As an example, 
industry-specific policies at the national or regional levels must address the ongoing 
internationalization of the industry, which will further reduce the ratio of aircraft exports to 
imports for manufacturing countries. The ratio has already decreased from 95 percent in the 
1960s to 55 percent in 2000s in the case of the US (Fingleton, 2005). 
Moreover, other major challenges of aerospace including but not limited to growing 
commercial air travel, rising consumption of oil-based fuels, increased congestion of air traffic 
control systems, over-capacity of airports and the introduction of new air transport vehicles 
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like drones will only be answered through further application of new technologies together 
with corresponding policy framework and business action. Mounting needs for ever safer, 
more reliable and more efficient aircraft have not so far forced OEMs to radically change their 
design, research and manufacturing platforms. However, Western OEMS are usually at the 
edge of the technological frontiers of their existing platforms, and the new models which will 
appear the earliest in late 2020s should incorporate not only radically different technologies 
but also a new industrial structure shaped by an ever stronger competition of multiple OEMs 
and a new supply chain structure. For new entrants, capabilities that help to manage the 
transition process from design to production (Mowery, 1988) as well as from production to a 
safety operation record to convince more airlines, especially foreign ones to buy new models 
they have never used are the most important elements of commercial success. Another 
question is to construct one’s own supply chain which necessitates substantial organizational 
capabilities both inward and outward. The issue, different than before if independent entry 
would be feasible or not (Mowery, 1990), is to organize one’s own authentic systems 
integration. 
The sustainability of Western industrial and manufacturing success cannot solely depend on 
the extend of government policy and its effectiveness in supporting sustainable industrial 
growth. No innovation or industrial policy can be successful without concordant corporate 
practices focused on innovation and capability development. The widening gap between 
public policies to preserve productive capabilities of national economies and the corporate 
strategies can only be reduced with sound corporate actions which have to move away from 
practices shaped by the financialized and value extraction logic of the shareholder value era 
of the last three decades. These actions should help corporations to maintain high-end, high-
productivity manufacturing that in turn sustains high-wage employment opportunities that 
can keep Western national economies prosperous. Corporations should have a long-term 
agenda to promote innovation, creation of new skills, career development or on-the-job 
training in order to protect the long-term interests of stakeholders against the short-term logic 
of value extraction. Cost-cutting has to be redefined in order to distinguish productivity 
increases through the efforts of workforce and other stakeholders from unmatched leverage 
of corporate managements to accomplish shareholder-value maximization goals. Finally, the 
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risk-reward balance has to be reestablished in favor of the economic actors who make 
contributions of effort and money to the innovation process (Lazonick and Mazzucato, 2013). 
The dead ends of excessive CEO pay, lack of corporate accountability, and misaligned interests 
of different stakeholders drag Western companies into vicious circles of the loss of 
competitiveness, faltering capability development and innovativeness in the long-run. 
Contrary to the mainstream statements which put stock markets together with stock buyers 
and sellers at the center of the economic value of governance efforts (OECD, 2014), a broader 
agenda reframes the purpose and obligations of corporations so that they also take into 
account interests of stakeholders other than just shareholders (Lazonick, 2015a; Palley, 2007). 
Only a combination of sustainable business practices and government policy can enable the 
conditions to sustain high-productivity with high-wage employment opportunities. 
As Boorer et al. (1969) stated more than 40 years ago: 
“Historically each succeeding step in aeronautical engineering or advance in the 
state of the art has taken longer from its conception to commercial application. 
The technical jumps have progressively become greater and from the early 
pioneering adventures the whole air transport industry has become a sophisticated 
business, dependent on cost effectiveness”. 
However, the audacity of humankind throughout the 20th century beginning with the Wright 
Brothers’ successful flight and the educating failures of many other aviation enthusiasts has 
now become restricted to corporate decision-making increasingly motivated by financial 
returns. Yet societies are in need of more efficient, cleaner and less costly air transport as they 
need more innovative drugs, safer and ethical food sources, and a better livelihood. Today’s 
efforts to research and develop new technologies will determine the character of the 
livelihood in future decades which basically depends on the current level of investments in 
education, training and career development of younger generations. 
Limitations of the research 
The major limitation of this study originates from the dynamic character of the subjects 
analyzed, which are the industrial dynamics of commercial aircraft manufacturing and the 
relation of innovation dynamics to the strategic, organizational and financial orientations of 
business firms. The topics investigated in the last three chapters had to be updated regularly 
during the course of the thesis research and some findings would have been substantially 
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different if the study had ended a couple of years ago or they might have been changed if it 
had been continued for several more years. As an example, when the patent data was first 
analyzed in early 2012, there was a large gap between Airbus and Boeing in terms of research 
in specific areas of aerospace and commercial aircraft manufacturing. But Boeing rapidly 
closed this gap in the last two years (2014 and 2015) with a reorientation of the company 
towards specific research in these areas. Similarly, the role of government support to 
commercial aircraft manufacturing continues to evolve in different directions, steadily 
nurturing the never-ending trade war between Airbus and Boeing. The extent and the 
implications of different support mechanisms are research topics that should be regularly re-
identified and updated. 
As expressed quite regularly throughout the thesis, even though the industry evolves slowly, 
it still contains a vivid dynamism marked with a constant change of interrelations among 
different stakeholders including governments that are involved in this productive activity. 
The analysis on suppliers presented in the chapter on business strategies of Airbus and Boeing 
was not deepened from the perspective of the suppliers. While the collective and cumulative 
character of innovation was highlighted by the increasing workshares of major suppliers in 
latest programs of Airbus and Boeing and by the role of these two OEMs in contributing the 
capability development efforts of suppliers, the efforts of suppliers were not detailed. 
Suppliers’ efforts to meet the stringent requirements of OEMs and their cost-cutting efforts 
expressed in continuously decreasing component prices have to be analyzed through a 
supplier-centered research framework which also highlights the competition among suppliers 
to win contracts from OEMs for their new aircraft development programs. These new 
contracts are the main instruments for suppliers to upgrade their technological and 
organizational capabilities. In addition, only through supplier-side research can OEM 
strategies to maintain a certain level of competition between suppliers in order to have access 
to latest technologies with favorable prices be revealed. 
Another important limitation connected to the dynamism of the industry and firm-level 
research is the lack of updated qualitative data on industrial relations at the industry and 
company level. The impact of the systems-integration orientation on shop-floor dynamics with 
potentially varying differences in company sites and plants in different cities, regions or 
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countries could not be explored from a labor-studies perspective. As a result, the study suffers 
from a lack of micro-level identification of organizational integration at shop floor, and hence 
cannot determine whether the systems integration business model has changed the set of 
relations that creates incentives for people to apply their skills and efforts to strategic 
objectives (Lazonick, 2013). The study only identified the broad contours of industrial relations 
at Airbus and Boeing highlighted by increasing concerns of job security and limited 
communication between the workforce and management with marked differences between 
the two firms. The lack of in-depth knowledge of shop-floor dynamics prevented the research 
from clearly defining the sources of similarities and differences between the two firms in 
terms of applying organizational integration to reach economic prosperity for the workforce 
and superior innovative performance of the company. 
Future Research 
This thesis focuses on commercial aircraft manufacturing as a specific industry, and a specific 
business/productive model embraced by the two major firms of the industry with noteworthy 
similarities and differences. Although it has a restricted focus, its integrated perspective with 
a focus on multiple aspects of productive organization and industrial dynamics contains a rich 
potential to be extended in different directions. 
First of all, the research on aerospace and commercial aircraft manufacturing can be extended 
to the investigation of the development paths of supplier firms and the degree of their 
potential to upgrade. Similar to the business/productive models framework proposed in this 
study to inquire into the implications of the systems integration models of Airbus and Boeing 
and the tensions it has created between innovation and financialization; comparative analyses 
of suppliers can be done through a similar business-model framework. The models can be 
developed for supplier firms with a focus on specific groups like suppliers performing in similar 
business segments, suppliers in a specific region or suppliers having different customer groups 
like single or multiple number of OEMs (Airbus, Boeing, Bombardier, Embraer, COMAC) or 
other tier-1 suppliers serving OEMs. Besides a comparative analysis of their financial 
structures and their access to finance, including funds provided by governments, through a 
qualitative methodology the interrelated dynamics between the access to finance, the 
development of their skill bases and their upgrading potential and increased bargaining power 
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vis-à-vis tier-1 suppliers or OEMs can be compared and contrasted. Their growth prospects 
can be revealed by looking at their capability development efforts, empowered by continuous 
access to finance and gradual development of their skill bases. The role of government support 
can also be further investigated in detail with a company focus. Such a research agenda can 
also address another limitation of this study: the diversity of suppliers in terms of their 
industrial activity. Some of these suppliers are subject to technological and organizational 
dynamics of other industries (other than aerospace) and their innovative capabilities may 
largely be affected by different industry-specific dynamics. 
In aerospace and commercial aircraft industry, another study can be focused on the rising 
competition mentioned in the chapter on industrial dynamics. It has become more evident 
that the capabilities of Western aerospace are going to be challenged due to an industry 
reorganization structured by the dynamics of increasing technological change, globalization of 
production, the emergence of new centers of aerospace, and corresponding evolution of 
corporate governance. Thus a comparative-historical analysis similar to that performed in this 
thesis can be extended to a global comparison of rival aircraft manufacturing companies in 
smaller commercial aircraft segments, namely Airbus (Europe), Boeing (USA), Bombardier 
(Canada), Embraer (Brazil), COMAC (China) and UAC (Russia). Again with a comparative 
business model methodology, the dynamics of world commercial aircraft manufacturing can 
be investigated. The research should also incorporate an institutional comparison which 
elaborates the differences of national innovation systems, financial commitment of national 
industrial actors and the impact of international collaborations on the innovative capabilities 
of OEMs. Such a research agenda could also include an international comparison of twenty-
first century government support in aerospace and aerospace industrial policy which are 
gradually unfolding in different directions. Moreover, the research can also be extended to 
the comparison of the space programs of these countries and regions reflecting the rising 
competition in the development and deployment of launch vehicles, spacecraft and other 
spaceflight vehicles including space probes. Related developments in regulatory frameworks 
can also be investigated. 
Last but not least, the continuing research on multiple dynamics of aerospace and commercial 
aircraft manufacturing industries can also be part of a broader research agenda on the 
evolution of firms and industries in the twenty-first century within the context of specific 
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institutional conditions. The business/productive model methodology which integrates theory 
and history, with a focus on industry-specific attributes such as systems integration elaborated 
in this thesis, can be extended to the analysis of other industries to enable intra-industry 
comparisons and the diversifying impact of trans-industry phenomena like financialization on 
distinct geographies.  
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Appendix 
 
The Fall of Manufacturing in the West 
 
This appendix was prepared to extend the initial discussion introduced at the beginning of this 
study around the dynamics of long-term success in commercial aircraft manufacturing in the 
US and Europe towards a general overview of the state of manufacturing in Western 
economies. 
It is widely accepted fact that manufacturing industries are key drivers of innovation. They 
account a great majority of company R&D spending in developed economies (EC, 2012; 
Tassey, 2010). A big part of product and process innovations are also realized within 
manufacturing (Boroush, 2010) and the manufacturing industries are especially engaged in in-
house R&D in the case of process innovations (Eurostat, 2013). 
In addition, manufacturing firms employ a much bigger ratio of engineers and other 
professional and technical employees compared with many other sectors of the economy and 
they are the leading source of employment with better-paid jobs for both highly educated and 
non-college-educated workers (Eurostat, 2013; Ezell and Atkinson, 2011; Levinson, 2012). 
Manufacturing is also a key enabler of national economic strength. With very high 
employment multipliers, it provides the conditions to have a vibrant national economy with a 
globally competitive traded sector. It is still the largest traded sector of the United States 
economy (Atkinson et al., 2012) and 75 percent of EU export comes from manufacturing (EC, 
2012). 
Descriptive statistics show the slowdown of manufacturing for almost every advanced 
economy of the West. However, the stark differences among these economies in detailed 
aspects of manufacturing capacity and the swift expansion of Chinese manufacturing capacity 
in relation to other major economies entail further discussion over the significance of 
manufacturing for any dynamic economy in the pursuit of sustainable growth. 
The rapid decline of manufacturing in the US and in several other developed economies in the 
last decade escalated the concerns about the future of manufacturing in the industrialized 
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world. In the case of the US, reasons proposed by scholars beyond the mainstream 
explanations of deindustrialization around impact of productivity growth and international 
competition (Lawrence and Edwards, 2013; OECD, 2007; Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, 1998; 
Rowthorn and Wells, 1987; ) include extensive outsourcing (Pisano and Shih, 2009), rising 
international trade (Boulhol and Fontagné, 2006), increased Chinese exports (Autor et al., 
2013), establishment of permanent normal trade relations with China which eliminated 
uncertainties over potential trade restrictions and contributed to the rapid rise of exports of 
this country (Pierce and Schott, 2012) and the failure of investment and industrial policy 
(Atkinson et al., 2012) or the gradual elimination of it (Wade, 2012). In Europe, in addition to 
concerns similar to the US, several other structural but market-specific reasons are also 
addressed including inefficiencies due to the underdevelopment of an intra-European market 
or difficulties to access to energy and a better business environment in general (EC, 2014). In 
the face of such inefficiencies and other problems with coordination, barriers to growth 
further increase the potential differences in national and regional economic performance 
across Europe (Gaffard, 2013). 
As the economic activity is primarily about resource allocation and the decisions taken over 
the resource allocation impose immediate consequences on working age population, the 
major concern is the ability of the economic sectors to provide opportunities for the workforce 
to upgrade or maintain their welfare standards with their existing jobs. However, many of the 
international statistics used for comparative purposes are unable to show the worsening 
trends for Western manufacturing in terms of welfare, skills or career opportunities for 
manufacturing labor and the contribution of the sector to the general welfare of the nation. 
A description of the degrading productive base of the West has to rely on the macro-level 
data, mostly incapable of giving details where the devil is generally hidden. 
Even though the available statistics to measure the qualitative and quantitative aspects of 
deindustrialization are not very suitable for international comparisons, this section presents 
existing descriptive numbers in order to show the divergent and convergent trends among 
different economies around specific indicators of manufacturing strength. When taken 
together, they may provide some evidence that manufacturing bases of some Western 
economies has notably weakened over the last decades. 
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The most widely used statistics to show the decreasing role of manufacturing is the fall in 
manufacturing employment across the developed world. From 1990 to 2012, the number of 
manufacturing jobs fell both absolutely and as a percentage of total employment almost every 
country in the West as Figure A.1a shows. As an example, during this period (1990-2012), 
manufacturing jobs fell by 5.2 million in the US. In the seven biggest economies of the 
European Union (Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain, Netherlands and Sweden) for the same 
period the same figure is 7.5 million lost jobs. The UK is the biggest loser with 3 million 
manufacturing jobs disappeared during the period. Figure A.1b shows the percentage losses 
in the period between 2000 and 2012. Countries in general meet with substantial losses in 
their manufacturing jobs during recessionary periods, without remarkable gains during 
recovery. For many countries, however, most of the loss was especially in the last decade 
despite a boom period after economic recession of early 2000s.  
Figure A.1a: Manufacturing employment as a percentage of total employment in selected 
countries, 1990-2012 
 
Source: The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics  
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Figure A.1b: Percent Change in Manufacturing Jobs in Selected Countries, 2000-2012 
 
Source: The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
As long as comparative international statistics are available, providing as much evidence as 
possible on the economic performance of manufacturing and industry is essential to show 
divergences and/or convergences between economies. While the share of manufacturing 
employment decreased in every developed economy in the last two decades, manufacturing 
output presents another picture. Real manufacturing value added has declined as a share of 
GDP in some developed economies including France, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, after a period of retraction in the early 1990s, while it is stable or even growing in 
others including, Germany, Japan and South Korea. China’s share of manufacturing has also 
been stable at over 30 percent during the entire period (Figure A.2a). Such a higher ratio 
compared to other major world economies is reflected in the steep increase of total value 
added of China (Figure A.2b). Its output surpassed Germany in 2002, Japan in 2008 and has 
been approaching to the US output with an average annual growth of approximately 10 
percent in the period between 2004 and 2013. The divergence occurred between advanced 
economies in the last decade is the result of the varying growth rates of manufacturing value 
added output. Manufacturing real value added in some Asian economies including Japan and 
most Northern European economies increased considerably while it fell between two to 15 
percent in other major economies of the West including the US, the UK, France, Spain, Italy 
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and Canada (Figure A.2c). As an example, the US trade deficit in manufactured products 
totaled nearly $4.5 trillion from 2000 to 2010 (Atkinson et al., 2012). 
Figure A.2a: Manufacturing value added as a percentage of country GDP, 1990-2013  
 
Source: The World Bank World Development Indicators 
Figure A.2b: Manufacturing value added, constant 2005 US$, 1997-2013 
 
Source: The World Bank World Development Indicators  
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Figure A.2c: Percentage change in manufacturing real value added (US adjusted), 2000-2010 
 
Source: Atkinson et al., 2012 
The divergence between countries is also reflected at the industry level. Some of the decline 
or increase in value added is common to every major economy in specific industries like 
textiles or pharmaceuticals respectively, due to industry specific factors that can be explained 
through demand trends, technological change or competitive pressures of the emergent 
economies. However, many of the industries still reflect the divergent dynamics in 
manufacturing value added among developed economies. Excluding computer, electronics 
and pharmaceutical industries which are uniformly positive in terms of increasing value added 
during the 11 years between 2000 and 2010 in all countries, only South Korea and Germany 
have grown more than half of their industries in the list. The US has only one single industry 
with value added increase during the period and the performance of France and Italy has also 
been less than mediocre. These countries lost an important part of their industrial 
competitiveness in the last two decades.  
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Table A.1: Value added change in 12 manufacturing industries in specific countries between 
2000 and 2010 (in volume) 
  USA Germany France S. Korea Italy Sweden 
D13 Textiles - - - - - - 
D17 Paper & paper products - + - + + + 
D20 Chemicals & chemical 
products 
- + - + - + 
D21 Basic pharmaceutical 
products & pharmaceutical 
preparations 
+ + + + + + 
D22 Rubber & plastics products - + + + - + 
D24 Basic metals - - - + - - 
D25 Fabricated metal products, 
except machinery and equipment 
- + - + + - 
D26 Computer, electronic & 
optical products 
+ + + + + + 
D27 Electrical equipment - - - + + - 
D28 Machinery & equipment 
n.e.c. 
+ - + + + + 
D29 Motor vehicles, trailers & 
semi-trailers 
- + - + - + 
D30 Other transport equipment - + + + - - 
Number of industries with 
value added growth (out of 11) 
3 8 5 11 6 7 
less computers & 
pharmaceuticals (out of 9) 
1 6 3 9 4 5 
Source: OECD STAN Database for Structural Analysis (ISIC Rev. 4) 
Declining competitiveness resulted in negative value added growth also explains the distorting 
trade balances in manufacturing goods especially of industries utilizing advanced degree of 
knowledge and technologies. While the countries in the list above have uniformly increased 
their volume of value added during the last decade in pharmaceuticals and computer and 
electronics, their trade balances show the divergences in their strength of competitiveness 
within these industries. Despite their value added growth, countries like France, United States 
and Sweden, together with United Kingdom, Japan and Canada which are not in the previous 
list display a decline in balances in similar industries. The balances of Germany, Italy, South 
Korea, Spain and China have increased since 2000 with a positive coverage ratio as of 2014 
(Figure A.3). 
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Figure A.3: Merchandise Trade Balance of a selected group of economies in a group of 
advanced technology products, by commodity 
 
The group includes pharmaceuticals, electronic data processing and office equipment, 
telecommunications equipment and integrated circuits and electronic components, the black 
line crossing 100 percent indicates the full trade balance 
Source: WTO Time Series on international trade. 
Finally, the decline is also expressed in the decreasing share of fixed capital formation in many 
of these economies (Figure A.4) which is one of the main basis for a healthy manufacturing 
sector within an economy as it includes a wide range of activities including but not limited to 
physical infrastructure development like land improvements, construction of roads, railways, 
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or buildings including commercial and non-commercial ones, and plant, machinery and 
equipment purchases (WBDI). 
Figure A.4: Gross fixed capital formation (Percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: The World Bank World Development Indicators 
In the aerospace industry, a major manufacturing end export industry both in the US and in 
Europe, the level of employment has stabilized in 2000s after a steep fall in employment in 
the early 1990s mostly due to the rapid decrease in defense budgets all over the world at the 
end of Cold War (Figure A.5). More interestingly, even though it is much stronger in Europe, 
aerospace manufacturing output in terms of production volume has also notably increased in 
the last two decades (Figure A.6a & A.6b). In Germany and France, two main Airbus countries, 
the increase is more than twofold since 1995. Diverging destiny of the aerospace industry from 
the rest of the manufacturing sector is a primary incentive of this study to analyze the extent 
of the role of different factors supporting the industry. 
Figure A.5: Aerospace employment in the US and Europe, 1992-2012 
 
Source: Aerospace Industries Association for the US, Aerospace & Defence Industries 
Association for Europe 
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Figure A.6a: Aerospace Manufacturing Output in Airbus’ Home Countries and Italy 
(2010=100) 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Figure A.6b: Value of US Aerospace Manufacturing Shipments (2009 = 100) 
 
Source: Aerospace Industries Association  
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Summary in French – Résumé en français 
 
Cette thèse examine les interconnections entre les trois principaux éléments de l’activité 
productive de la firme dans le capitalisme moderne, à savoir la stratégie d’entreprise, la 
structure organisationnelle et l’engagement financier (financial commitment). Elle s’appuie 
sur l’étude des cas des deux plus grandes firmes du secteur aéronautique au niveau mondial, 
Airbus et Boeing. L’activité productive de chaque firme est analysée à partir du cadre original 
« modèle d’affaires (business model) / modèle productif de l’intégration de systèmes » 
développé dans le premier chapitre. Les transformations récentes des stratégies d’entreprise, 
des relations industrielles et des activités financières des firmes dans les économies 
développées sont brièvement abordées avant de mobiliser le cadre analytique dans une 
perspective historique et comparative. En adoptant une approche basée sur le récit détaillé 
dans le temps long des stratégies des deux firmes et leur mise en comparaison, l’étude de la 
deuxième partie s’inscrit dans la lignée des travaux de Chandler (1962, 1977), de Penrose 
(1959, 1960) et, plus récemment, de Froud et al. (2006) et de Lippert et al. (2014). 
À travers cette approche, la thèse met aussi en évidence les dynamiques industrielles qui 
caractérisent la phase de restructuration plus récente du secteur aéronautique. Ce processus 
est généralement lent mais également profond et irréversible comme dans le cas de la Russie 
et des Pays-Bas où les deux dernières décennies ont été marquées par leur incapacité à 
retrouver leur précédent niveau de production.   
Contrairement à la littérature analysante la technologie qui considère l’intégration de 
systèmes comme une nouvelle forme de capacité utilisée pour développer et produire des 
biens ayant le caractère de « systems » (c’est-à-dire des biens plus coûteux, plus complexes et 
exigeant la collaboration d’un grand nombre d’organisations, Hobday et al., 2005; Prencipe et 
al., 2003), cette thèse examine l’intégration de systèmes comme un modèle productif / 
modèle d’affaires qui a des caractéristiques à la fois stratégiques, organisationnelles et 
financières. La forme prise par l’intégration de systèmes dans les deux firmes au cours des 
deux dernières décennies définit non seulement leur réorganisation en termes de R&D et 
d’activité productive, mais elle entraîne également d’importantes conséquences financières 
et organisationnelles. En s’appuyant sur l’approche des modèles productifs issue de la Théorie 
297 
 
de la Régulation et sur la théorie de l’entreprise innovante développée par W. Lazonick, ce 
travail identifie les stratégies distinctes d’intégration et de désintégration suivies par Airbus et 
Boeing ainsi que leurs conséquences sur l’amélioration ou la dégradation de leurs capacités 
productives. Il souligne le rôle important joué par les nouvelles pratiques poursuivies par les 
firmes en termes de finance et d’organisation du travail dans le cadre de la mise en place de 
l’intégration de systèmes.  
L’apport principal de cette thèse est de montrer qu’une analyse strictement basée sur les 
stratégies commerciales et la technologie est insuffisante pour rendre compte des 
orientations choisies dans les activités productives. Pour cette raison, la thèse propose le 
cadre analytique fondé sur les modèles productifs / modèles d’affaires qui permet non 
seulement d’analyser les stratégies poursuivies en termes de technologie et d’organisation de 
la chaîne de valeur mais également en termes d’organisation industrielle et d’engagement 
financier. Ce cadre intègre ainsi des éléments financiers et organisationnels dans l’étude des 
processus d’innovation dans leur ensemble.    
Les résultats montrent qu’il existe une corrélation forte entre l’externalisation massive, la 
financiarisation et les relations d’emploi conflictuelles. Externalisant 70% de son dernier 
programme innovant B787 et voulant garder sous contrôle les dépenses de R&D et 
d’investissement, Boeing exerce une pression sur ses employées par des licenciements 
récurrents, des relocalisations, des suppressions à la fois de poste et d’avantages postérieurs 
à l’emploi. La sécurité de l’emploi est devenue la préoccupation principale de la main-d’œuvre 
et la réorganisation de la R&D intensifie les tensions entre la direction et les employés.  Alors 
que la firme vise à réduire ses dépenses par le recours à l’externalisation et le durcissement 
des conditions de travail, elle a dans le même temps étendu ses pratiques en termes de 
création de valeur actionnariale par l’augmentation des dividendes et des rachats d’actions 
ainsi que par les stock-options accordées aux directeurs et employées dont le rang dans la 
hiérarchie est élevé. Ainsi les pratiques d’extraction de valeur liées au processus de 
financiarisation sont profondément enracinées dans la firme. Par rapport à Boeing, Airbus a 
suivi jusqu’à récemment une stratégie équilibrée permettant d’atténuer les intérêts 
conflictuels. Bien qu’elle ait externalisé 50% de son dernier programme d’avion commercial 
A350 et cédé certaines divisions opérationnelles dans le cadre de programmes de réduction 
de coûts, la tension avec la main-d’œuvre et la distribution massive de la valeur actionnariale 
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ont jusqu’ici été maîtrisées par la firme. Toutefois, son discours et ses pratiques récentes en 
termes de distribution de la valeur actionnariale tendent à montrer que la firme est sur la voie 
d’une stratégie plus financiarisée. Les inquiétudes de la main d’œuvre quant à la sécurité de 
l’emploi ont également augmenté. 
L’analyse menée tout au long de cette thèse tend à montrer que les stratégies menées par 
Boeing et Airbus en termes d’intégration de systèmes peuvent avoir des effets nuisibles sur 
leur position concurrentielle à long terme, et elles ne sont pas à l’abri d’effets négatifs liés à 
la financiarisation et à la détérioration des pratiques d’emploi. Plus généralement, l’évolution 
future de leurs activités aura des répercussions majeures sur le secteur aéronautique dans 
leur(s) pays d’origine.  
 
